PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ABELARDO DAYRIT, PRESIDING JUDGE OF MANILA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 39, AND RUBEN SIAO, RESPONDENTS.

The Court of Appeals is faulted for its refusal to reinstate a
search warrant quashed by the same trial court that had earlier issued it. The principal reason for the challenged
decision is that the issue had become moot and academic with the dismantling of
the properties subject of the said warrant.

The properties consisted of 27 units of distribution transformers
of various sizes sold to the University of the Philippines-Iloilo (UP, for
short) and delivered on June 15, 1987. The agreed price, including installation cost, was $39,516.00 and was
fully paid by UP to the seller, Varona Trading, through its general manager,
Danilo Varona. On June 27, 1987, these
same properties were pulled out by Varona on the excuse that they had certain
factory defects that had to be repaired. When Varona failed to comply with UP’s demand for their return pending
their replacement, UP referred the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation, which found that the properties were in the warehouse of Ruben
Siao, herein private respondent. NBI
applied for and secured the questioned search warrant,^[1] which
was issued by Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on
September 25, 1987. On the strength of
this warrant, NBI seized the said transformers, which were later ascertained to
be the same transformers sold to UP, not only by their serial numbers but also
because the crates where they were contained were marked “UP-Iloilo.”

On September 28, Siao filed an urgent motion to quash the search
warrant on the ground that Nissen-Denki Philippine Corporation, of which he was
the manager, had bought the said transformers from Varona for the sum of
P702,483.00. The motion was denied on
December 10, 1987, after a lengthy exchange of pleadings between the parties. However, on July 7, 1988, again after a
spirited debate between the petitioner and the private respondent, Judge Dayrit
granted Siao’s motion for reconsideration and dissolved the search warrant. He also ordered the NBI to return the seized
transformers to Siao.

Meanwhile, UP had filed a complaint for estafa against Varona and
Siao and the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City had lodged the corresponding
information before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Upon re-investigation of the complaint,
however, it was found that there was no cause to hold Siao for trial and
accordingly, on motion of the prosecution, the case against him was dismissed
by the trial court on October 13, 1989.

Disagreeing with the quashal of the search warrant, the
petitioner went to the respondent court, which, as earlier noted, sustained the
action of the trial court.

The present petition is based principally on the argument that
the search warrant issued by Judge Dayrit complied with all the requirements
set out in Article III, Section 2, of the Bill of Rights. There was probable cause to justify its
issuance because the properties were fraudulently taken by Varona from UP, the
purchaser?owner. Siao, who
claimed to have bought it also, was not a purchaser in good faith because he
knew or should have known that the transformers belonged to UP as the markings
in the crates clearly indicated. The
Solicitor General also argues that the question of ownership cannot be
litigated in search warrant proceedings and that any property is subject to
seizure, regardless of its ownership, as long as it is illegally
possessed. He adds that, as required by
the Constitution, the probable cause was determined personally by Judge Dayrit
and the warrant specifically described the properties to be seized.

In his Comment, the private respondent supports the finding of
the Court of Appeals that the issue had become moot and academic. He points out that his company had bought
the transformers from Varona not for use in their original condition but
precisely for dismantling and conversion to other transformers according to
specifications set by the end-users. The transformers had been so dismantled and converted and, at that, not
immediately but only after two months following their recovery, when it appeared
that the petitioner was no longer interested in pursuing the matter. Even assuming that the properties were the
subject of an offense, the search warrant could not be directed against him
because the estafa case against him had been dismissed and remained pending
only against Varona. And while it was
true that stolen property could be recovered even from an innocent purchaser,
this rule would not apply in the instant case because UP allowed the withdrawal
of the transformers by Danilo, who was consequently able to sell them to
Nissen-Denki. Finally, he agrees with
the petitioner that the issue of ownership could not be resolved in the search warrant proceedings but in a separate civil action.

