PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TEMISTOCLES CASTOR Y TRANGUIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In the evening of 17 May 1986 at Cherryville Subdivision,
Barangay Nagkaisang Nayon, Novaliches, Quezon City, Sotero Roy y Barnuevo was
stabbed. Sustaining the following injuries:

“x x x Wound, incised, 3.0 cm., dorsal surface, hand, left;
12.0 cm., anterior aspect, chest, left.

Wounds, STAB:

1)   2.0 cm. elliptical (sic), edges clean cut,
median aspect, chest, along the anterior median line, on level with the 2nd
intercostal space, oriented obliquely, with sharp left upper extremity and
blunt right lower extremity, directed backward slightly upward, and to the
left, involving among others, the skin and soft tissues, fracturing the
sternum, into the thoracic cavity, perforating the aorta, with an approximate
depth of 11.5 cm.

2)   2.0
cm., elliptical, edges clean cut, median aspect chest, left side, 1.0 cm. from
the anterior median line, level of the 4th intercostal space, oriented
horizontally with blunt medial and sharp lateral extremity, directed backward
upward, and medially, involving among others, the skin and underlying soft
tissues into the thoracic cavity, penetrating the heart, with an approximate
depth of 12.0 cm.

3)   2.5
cm. elliptical, edges clean cut, infrascapular region, left, 12.0 cm. from the
posterior median line, oriented almost vertically, with sharp upper and blunt
lower extremity, directed forward, upward, and laterally, involving the skin
and underlying muscular soft tissues only, with an approximate depth of 8.5 cm.

4)   1.8
cm., elliptical, edges clean cut, lower medial region of the back, left side, 3.0 cm. from the posterior median line, oriented horizontally, with
sharp lateral and blunt medial extremity, directed forward, upward and
laterally, involving the skin and underlying muscular soft tissues
only, with an approximate depth of 4.0 cm.”^[1]

he died on the spot. The cause of death was “Hemorrhage,
secondary to stab wounds chest and back.”^[2]

The police authorities conducted an investigation and thereafter
took down the sworn statements of witnesses. In due time, an information charging the accused-appellant and one Luis
Canalan y Bacatano with the crime of Murder was filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-43760, it was raffled off to Branch 98 of the said
court. After both accused pleaded not
guilty on arraignment, trial on the
merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Robert Mingoa, Armando Baldemoro,
Pio Ang, Pfc. Dante Laguelles and Dr. Rodolfo Lisondra as its witnesses. The two accused took the witness stand in
their defense.

Before a decision could be rendered, a fire gutted the building
which housed the court; the records of this case were among the items destroyed
in the said fire.

In its Order of 30 September 1988, the trial court directed the
prosecutor assigned to the case to reconstitute the records thereof.^[3]
The motion to reconstitute the information was subsequently filed on 18 May
1989.^[4]
Attached thereto is the reconstituted Information which reads:

“The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses TEMISTOCLES
CASTOR Y TRANGUIA, LUIS CANALAR (sic) Y BACATANO of the crime of MURDER (Art.
248, RPC), committed as follows:

‘That on or about the 17th day of May, 1986 in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage
of superior strength, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the
person of SOTERO ROY Y BARNUEVO, by then and there stabbing him several times
with kitchen knives, hitting him on different parts of his body, thus
inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said SOTERO ROY
Y BARNUEVO, in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil
Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”^[5]

In its Order of 18 May 1989,^[6] the
trial court admitted the reconstituted Information and ordered the re-taking of
the testimonies of witnesses considering that the transcripts of stenographic
notes in the case were also burned during the aforesaid fire.

On 3 August 1989, the accused were re-arraigned. On said occasion, they reiterated their plea
of not guilty.^[7]
Thereupon, all the witnesses who had earlier testified, with the exception of
Dr. Lisondra, were presented anew.^[8]

Accused-appellant relied on the defense of alibi. He claims that he was in Caloocan City at
the time Sotero Roy was attacked and killed.

On 3 May 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision^[9]
convicting the accused-appellant but acquitting his co-accused Luis
Canalan. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises above-considered, the Court finds accused
TEMISTOCLES CASTOR Y TRANGUIA, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the
information and hereby sentences him to the (sic) penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Sotero Roy y Barnuevo in the sum of P30,000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the costs.

For lack of sufficient
evidence against accused LUIS B. CANALAN, he is hereby acquitted. He is hereby ordered released from
confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila unless his
further detention is warranted for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.”^[10]

The trial court gave full faith to the version of the prosecution
and discredited the accused-appellant’s defense of alibi as the latter and his
companion Palping were positively identified
by witness Roberto Mingoa as the perpetrators of the crime.

