G.R. No. 93511. June 03, 1993
CORAZON L. CABAGNOT IN HER CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF AKLAN, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND RENATO R. BAUTISTA, PEDRO R. SAYON, EUFEMIA I. MAQUINICA, ARLYN…
ROMERO, J.:
The present petition seeks the reversal of Civil Service
Commission Resolutions dated August 23, 1989 and April 10, 1990 ordering the
reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions or positions of
comparable or equivalent rank.
On September 21, 1988, the new organizational structure and
staffing pattern of the provincial government of Aklan was approved by the
Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration (JCLGPA) thru the
Director of the Bureau of Local Government Supervision. The reorganization provided three hundred
sixty four (364) regular plantilla positions from the previous three hundred
thirty nine (339) with the Office of the Governor allocated one hundred forty
four (144) from the previous sixty (60) positions. The implementation of the reorganization plan was subject to
several conditions, relevant of which are the following:
“x x x x
x x x
x x
2. that the qualification standards for each
position shall be in accordance with the standards set therefor by the Civil
Service Commission;
x x x x
x x x
x x
5. that there shall be no reduction in actual
salary of the employees except in instances where the salaries of such
employees equal or exceed the salary of
their immediate supervisor; in which case, the actual salary of the subordinate
employees shall be reduced by at least one (1) step rate below that of the
immediate supervisor;
6. that all retained personnel shall be issued
new appointments except those who are occupying elective positions and those
appointed by national officials;
x x x x
x x x
x x
9. that the placement of personnel shall be in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6656 dated June 10, 1988 and the implementing
rules and regulations issued by the
Civil Service Commission;
x x x x
x x x x x.”[1]
Governor Corazon L. Cabagnot, petitioner herein, issued a
Memorandum dated November 2, 1988 inviting all provincial officials and
employees to apply for any of the authorized positions in the new staffing
pattern for the evaluation and assessment of the Provincial Placement Committee
which petitioner subsequently created thru Executive Order No. OII-88.
On January 5, 1989, the list of employees newly appointed and
re-appointed was posted. Individual letters
were sent to all employees in the list directing them to accomplish and submit
the necessary documents to complete their appointment and to report to their
assigned offices. On January 17, 1989,
twenty-one (21) supposedly aggrieved employees jointly appealed to petitioner
pursuant to Section 18 of the Rules on Government Reorganization issued by the
Civil Service Commission and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 12 of Republic Act 6656
(1988) entitled An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers
and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization. They prayed that they be appointed to the
positions they applied for to which they are eligible, having the required
educational background, training and experience. They likewise sent petitioner individual letters reiterating
their qualifications and praying for reconsideration of their new appointments
to positions lower in rank than their positions prior to the reorganization.
In denying their appeal, petitioner explained that since
reorganization renders all positions vacant, the employees have no vested right
to their original positions. Moreover,
as the appointing authority, she enjoys the prerogative to transfer employees
to offices other than those they previously occupied if such is necessary to
make them function more effectively. Lastly, the appointments of private respondents did not violate the
Civil Service Law on security of tenure as the items offered them carried the
same rate and salary they were receiving prior to the reorganization, i.e.,
there was no diminution or reduction of their salary.
Out of the original twenty-one (21) protestants only seventeen
(17), private respondents herein, instituted a collective appeal dated March 2
and 29, 1989 before the Civil Service Regional Office in Iloilo City praying
that:
“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable
Commission:
1. Declaring the reorganizational structure and
new staffing pattern of the province of Aklan to be a failure it being not in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 6656 specifically as it is violative of Sec. 2 (c), Sec. 2 (d),
Sec. 2 (e) in relation to Sec. 3, Sec. 4 and Sec. 5 of the said law;
2. Ordering protestee-appellee to appoint the
protestants-appellants rightful and qualified appointees to the positions they
applied for and declaring protestee-appellee’s proposed appointees to the positions applied for by
protestants-appellants as null and void;
3. Ordering protestee-appellee to reinstate
terminated protestants-appellants and/or appoint them to positions where their
qualification, experience, training and civil service eligibilities may fit
them;
4. Ordering protestee-appellee to direct the
fiscal authorities of the province of Aklan to pay the salaries due the protestants-appellants
in the meantime that their appeals are being considered by the Honorable
Commission and directing the fiscal authorities of the province of Aklan to
desist from paying the salaries of protestee-appellee’s appointees as
protestee-appellee’s appointees do not have duly attested or approved
appointments from the Civil Service Commission.
