RICARDO C. SILVERIO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, AS JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY, BRANCH IX, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, …

Silverio versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is the story of a man charged with a crime who posted bail, then kept leaving the country, and finally asked the Supreme Court to strike down the order that stopped him from travelling. Ricardo Silverio, the petitioner, was charged with violating the Revised Securities Act before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. When that court cancelled his passport and barred his departure, he brought a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, lost there, and came to the Supreme Court on a petition for review. The case matters because it settles a constitutional question every Bar candidate must know: does the 1987 Constitution confine the power to restrict the right to travel to the executive grounds of national security, public safety, and public health, or may a court, in a pending criminal case, restrain an accused from leaving the country to answer for his bail?

Procedural History

On the fourteenth of October 1985, an Information was filed against Silverio before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, and he posted bail for his provisional liberty. More than two years later, the prosecution moved to cancel his passport and to issue a hold-departure order, and the trial court granted the motion in an Order dated the fourth of April 1988. The trial court denied his motion for reconsideration on the twenty-eighth of July 1988. Silverio then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which denied it in a Decision dated the thirty-first of January 1990, and denied reconsideration on the twenty-ninth of June 1990. He filed his petition for review before the Supreme Court on the thirtieth of July 1990, and the Court gave due course and decided the case.

Facts

Silverio was charged with a violation of the Revised Securities Act and posted bail. From the filing of the Information in October 1985 until July 1988, the case had never been arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly because Silverio failed to appear, and the reason for his non-appearance was invariably that he was abroad in the United States of America. He never appeared in person before the court during that entire period, and his bond was cancelled twice, with warrants of arrest issued against him for the same reason: failure to appear.

On the twenty-sixth of January 1988, the prosecution filed an urgent ex parte motion to cancel his passport and to issue a hold-departure order, on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without court approval, causing postponements of the arraignment and of scheduled hearings. Over his opposition, the trial court issued the Order of the fourth of April 1988 directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel his passport or deny his application, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent him from leaving the country. The court based its order on its finding that the accused had never appeared for arraignment and had left the country without the knowledge and permission of the court.

Silverio argued that the scheduled arraignments could not proceed because a motion to quash the Information was pending. The Supreme Court found, however, that the motion to quash was filed long after the Information, and only after several arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to his non-appearance; it was set for hearing only on the nineteenth of February 1988.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the orders cancelling the passport and barring departure, on facts allegedly patently erroneous, namely that the arraignments could not be held because a motion to quash was pending.
• Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired upon lawful order of the court in a pending criminal case, even on grounds other than national security, public safety, or public health.

Applicable Provisions

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

This is the provision Silverio invoked, arguing that the second sentence confines every impairment of the right to travel to the three executive grounds.

Article III, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution provided:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired.

The Court used this to show that the 1935 text treated abode and travel together and did not mention travel at all.

Article IV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution provided:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health.

The Court compared this with the 1987 text to show that the phrase "as may be provided by law" was newly added.

Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides:

When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.

This is the source of the court's inherent power to enforce its orders in pending criminal cases.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found no reversible error. The questioned orders were not based on erroneous facts. The motion to quash came about only after several arraignment settings had already been scheduled and cancelled by reason of the petitioner's non-appearance. The trial court's findings, conformed to by the Court of Appeals, showed that the case had never been arraigned, that the accused had never appeared in person, and that his bond had been cancelled twice with warrants of arrest issued, all for failure to appear.

On the second issue, the Court likewise ruled against the petitioner. The condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. The Court held that Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should not be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. The second sentence addresses executive and administrative authorities, who may impose limits only on the stated grounds and as may be provided by law; it does not strip the courts of their power. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions, and the ruling in Manotoc versus Court of Appeals was but a re-affirmation of doctrine laid down long before in People versus Uy Tuising. The Court stressed that the offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines, and it is to their best interest that prosecutions run their course without undue delay, with the accused holding himself amenable at all times to court orders and processes.

Doctrine

First, the right to travel under Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is not absolutely limited to the grounds of national security, public safety, and public health. That clause governs executive and administrative authorities; it does not diminish the inherent power of courts to enforce their orders in pending criminal cases.

Second, the condition in a bail bond that the accused make himself available whenever the court requires his presence is a valid restriction on his right to travel. An accused who violates that condition may be restrained from leaving the country, and if abroad, compelled to return.

Third, a court may cancel a passport and issue a hold-departure order against an accused who repeatedly leaves the country without permission, causing delay in the proceedings, because the People of the Philippines have an interest in the prompt and orderly prosecution of crimes.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review, with costs against the petitioner, Ricardo Silverio.

Remember This

Memorize this line: bail is a valid restriction on the right to travel, and Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution does not limit the court's inherent power to keep an accused within its reach. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the liberty of abode, which requires a lawful court order, and the right to travel, which the executive may restrict only on the stated grounds, while the courts retain their power to enforce orders in criminal cases.