The prosecution’s version
of the killing is faithfully summarized in the Appellee’s Brief^[11] as follows:

“Pio Ang operated a junk shop at Cherryville Subdivision,
Novaliches, Quezon City. Among his
employees were Temistocles Castor and Sotero Roy who, together with his wife,
Edmunda, was (sic) allowed to stay inside
the compound of the junk shop. Aside
from Sotero and his wife, Robert Mingoa and Jimmy Hao, brothers of Pio Ang,
also lived in a house inside the compound (TSN, August 24, 1989, pp. 12-13, 18,
20; TSN, August 22, 1989, pp.
6-8).

On May 1, 1986, Sotero alias Vietcong and Castor quarreled over an
allegation that Castor had an amorous relation with Sotero’s wife,
Edmunda. Before the two (2) could
exchange blows, however, they were pacified by their co-workers. But before leaving, Castor threatened Sotero
that if he had an opportunity, he would kill him (TSN, August 24, 1989, pp.
9-10).

Two weeks after the said incident, particularly on May 17, 1986,
about (sic) 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Castor made good his threat. Together with a companion named Palping,
Castor stabbed Sotero near the gate inside the junk shop compound. Despite the wounds inflicted on him, Sotero
was able to run away from his attackers towards the house being occupied by
Robert Mingoa and Jimmy Hao, about ten (10) meters from the gate. But he was followed inside the house by
Castor and Palping who continued their attack until Sotero slumped on the
floor, mortally wounded (TSN, August 22, 1989, pp. 3-4, 11).

Unknown to Castor and his companion, the whole incident was
witnessed by Robert Mingoa who was then standing a few meters from the
gate. Mingoa was about to leave for his
friend’s house when he saw Castor and his companions stab Sotero near the
gate. Afraid that the attackers might
turn against him, Mingoa ran towards his house where the victim ran to, and
went directly inside his room and locked himself in. While in his room, Mingoa heard a commotion inside the house and,
peeping through a partially opened window, saw Castor and Palping once again
stab Sotero. Thereafter, Sotero finally
slumped on the floor. Mingoa clearly witnessed the incident as the
place where the incident took place was lighted (Ibid, pp. 3-5, 11-12).

Patrolmen Dante Laguelles and Salvacion of the Station
Investigation Division, Quezon City Police, rushed to the scene of the crime
following a call from Pio Ang. They
found at the scene the lifeless body of Sotero, drenched in blood. They took pictures of the victim, searched
the place for any instrument used in perpetrating the crime, and questioned
witnesses. Temistocles Castor and Luis Canalan, who surfaced as the prime suspects
in the killing, were subsequently arrested in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and
Plaridel, Bulacan, respectively (TSN, October 25, 1989, pp. 4-6).“^[12]

On 11 May 1990, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal.^[13]
We accepted the same on 16 July 1990.^[14]

In his Brief,^[15]
accused-appellant faults the trial court:

“I

X X X IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
EYE-WITNESS ROBERT MINGOA DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING HIS
CREDIBILITY.

II

X X X IN REJECTING OUTRIGHT THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI.

III

X X X IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM
IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”^[16]

Anent the first assigned error, accused-appellant seeks to
convince this Court of the unreliability of the testimony of Robert Mingoa
because of its inherent inconsistencies — especially with respect to the place
where the stabbing took place. While
initially, Mingoa testified that the stabbing occurred near the gate, he later
claimed that it took place inside the house. The accused-appellant also capitalized on Mingoa’s inability to give the
complete names of the victim and the latter’s co-employees.

As to the second error, accused-appellant maintains that alibi is
the only defense available to him; he could not claim any other credible
defense, like self-defense, in the absence of any fact that “could lend
evidence (sic) to such defense.”^[17] He further
stresses that the Court should not harbor a mental prejudice against an accused
who invokes the defense of alibi.

As regards the last assigned error, accused-appellant insists
that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt; and even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that he was responsible for the death of
Sotero Roy, he can only be held liable for homicide since no qualifying
circumstances were proven by the prosecution. The threat uttered on 1 May 1986 was made in the heat of a quarrel;
there was no evidence to show that he intended to make good the same. On the contrary, both he and the victim
continued to work together, thus indicating that he did not cling to his
determination.

This appeal is unmeritorious.

The inconsistencies in
the testimony of Robert Mingoa involve minor or inconsequential, if not
trivial, matters.