Other reliefs deemed just and equitable are likewise prayed for.”[2]
In the Resolution dated August 23, 1989, respondent Civil Service
Commission found that irregularities attended the election of the two members
representing the first and second level personnel to the Placement Committee
based on the affidavit executed by one Nida E. Melgarejo and the letter appeal
of some thirty-seven (37) employees of the provincial government of Aklan. Furthermore, it found petitioner to have
violated Sec. 7 of the Rules on Reorganization and Memorandum Circular No. 5,
s. of 1988 providing preference for appointment of employees holding permanent
positions considering that private respondents who were all holding permanent
appointments to regular items prior to the reorganization were proposed to
positions much lower than their former items despite the fact that their old
items were carried over in the new staffing pattern. The Commission found no reason for displacing the services of
private respondents primarily because there are eighty-four (84) additional
positions for the Office of the Governor alone. Hence, it directed that:
“1. A new election be conducted within five (5)
days from receipt of this decision to elect the representatives of the first
and second level employees to the Placement Committee in an open election where
members of the rank and file will have
the opportunity to cast their vote. A
Commission on Election should be constituted for this purpose to preside during
the election. The Director of the Civil
Service Regional Office IV should witness the election proceedings and report
to the Chairman of this Commission on the results thereof. The newly elected representatives will then
replace those allegedly elected in November 1988.
2. The Placement Committee shall immediately convene after the election to
re-assess and re-evaluate the qualifications of all appointees including herein
appellants for placement to positions comparable to their former positions which evaluation shall be completed within
fifteen (15) days after the election.
3. Pending completion of the evaluation, the Assistant Provincial Treasurer
or Officer-in-Charge is hereby directed to pay the salary of the appellants
retroactive to the date payment thereof was stopped, effective immediately,
based on the salary rate of their old items prior to the reorganization if they
had reported for work as shown from their Daily Time Records;
4. That appellants submit all pertinent documents (like Personal Data
Sheets, Performance Ratings for the last two years, etc.) required of them by
the Governor, as bases for the latter to prepare the necessary placement
documents; and
5. The Commission be informed of the action taken hereon within twenty (20)
days from receipt of this decision.”[3]
In her Motion for Reconsideration dated September 15, 1989,
petitioner questioned the Commission’s finding of irregularities in the election
of the two members representing the first and second level personnel to the
Placement Committee and its order that another election be held anew to elect
said representatives. Petitioner
pointed out that private respondents did not contest the conduct of the
election of the two representatives; much less did they pray for the holding of
a new election. In an effort to prove
that the election was clean, honest and orderly, petitioner attached the
minutes of the meeting where the two representatives were elected, the
affidavit of all the employees who attended the said meeting and the letter of
Nida E. Melgarejo and Evangelina M. Baladjay informing petitioner that they
have received their salary and that any written complaint signed by any of them
should be considered null and void.
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration was filed by private
respondents who, noting that the same focussed only on the findings of
irregularity in the election of the two representatives, petitioner was deemed
to have accepted the findings of the Commission regarding the invalidity of the
reorganization. As to the
irregularities in the Placement Committee, they questioned the joint affidavit
of the employees who supposedly participated therein, for among the affiants,
only fourteen (14) were permanent employees, twelve (12) were temporary
employees and thirty-two (32) were casuals who did not belong to the first and
second level participants. They
likewise questioned the import of Melgarejo’s and Baladjay’s letter which, for
them, was not a retraction of the former’s affidavit but a mere clarification
on matters relative to their appointments.
