VICENTE J. SANTI, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO A. REYES, JR., REPRESENTED BY ALEXANDER REYES, RESPONDENTS.
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Santi versus Court of Appeals
The Case
This is a petition for review brought by Vicente J. Santi, the owner of a parcel of land in Cavite City, against the Court of Appeals and the heirs of Augusto A. Reyes, Jr., who are the lessees of a cinema house built on that land. The whole controversy turns on a single question of contract interpretation: whether the phrase "said period of lease being extendable for another period of twenty years" in a lease contract means that the lease renews itself automatically, or whether it merely means that the lease is capable of being extended by a new agreement. The case matters because it draws a sharp line between two kinds of lease clauses — an automatic extension and a mere option to extend — and because it shows how the Court treats a lessee who stays on after the contract ends, through the implied new lease under the Civil Code.
Procedural History
Vicente Santi filed a complaint before the trial court, the Municipal Trial Court of Cavite City, seeking to recover possession of the leased premises after the lease expired. The trial court rendered judgment for Santi, ordering the heirs of Augusto Reyes, Jr. to turn over possession of the property, to pay a monthly rental of 1,000 pesos beginning April 1, 1982 until they vacated the premises, to pay 5,000 pesos as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The heirs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the lease had been automatically extended for another twenty years. Santi then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review, and the Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the decision of the trial court, subject to a modification of the rental rate.
Facts
Esperanza Jose was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Cavite City, described as Lot 3, Block 89, with an area of 1,472 square meters. On July 12, 1957, she leased a portion of the property to the spouses Eugenio Vitan and Beatriz Francisco for a period of twenty years, automatically extended for another twenty years, at a monthly rental of 220 pesos. The lessees built a cinema house on the land. In 1962, the lessees sold all their rights, interests, and participation over the cinema house, together with their leasehold rights, to Augusto A. Reyes, Jr., and a new contract of lease was entered into between Esperanza Jose and Augusto Reyes, Jr.
The new lease ran for twenty years from April 1, 1962, at a monthly rental of 180 pesos payable in advance, and its period was "extendable" for another twenty years at a monthly rental of 220 pesos, also payable in advance. In the meantime, Esperanza Jose sold all her rights and participation over the land to Vicente J. Santi, and a new title was issued in his favor.
When the lease expired on March 31, 1982, Santi wrote to Alexander Reyes, representing the heirs of Augusto Reyes, Jr., who had died, informing him of the termination of the lease and demanding peaceful turnover of possession. The heirs refused, on the ground that, after consulting their lawyer, they had been advised that the lease was automatically extended for another twenty years at 220 pesos a month. They tendered that amount to Santi, who refused it, and they deposited the amounts with the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Cavite City. Santi filed a complaint before the Barangay Captain, and no settlement having been reached, a certification to file action was issued. At pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only question for resolution was the interpretation of paragraph 3 of the lease contract.
Issues
- Whether or not the phrase "said period of lease being extendable for another period of twenty years" in the lease contract means that the lease was automatically extended for another twenty years without any new agreement between the parties.
- Whether or not the lessees, having continued in possession after the expiration of the lease, are bound to pay a monthly rental of 1,000 pesos, as the trial court ordered, or only 220 pesos, the amount stipulated in the contract.
Applicable Provisions
Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides:
If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
This is the Court's starting point: where the contract is clear, its literal meaning controls, and the Court reads the disputed phrase in its ordinary sense.
Article 1670 of the Civil Code provides:
If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.
This governs what happens when the lessees stay on after the lease ends, and it is the basis for the Court's correction of the rental rate.
Article 1687 of the Civil Code provides:
If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly, and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.
This supplies the period of the implied new lease, which the Court fixes by reference to the monthly rental stipulated in the contract.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court ruled that the lease was not automatically extended. The phrase "being extendable" means "capable of being extended," and it does not by itself bring a new lease into existence. The Court compared the two contracts. The earlier lease of 1957 expressly provided that the period "shall be automatically extended for another twenty years," and the Court held that this clause, being clear and unambiguous, had to be read in the sense the parties meant it. But the phrase "automatically extended" did not appear and was not used in the later lease with Augusto Reyes, Jr., and the Court said this was for the simple reason that the lessor did not want to be bound by an automatic extension. The Court explained that the lessor's intention was not to automatically extend the lease but to give herself time to ponder and think whether to extend it, and that if she decided to do so, a new contract would have to be entered into for another twenty years at 220 pesos a month. The Court added that if the parties had intended an automatic extension, they could easily have provided for a straight forty-year contract instead of twenty.
On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in fixing the rental at 1,000 pesos a month. Under Article 1670, when the lessee continues to enjoy the thing leased after the end of the contract with the acquiescence of the lessor, an implied new lease arises, not for the period of the original contract but for the period established in Article 1687, and the other terms of the original contract are revived. Since the contract provided for a monthly rental of 220 pesos upon the expiration of the first twenty years, the lessees were bound by that amount. The private respondents may therefore continue to occupy the premises, provided this is with the permission and consent of the petitioner as lessor, and they must pay 220 pesos a month from April 1, 1982 until they vacate and turn over possession.
Doctrine
A lease clause stating that the period of lease is "extendable" for another period does not create an automatic extension. It means only that the lease is capable of being extended, and an extension requires a new agreement between the parties. By contrast, a clause stating that the period "shall be automatically extended" produces an automatic extension by the mere lapse of the original term. The controlling rule is that when the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control, as Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides. Finally, when the lessee continues to enjoy the thing leased after the end of the contract with the acquiescence of the lessor, an implied new lease arises under Article 1670, not for the period of the original contract but for the period fixed in Article 1687, with the other terms of the original contract revived — including the stipulated rental.
Disposition
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the decision of the trial court, modified so that the heirs of Augusto Reyes, Jr. must turn over possession of the property and pay a monthly rental of 220 pesos from April 1, 1982 until they vacate, plus 5,000 pesos in attorney's fees, with costs.
Remember This
The one line to memorize: "extendable" is not "automatically extended" — the first requires a new agreement, the second extends the lease by its own force. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between an automatic extension and a mere option to extend, and to test the implied new lease under Article 1670 of the Civil Code.