One of the more well-entrenched rules in our criminal justice
system is that inconsistencies on minor, trivial or inconsequential matters do
not affect the credibility of a witness;^[18] on
the contrary, they may be considered as badges of veracity^[19]
or manifestations of the truthfulness on material points in the testimony.^[20]
They may likewise show the sincerity of the witness and the absence of connivance
between witnesses to make their testimony tally in every respect,^[21]
and heighten the witness’ credibility.^[22]

It is clear that the alleged inconsistency regarding the place
where the incident took place results from a misappreciation of the totality of
the testimony of Robert Mingoa. The
latter did not say that the attack on the victim commenced and ended in the
house. On the contrary, he
categorically declared that the victim was initially stabbed near its
gate. It was after this first attack that
the latter rushed towards the house. The assailants then followed him and continued their attack inside the
house. Moreover, there is absolutely no
evidence to indicate any ulterior or improper motive which would have caused
Robert Mingoa to testify against the accused except to see to it that justice
be done. This absence of improper
motive further enhanced his credibility.^[23]
Finally, Mingoa’s failure to state the
complete names of the victim and the latter’s co-employees has no bearing
whatsoever on the case and is entirely irrelevant.

The trial court correctly discredited accused-appellant’s defense
of alibi. We have held that this
defense can be availed of only when there is no clear evidence of the presence
and participation of an accused in the crime charged, and it is impossible for
him to be physically present at the crime scene at the time it was committed.^[24]
Otherwise stated, it cannot prevail over a positive identification of the
accused,^[25]
and will not be appreciated where it was not impossible for the latter to have
been present at the time of the commission of the crime.^[26]
In the instant case, accused-appellant and his companion Palping were
positively identified by Robert Mingoa as the perpetrators of the crime. For this reason alone, the defense of alibi
is worthless. Moreover, the
accused-appellant was allegedly in Caloocan City when the victim was attacked
and killed in Novaliches, Quezon City. The former did not show that it was physically impossible for him to
have been in Novaliches at that particular time by reason of the distance
between these two places. This Court
takes judicial notice of the proximity of Caloocan City to Novaliches, Quezon
City and concludes that it was not impossible for the accused-appellant to have
been present at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing.

All the protestations of innocence by the accused-appellant are
belied by his flight. He did not report
for work the day after the incident. Furthermore, he left his residence, which was at his place of work in
Novaliches, and moved to Caloocan City in the evening of 17 May 1986 where he
stayed for one week with Palping. Thereafter, he transferred to Mandaluyong where he remained until his
arrest.^[27]
He offered no acceptable explanation as to why he so suddenly left his
employment — his only source of livelihood — and why he had to move from one
place to another. It has long been
settled that the flight of the accused is competent evidence against him as
having a tendency to establish his guilt;^[28] unexplained
flight is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn, for the
wicked flee even when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion.^[29]

We are unable to agree with accused-appellant’s proposition that no qualifying circumstance
attended the commission of the crime.

The reconstituted Information alleges three qualifying
circumstances, namely evident premeditation, treachery and the accused’s taking
advantage of superior strength. The
evidence for the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt, through the
testimony of Armando Baldemoro, that on 1 May 1986, the victim and the
accused-appellant quarreled over the latter’s alleged amorous relation with the
formers wife, Edmunda. Before the two
could come to blows, co-workers intervened and pacified them. However, before leaving, accused-appellant
threatened Sotero, saying that given the opportunity, he would kill the latter.^[30]
The killing occurred sixteen (16) days later. At that time, accused-appellant purposely brought along Palping;
together, they attacked the victim.

These facts unerringly show that the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation^[31]
attended the killing of the victim. To
properly appreciate this circumstance, it is necessary to show (a) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating
that he had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution
of his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings.^[32]
Sixteen (16) days afforded accused-appellant more than enough time to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. Anent
the second requisite, the accused-appellant showed that he had clung to his
resolution by entering into a conspiracy with Palping to eliminate Sotero Roy
so he could have Edmunda all to himself.

As regards the allegation of abuse of superior strength, which is
a relative circumstance, We find that the same was not adequately proven. Mere superiority in number is not enough;
there must exist proof of deliberate intent to take advantage of superior
strength.^[33]
Treachery was not likewise established. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.^[34]
In the instant case, Robert Mingoa, the lone eyewitness, was not able to
observe the commencement of the assault; he could, therefore, not testify on
how it all began and developed. In United States vs. Perdon^[35] and United States vs. Pangilion,^[36]
this Court ruled that where no
particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how
the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed,
treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing. Thus, it cannot be considered where the lone
eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault.^[37]
In the instant case, the victim sustained two (2) stab wounds in his chest and
two (2) stab wounds in his back. The
chest wounds could have very well resulted from an initial frontal attack on
the victim; thus, it is possible
that the latter could have even offered some resistance by parrying the thrusts
of the assailants. This is evidenced by
the “[W]ound incised, 3.0 cm. … anterior aspect, chest, left.”^[38]
The possibility of this initial frontal attack and the absence of any proof
that the same was unexpected and sudden sustain a rejection of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

With evident premeditation having been sufficiently established, the
killing of the victim, Sotero Roy, would amount to Murder, penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Since neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were proven, the penalty, pursuant to
Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code, should be imposed in its medium
period. Considering Section 19(1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, and the rule enunciated in People vs. Muñoz,^[39] the trial court correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity should, however, be increased to P50,000.00 in view of the
present policy of this Court.