In justifying his dissolution of the search warrant, Judge Dayrit
said in his order dated July 7, 1988:

(a) The warrant earlier issued omitted (perhaps
by inadvertence) to indicate clearly what specific offense had been violated;

(b) While it did mention that the subjects of
the offense are “stolen or embezzled” goods or proceeds thereof, this
Court recognizes that the offense possibly committed from that description may
either be robbery, theft, qualified theft, or estafa;

(c) Furthermore, Danilo
Varona’s deposition, on which this Court relied heavily when it first issued the
warrant, stated that the transformers in question were brought to defendant
Ruben Siao for repair; but during the hearing on the motion to quash and after
the evidences adduced therein, this Court discovered that defendant Siao had
strong evidence tending to establish his claim that he bought the transformers
in good faith and in the ordinary course of business from Varona Trading which
was a merchant of such products;

(d) There was, therefore, no probable cause for
the issuance of the search warrant in the first place; and

(e) The Court would not
have issued the warrant if it had been confronted with that fact.

As correctly observed by the private
respondent:

The search warrant issued by the trial court left the space in the
caption intended for the nature of the offense in blank, indicating the
uncertainty of petitioner and the court as
to the crime committed and for which the search warrant was issued. On the other hand, all that the body of the
search warrant stated was that
the transformers were “Stolen or Embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense, used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense.” But, since the particular offense was not mentioned, the reason for the issuance of the search
warrant could be anything under
the sun.

There is no question that the search warrant did not relate to a
specific offense, in violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v. Diokno^[2]
and of Section 3 of Rule 126 providing as follows:

Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized. (Underscoring supplied.)

Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the
search warrant and has merely said that there was probable cause, omitting to
continue that it was in connection with one specific offense. He could not, of course, for the warrant was
a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in Judge Dayrit’s own words, “to
robbery, theft, qualified theft or estafa.” On this score alone, the
search warrant was totally null and void and was correctly declared to be so by
the very judge who had issued it.

Probable cause is defined as referring to “such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are
sufficient to induce a cautious person to rely on them, and to act in pursuance
thereof.”^[3]
At the time he issued the search warrant, there was in Judge Dayrit’s view
probable cause that a crime had been committed by Siao, who had possession of
the subject properties. However, such
probable cause no longer exists now because the information for estafa against
Siao has already been dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on motion
of the prosecution itself. Siao’s guilt
is no longer open for conjecture.

What is whether the search warrant could be issued against Siao,
assuming he was an innocent purchaser for value, in connection with the
prosecution of Varona for estafa. But
this is a question we need not decide here. It is clear that, even if it were resolved affirmatively, the search
warrant in question would still have to be annulled for its failure to state
therein the specific offense for which it was being issued.

The Solicitor General complains that unless the search warrant is
reinstated, the properties subject thereof cannot be used in the criminal
action for estafa against Varona. The
trouble is that the search warrant is invalid as already demonstrated, and the
Constitution clearly says that any evidence taken in violation of its Article
III, Section 2, cannot be used for any purpose in any proceeding. Moreover, as correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the subject of the warrant no longer exists, having been converted to
other articles not answering to the specific description of the properties
ordered to be seized under the search warrant.

Both the petitioner and the respondents agree that ownership of
the transformers is a question that cannot be determined in search warrant
proceedings but must be litigated in a separate civil action. They are correct. Of course, UP is not left without recourse, for it may still
claim restitution of the transformers or their value in the civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal action for estafa against Varona or in a
separate civil action if it has been reserved. Any statement made by the trial court resolving that question shall be
considered mere obiter dictum and not conclusive in any such
recovery case.

We find that the search warrant issued by Judge Dayrit on September
25, 1987, was null and void for the reasons above discussed and so
was correctly dissolved in the resolution dated July 7, 1988. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in refusing to reinstate it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Griño-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Records, p. 113.

^[2]
20 SCRA 383.

^[3]
People v. Syjuco, 64 Phil. 667.