LYDIA ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ILOILO AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Alleging that the respondent Court of Appeals:

(1)  Decided the case in a way contrary to law and
jurisprudence and in violation of petitioner’s right to due process in that it
reversed the decision of the trial court and declared that private respondent Bank
of the Philippine Islands (hereinafter referred to as BPI) may foreclose on her
mortgage for P210,000.00 when at the very most the amount secured thereby is
only P110,000.00, without stating compelling reasons and without citations of
evidence and the record;

(2) Committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it authorized the
private respondents to foreclose on petitioner’s mortgage when her true
obligation to private respondent has not been determined because private respondent
failed to deduct from her obligation (a) the time deposit of P150,000.00 and
(b) the accrued interest thereon for one year amounting to P37,500.00, all
belonging to her; and

(3) Committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it reversed the
decision of the trial court directing defaulted defendant Salvador Alcantara to reimburse her the P60,000.00 said defendant
received from BPI under her name and responsibility, despite the fact that this portion of the trial court has never been discussed nor
considered in the body of the decision.

petitioner urges Us in this petition, filed on 28 August 1990, to review and set aside the decision^[1]
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 13079,^[2] promulgated on 28 February 1990, and its resolution of 22 June
1990 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the decision.

The antecedents of this case as unfurled by the pleadings of the parties are as follows:

Petitioner and one Salvador Alcantara
obtained several loans from BPI.  Per the
testimony of petitioner’s own accountant, Jose
Velez, these loans summed up to
P530,000.00, of which P270,000.00 had been paid on settled, leaving a balance of P260,000.00.  Thereafter, P50,000.00 was paid from the time
deposit of petitioner with BPI, thereby leaving an outstanding balance of P210,000.00. 
Velez further admitted that the P150,000.00 time deposit of
petitioner had already been applied to reduce the account to its aforesaid
outstanding balance.^[3]

This outstanding balance consists of (a) the loan of P60,000.00,
which matured on 29 December 1977,
and secured by a real estate mortgage (Exh.
“E”), and (b) the Promissory Note for P150,000.00, dated 16 December 1975, which matured on December 17, 1976.

According to petitioners, from the loan of P150,000.00 the
amount of P100,000.00 was used to settle
a then outstanding account
P100,000.00 which was secured by
a real estate mortgage of
P100,000.00 dated 4 April 1975
(Exh. “A”). 
In connection with the promissory note for P150,000.00, petitioner
executed a real estate mortgage for P50,000.00 (Exh.
“C”).^[4]

According to BPI,
however, the P100,000.00 account is the total
of three loans, namely:  P30,000.00 of 19 May 1975, P40,000.00 of 7 June 1975, and P30,000.00 of 2 July 1975.  On or about 15 December 1975 petitioner applied for an additional
loan of P50.000.00.  Since by then she and Alcantara still owed BPI the aforesaid amount of
P100,000.00 under the three loan accounts, and if the application would be granted there would be four separate loans,
it was decided that her application would be approved but that her four loan accounts (the previous three
loans and the new one) would be consolidated into one single account of P150,000.00 to be covered by one
single promissory note (Exh. “B”, Exh.
“16”), out of the proceeds of
which P50,000.00 was released to her and P100,000.00 was utilized to settle the
three loans totalling P100,000.00.  Inasmuch as petitioner had already executed a real estate mortgage for P100,000.00 (Exh.
“A”), no new mortgage for P150,000.00 to
secure the Promissory Note was executed; instead, BPI required petitioner to
execute a second real estate mortgage for
P50,000.00.  However, it was duly noted
in the Promissory Note (for P50,000.00) that said amount was secured by the
first mortgage of P100,000.00, and
the second mortgage for P50,000.00.  This
note is the addendum to the Promissory Note (Exh. “16-A”).^[5]

This addendum, found below the signatures of the parties, reads
in full as follows:

“This obligation is covered by REM for P100,000.00 dated April 4, 1975 under Doc. No. 119; Page
No. 94; Book No. XXV; Series of 1975; Benjamen H. Tirol, Notary Public and REM for P50,000.00 dated December
15/75 under Doc. No. 528; Page No. 76; Book No. XXVI; Series of 1975; Benjamen H. Tirol, Notary Public;
and Deed of Assignment of Fixed Deposit for P100,000.00 dated 4/4/75 under Doc.
No. 120; Page No. 94; Book No. XXV; Series of 1975; Benjamen
H. Tirol, Notary Public.”

