G.R. No. 93986. December 22, 1992

BENJAMIN T. LOONG, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURHUSSEIN UTUTALUM AND ALIM BASHIR EDRIS, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 22, 1992 EN BANC PADILLA, J.:
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PADILLA, J.:


In this special civil
action of certiorari, petitioner assails the Resolution dated 15 May 1990 of
the Commission on Elections (Second Division), issued in SPA No. 90-006
entitled “Nur Hussein Ututalum, petitioner vs. Benjamin Loong, respondent,” a
petition to disqualify Benjamin Loong, candidate for Regional Vice-Governor of
the Autonomous Government in Muslim Mindanao. Said assailed resolution ruled that the respondent Commission has
jurisdiction to hear and decide SPA No. 90-006.

On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the respondent
Commission his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of
the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990 (15
January 1990 being the last day for filing said certificate); herein two (2)
private respondents (Ututalum and Edris) were also candidates for the same
position.

On 5 March 1990 (or 16
days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the
respondent Commission (Second Division) a petition (docketed as SPA
Case No. 90-006) seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional
Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy as to
his
age.

On 7 March 1990, the other candidate, respondent Edris, filed a
“Petition in Intervention” in the said SPA No. 90-006, raising therein issues
similar to those raised by respondent Ututalum in his main petition.

On 19 March 1990,[1]
petitioner Loong filed in SPA No. 90-006 his answer to the petition, seeking
the dismissal of the petition, and alleging the following:

1. that it has not been the practice among the Muslim people in the
community where respon­dent was born to record the birth of a child with the
Office of the Civil Registry; that
following such practice, respondent’s parents did not also record his birth
with the said office; that, to be sure of his age qualification, respondent, before
filing his certificate of candidacy consulted his mother and other persons who have personal knowledge of his date of
birth and all assured respondent that his correct date of birth is July 4,
1954.

2. that respondent COMELEC has no juris­diction because such
petition is actually one which is to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy which, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), as
amended by Election Reforms Law of 1987, should have been filed within 5 days
following the last day for filing of the certificate of candidacy.

On 30 March 1990,
petitioner Loong also filed his “Answer to Petition for Intervention.”
[2]

On 15 May 1990, the
respondent Commission (Second Division) rendered the now assailed Resolution
[3] (with
two (2) Commissioners – Yorac and Flores concurring, and one Commissioner –
Dimaampao dissenting), holding that:

“WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Commission on
Elections (Second Division) holds that it has jurisdiction to try the instant
petition and the respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is hereby denied.”

In its questioned
resolution, respondent Commission held that, in consonance with the ruling of
this Court in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
[4] to
wit –

“The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased
by the electorate alone. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as
in this case, that the candidate was qualified.”

Sections
6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646[5] (in
relation to the said Frivaldo ruling) should now mean that:

“1. When there is an allegation of falsifi­cation of an entry in a
candidate’s certificate of candidacy, and such alleged falsification refers to
a fact concerning the candidate’s eligibility to run for and hold an elective
public office, a petition to declare such candidate ineligible is seasonable if
it is brought within a reasonable time of the discovery of ineligibility.

2. Such petition for a declaration
of ineligibility is seasonable even if filed after the period prescribed by law
for attacking certificate of candidacy
and before the procla­mation of the candidate sought to be disqualified. The substantive issue of qualification
cannot be subordinated to
or defeated by the gap in procedural rules. x x x”[6]

Denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution, the respondent
Commission issued Resolution dated 3 July 1990,
[7] stating among others that –

“While the Frivaldo case referred to the question of respondent’s
citizenship, we hold that the principle applies to discovery of violation of
other requirements for eligibility, such as for instance the fact that a candidate is a holder of a green card
or other certificates of permanent residence in another country, or, as in this
case, that the candidate does not possess the age qualification for the
office.”

On 3 July 1990,
petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Vice-Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region.
[8] Hence, this special civil action of
certiorari filed by petitioner on 9 July 1990 to annul the aforesaid
resolutions of respondent Commission dated 15 May 1990 and 3 July 1990, issued
in SPA No. 90-006.