Petitioner filed a supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration
which, not only reiterated the absence of factual and legal bases for the
Commission to order a new election but also asserted her wide latitude of
choice, as appointing power, in determining the best qualified for the
position. She insisted that Section 7
of the Rules on Reorganization providing for preference of appointment is
directory and not mandatory.
In their reply to the supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration, private respondents, while recognizing the appointing power’s
prerogative based on assessment and perception of the employees’
qualifications, maintained that the same is subject to existing rules, namely,
Rep. Act No. 6656 and the Rules on Reorganization of the Civil Service
Commission.
On April 10, 1990, the Commission promulgated its second
Resolution modifying the Resolution of August 23, 1989 to the extent that the
earlier order calling for a new election and the reconvening of the Placement
Committee was deemed unnecessary in light of the new evidence presented by
petitioner and the length of time the controversy has been raging. However, after a thorough study, it found
that a wide disparity existed between the former positions held by private
respondents (except Oczon) and the positions proposed for them by petitioner
even if equivalent positions were available. With the case of Floreza v. Ongpin[4]
as authority, it declared private respondents to have been demoted. Private respondent Oczon was found to have
been terminated/removed. Moreover,
petitioner was found to have violated Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6656 providing
preference for appointment of permanent employees to the new positions or if
there are not enough comparable ones, to positions next lower in rank. Thus, the Commission ordered that:
“1. Appellants be immediately appointed and
restored to their positions or positions of comparable or equivalent rank
without loss of seniority rights with back salaries reckoned from the dates
they should properly have been appointed thereto effective the date of the
reorganization of said province.
2. Appellants
who were demoted in position or proposed to much lower position be reverted to
their position or positions of comparable or equivalent rank with payment of
salary differentials, if any reckoned from the dates they were demoted.
3. Appellant Oczon who was terminated as Janitor be restored to his former
position if still available, otherwise to the new position of Utility Worker
with payment of back salaries retroactive to the effective date of
reorganization.
4. It
is further directed that the CSC Region VI Director in Iloilo City coordinate
with the Provincial Governor’s Office in the implementation of this Resolution specifically in the
determination of proper comparable position of appellants suitable to their
qualifications.”[5]
Petitioner, believing that the questioned resolutions were issued
with grave abuse of discretion because they encroached on her power to appoint,
filed the present petition.
On November 22, 1990, the Court resolved to issue a Temporary
Restraining Order ordering respondent Civil Service Commission to cease and
desist from implementing the questioned resolutions.
The principles defining the extent of the power of the appointing
authority vis-a-vis that of the Civil Service Commission are well-settled.[6]
The power to appoint is essentially discretionary. The only condition for its proper exercise by the appointing
authority is that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. The determination of who among
several candidates for a position possesses the best qualifications rests
solely on the appointing authority who occupies the ideal vantage point from
which to identify and designate the individual who can best fill the post and
discharge its functions. Once the
discretion has been exercised, the CSC cannot replace the appointee with an
employee of its choice whom it believes to be better qualified because the
power of the CSC is merely confined to approving or disapproving
appointments. In other words, it is
limited to the determination of whether the appointee possesses the required
qualifications for the post. Thereafter, its participation in the appointment process ceases. Substituting its judgment for that of the
appointing authority constitutes encroachment on the latter’s discretion. Even this Court cannot control the
appointing authority’s discretion as long as it is exercised properly.
Petitioner anchors her case on these established principles which
have been consistently applied in cases of contested appointments where the CSC
revokes the appointment made by the appointing authority and directs the
appointment of another person whom it believes to be better qualified. In these cases, we upheld the discretion of
the appointing authority whenever it is exercised properly. The situation in the case at bar is
different. Here, the CSC is not
revoking any appointment made by petitioner. It is merely ordering the reinstatement of private respondents whom it
found to have been demoted or terminated. Thus, the basic issue in this case is whether, as a result of the
reorganization undertaken by the Provincial Government of Aklan, the security
of tenure of private respondents is impaired.
The CSC found that sixteen (16) of the seventeen (17) private
respondents were demoted because of the wide disparity between the former
positions held by them and the positions to which they were proposed by
petitioner. In the succeeding
discussion, those who are similarly situated are grouped accordingly.
