G.R. No. 93381. September 28, 1990
YBL (YOUR BUS LINE) AND PRUDENCIO JARING, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RUFINO C. LAMBINO, ALEJANDRO BASBAS, CRESENCIANO BELTRAN, NANCY MARCAIDA, YOLANDA…
GANCAYCO, J.:
The need to render substantial justice as against technicality is
put to test in this case.
Private respondents were drivers and conductors of
petitioner-corporation which was operating buses it leased from the Metro Manila Transit Corporation
(MMTC). During the period 1983-1986, it
appears that incurred serious business losses and failed to pay rentals to the MMTC which in turn
instituted a civil action against it.
During the pendency of the case the MMTC was
able to repossess all the buses operated by petitioner corporation. Since it had no more buses to operate and was
severely financially distressed, it stopped its operations and the employment
of private respondents was discontinued.
Private respondents thus filed a case for illegal dismissal in
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which was subsequently amended
to a complaint for payment of separation
pay.
Impleaded in the complaint was petitioner Prudencio
Jaring who is sought to be principally liable with the petitioner corporation as president
thereof.
After the parties submitted their position papers, the labor
arbiter rendered a decision declaring private respondents entitled to
separation pay and ordering the petitioners to jointly and severally pay
private respondents their separation pay computed from the date of hiring up to
their termination at the rate of
one-half (1/2) month for every year of service.
Within the reglementary period for appeal,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and a memorandum of appeal with the
respondent NLRC wherein they questioned the award of separation pay despite the
acknowledgment by the labor arbiter that petitioner corporation suffered
business losses. It was also advocated
in the same appeal that petitioner Jaring was no
longer an officer at the time of
the termination of private respondents, and granting that he was the president
of petitioner corporation then, the latter has a separate and distinct
personality from petitioner Jaring who cannot be
jointly and severally be held liable in this case with petitioner corporation.
However, on January 30,
1990 an order was issued by the NLRC stating that as the
petitioners failed to post the required bond, their appeal was rendered
imperfect making the decision
appealed from final executory.[1]
A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the NLRC in a resolution
dated May 8, 1990.
Hence, this petition for review, which this Court will treat as a special civil action for certiorari, whereby petitioners raised the sole
issue that the NLRC erred in not giving due course to the appeal for failure to satisfy a purely
technical requirement when issues involving substantial rights were raised in
the appeal.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended by Republic Act No. 6715
provides as follows:
“ART. 223. Appeal
x x x. – In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.” (Underscoring supplied.)
The NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under Republic Act No. 6715,
which took effect on September 5, 1989,
provide in Section 5 thereof as follows:
“Section 5. Requisites of Appeal; When Perfected.
x x x shall be under oath
with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash
or surety bond as provided in Section 7 of these rules. x x x “(Underscoring supplied.)
The appeal interposed by petitioners to the NLRC was made on September 11, 1989, or just after six (6) days from the effectivity of the aforestated
Interim Rules. In undertaking the
appeal, the counsel of petitioners relied on the notice of the decision in the
case which stated the requirements of an appeal without any mention that a bond
must be filed.[2]
Apparently said counsel did not know as yet of said new law and Interim Rules
requiring the posting of a bond on appeal.
It also appears that private respondents did not know about it as no opposition to the appeal was made on
this account.
Moreover, in the appealed decision of the labor arbiter the exact
total amount due to the private respondents as separation pay is not stated
which would be the basis of the
bond that is required to be filed by petitioners
under the said law. Thus even if
petitioners may be expected to know the law, then they allege that they would
have to go to the socio-analyst of the NLRC
to compute the approximate amount due
the private respondents as the basis of the amount of the bond to be filed so
that it is not probable that they may be able to secure such computation within
the non-extendible period of ten
(10) days to appeal provided for by law.
Petitioners also assert that at that time the petitioner
corporation was in financial distress.
At any rate they offered to post the bond in compliance with the
requirement of the law so that they may be afforded the relief of an appeal.
The Court finds that while Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715, requiring a cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from for the appeal to be perfected,
may be considered a jurisdictional requirement, nevertheless, adhering to the
principle that substantial justice is better
served by allowing the appeal on the merits threshed out by the NLRC,[3]
the Court finds and so holds that the foregoing requirement of the law should
be given a liberal interpretation.
In Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. vs. Maximiano C. Asuncion,[4] this Court relaxed the rule in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals[5] by allowing a liberal interpretation
of the rule that the payment of the docket fees is jurisdictional. More so when the party involved demonstrated
his willingness to abide by the rules to pay the docket fees required. This Court held that the payment of said fees may be authorized by the Court within
a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The greater interest of justice will be served by giving due course to the appeal despite the much delayed
filing of the appeal bond.[6]
In this case, the circumstances of the non-filing of the bond are
understandable and could be attributed to excusable oversight. The Court holds that petitioners should be
given the opportunity to file the required bond and avail of the remedy of
appeal.
Further, considering that in
the appeal valid issues are raised as to whether or not under Rule 1,
Section 9 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code where the termination of
employment is due to serious business losses or financial reverses, as in this
case, the employee shall still be entitled to separation pay, and whether or
not petitioner Jaring, assuming that he was president
of petitioner corporation at the time of the separation from the service of
private respondents, can be held jointly and severally liable with petitioner
corporation for the separation pay due private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the public respondent NLRC dated January 30, 1990 and May 3, 1990
are hereby SET ASIDE. The respondent
NLRC is hereby directed to give
due course to the appeal of the petitioners after the filing of the required
appeal bond within such reasonable
period of time it may set. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[1]
Annex A to Petition; pages 31 to
32, Rollo.
[2]
Annex E-1 to Petition.
[3]
Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Sison, 149 SCRA 238 (1987).
[4]
170 SCRA 274, 284 to 285 (1989).
[5]
149 SCRA 562 (1987).
[6]
C.W. Tan Manufacturing vs. NLRC, 170 SCRA 240 (1989).