PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VIRGILIO SANTOS Y CONCEPCION, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
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Santos versus People
The Case
This is the appeal of Virgilio Santos y Concepcion, known in his neighborhood as Tatang Biliong, from a conviction for delivering dried marijuana flowering tops in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The People prosecuted him for delivering to another 75.1 kilograms of marijuana, and the trial court sent him to life imprisonment. The case matters for the bar because it fixes the meaning of the word deliver in the dangerous drugs law: the Court holds that delivery need not be personal, and that the reason for the delivery is irrelevant. It also teaches the rule on retroactive application of penal laws when the amendatory law is harsher than the law in force at the time of the crime.
Procedural History
Virgilio Santos was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 58, with violating Section 4, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After trial, the court, in a decision dated 23 April 1990, found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 pesos. He appealed directly to the Supreme Court, praying for acquittal on three grounds, which the Court discussed one by one.
Facts
On 27 September 1987, a team of Philippine Constabulary soldiers conducted a surveillance along Sadie Street, Angeles City, following reports of a huge delivery of marijuana to the house of a certain Tatang Biliong by persons coming from the Mountain Province. The surveillance began in the evening and continued until eleven o'clock the following morning, when the team saw the accused, who is Tatang Biliong, transferring three boxes and two pieces of luggage from his house to the house of his next-door neighbor, Marciana Karganilla. When the team tried to apprehend him, he evaded arrest. The team seized the boxes and luggage from Karganilla's house and found them stuffed with dried marijuana flowering tops weighing 75.1 kilograms.
The accused denied the account. He claimed he first saw the boxes and luggage in the early morning of 28 September 1987 when he went to his motor shop, located in front of his house. His welder, Vicente Camat, told him that five persons had left the boxes the previous day and promised to return the next morning to have their vehicle fixed. Seeing a firecracker through an opening in one of the boxes, the accused instructed Camat to move them away from the welding equipment to a safer place, and Camat transferred them to Karganilla's house with the help of another welder, Renato Villanueva. The accused then sought the help of the Chief of the City Fire Department to verify whether the boxes contained firecrackers, but by the time they returned, the police had already seized the boxes.
The trial court rejected the defense, reasoning that five persons would not simply leave 75.1 kilograms of marijuana at a motor shop unless they knew its owner and were in cahoots with him. It found the version of the arresting team more credible, especially since no improper motive was attributed to the team.
Issues
- Whether or not the accused may be held liable for delivering marijuana when, according to the prosecution witness Marciana Karganilla, it was some other person who actually made the delivery.
- Whether or not entrusting the marijuana to another for safekeeping, rather than giving it away, constitutes the delivery penalized by the Dangerous Drugs Act.
- Whether or not the accused's claim of lack of knowledge of the contents of the boxes, and his claim that no one would commit the crime in broad daylight, should acquit him.
Applicable Provisions
Section 4, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 provides:
Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of x x x shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transaction.
This is the provision under which the accused was charged and convicted, and its text frames the whole appeal.
Section 2, paragraph f, of the same law defines the word deliver:
The word deliver refers to a person's act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.
The definition is decisive because it expressly covers passing the drug to another personally or otherwise, which answers the first issue.
Article 21, in relation to Article 22, of the Revised Penal Code provides:
No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
This provision governs the Court's refusal to apply the harsher penalties introduced by the later amendatory law.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the argument lacks merit. It does not matter whether the accused personally delivered the boxes or some other person did so at his behest, because the act of delivering prohibited drugs is not limited to deliveries made personally by the accused but covers those effected through other means as well. What is material is that the giving of the prohibited drug was pursuant to the instruction of the accused, even if he did not personally deliver it. The Court also found the claim that his helper transferred the boxes without his knowledge unbelievable, since the helper had no reason on his own to choose Karganilla's house, which was farther than the employer's own house, and the accused had no special relationship with Karganilla apart from being her neighbor. Moreover, Karganilla never said that it was not the accused who delivered the boxes; she testified only that a woman from his house asked that the packages be stored for safekeeping, and she did not see who actually delivered them.
On the second issue, the Court held that whether the boxes were entrusted for safekeeping makes no difference. Section 4 makes the delivery of prohibited drugs an offense regardless of the reason for it, and mere delivery is enough to constitute the offense. The Court added that we should not distinguish where the law does not.
On the third issue, the Court held that the claim of ignorance cannot prosper, because both nocturnity and daylight can be used to camouflage illegal activities. Criminals may choose daylight, hiding behind the mass of humanity or taking advantage of the lowered defenses induced by the false feeling of security that no crime can be committed in daytime. Here the scheme would have succeeded had prior information not reached the narcotics command. Finally, the Court reiterated that findings of the trial court on matters of credibility are conclusive absent a showing that some fact or circumstance of weight and substance was overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.
On the penalty, the Court noted that when the offense was committed, the violation was punished with life imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 pesos, but the law had since been amended to impose reclusion perpetua and a fine ranging from 500,000 pesos to 10,000,000 pesos. A retroactive application of the new penalties would be clearly unfavorable to the accused, so the Court affirmed the penalty imposed by the trial court. The increased fine cannot be imposed, and neither can reclusion perpetua, because although its duration is fixed, it carries the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification, which the accused cannot justifiably be made to suffer.
Doctrine
First, the delivery of prohibited drugs under Section 4, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is not limited to personal delivery by the accused. Delivery through another person, at the accused's behest, is equally punishable, because the definition of deliver covers passing the drug to another personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.
Second, mere delivery is enough to constitute the offense. The law makes no distinction as to the reason for the delivery, and courts should not distinguish where the law does not. Entrusting the drug for safekeeping is therefore no defense.
Third, findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are conclusive on appeal absent a showing that a fact or circumstance of weight and substance was overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.
Fourth, a penal law cannot be applied retroactively when it is unfavorable to the accused, under Article 21 in relation to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the amendatory law increases the fine and substitutes reclusion perpetua, with its accessory penalties, for life imprisonment, the penalty in force at the time of the crime governs.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court finding Virgilio Santos y Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to life imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 pesos, with costs against him.
Remember This
Memorize the line that delivery of a prohibited drug need not be personal, for it may be effected through another at the accused's behest, and that mere delivery is enough regardless of the reason. Examiners use this case to test the definition of deliver under the dangerous drugs law and the rule against retroactive application of a harsher penalty.