Petitioner claims, however, that she
signed the promissory note in blank and the addendum was
not there when she signed the note.^[6]

The real estate mortgage for P100,000.00 was not released or
canceled.^[7]
Petitioner has not denied this fact.

The above three real estate mortgages (Exhs.
“A”, “C” and “E”) were constituted on the same three parcels of land belonging
to petitioner and located in Mandurriao, Iloilo
City; they uniformly contain the
following statement in the prefatory paragraph:

“x x x for
and in consideration of certain
loans, overdrafts and other credit accommodations obtained from the Mortgagee,
and to secure the payment of the same and those that may hereafter be obtained,
the principal of all of which is hereby fixed at __________ Pesos, Philippine          Currency,
as well as those that the
Mortgagee may extend to the Mortgagor/Debtor, including interest and expenses
and any other obligation owing to the Mortgagee, whether direct or indirect,
principal or secondary, as appears in the accounts, books and records of the
Mortgagee . . . x x x.”

Paragraph 5 therein also provides to the
effect that the mortgage covers all loans, overdrafts and other credit
facilities granted:

“x x x or which may
hereafter be granted which are further evidenced by other documents or
promissory notes now or which may hereafter be executed and the terms and
conditions thereof shall be considered as an integral part of this mortgage
agreement.”^[8]

Upon failure of
petitioner and Alcantara to pay the aforesaid
outstanding loan, BPI applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgages pursuant to Act. No. 3135. 
The Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo
scheduled the foreclosure sale on 22
February 1983 (Exhs. “2”,
“3”, “6” and “6-A”); but it was postponed to 24 March 1983 at the instance of petitioner (Exh. “4”), then to 25 April 1983, also at the instance of petitioner (Exh. “5”). 
In the meantime, however, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo an action for Injunction, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 14973
and assigned to Branch XXXIII thereof, against BPI, the Provincial
Sheriff and Alcantara.  The trial court issued a restraining order,
hence the foreclosure sale scheduled on 25 April 1983 did not push through.^[9]

In the action, petitioner maintains that only the real estate
mortgage for P60,000.00 and for P50,000.00 (Exhs.
“C” and “E”) may validly be foreclosed, but not that for
P100,000.00 (Exh. “A”) because the
obligation secured by it had been paid out of the loan of P150,000.00.  Elsewise stated,
petitioner maintains that the loan of P150,000.00 was secured only to the
extent of P50,000.00 as evidenced by the real estate mortgage for P50,000.00 (Exh.”C“). 
Upon the other hand, BPI asserts that the real estate mortgage for
P100,000.00 remain valid and subsisting as it is referred to in the addendum of
the Promissory Note; by its terms, it covers all subsequent loans; and it has
not been released or canceled.

The trial court sustained the theory of petitioner, thus:

(a)   “To resolve this issue, this court has
to decide whether Exhibit “16” and “16-A”, the promissory
(sic) note and the addendum which are merely private documents constitute a
legal mortgage.  By express provision of
Section 112, P.D. 1529, a mortgage affecting land whether registered or not
registered at all is not deemed to be sufficient in law nor it may (sic)
effective to encumber or bind the land unless made substantially in the form
prescribed.  It is required, among other
things, that the document be signed by the mortgagor executing the same, in the
presence of two witnesses, and acknowledged as his free acts and deed before a
notary public.  A mortgage constituted by
means of a private document does not comply with such legal requirements.  Furthermore, Art. 1358 of the Civil Code
provides:

‘The following must appear in a public document:

(1) Acts and
contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification
or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; x x
x

x x
x

A constitution of a mortgage upon real property creates in favor of the mortgagee real rights and
under the provisions of Art. 1358 of the Civil Code must appear in a public
document’.”^[10]

b)
“If the contention of the defendant Bank is correct and that the original
real estate mortgage Exhibit “A” secures all future advancements
which may thereafter be extended by defendant Bank to the plaintiff then it would have been unnecessary to cause
the execution of another real estate mortgage for P50,000.00 on the same pieces
of property.  Subsequently when loan no.
8 for P60,000.00 was extended on December
29, 1976 it would not have been necessary to execute another real
estate mortgage covering the same three parcels of land together with the
improvements thereon.  Furthermore, the
purpose of the loan originally granted on May 19, 1975 for P100,000.00 was for the construction of
the house of the plaintiff Lydia Arriola.  It was not an agricultural crop loan.  It was not a real estate mortgage to secure
future advancements.  It must have been
an oversight on the part of the defendant Bank when the real estate mortgage
(Exhibit “C”) was made out for only P50,000.00 and not for P150,000.00.  To attempt to correct the error an addendum
was made on the promissory (sic) note Exhibit “16” and
“16-A”.”^[11]

The trial court also ruled that although the liability of Lydia Arriola with
Salvador Alcantara and the loans was solidary, yet the former may recover from the latter the
P60,000.00 which was credited to his account.

Accordingly, the trial court rendered its decision in Civil Case
No. 14973 on 31 March 1986, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

“THEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. The injunction is
hereby granted and made permanent.  The
Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo through Deputy Sheriff Benjamen
Carreon is hereby ordered to stop and desist in
spelling (sic) at public auction the properties in question for the amount of P210,000,00;

2. The defendant
Salvador Alcantara is hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P60,000.00 plus
interests from the time this amount was credited to the account of Salvador Alcantara until fully paid;

3. The defendant Bank of the Philippine
Islands and the defendant Salvador Alcantara, jointly
and severally are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P40,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses and the
costs of this suit.”^[12]

The BPI and the Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 13079)
to which it submitted the following assignment of errors:

“I.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE WHICH SECURED PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S LOANS TOTALLING (sic) P100,000.00 WAS NOT VALIDLY
CONSTITUTED IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.

II.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE FOR P100,000.00, EXHIBIT
“A” WAS NOT VALID BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A MORTGAGE TO SECURE FUTURE
ADVANCEMENTS NOR AN AGRICULTURAL CROP LOAN.

III. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MORTGAGE CANNOT BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE BECAUSE IT IS A CONTRACT OF ADHESION.

IV. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S INDEBTEDNESS IS
P210,000.00, THE REAL  ESTATE MORTGAGE
VALIDLY CONSTITUTED IN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BANK’S FAVOR WAS ONLY FOR P110,000.00 BECAUSE THE FIRST MORTGAGE
FOR P100,000.00, EXHIBIT
“A” WAS EXTINGUISHED OR CANCELLED WHEN THE THREE LOANS TOTALLING
(sic) P100,000.00 WHICH IT SECURED WERE PAID OUT OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S FOURTH LOAN OF P150,000.00.

V. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE DID NOT EXIST ANY GROUND FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
INJUNCTION.

VI. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS TO PAY
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE P40,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES AND
THE COST OF SUIT.

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AND THE DEFENDANT SALVADOR ALCANTARA JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
DAMAGES.”^[13]

On 28 February 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
in the appeal, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed
from is REVERSED and a new judgment is entered dismissing the complaint and
dissolving or recalling the preliminary writ (sic) of injunction previously
issued, with costs against the plaintiff-appellee.”^[14]

A motion for its reconsideration having been denied by the Court
of Appeals in its resolution of 22 June 1990,^[15]
petitioner has come to Us, ascribing to the Court of Appeals the errors adverted
to in the opening paragraph of this decision.

In compliance with Our resolution of 10 September 1990,
respondents filed their Comment on 16 November 1990,^[16]
to which, pursuant to the resolution of 26 November 1990, petitioner filed a
reply^[17]
on 12 December 1990.

