THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MASALIM CASIM, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Accused-appellant Masalim Casim together with John Doe, Peter Doe
and Alfred Doe were charged with the crime of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE in
an Information which reads:

“That on or about March 7, 1987, at around 11:30 p.m., in the
Municipality of Tagig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, and mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of intimidation
and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
lewd designs abduct, take and carry away Aida Pandita y Dinia against her will
from her own dwelling, and once the above-named accused were in possession and
control of said Aida Pandita y Dinia, accused Masalim Casim, by means of force,
intimidation, threats and at the point of a knife did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of her against her
will.”^[1]

Only Masalim Casim was arraigned and, with the assistance of his
counsel, pleaded “NOT GUILTY” to the charge. After trial, a judgment of conviction was
rendered against him on March 2, 1990 by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 152 in Criminal Case No. 71660, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused MASALIM CASIM guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape
defined and punished under Articles 342 and 335 in relation to Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance
attendant thereto and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the complainant the sum of P20,000.00 by way of
moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.

“SO ORDERED.”^[2]

The facts as narrated by the prosecution are as follows:

At around 11:30 p.m. of March 7, 1987, accused Casim went to the
house of the complainant Aida Pandita and had a drinking session with
complainant’s husband Ismael “Mike” Pandita while complainant was
playing with her seven (7) month old daughter in the “sala”.

After finishing four (4) bottles of “Tanduay” which was
brought by the accused Casim, complainant’s husband fell asleep and accused
Casim, while carrying complainant’s daughter, poked a gun toward the side of
the baby and threaten to kill the latter if she refused to go with him, leaving
complainant no other recourse but to go along with the accused. However, before leaving the house with the
accused, complainant was able to scribble on a piece of yellow paper the following
message to her husband, to wit: “Dear Dad, love you dad, kaya lang kung hindi ako sasama papatayin
kami dito. Love, Dina.”^[3]

Thereafter, accused and his two male companions, who were in the
tricycle parked near complainant’s house, brought complainant and her daughter
to a hotel where accused Casim succeeded in forcing complainant to have carnal
knowledge with him.

At around 3:00 a.m. of March 8, 1987, someone picked them up from
their hotel room and brought complainant and her daughter to an old house in
Taytay, Rizal and kept them for nine (9) days in a dilapidated room of said
house. While complainant and her
daughter were held in captivity at said place, accused Casim repeatedly had
sexual intercourse with the complainant and whenever the accused left said
place, a man and a “tomboy” would guard and keep them company.

On the 10th day of their captivity or on March 17, 1987, accused
Casim went out to buy milk for complainant’s daughter and left the door of the
house open which enabled complainant to escape although she had to leave her
daughter behind since the “tomboy” was holding the baby at the time
of her escape. Thereafter, she
immediately took a taxi home and reported her harrowing experience to her
husband who requested his relatives to accompany complainant and rescue their
daughter.^[4]

On the following morning or on March 18, 1987, complainant went
to the police station and executed a statement regarding said incident.^[5]
After which, she was brought to Camp Crame for her medical examination wherein
the medico-legal examiner concluded that “there are no external signs of
recent application of any form of trauma. Subject is in a non-virgin state physically.”^[6]

Accused-appellant, however, disputes the foregoing facts and
alleged that:

“On March 7, 1987 he and the complainant eloped from the
latter’s house where she was living with Ismael “Mike” Pandita. With them were the complainant’s young
daughter and a maid. They went to
Quiapo and slept at the Echaque Hotel where they had sexual relation for four
(4) times that night. From the hotel
they went to Antipolo, Rizal where they stayed for more than three (3) weeks in
a rented room. During that period he
continued to work as a driver of Commissioner Musib Buat of the National Labor
Relations Commission and would return home only after work, sometimes during
weekends.”^[7]

Accused-appellant further maintained that he never courted
complainant. On the contrary, it was
complainant herself who requested him to take her away because of her miserable
life with her husband who was maltreating her. In fact, he had received more than ten (10) love notes from the
complainant and had already brought complainant’s personal belongings to a
neighbor’s house named George before they eloped. However, when he told complainant to return to her husband, complainant
refused, presenting him with a problem, so much so that he had to seek the
advice of his employer, Musib Buat, who told him to bring complainant to the
Office of Muslim Affairs.

Thereafter, Musib Buat brought complainant to her husband, Mike
Pandita, who requested Buat to fetch their daughter and maid from Taytay. Thereafter, complainant and her husband
reconciled and Mike Pandita agreed to refer the matter to the eldest Muslim at
the Maharlika Village. Accused-appellant’s version of the incident was corroborated by Musib
Buat, a former Commissioner for Muslim Affairs.^[8]

Hence, this appeal raising the issue of whether the guilt of the
accused-appellant was established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the
crime of forcible abduction. The
elements of forcible abduction are the following: that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age,
civil status, or reputation; that the abduction is against her will; and that
the abduction is with lewd designs.

