DAGUPAN BUS COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND LEONITO T. MARASIGAN, RESPONDENTS.

The employment of many of its workers is usually only a minor
statistic with management, to be given commensurate attention along with such
other business items as inventories, credit lines,
receivables, taxes, interests, and depreciation.  The worker himself gives it more
importance, it being the source of his livelihood and that of his family,
his
assurance of present security if not well-being, and even his hope for a
better future.

Leonito T. Marasigan,
herein private respondent, had been employed as a driver with petitioner Dagupan Bus Co., Inc. since 1981 when in September 1986 he
had to stop working because the bus assigned to him was being repaired.  When he reported back two days later, he was
told the repairs had not yet been completed. 
Not yet worried, he returned the following day,
only to be informed that his bus was being used by the Saulog
Transit in connection with a strike in
that company.  He was advised to come
back after the strike.  The strike ended
in late September, but when he returned for work the following month, he was told
to come back after a week.  Now
apprehensive, he approached the general manager of the petitioner company who
referred him to another officer.  He was
instructed to go on vacation.  Grown more
anxious, he reported back a number of times thereafter but was put off with
inconclusive answers that finally made him realize he had actually been
dismissed.  It was then he decided, after
more than a year, to file his complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of
salary differentials, 13th month, sick leave and other benefits against the
petitioner.

The defense of the
petitioner was that Marasigan had not been illegally
dismissed but had actually abandoned his position for fourteen months from
September 1986 until he demanded his job back. 
Its notices advising him to report for work having been ignored, he was
dropped from the company roll of employees for unauthorized
absences.  He was duly informed of the
termination of his services for his refusal to return as directed.  The petitioner stressed that even before his
abandonment, Marasigan had been habitually absent and
had been called down several times for these shortcomings.

After considering the
evidence of the parties, Labor Arbiter Dominador Saludares held in favor of the complainant but awarded him
separation pay instead of ordering his reinstatement.  The reason was the strained relations
between the parties.  The other claims
were disallowed except for the attorney’s fees. 
On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto
by the respondent NLRC, which is now faulted by the petitioner for grave abuse
of discretion.

The petition has no merit.

The issues raised are
mainly factual.  There is no showing that
the findings thereon are tainted will arbitrariness or lacking in basis to
justify their reversal.  This Court is
not a trier of facts. 
We defer to the superior opportunity of the lower courts or
administrative bodies to test the credibility of the witnesses and examine the
authenticity of the documentary evidence directly before them.  Their conclusions on these matters area
binding on us in the absence of any of the established exceptions calling for
our review.^[1]

We are satisfied, as the
public respondent has found, that Marasigan had not
abandoned his employment.  He had
sought to return after completion of the repairs on the bus assigned to him but
without success.  His attempts were
warded off with temporizing and vague promises. 
In the idiom of the day, he was “given the run-around.”

His proven requests to
resume work are inconsistent with his alleged abandonment.  Not even his occasional absences, assuming
they had really been incurred, would constitute abandonment.  It has not been shown that he was giving
up his employment for good, with the intention of not
returning.  As the Labor Arbiter
correctly observed:

x x x
Moreover, even granting without admitting that complainant made absences, the
same are insufficient to constitute abandonment, because abandonment of work
cannot just be shown by mere absence.  It
requires a deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in terms
of specific circumstances that the worker does not intend to report for
work.  Furthermore, even prolonged
absence does not necessarily mean abandonment. 
For abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention
to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee
has no more interest to work.  For one
could not possibly abandon his work and shortly thereafter, vigorously pursue
his complaint for unjust dismissal with prayer for reinstatement.  (Policarpio v.
Vicente Dysun, Jr., NLRC Case No. R04-903074, July 12, 1976; Mario Franco, et al. v. E & M Security
Agency, NLRC Case No. 1036, 2nd Div., December 27, 1978.)

The petitioner claims it
had required Marasigan to report back for work and ultimately,
upon his refusal, informed him of his separation.  The evidence shows, however, that the notices
were sent to his old address although he had given the company his new address.  It is also argued that it would not have
taken him more than one year to file his complaint if it was true that he had
not really abandoned his employment.  The
reason for that delay is obvious. 
Marasigan was repeatedly reporting back for
work during that period in the hope, eventually turned forlorn, that he
could still return.

The suggestion is made that
Marasigan had left his employment with the petitioner
to work in Saudi Arabia, but there is nothing in the record to prove this assertion.  It is added that he is still working there
now, but that does not prove he was not illegally dismissed by the petitioner
in 1986.

As we see it, the
petitioner was, at the very least, lacking in candor toward the private
respondent.  Whatever its reasons for
dismissing him, it should have informed him as soon as possible that his
services had been terminated.  It
should not have left him dangling, so to speak, expecting he could still resume the work
that in fact had already been denied him. 
Frankness, if not fairness, would have enabled the private respondent to
act more decisively on the action of the petitioner.

The constitutional mandate
for the protection of labor is as explicit as it is demanding.  The purpose is to place the workingman on an
equal plane with management – with all its power and influence – in negotiating
for the advancement of his interests and the defense of his rights.  The ordinary laborer usually speaks through
his union and so speaks with the force and assertiveness of its
membership.  In the case at bar, the
workingman speaks alone to plead a lonely cause.  Nevertheless, he speaks with strength, for the
Constitution is behind him.

WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the
petitioner.  It is so ordered.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1] Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., 97
SCRA 734; International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines vs. Leogardo,
117 SCRA 967; Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514; Ateneo de Manila
University vs. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 100; Alcuaz vs. PSBA, QC Branch, 161 SCRA
7; Mapa vs.
Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76.