THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AMADO ESMUNDO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija of
the crime of arson.

The information charges that: “On or about the night of April 30 of this year
(1913), the said accused, maliciously and criminally, set fire to the two
warehouses of Jacobo Selzer, situated in the inhabited part of the barrio of
Luyos, which were destroyed together with the tobacco, rice, and corn contained
therein, the value of which amounted to P8,320. The motive is unknown. The act
took place in the municipality of San Antonio, Province of Nueva Ecija, P. I.,
in violation of the law.”

The facts disclosed by the evidence of record are fully set forth by the
Solicitor-General in his brief on appeal as follows:

“The evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that on the evening of May 1,
1913, some warehouses owned by Jacobo Selzer were destroyed by a fire and that
their destruction entailed a loss estimated at P8,400; that the defendant was
seen in the neighborhood during the afternoon of the day on which the fire
occurred, and asked.a servant of Selzer if her masters were at home and was
informed that they were away; that after the fire started the defendant was seen
a short distance from the burning warehouses running away from them.

“There was no evidence introduced by the defense.”

The decision of the trial judge is as follows:

“In this case it has been proven that the accused, Amado Esmundo, a short
time before the fire in question, was seen near the buildings that were burned
and was asking one of the servants of the house, Eugenia Arsega, if her master
and mistress were at home on that occasion. He was told by her that they were
not. It is further shown by the witness Andres Villamayor that when he started
for the fire at its inception he met the accused running away from the fire. It
is shown by the witness Sabas Villamayor that on the night when the warehouses
were burned the accused was seen in the neighborhood of said warehouses going in
the direction of the warehouses. It is objected that the testimony of Sergeant
Carreon of the Constabulary is not sufficient because it has not been shown that
these declarations of the accused were given spontaneously, freely and
willingly. The court is of the opinion that the evidence is sufficient even if
we exclude the testimony of said Sergeant Carreon.

“The court, therefore, finds the accused Amado Esmundo guilty as charged in
the complaint and sentences him to eight years and one day-in Bilibid, to
indemnify the injured party, Jacobo Selzer, in the sum of eight thousand three
and twenty pesos (P8,320) and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment as prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of this proceeding. It
is so ordered.

“Done in open special court at Cabanatuan, Province of Nueva Ecija, Fourth
Judicial District, on this the 24th day of September, 1913.

“W. E. McMAHON,

“Judge of the Mountain Judicial District,

“Acting in the Fourth Judicial District.”

Counsel for appellant, appointed de officio by this court, concludes his
brief with the following observation:

“We submit that it is useless to write a brief on this case.
The
prosecution has no case at all.”

We are strongly inclined to agree with counsel. In the absence of any
evidence as to motive, there is nothing in the record which would sustain a
finding that the origin of the fire was malicious and not accidental, or that
this accused was guilty of the crime of arson with which he was charged.

The accused introduced no evidence in his own defense, but in doing so he was
clearly within his rights, and the prosecution having failed utterly to make out
a case, there was no necessity for his doing so. Certainly no inference of guilt
can be drawn from his silence, though we are at a loss to account for the
conviction in the court below unless the trial judge overlooked the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused and his right to decline to testify at the
trial without having any inference of guilt drawn from his failure to go on the
witness stand.

As appears from the information, the fiscal before going to trial was well
aware that he had no evidence as to a motive which might have induced the
accused to commit the crime of arson, and with no evidence which even tended to
disclose that the buildings had been set on fire maliciously, it would seem that
he should either have asked for a dismissal, or for a continuance until he could
find some evidence tending directly to establish the commission by the accused
of the oifense with which he was charged. For the benefit of the various
officers engaged in the prosecution of criminal offenses, we cite from a former
decision as follows:

“The records of criminal cases submitted to this court so frequently disclose
a lack of all effort to develop the motive for the commission of the crime
charged, that we take advantage of this opportunity to direct the attention of
all prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, to the
importance of definitely ascertaining and proving when possible the motives
which actuated the commission of a crime under judicial investigation. It is
true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the particular
motive for taking the life of a human being shall be established at the trial,
and that in general when the commission of a crime is clearly proven conviction
may and should follow even where the reason for its commission is unknown (151
U. S., 396); but in many criminal cases one of the most important aids in
completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the
introduction of evidence disclosing the motive which tempted the mind to indulge
the criminal act; and in nearly every case wherein the’ law places the penalty
to be imposed in the discretion of the courts within certain limits, it will be
found that a knowledge of the motive which actuated the guilty person is of the
greatest service in the exercise of this discretion.” (U. S. vs.
Carlos, 15 Phil. Rep., 47.)

The judgment of conviction entered in the court below should be reversed, and
the accused acquitted of the offense with which he is charged in the
information, with costs in both instances de officio. If in detention he will be
set at liberty forthwith, and if at large under bail, his bond should be
exonerated. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo,
JJ., concur.