In the resolution of 6 February 1991,^[18]
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective Memoranda, which the petitioner complied with on 12 April 1991^[19]
and the respondents on 7 May 1991.^[20]

We shall now
resolve the assigned errors.

In reversing the decision appealed from, the respondent Court
made the following disquisitions:

“THE lower court in its decision is of the opinion that
although the indebtedness of plaintiff Lydia Arriola
to the defendant Bank is P210,000.00, the real estate mortgage validly
constituted was only in the amount of P110,000.00.  Several reasons were given in support of its findings, some of which refers to
the promissory note marked in evidence as Exhibit “B”/Exhibit
“16” covering the loan of P150,000.00 and the addendum
thereto which are merely private documents and as such, NOT a valid legal
mortgage.  The Court a quo has chosen to consider Exhibit “B”/Exhibit “16” and its
addendum as the mortgage itself for compliance with the requirements of Sec.
112 P.D. No. 329 and Art. 1358 of the New Civil Code.  In this regard, an error was committed in the
appreciation of the evidence presented. 
The mortgage for the P100,000.00, out of the P150,000.00 loan embodied
in the promissory note (Exh. B/Exh. 16), is the deed of real estate mortgage
dated April 4, 1975 marked in evidence as Exh. “A”.  A
promissory note to be binding between the parties need not be in a public
instrument.  The addendum incorporated
thereto is merely an annotation and a reference to the obligation of the
plaintiff.  The amount of P100,000.00 is
covered by a real estate mortgage, dated April 4, 1975 and the remaining
P50,000.00 is covered by a separate mortgage marked in evidence as Exhibit
“C”.  The aforementioned
addendum is quoted as follows:

‘This utilization is covered by REM for P100,000.00 dated April 4, 1975 under Doc. No. 119; Page No.
94; Book No. XXV; Series of 1975; Benjamin H. Tirol,
Notary Public and REM for P50,000.00 dated December 15, 1975 under Doc. No.
528; Page No. 76; Book No. XXVI; Series of 1975; Benjamin H. Tirol, Notary Public; and Deed of Assignment of Fixed Dep.
for P100,000.00 dated April 4, 1975 under Doc. No. 120; Page No. 94; Book No.
XXV; Series of 1975; Benjamin H. Tirol, Notary
Public.’

WHEN presented as a rebuttal witness, plaintiff-appellee
testified that when she signed the promissory note, the addendum quoted was not
on the note and further claims that she was not given a copy of any promissory
note she executed.  (TSN, Aug.
13, 1985, pp. 4-6). 
Her claim, however, was belied by her own witness, Jose Velez, who
testified that he based his Loan Summary (Exh. “F”)
on the various papers and documents including promissory note which was
supplied to him by the plaintiff-appellee (TSN,
Nov. 14, 1984, pp. 4-5).  Moreover, the promissory note was even
adopted by the plaintiff-appellee as its own evidence
(Exh. “B”).

CONTRACTS must be interpreted from its four corners.  A thorough
evaluation and examination of the evidence presented as well as the subsequent
acts of the parties reveal that the parties intended the real estate mortgage
marked in evidence as Exh. “A”
to continue as the security for the new loan of P100,000.00 as indicated by the
fact that another mortgage for P50,000.00 only was executed (Exh. “C”).  Plaintiff-appellee
never asked for the formal release of the real estate mortgage nor was a
cancellation thereof executed by the Bank. 
In fact, she even admitted her indebtedness and pleaded time to pay.  Thus, in the case of Lim Juan vs.
Lutero (49 Phil. 715),
the Supreme Court made the following pronouncement:

‘The Rule, of course, is well-settled that an action to foreclose a
mortgage must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage.  The exact amount, however, for which the
mortgage is given, need not always be specifically named.  The amount for which the mortgage is given
may be stated in definite or general terms, as is frequently the case in
mortgage to secure future advancements. 
The amount named in the mortgage does not limit the amount for which it
may stand as security, if, from the four corners of the document, the intent to
secure future indebtedness or future advancement is apparent.  Where the plain terms of the mortgage
evidence such an intent, they will control as against a contention of the
mortgagor that it was the understanding of the parties that the mortgage was
security only for the specific amount named’.”^[21]

We find the same to be correct.