A. Renato Bautista, Ma. Mujane
Begonia Miroy, Pedro Sayon, Eufemia Maquinica, Anita Meren, Vivian Ruiz, Arlyn
Buensalido and Reba Concepcion.
Mr. Bautista, the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator
of the Provincial Development Staff (PDS), applied for the same position under
the newly-named Provincial Planning and Development Office (PPDO), formerly
PDS. Petitioner gave him the position
of Tax Mapper I in the Provincial Assessor’s Office (PASSO), a position lower
by fourteen (14) grades. He claims he
was, not only demoted, but his right of preference was also violated
considering his fourteen (14) years of service with PDS where he has undergone
all relevant training and seminars. He
believes that he cannot perform the work of a Tax Mapper for lack of
educational qualifications and experience.
Ms. Miroy, the Development Project Analyst at the PDS, applied
for the positions of Planning Officer I and Project Development Officer I in
the same office. She was given the
position of Tax Mapping Aide at the PASSO, a position lower by six (6) grades.
Mr. Sayon used to be the Executive Assistant in the Office of the
Provincial Governor (OPG). He applied
for the positions of Administrative Officer II and Management and Audit Analyst
but was offered the position of Construction and Maintenance Capataz at the
Provincial Engineers Office (PEO) which is six (6) grades lower.
Ms. Maquinica, Personnel Officer I at the OPG applied for the
positions of Management and Audit Analyst I and II, also at the OPG. The position proposed to her was that of
Security Guard I. She believed she could
not very well accept this position which is five (5) grades lower than the one
she previously held and for which she is not qualified, considering her
physical condition.
Ms. Meren, as the incumbent Development Project Assistant at PDS,
applied for the same position though renamed Project Development Assistant in
PPDO (formerly PDS). She was given the
position of Community Affairs Worker at the Public Affairs Information and
Assistance Office (PAIAD) of the OPG, a position lower by four (4) grades.
As Public Information Assistant of the OPG, Ms. Ruiz was the
editor of the two previous provincial newsletters: Tambuli and Inforcen Balita. She applied for the positions of Information Assistant and Information
Officer, both at the OPG. She was given
the position of Security Guard I which is three (3) grades below her previous
position.
As former Senior Personnel Aide, Ms. Buensalido applied for the
positions of Clerk II and Communications Equipment Operator since she was also
a holder of a radio operator eligibility. She was offered the position of Security Guard which is two (2) grades
lower than her former position.
Ms. Concepcion, former Senior Clerk at the OPG, applied for the
positions of Clerk III and Records Officer II of the OPG but was proposed for
the position of Security Guard I, a position lower by two (2) grades.
These private respondents were given positions which were not
only lower, by two (2) to as much as fourteen (14) grades, but which were
different in nature from the ones they previously held.
B. Joyce Martirez, Annie Dala, Ellen Tolentino and Margareth Natal.
As a former Clerical Aide at the Personnel Division of the OPG,
Ms. Martirez applied for the position of Clerk I at the Human Resources
Development Office (HRDO), a new office which performs the functions of the
abolished Personnel Division. She was
instead given the position of Utility Worker at the General Services of the OPG
which is not only a grade lower but also caused a change in the nature of her
work – from clerk to janitor. She
believes this offer did not take into account her educational qualification (BS
Commerce Major in Business Administration), her more than five years of service
as clerk and the fact that she was a former clerk in the same office.
Ms. Dala, the former Training Officer of the PDS, applied for the
positions of Project Evaluation Officer and Planning Assistant at the PPDO
(former PDS). Instead, she was offered
the position of Information Writer in the PAIAD, a position lower by one
grade. She claims she lacks the
necessary experience to perform the new task.
As the former Personnel Officer III at the Personnel Division of
the OPG, Ms. Tolentino applied for the positions of Human Resource Development
Officer II and IV. She was offered
instead the position of Statistician I at PASSO. She refused to accept the same, not only because it was a grade
lower, but also because she does not possess the necessary educational
qualification, experience, and training for it.
