🎧 Case Brief Lecture

HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BRAULIO ABALOS AND AQUILINA ABALOS, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 93401. June 26, 1991 June 26, 1991

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Heirs of Roman Soriano versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the heirs of Roman Soriano against the Court of Appeals and the spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos. The dispute concerns a parcel of land in Pangasinan originally owned by Adriano Soriano, and the narrow question is whether a motion for execution of a post-decisional agreement approved by the agrarian court in December 1972 could still be filed in August 1984, some eleven years and eight months later. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between execution by motion and execution by ordinary action, and because it reminds us that equity yields to positive rules of procedure.

Procedural History

Roman Soriano was ousted as caretaker of the property and filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The agrarian court authorized his ejectment, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed, and that decision became final and executory. Before execution, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement allowing Roman to sub-lease the property until the termination of the original lease on June 30, 1982, and the agrarian court approved this agreement in an order dated December 22, 1972.

Meanwhile, the Abalos spouses applied for registration of title before the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at Lingayen, sitting as a land registration court. The application was granted, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and this Court denied the petition for certiorari, with entry of judgment made on December 16, 1985.

After the lease and sub-lease expired, the Abalos spouses filed an unlawful detainer case against Roman, but they later caused its dismissal. On August 22, 1984, they filed a motion for execution of the December 1972 order in the agrarian case. Roman moved to suspend the hearing on rentals, questioning the Abalos spouses' personality, the alleged prior implementation of the agreement, and the lapse of time. The trial court denied his motion and allowed the substitution of the de Vera spouses by the Abalos spouses. Roman went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and prohibition, but the petition was denied on April 25, 1990. Roman had in the meantime died on December 11, 1985, without substitution of parties. His heirs then brought this petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

Adriano Soriano died intestate in 1947, leaving the land to his heirs. On June 30, 1967, the heirs leased the property to the de Vera spouses for fifteen years beginning July 1, 1967, with Roman Soriano named as caretaker. During the lease, the heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement adjudicating the property to seven of the nine children pro-indiviso. The property was later divided into two lots, and the shares in both lots were eventually sold to the Abalos spouses, except the share of Roman.

On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman as caretaker. Roman filed a case with the agrarian court, which initially authorized his ejectment, but the Court of Appeals reversed and the decision became final. Before execution, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement allowing Roman to sub-lease the property until June 30, 1982, approved by the agrarian court on December 22, 1972.

After the sub-lease expired, the Abalos spouses sought to enforce that 1972 order. They filed a motion for execution on August 22, 1984, asking that they be placed in joint use and enjoyment of the premises with Roman and that rentals be levied. Roman opposed, and the trial court, invoking equity and an implied new lease, allowed evidence on rentals. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, bringing the matter to this Court.

Issues

  • Whether or not a motion for execution of a post-decisional agreement approved by the court in 1972 may still be filed eleven years later.
  • Whether or not the trial court, acting on the motion for execution, had jurisdiction to entertain matters outside the scope of the agreement sought to be executed, such as the fixing of rentals.
  • Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's reliance on its equity jurisdiction.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Execution of a judgment or a final order may be made by motion within five years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only by an ordinary action.

This provision fixes the period within which execution may be had by motion, and it is the rule the Court applies to the 1972 order.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides:

Actions upon a judgment or a final order of the court must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.

This provision supplies the period for enforcing a judgment by ordinary action after the five-year period for execution by motion has lapsed.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious. On the first issue, the Court held that the motion for execution was filed eleven years and eight months after the December 22, 1972 order. Under Section 6, Rule 39, execution by motion is available only within five years from finality; after that, and before the statute of limitations bars it, the judgment may be enforced only by an ordinary action, which must be brought within ten years under Article 1144. The Court also found that the agreement had already been executed: the obligations of the de Vera spouses and of Roman under the sub-lease had been complied with, possession and rentals had been delivered, and at the time the motion was filed the sub-lease had already expired. There was nothing more to execute.

On the second issue, the Court held that the agrarian court, acting on the motion for execution, had no jurisdiction to entertain propositions outside the scope of the agreement sought to be executed. The relief demanded, namely reasonable compensation and joint possession, should have been asked in an unlawful detainer case or other proper proceedings, especially since a civil action between the parties was pending where possession was an issue.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court's reliance on equity was misplaced. Equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement, and all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. A court acting without jurisdiction cannot justify its assumption thereof by invoking its equity jurisdiction.

Doctrine

Execution of a judgment or final order by motion is available only within five years from the date it becomes final and executory; after that period, and before the statute of limitations bars it, enforcement must be by an ordinary action, which must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. A court acting on a motion for execution has no jurisdiction to entertain matters outside the scope of the agreement or judgment sought to be executed. Equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement; it cannot cure a want of jurisdiction.

Disposition

The petition was granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside, and the motion for execution filed in the agrarian case was denied.

Remember This

Memorize the rule: execution by motion within five years from finality, and by ordinary action within ten years thereafter. Examiners use this case to test the periods for execution and the principle that equity cannot replace the law or confer jurisdiction.