The contrary findings and
conclusions of the trial court are tenuously belabored, or otherwise
based on unfounded assumptions.  It
assumed that the real estate mortgage in the amount of P100,000.00 (Exh. “A“) was, in effect, released when
the obligation of P100,000.00 secured by it was paid out of the proceeds of the
P150,000.00 loan, which is of course incorrect since the latter was merely a
consolidation of the three loans of P30,000.00 of 19 May 1975, P40,000.00 of 7
June 1975 and P30,000.00 of 2 June 1975 (totaling P100,000.00 and secured by Exh. “A”) and the additional loan of P50,000.00,
for which reason, to fully secure the consolidated sum, it became necessary to
require the petitioner to execute the real estate mortgage for P50,000.00.  If this were not the intention or agreement
of the parties, petitioner should have demanded
for the execution of a deed of cancellation or release of Exh.
“A” and for the delivery to her of the original copies of both such deed and the real estate
mortgage.  There is nothing extant on the
record to show that she did so at anytime between 15 December 1975 and 22 April
1983 when she filed Civil Case No. 14973. 
On the contrary, she categorically alleges under oath in her complaint
in said Civil Case that:

“5. April 4,
1975, plaintiff mortgaged the aforedescribed parcels
of land in favor of defendant bank as security for the principal loan of
P100,000.00;

6. Thereafter, and on the same security, defendant
bank granted the plaintiff an additional loan of P50,000.00 on December 15,
1975; and finally, on December 27, 1976, defendant bank granted to plaintiff a
second additional loan in the amount of P60,000.00, still on
the same collaterals earlier­-mentioned; (emphasis
supplied).

7. In the three
deeds of real estate mortgages covering the three loans aforementioned, defendant
Salvador Alcantara acted as co-mortgagor x x x.”^[22]

clearly indicating that petitioner admits
the continuing validity of the real estate mortgage for P100,000.00.  Furthermore, nowhere in the complaint has she alleged that said real estate
mortgage had been cancelled or rendered of no legal effect in view of the
payment of the loan of P100,000.00.  Her main thesis in said case is that
she is liable to BPI for only P100,000.00,
and not P210,000.00 because that is
the amount “actually released to her.”^[23] The remaining P110,000.00 benefited Alcantara because:

“17. Precisely
for these reasons that defendant bank applied plaintiff’s own loan of
P50,000.00 and P60,000.00, respectively to the overdraft account of defendant
Salvador Alcantara, except P30,000.00 thereof which
amount said bank likewise, turned over to the said defendant.”^[24]

The trial court likewise made an outlandish conclusion that the
promissory note for P150,000.00 and the addendum regarding the real
estate mortgage for P100,000.00 as among the security therefor
is the contract of mortgage and, considering that it is not in the form
prescribed in Article 1358 of the Civil Code, it did not then effectively bind
the property.  The promissory note and
the addendum therein can in no case
be deemed as the mortgage.  But as
correctly pointed out by the respondent Court, the addendum “is merely an
annotation and a reference to the obligation of the plaintiff.” In short,
the addendum merely points or makes reference to the security offered for the
obligation, appearing in separate
documents, which are the real estate mortgages.

It likewise assumed that the addendum was written after the
parties had signed the Promissory Note. 
Except for the self-serving testimony of petitioner in that regard, no
evidence had been offered to support such an assumption.

If her self-serving testimony were indeed true, petitioner could
have easily so alleged the same in her complaint, since this is a matter of
vital importance affecting her liability to BPI.  Petitioner’s claim then that she signed the
promissory note in blank and that it did not contain the annotation is nothing
but a delayed after-thought to give a semblance of credibility to her version.

It likewise erroneously assumed that if indeed the real estate
mortgage for P100,000.00 were a continuing security for all future
advancements, then it was not necessary to cause the execution of another real
estate mortgage for P50,000.00.  The
trial court forgot that in the former, the maximum limit of the obligations to be
secured was fixed at P100,000.00.  That
mortgage contract then remains as the security for the P100,000.00 portion of
the P150,000.00 promissory note.