The principal issue in the case at bar, as we see it, is whether
or not SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner Loong) was filed within the period prescribed by law.

The undisputed facts are as follows: petitioner Loong filed his
certificate of candidacy on 15 January 1990 (the last day for filing the
same), the election for officials of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region
being on 17 February 1990; but
private respondent Ututalum filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to
disqualify-candidate Loong only on 5 March 1990, or forty-nine (49) days
from the date Loong’s certificate of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January
1990), and sixteen (16) days after the election itself.

Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 was filed out of
time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 76 of
the Omnibus Election Code. On the other
hand, private respondent Ututalum alleges that SPA No. 90-006, though filed
only on 5 March 1990, was filed when no proclamation of winner had as yet been
made and that the petition is deemed filed on time as Section 3, Rule 25 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure states that the petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds of ineligibility “shall be
filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but
not later than the date of proclamation.”

On the part of respondent Commission, it held in its assailed
resolution that the petition in SPA No. 90-006 was timely filed, applying
Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646,[9] and Section 2, Rule 23 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure which states that the petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy must be filed within five (5) days following
the last day for the filing of a certificate of candidacy, both read in the
light of the Frivaldo ruling of this Court.

We find the present
petition to be meritorious.

Sections 3 and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6734 (entitled, “An act
providing for an organic act for the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao”) requires
that the age of a person running for the office of Vice Governor for the
autonomous region shall be at least thirty-five (35) years on the day of the
election. Private respondent Ututalum
alleges that petitioner Loong falls
short of this age requirement, hence, on 5 March 1990, he filed a petition to
disqualify the petitioner.

Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code (“Code” for brevity) provides that the certificate of candidacy
of the person filing it shall state, among others, the date of birth of said
person. Section 78 of the same Code
states that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed
false representation,
a
petition to cancel the certificate of the aforesaid person may be filed within
twenty-five (25) days from the time the certificate was filed.

Clearly, SPA No. 90-006
was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed
by Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

We do not agree with
private respondent Ututalum’s contention that the petition for
disqualification, as
in the case at bar, may be filed at any time
after the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the
date of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.

Rule 25 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure refers to Disqualification of Candidates; and Section 1 of
said rule provides that any candidate who commit any act declared by law to be
a ground for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate. The grounds for disquali­fication as expressed
in Sections 12 and 68 of the Code are the following:

“SEC. 12. Disqualification. – Any person
who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or
for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate
and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.”

“SEC. 68. Disqualifications. – Any
candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by
final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material consider­ation to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e,
k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.”

The petition filed by
private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to disqualify
petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in
his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the
grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered
by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel
certificate of candidacy. Moreover,
Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after
the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the
date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent
Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative
powers. Thus, it can not supersede
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

We also do not find merit
in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the provisions
of Section 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable
time
from the discovery of the ineligibility.

Sections 6 and 7 of Rep.
Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:

“SEC. 6. Effect of
Disqualification Case. – Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”

“SEC. 7. Petition to Deny
Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. – The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section
78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.”

It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or
alters the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the
appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false
represent­ation made therein. On the contrary,
said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a
disqualification case which may be based on grounds other than that provided
under Section 78 of the Code. But
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6
applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act. No.
6646 is mention made of the period within which these disqualification cases may
be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the
periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must
be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions
for quo
warranto.

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a
certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely
helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the
candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of
the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any
regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with
the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date the
respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

It is true that the discovery of false representation as to
material facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy, under
Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who
discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of
the candidate committing the misrepresentation. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap
between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery
is made after the 25-day period under Sec.
78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the
results of the election is made. During
this so-called “gap” the would-be petitioner (who would seek the
disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait
for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against
the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this “gap” in
what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, is unnecessary and should
be remedied.