On the other hand, Article 335 of the same Code also defines and
penalizes the crime of rape. The
elements of rape pertinent to the instant case are the following: that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman and that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.

The crime of forcible abduction with rape is both difficult to
prove or to disprove considering the very nature of the offense. The resolution of the case would hinge on
whose version is more credible and trustworthy considering the circumstances
surrounding its commission, that of the complainant or that of the
accused-appellant, calling for a careful examination and synthesis of the
evidence on record.

The thrust of the defense is that complainant was not abducted
nor raped. It was an elopement, wherein
complainant willingly went with accused-appellant.

This Court notes that the prosecution relied heavily on the
testimony of the complaining witness which is inherently weak, fraught with
material inconsistencies and replete with highly improbable circumstances to
sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

In the instant case, complainant stated in her sworn complaint
before the fiscal that she was abducted and raped by the accused-appellant with
the use of a knife.^[9]
However, at the witness stand complainant contradicted her own statement when
she testified that accused-appellant poked a gun at her seven months old
daughter to compel her to go with him.^[10]
These unexplained conflicting accounts, involving as they do a very essential
element of the offense of forcible abduction with rape, which is the employment
of force and coercion, necessarily impair the credibility of the complaining
witness and the same cannot simply be dismissed as a minor discrepancy. The circumstances under which
accused-appellant allegedly poked his weapon at the side of complainant’s
daughter, indicate that complainant could clearly see the kind of weapon used by
the accused-appellant as the latter had taken the child in his arms and was
facing the complainant at the time. Thus, it is highly improbable that complainant would not be able to
distinguish whether appellant had used a gun or a knife in forcing her to go
with him. Indeed, complainant could not
have been mistaken as to the type of weapon used since the latter allegedly
continued to threaten her with said weapon inside the tricycle while trying to
get away from their place.

Complainant also stated in her complaint that there were three
(3) other unidentified men with the accused-appellant when the latter abducted
her but during the trial, complainant testified that aside from the appellant,
there were only two other persons who abducted her.^[11]
Again, no explanation was given by complainant for the discrepancy.

It is also stated in her Sworn Statement that her escape was made
possible when the accused-appellant happened to leave the door of the house
where she was detained open, thereby giving her the opportunity to call her cousin
who thereafter fetched complainant and her daughter from said place. However, in court complainant gave a
different version, that she was able to escape when she requested the
accused-appellant to buy milk for her daughter.^[12]

Complainant further stated in her Sworn Statement that she was
detained more or less for seven (7) days, but when she testified in court she
stated that she was detained by the accused-appellant from March 7, 1987 up to
March 17, 1987 or for a period of ten (10) days.^[13]

Finally, complainant’s allegation that she was raped by the
accused-appellant deserve scant consideration in the absence of external
injuries around the genital area or other parts of her body.^[14]

Jurisprudence teaches Us that where the sworn statement
given during the preliminary examination conflicts with that given during
the trial, and the variance in the answers of the witness is greatly
disturbing and irreconcilable, the testimony of said witness should not be
given in evidence as the discrepancy in the witness’ statements show that
he was either lying when he executed it or he had simply forgotten what he
truly witnessed.^[15]
Simply stated, serious inexplicable discrepancies between a previously executed
sworn statement of a witness and her testimonial declarations as to the
appellant’s participation in the commission of a crime raise a grave doubt on
the veracity of her account.^[16]

While conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses
are not to be disturbed on appeal, this doctrine bows to the immutable rule
that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.^[17]
The appellate court is thus not bound by the trial court’s factual findings
where its assessment of the evidence discloses a failure on the part of the
prosecution to satisfy the burden of proof in criminal cases.

Moreover, in crimes against chastity, the testimony of the
injured woman should not be received with precipitate credulity. When the conviction depends at any vital
point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted unless her
sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. For rape is an accusation easy to make, hard to prove, but harder to be
defended by the party accused, though innocent.^[18]

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and the
accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Cost
de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., no part.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 4.

^[2]
Id., at p. 49.

^[3]
Records, p. 75.

^[4]
T.S.N. September 2, 1988, pp. 21-24.

^[5]
Records, pp. 76-77.

^[6]
Id., at p. 78.

^[7]
Rollo, at p. 44.

^[8]
Records, at pp. 104-105.

^[9]
Id., at p. 1.

^[10]
T.S.N., November 4, 1988, p. 14.

^[11]
Id., at p. 11.

^[12]
T.S.N., September 2, 1988, p. 21.

^[13]
T.S.N., November 4, 1988, p. 9.

^[14]
People vs. Bardaje, G.R. No. L-29771, Aug. 29, 1980.

^[15]
People vs. Magallanes, G.R. No. L-63936, January 7, 1987, 147 SCRA 92.

^[16]
People vs. Tulagan, G.R. No. L-68620, July 22, 1986, 143 SCRA 107.

^[17]
No. L-47500, People vs. Maribung, 149 SCRA 292, (1987).

^[18]
People vs. Cui, Jr., 162 SCRA 220 (1988).