The foregoing disposes of the first assigned error.

The second assigned error is baseless.  The trial court itself correctly observed
that, on the basis of the testimony of petitioner’s witness, Mr. Jose Velez, an
accountant, the time deposit had already been taken into account.  Said the trial court:

“The court in its desire to understand the actual amount which
was outstanding and payable to the bank suggested that the plaintiff present an
accountant.  The plaintiff presented
accountant Jose Velez who testified that based on the receipts and documents
supplied by the Plaintiff Lydia Arriola he prepared
Exhibit “F” which he identified in court.  Exhibit “F” showed that a total
loan of P530,000.00 was obtained by Lydia Arriola and
Salvador Alcantara of which P270,000.00 was paid or
settled leaving a balance of P260,000.00. 
He testified in open court that of the balance of P260,000.00 appearing
on Exhibit “F” another P50,000.00 was paid from the time deposit of
P50,000.00 of plaintiff Lydia Arriola leaving an
outstanding balance of P210,000.00.  When he was asked whether the P150.000.00
time deposit of plaintiff Lydia
Arriola was taken into
consideration in his computation, he
answered that the P150,000.00 time deposit
was already applied to the amount of indebtedness and the
balance is still P210,000.00.”^[25]
(underscoring supplied for emphasis).

Petitioner did not appeal from the decision of the trial
court.  She cannot now be heard to lament
on this point.

There is, however, merit in the third assigned error.  Verily, with the reversal of the decision of
the trial court, respondent Court likewise reversed that portion of the
decision ordering Salvador Alcantara to pay
petitioner the sum of P60,000.00 plus interest from the time the amount was
credited to the account of Alcantara until it is
fully paid.  Alcantara
did not appeal from the decision.  Besides, this matter was not involved in the appeal interposed by BPI.  The challenged decision then must be modified
accordingly.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 13079, promulgated on 28
February 1990, to the extent that it reverses the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo (Branch XXXIII) in Civil Case No. 14973 insofar
as private respondents Bank of the Philippines Islands and the Provincial
Sheriff of Iloilo are concerned, subject to the modification above indicated,
and pursuant to such modification, REINSTATING
that part of the dispositive portion of the
decision in Civil Case No. 14973 on the liability of Salvador Alcantara to pay petitioner the amount of P60,000.00 with
interest thereon for the period therein stated.

No pronouncements as to costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and
Bidin, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., no part, formerly counsel for private respondent.

^[1]
Per Associate Justice Jainal
D. Rasul, concurred in by Associate Justices Manuel
Herrera and Eduardo R. Bengzon.

^[2]
Entitled Lydia
Arriola vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al.

^[3]
Exh. “F”; Decision of trial court (Annex
“A” of Petition); Rollo, 26.

^[4]
Rollo, 15-16.

^[5]
Pages 2-3 of Comment of private respondent; Rollo,
86-87.

^[6]
Exh. “16-A”; Decision of the trial court
(Annex “A” of Petition); Id.,
31.

^[7]
Page 3, Comment of BPI; Id.,
87.

^[8]
Pages 67-88 of BPI’s Comment; Rollo,
87-88.

^[9]
Page 2, Annex “A” of Petition; Id.,
25.

^[10]
Rollo, 32-33.

^[11]
Id., 35.

^[12]
Rollo, 37-38.

^[13]
Rollo, 66-67.

^[14]
Id., 70-71.

^[15]
Id., 73.

^[16]
Id., 85-108.

^[17]
Id., 122-130.

^[18]
Rollo, 135.

^[19]
Id., 139, et seq.

^[20]
Id., 162, et seq.

^[21]
Rollo, 68-70.

^[22]
Annex “A” of BPI’s Comment; Rollo, 111.

^[23]
Par. 27 of Complaint; Id.,
115.

^[24]
Par. 17 of Complaint; Id.,
113.

^[25]
Page 3 of Decision (Annex “A” of Petition); Rollo,
26.