WHEREFORE, except as to the indemnity which is hereby
increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, the appealed decision of Branch 98 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-43760, dated 30
April 1990 and promulgated on 3 May 1990, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Autopsy Report of Dr. Rodolfo Lisondra, NBI Medico-Legal Officer (Exhibit
“F”).

^[2]
Id.

^[3]
Reconstituted Original Records, 3.

^[4]
Id., 33.

^[5]
Reconstituted Original Records, 34-35.

^[6]
Id., 37.

^[7]
Id., 65.

^[8]
Complying with this Court’s Resolution of 2 September 1992 (Rollo, 65),
both the appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that the
testimony of Dr. Lisondra may be dispensed with (Id., 67; 70). The appellant offered no objection to the
latter’s autopsy report (Exhibit “F”) and certificate of post-mortem
examination (Exhibit “G”).

^[9]
Reconstituted Original Records, 160; Rollo, 32-36.

^[10]
Id., 159-160; Id., 39-40.

^[11]
Id., 59 et seq.

^[12]
Appellee’s Brief, 3-6.

^[13]
Reconstituted Original Records, 165; Rollo, 43.

^[14]
Id., 45.

^[15]
Id., 52, et seq.

^[16]
Appellant’s Brief, 1.

^[17]
Appellant’s Brief, 9.

^[18]
People vs. Genoguin,  56 SCRA 181
[1974]; People vs. Pajenado,
69 SCRA 172 [1976]; People vs. Mahinay, 80 SCRA 273 [1977]; People vs.
Molo, 88 SCRA 22 [1979]; People vs. de la Cruz, 91 SCRA 525 [1979]; People vs. Celestino, 96 SCRA
489 [1980].

^[19]
People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA 303 [1974]; People vs. Balmaceda, 87
SCRA 94 [1978].

^[20]
People vs. Manzanares, 177 SCRA 427 [1989]; People vs. Barba, 203
SCRA 436 [1991].

^[21]
People vs. Pielago, 140 SCRA 418 [1985]; People vs. Noguerras,
181 SCRA 19 [1990].

^[22]
People vs. Castañeda, 93 SCRA 56 [1979].

^[23]
People vs. Valera, 90 SCRA 400 [1979].

^[24]
People vs. Tanchico, 93 SCRA 575 [1979].

^[25]
People vs. Abletes, 58 SCRA 241 [1974]; People vs. Salazar, 58
SCRA 467 [1974]; People vs. Jamero, 75 SCRA 137 [1977]; People vs.
Gonzaga, 77 SCRA 140 [1977]; People vs. Damaso, 86 SCRA 370 [1978];
People vs. Pasco, 181 SCRA 233 [1990]; People vs. Obando, 182
SCRA 95 [1990]; People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232 [1980].

^[26]People
vs. Ignacio, 60 SCRA 11 [1974]; People vs. Lingao, 75 SCRA 130
[1977]; People vs. Lopez, 80 SCRA 18 [1977]; People vs. Dueño, 90
SCRA 23 [1979].

^[27]
TSN, 27 March 1990, 4, 13, 14.

^[28]
U.S. vs. Alegado, 25 Phil. 510 [1913].

^[29]
U.S vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486 [1918]; see also, People vs.
Garcia, G.R. No. 69581, 21 May 1992.

^[30]
TSN, 24 August 1990, 9.

^[31]
Article 14 (13), Revised Penal Code.

^[32]
U.S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530 [1909]; People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA
158 [1972]; People vs. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245 [1974]; People vs.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631 [1974]; People vs. Manzano 58 SCRA 250 [1974];
People vs. Lacao, 60 SCRA 89 [1974]; PeopIe vs. Beralde, 91 SCRA
125 [1979]; People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642 [1991]; People vs. Nabayra,
203 SCRA 75 [1991]; People vs. Barba, 203 SCRA 436 [1991].

^[33]
People vs. Martinez, 96 SCRA 714 [1980].

^[34]
Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code.

^[35]
4 Phil. 141 [1905].

^[36]
34 Phil. 786 [1916].

^[37]
People vs. Cananowa, 92 SCRA 427 [1979]; People vs. Narit, 197
SCRA 334 [1991].

^[38]
Exh. “F”.

^[39]
170 SCRA 107 [1989].