Ms. Natal was the Treasury Accounts Examiner of the Provincial
Treasurer’s Office (PTO) when she applied for the position of Local Treasury
Operations Officer I. She was instead
appointed as Revenue Collection Clerk which, she says, demoted her by one grade
and changed her status from an examiner to a mere clerk in the same office.
These private respondents were offered positions lower by one
grade although they applied for positions which they have shown to be
comparable to the ones they previously held.
C. Estelito Silva, Eves Poblacion and Tita Lumio.
Mr. Silva, a clerk at PASSO, applied for the same position
because it was not abolished. However,
he was given the position of Utility Worker I in the General Services Division
(GSD) at OPG. His new position,
although belonging to the same salary grade (SG-3), is actually lower by two
steps.
Ms. Poblacion, a clerk at the OPG applied for the same position,
as well as the positions of HRD aide in the same office, and of statistician at
PASSO. She was, however, given the
position of security guard, a position of the same salary grade (SG-3) but a
step lower.
Ms. Lumio, the Property Management Officer at the Provincial
Treasury Office (PTO) applied for the position of Local Treasury Operation
Officer IV in the same office, as well as for the position of Administrative
Officer II at the GSD. Instead, she was
given the position of Records Officer II at the latter’s office, a position of
the same salary grade (SG-10) but lower by one step.
It is to be observed that these private respondents were given
positions of the same salary grade but lower by one or two steps. Moreover, there was a change in the nature
of their work and their status. Mr.
Silva was demoted from clerk to janitor; Ms. Poblacion, from clerk also to
security guard and Ms. Lumio was reduced to a mere subordinate from being a
former division chief.
D. Priscilla Briones
As former clerical aide at the Personnel Division of the OPG, Ms.
Briones applied for the same position at the same office, now called,
HRDO. However, she was given the
position of bindery helper at the PASSO which is of the same grade and step as
her former position.
While there was no actual decrease in the salary grade and step
of Ms. Briones, there was a change in the nature of her work – from clerk to
bindery helper.
We agree with the CSC when it found that a glaring disparity
exists between the former positions held by private respondents and the
positions proposed to them by petitioner. This is fairly obvious in the case of respondents Bautista, et al. who were
given positions which were, not only lower by two grades to as much as
fourteen, but which also changed the nature of their work. This is also true with respect to
respondents Martirez, et al. who were given positions lower by one grade
despite the showing that comparable positions exist. In the case of respondents Silva, et al. there were differences
in their proposed positions, by one or two steps. Finally, in the case of Briones, the disparity consists, not so
much in the salary grade and/or step, but in the nature of the work.
Section I of Rep. Act No. No. 6656 declares as the policy of the
State, the protection of the security of tenure of civil service officers and
employees in the reorganization of the various agencies of the government. Section 2 requires prior determination of a
valid cause after due notice and hearing before any officer or employee in the
career service can be removed, or demoted, which in effect is a removal.
In order to show that valid cause for demotion exists, petitioner
submits an evaluation[7]
supposedly made by the Placement Committee showing that private respondents
were recommended to positions to which they are best fitted and where they
would be performing more effectively as demanded by the interest of public
service. However, private respondents
raise some serious objections regarding this evaluation. First, they observe that this supposed
evaluation was not certified by any member of the Placement Committee. Second, the supposed evaluation is not
complete, meaning, not all of private respondents have their respective
evaluation.[8]
Third, its validity is dubious because different typewriters were used which
could mean that other entries were belatedly entered. Fourth, this evaluation
was not submitted before the CSC and offered only to this Court for the first
time.