At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and
intent of the legislative branch of the government
to fix a definite time within which petitions or protests related to
eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed,
[10] as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the
Code. Respondent Commission may have
seen the need to remedy this
so-called “procedural gap”, but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does
not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these petitions or
protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and
remedy.

We are aware that in Erivaldo
vs. Comelec
,
[11] this Court held that a petition to
disqualify an elective official, on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen,
may be filed at anytime, even beyond the period
prescribed by law, and even if he had already been proclaimed elected to the
office and in fact had long been discharging the duties of said office. But we disagree with respondent Commission
that the Frivaldo ruling applies to the case at bar in all its
connotations and implications. For one,
the ground for which disqualification is sought in the present case is
misrepresentation as to the required age of
the candidate, whereas, in Frivaldo the ground for
disqualification was lack of Philippine citizenship. This is an overriding and fundamental
desideratum matched perhaps only by disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Mr. Justice Gutierrez,
Jr., in his concurring opinion in Frivaldo vs. Comelec
[12] said:

“It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed
by law for the filing of a protest – whether quo warranto or election contest –
is mandatory and jurisdictional.

“As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the
petitioner’s election and proclamation should have been filed within ten days
after the proclamation of election results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the
period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which
petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide
summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes.

x x x              x x x

“I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a
clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of loyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the
ten-day period should be applied strictly.”

In Aznar vs. Comelec,[13] the records show that private respondent
filed his certificate of candidacy on 19 November 1987 and that the
petitioner filed his petition for disqualification of said private respondent
on 22 January 1988. Since the
petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period
required in Section 78 of the Code, it was clear that said petition had been
filed out of time. The Court also ruled
that the petition for the disquali­fication of private respondent could not
also be treated as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253
of the same Code as it was unquestionably premature, considering that
private
respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on 3 March 1988. However, as a matter of public interest to
ascertain the respondent’s citizenship and qualification to hold the
public office to which he had been proclaimed elected, the Court ruled on the
merits of the case.

But the Court, in another
case, in an EN
BANC Resolution[14] affirmed the dismissal by the COMELEC of the
petitions for disqualification. It
appeared that on 2 March 1990, a petition to disqualify Padilla Pundaodaya (SPA
No.
90-004) was filed because of an allegedly falsified certificate of
candidacy which he could not have personally filed on 15 January 190 since he
had been in Saudi Arabia since 24 July 1987 and arrived in Manila only on 24
January 1990. The Court held that the
disqualification petition was correctly treated by the Commission on Elections
as a petition to cancel a defective certificate of candidacy but the petition
was filed out of time and could not anymore be entertained.

In sum, SPA No. 90-006
was filed by private respondent Ututalum beyond the 25-day period (from the
filing by petitioner Loong of the questioned certificate of candidacy)
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code. It follows that the dismissal of said petition for disqualification is
warranted. Further it would appear that
we can not treat S
PA No. 90-006 as a petition for quo warranto (Section 253 of the
Code) for when it was filed with the respondent Commission, no proclamation of
election results had as yet been made, hence, it was premature.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions
of respondent Commission, dated 15 May 1990 and 3 July 1990, rendered in SPA
No. 90-006 are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.


[1]
Rollo, p. 67

[2]
Rollo, p. 75

[3]
Rollo, p. 22

[4]
G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989,
174 SCRA 245

[5]
The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 approved on January 5, 1988

[6]
Rollo, pp. 23-24

[7]
Rollo, p. 30

[8]
Rollo, p. 10

[9]
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 provide that:

“SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification
Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.”

“SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. – The procedure hereinabove
provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.”

[10]
Municipality of Masantol vs. Guevarra, 44 Phil. 580 (1963)

[11]
174 SCRA 245

[12]
Ibid., pp. 256-258

[13]
G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990, 185 SCRA 703

[14]
Dr. Tocod D. Macaraya, et al. vs.
The Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. No. 93404; Zorayda Y.A.
Tamano, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 93405, August 2, 1990