BAQUIT S. UNDA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. DIMAPORO T. CASAR, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 10, OF LANAO DEL SUR, AND HADJI ACMAD D…

The sole issue presented
herein for resolution involves the jurisdiction of the trial court over an
election protest filed against a protestee who had
died prior to the filing thereof.

The instant petition for certiorari
seeks to annul the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
promulgated on July 12, 1990 in SPR No. 1-90, dismissing the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner Baquit
Unda and ordering the court a quo to
proceed with the trial of the election protest.^[1]

Hadji Minandang Guiling and private respondent Hadji
Acmad Ditangongan Rangiris were the rival candidates for mayor of Masiu, Lanao del Sur in the local elections of February 4, 1988.  On February
8, 1988, Hadji Minandang Guiling was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Masiu, along with herein petitioner who was proclaimed as
the duly elected vice-mayor of the same municipality.  Both officials duly took their oaths of
office and entered upon the performance of their duties.

On February
12, 1988, private
respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition questioning the said proclamation,
docketed therein as SPC No. 88-645.  On October
26, 1988, private
respondent received the decision of the COMELEC dismissing his aforesaid
petition, without prejudice to the filing of an election contest within ten
days from receipt thereof.

On November
1, 1988, Mayor Minandang Guiling passed away
and, the following day, petitioner took his oath of office as mayor and
forthwith assumed and exercised the duties of said office.

On November
3, 1988, private
respondent filed an election protest against the deceased Mayor Minandang Guiling with Branch 10
of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Election Case No. 77-88.  The summons issued to Mayor Minandang Guiling was returned unserved on December 8, 1988 since protestee Minandang Guiling had already
been dead for over a month.

Thereafter, the protest
filed by private respondent was brought to the COMELEC three times on certiorari.

The first was SPR No.
4-89 in which the COMELEC declared
null and void the order of the aforesaid regional trial court denying
petitioner’s motion for intervention, and ordered the trial court to admit the
intervention and proceed with the trial of the case on the basis of the protest and petitioner’s
answer in intervention.

The second was SPR No.
17-89 wherein the COMELEC reversed
the resolution of the trial court denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and affirming the order of the same court denying petitioner’s
motion for inhibition and manifestation, and ordered the court a quo
to proceed with the hearing on the
affirmative defenses raised by herein petitioner.

The third is SPR No. 1-90
wherein the COMELEC issued the resolution, now subject of this petition,
ordering the court below to proceed with the trial of the case on the ground,
among others, that the death of the protestee does
not divest the court of jurisdiction over the election protest.

On August
30, 1990, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order directing the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 at Marawi City, to cease and desist from taking further
action on the election case pending before him.^[2]

Petitioner argues that
there is no law which allows a deceased person to be sued as a party defendant,
much less as a protestee in an election contest; and
that the COMELEC misapplied, in
support of its challenged resolution, the case of Vda.
de De Mesa, etc., et al. vs. Mencias,
etc., et al.^[3] Impliedly suggested thereby is that the
procedure would be to have the case dismissed without prejudice,
to be refiled against the proper protestee.  This may be the conventional procedure but it
overlooks the time element which is of the essence of and constitutes a major consideration
in this case.

It has been frequently
decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all courts, that
statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. 
To that end, immaterial defects in pleadings should be disregarded and
necessary and proper amendments should be allowed as promptly as possible.^[4]

An election case, unlike
an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not
only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but also the
paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of
the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the
office within their gift.^[5]
Moreover, it is neither fair nor just
to keep in office for an uncertain period one whose right to it is under
suspicion.  It is imperative that his
claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the
sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action.^[6]

On the procedural aspect,
it is established that amendments to pleadings may be permitted by this Court
even for the first time on appeal in order to substitute the name of the real
party in interest, provided that such an amendment would not involve a
change in the cause of action or result in undue prejudice to the adverse
party.  For, as long as there is justice done upon the merits, all
the imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure ought to be
brushed aside as wholly trivial and indecisive.^[7]

It follows, therefore,
that the election protest filed by private respondent can and ought to be
amended by striking out the name of Hadji Minandang Guiling, as the protestee, and substituting, in his place,
petitioner Baquit S. Unda.  Besides, we do not find that such a course of
procedure will be productive of any undue substantial prejudice to herein
private respondent.  For that matter,
said procedure should have been
inceptively adopted by the trial court under the circumstances of the election
case before it.

We agree with private
respondent that Vda. de De Mesa, as well as the other cases invoked and relied upon by public
respondent, do not present the same factual situation obtaining in the case
before us.  In the decisions cited by
public respondent, the protestees had been duly
served with summons and died either during the pendency
of the election protest or on appeal, which is not so in the case at bar
wherein the protestee was already dead at the time of the filing of the election
protest.  However, as earlier explained,
we cannot allow public interest to be fettered by procedural lapses or technicalities where the circumstances demand
and warrant the adjudication of the case on the merits as early as practicable.

We can, however, for
purposes of the present case avail of the ruling in the Vda.
de De Mesa case to the effect that Section 17,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, on substitution of parties, applies to election
contests to the same extent and with the same force and effect as it does in ordinary civil actions.

Now, under the Local
Government Code,^[8] the vice-mayor stands next in the line of
succession to the mayor in case of a permanent vacancy in the latter’s
position.  Upon the death of the protestee mayor in the case at bar, petitioner, as then
incumbent vice-mayor, succeeded by operation of law to the vacated office and
is ordinarily entitled to occupy the same for the unexpired term thereof.  The outcome of the election contest
necessarily and primarily bears upon his right to his present position and he
is the person directly concerned in the fair and regular conduct of the
election in order that the true will of the electorate will be upheld.  His status as a real party in interest in the
continuation of said case cannot thus be disputed.

It appears that petitioner became a party to the election protest
as an intervenor with the approval of respondent
COMELEC.  As already discussed, the
pleadings in the election protest should properly be amended to substitute
petitioner as the party protestee, instead of his
being merely an intervenor therein, and that the
proceedings be thereafter conducted accordingly.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.  AFFIRMING the resolution
of public respondent Commission on Elections promulgated on July 12, 1990 in SPR No. 1-90;

2.  ORDERING the court a
quo to forthwith appoint petitioner as the legal representative of the
deceased protestee, and cause the amendment of the
pleadings and processes concerned to substitute petitioner therein in the name
and stead of the late protestee;

3.  ALLOWING petitioner to
file an answer in said election case within ten (10) days from receipt of this
resolution, failing which his aforestated answer in
intervention shall stand as his answer to the amended protest; and

4.  DIRECTING the lower
court to grant full representation of and participation by petitioner Baquit S. Unda as protestee in all proceedings and incidents in Election Case
No. 77-88 of said court.

The temporary restraining order issued in this case is LIFTED,
and the court a quo is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial
and adjudication of said election case with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Sarmiento, Bidin, Cortes, Grino-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, 13-21.

^[2]
Ibid., 33-35.

^[3]
18 SCRA 533 (1966).

^[4]
Ibasco vs. Ilao, et
al., 110 Phil. 553 (1960), citing Heyfron vs.
Mahoney, 18 Am. St. Rep. 757, 763.

^[5]
Grand Alliance for Democracy, et
al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., 150 SCRA 665 (1987); Sanchez vs.
Commission on Elections, 153 SCRA 67 (1987).

^[6]
Reforma vs. De Luna, 104 Phil. 278 (1958).

^[7]
Alonso vs. Villamor, et al., 16 Phil. 315
(1910); Chua Kiong, etc. vs. Whitaker, et al.,
46 Phil. 578 (1924).

^[8]
Section 48(1), Batas Pambansa Blg.
337.