In view of the seriousness of the objections raised against the
evaluation which was the only proof evidencing the existence of valid cause for
demotion, it was expected that petitioner would meet squarely these
objections. However, she chose to
ignore the same. Her silence is at once
obvious and ominous. The letters sent
by petitioner to private respondents simply informed them of their new
assignments and required them to submit the pertinent documents. These were not accompanied by a copy of the
evaluation allegedly made by the Placement Committee or by any explanation for
their demotion. It was only when
private respondents protested their new assignments that petitioner, in her
decisions dated February 7 and 18, 1989, explained that the new appointments
and transfers to offices other than their original positions were done to
enhance their efficiency and effectivity.[9]
We find that petitioner has failed to show satisfactorily that respondent CSC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
We hold that, as a result of the reorganization of the provincial
government of Aklan, these sixteen private respondents have been demoted by
their assignment to positions which are lower than those they previously held,
or which, though of equivalent salary grade and step, drastically changes the
nature of their work without a showing by petitioner of the existence of a
valid cause for such demotion, which in effect is a removal, determined after
due notice and hearing. We reiterate
the Court’s reminder in Mendoza v. Quisumbing:
“x x x If a person is dismissed from his job, he should be informed
of the reason. The reason should be in
the Civil Service Law or, at least, in the law authorizing the removal. The reason must have a reasonable
relationship to the employee’s merit and fitness for the job. He must be given, before he is fired, an
opportunity to show that the cause for removal does not apply to him. Elementary principles of fairness and
compassion are essential. Only then can the reconciliation and unity
so earnestly sought today be achieved.”[10]
Assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service
which has a lower rate of compensation is a clear case of demotion tantamount
to removal when no cause is shown for it or when it is not a part of any
disciplinary action.[11]
Thus, petitioner stresses the fact that since private respondents would be
receiving the same rate of salary they were receiving before the
reorganization, therefore they are not demoted. In the case of Floreza, we ruled that there was demotion
even if Floreza was allowed to receive the same salary as his previous higher
position. Similarly, we find that
private respondents, notwithstanding non-diminution of their salary, have been
demoted. This arbitrariness has no
place in a government that nurtures the constitutional mandates of security of
tenure and due process.[12]
In addition to a finding of demotion, the CSC also found
petitioner to have violated the rule on preference for appointment of permanent
employees based on Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6656,[13]
Sec. 7 of Rules on Organization[14]
and Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988 of the CSC.[15]
The rule means that “old employees should be considered first” on the
assumption, though not absolutely true, that they have gained “not only
superior skills but also greater dedication to the public service.” This is not
to say, however, that they should be automatically appointed because “the law
does not preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary
talents into the government service” provided that the acts of the appointing
power are “bonafide for the best interest of the public service and the person
chosen has the needed qualifications.”[16]
It is less than accurate, however, to conclude that petitioner violated the
rule on preference for appointment of permanent employees because not all
appointees to the positions formerly held by private respondents or to those
comparable positions were new appointees.
In the case of Mr. Oczon who was the only one found by respondent
Commission to have been terminated, he used to be a janitor at the Science
Development High School of Aklan (SDHSA). His salary came from the contribution of the provincial government of Aklan. When the SDHSA was nationalized, the
provincial government discontinued its contribution so that he now receives his
salary from the national government. Notwithstanding this, Oczon still claims entitlement to “back salaries
and salary differentials reckoned from the time he was terminated as janitor as
a result of the reorganization to the time that he was integrated as a national
employee of the Science Development High School of Aklan.”[17]
We do not share the opinion of Mr. Oczon that he was terminated
as a result of the reorganization. His
supposed “termination” was actually caused when SDHSA was nationalized. His “termination” merely coincided with the
reorganization of Aklan’s provincial government which used to allocate a share
or contribution to SDHSA. When SDHSA
was nationalized, the contribution of Aklan’s provincial government
consequently ceased. On this score, we
rule for petitioner and find respondent Commission to have committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering that Oczon be “restored to his former position
if still available, otherwise to the new position of Utility Worker with
payment of back salaries retroactive to the effective date of reorganization.”[18]
To summarize: with
respect to the sixteen private respondents, respondent Commission committed no
grave abuse of discretion in ordering that they be “immediately appointed and
restored to their positions or positions of comparable or equivalent rank
without loss of seniority rights with back salaries reckoned from dates they should
properly have been appointed thereto effective the date of the reorganization
of said province.”[19]
As explained in Gayatao v. Civil Service Commission:
“x x x The CSC, after finding that the demotion was patently illegal, is merely restoring private
respondent to his former position, just as it must restore other employees
similarly affected to their positions before the reorganization.
It is within the power of public respondent to order the
reinstatement of government employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency,
has the obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on
security of tenure and due process. In
the present case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for
the reasons clearly explained therein, is indubitably in the performance of its
constitutional task of protecting and strengthening the civil service.”[20]
However, with respect to private
respondent Oczon, we hold that respondent Commission did commit grave abuse of
discretion in ordering his reinstatement with back salary, considering that he
was not terminated as a result of the reorganization.
WHEREFORE, with
respect to the abovementioned sixteen (16) private respondents, the present
petition is hereby DISMISSED; with respect to private respondent Expedito W.
Oczon, the same is hereby GRANTED. The
temporary restraining order issued on November 22, 1990 enjoining their
reinstatement is accordingly LIFTED in the case of the sixteen private
respondents but made PERMANENT with regard to private respondent Expedito W.
Oczon.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., no part close
association with one of parties.
[1]
Annex “C” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 36-37.
[2]
Annex “I” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 60-67, at p. 65.
[3]
Annex “A” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 25-30, at pp. 29-30.
[4]
G.R. Nos. 81356 and 86156,
February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 692.
[5]
Annex “B” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 31-35, at pp. 34-35.
[6]
Medalla, Jr. v. Sto Tomas, G.R.
No. 94255, May 5, 1992, 208 SCRA 351; Alim v. Civil Service Commission
(CSC), G.R. No. 99391, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 510; Abila v. CSC;
G.R. Nos. 92573, 92867, June 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 102; Lustre v. CSC, G.R.
No. 96578, May 20, 1991, 197 SCRA 288; Lapinid v. CSC, G.R. No. 96298,
May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 106; Lopez v. CSC, G.R. No. 92140, February 19,
1991, 194 SCRA 269; Simpao v. CSC, G.R. No. 85976, November 15, 1990,
191 SCRA 396; Gaspar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90799, October 18,
1990, 190 SCRA 774; Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990,
189 SCRA 459; Patagoc v. CSC, G.R. No. 90229, May 14, 1990, 185 SCRA
411; Central Bank v. CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA
744; Luego v. CSC, G.R. No. 69137, August 5, 1986, 143 SCRA 327; and
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 65439, November 13, 1985, 140 SCRA 22.
[7]
Annex “N”, Rollo, pp. 88-105.
[8]
Private respondents Vivian Ruiz, Reba
Concepcion, Margareth Natal do not have their respective evaluation by the
Placement Committee.
[9]
Rollo, p. 26.
[10]
G.R. Nos. 78053, 78525, 81197, 81495,
81928, 81998, 86504, 86547, 88951, 89427, June 4, 1990, 186 SCRA 108.
[11]
See: Department of Transportation and Communications v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. Nos. 89325-26, 90033, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 340; Floreza v.
Ongpin, G.R. Nos. 81356-86156, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 692.
[12]
Floreza v. Ongpin, supra,
p. 708.
[13]
SEC. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given
preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing
pattern comparable to their former positions or in case there are not enough
comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank.
No new employees shall be taken in
until all permanent officers and employees have been appointed, including
temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary qualification
requirements, among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility, for
permanent appointment to positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case
there are still positions to be filled, unless such positions are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.
[14]
Section 7. Preference for appointment – Subject to the preceeding Section,
preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing
pattern shall be in the following order:
(1) Officers and employees holding
permanent appointments to positions comparable to their former positions or in
case there are not enough comparable positions next lower in rank; x x x.
[15]
7. No appointment of new personnel to career positions, whether by transfer,
reinstatement or original, shall be made until incumbent personnel are placed
in the
[16]
Torio v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. Nos. 99336, 100178, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 677, 692 citing Medenilla v.
CSC, G.R. No. 93868, February 19, 1991, 194 SCRA 278, 289.
[17]
Rollo, p. 179.
[18]
Rollo, p. 34.
[19]
Ibid; See also, Section 9, Rep. Act No. 6656.
[20]
G.R. No. 93064, June 22, 1962, 210 SCRA 183, 189.