EDMUNDO SAMANIEGO, ANTONIO L. ACOSTA, JAIME L. DIAZ AND PABLO MANAHAN, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SANDVIK PHILIPPINES, INC., KRISTER BROBECK AND AKE F…

The post-employment status of certain managerial employees is in
issue in this special civil action for certiorari.  The
employees contend that the termination of their employment with the company was
illegally undertaken.  On the other hand,
the company maintains that the said employees voluntarily resigned.  Thus put, the Court is tasked to resolve the
controversy.

The facts are not disputed.

The herein petitioners Edmundo Samaniego, Antonio L. Acosta,
Jaime L. Diaz and Pablo Manahan used to be managerial employees of the private
respondent company, Sandvik
Philippines, Inc.  The other private
respondents, Krister Brobeck and Ake Friberg, are ranking officials of the said company.

Sometime before 1987, the
management was of the view that a serious financial crisis was confronting the
company.  For this reason, the management
resolved to reorganize the company by streamlining its operations and
eliminating middle management positions, including those of the
petitioners.  The management eventually
decided that the managerial employees so affected by the reorganization should
be given the option of either facing termination of their employment and
receiving separation pay, or resigning voluntarily from the company under terms
more financially advantageous than those as regards the first option.

Meanwhile, as early as
April 1987, three of the petitioners filed a labor case against the company for
the purpose of seeking the payment of certain money claims, and for the
purpose of calling public attention to some alleged anomalous activities of
private respondent Krister Brobeck.  The
matter, however, remained unresolved.

On August 24, 1987,
representatives of the company held a meeting with the petitioners at the Hotel
intercontinental Manila for the purpose of discussing the company
reorganization.  In time, the petitioners
were given the following options:

(1)  
Termination of employment on account of the company reorganization, with
payment of separation benefits; or

(2)  
Voluntary resignation
from the company, with more benefits.

It appears that the
petitioners negotiated with the company representatives for an improvement of
the benefits under the voluntary resignation option.  By the end of the day, no agreement was
reached by the parties.

Negotiations were resumed
the next day, August 25, 1987.  The company representatives eventually
offered better benefits under the voluntary resignation option.  Three of the petitioners found the proposal
satisfactory and thus accepted the same. 
The fourth employee, petitioner Diaz, at first decided to take the first
option but he eventually changed his
mind and opted to resign from
the company under the improved terms. 
The petitioners signed company-prepared resignation letters.  They acknowledged therein that they have
received the benefits agreed upon and that they have no legal claim against the
company or its officers and repre­sentatives. 
On the same day, the petitioners received the checks corresponding to
their benefits under the voluntary resignation option.

It appears, however, that
sometime later in the day, the
petitioners sent a letter to the company, through registered mail,
informing the latter that they received their benefits under protest.  Later on, the petitioners deposited their
checks in their respective bank accounts. 
Petitioners Diaz and Samaniego eventually received documents effectively
transferring in their favor the ownership rights over the company vehicles
assigned to them in the course of their employment, pursuant to their corresponding
benefits.  In time, the petitioners
received all the benefits appertaining to the voluntary resignation option.

On September 2, 1987, the
petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, discrimination and damage
against the private respondents before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).  The case was docketed as
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-09-03062-87 and assigned to Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana.  A formal trial on the merits ensued and upon
the conclusion thereof, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.  As stated earlier, the petitioners contended that the termination of their employment was
illegally undertaken.  The private
respondents maintained that this case is one of voluntary resignation.

On November 28, 1989, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners.  The labor arbiter opined that the
reorganization of the company was merely a scheme to dismiss the petitioners inasmuch as the same was haphazardly
carried out and considering the haste attending the termination of the
employment of the petitioners.  The labor
arbiter also opined that the termination of the employment of the petitioners
was in retaliation against them for the complaint they filed against the
private respondents earlier.  In sum, the
labor arbiter concluded that the petitioners did not voluntarily sign their
resignation letters.^[1]

The private respondents
brought an appeal to the NLRC.  On April 24, 1990, the NLRC promulgated a
resolution setting aside the decision of the labor arbiter and entering a new
one dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners.^[2] The NLRC stressed that the issue to be
resolved is not whether the company reorganization was valid, but whether or
not the petitioners voluntarily resigned from the company.  All told, the NLRC held that the petitioners
voluntarily resigned from the company. 
The pertinent portions of the said resolution are quoted herein —

“The issue in this
case is not whether the company’s reorganization announced to the complainants (the herein
petitioners) on August 24, 1987 is valid. 
Rather, the pivotal issue is whether or not the complainants voluntarily resigned from the xxx company.

“The appeal  is impressed
with merit.  Contrary to the findings of
the Arbiter a quo, there is nothing on record which will support
her conclusions that the complainants were terminated in due haste, much less
under the guise of a reorganization. 
Perhaps because of this mistaken impression, the issues were diverted to
whether or not there was an honest – to goodness reorganization.  This particular issue, however, is material
only if the complainants were indeed dismissed from employment due to said
ground.  The facts of the case do not
show that this is the controversy.

“Although it is true that in the morning of August 24, 1987,
the complainants were notified that their positions would be abolished due to
the company’s reorganization program and hence, their services will no longer
be needed, it is equally true that their termination from employment did not
materialize.  There is no dispute that
notwithstanding the announced reorganization plan of the company, the
respondents offered the complainants an alternative avenue for exit which is
voluntary resignation.  We see nothing
illegal with this approach.  Indeed, the
practice of allowing an employee to resign instead of being terminated for just
cause so as not to smear his employment record is commonly practiced in some
companies.  xxx.

“In the present case, the propriety of the choice given to the
complainants by the company is even reinforced by the fact that the separation
benefits due to resignation offered to them were much higher than what they
would receive under termination due to the reorganization.  A more attractive scheme, therefore, was
merely tendered to the complainants.  It
was not imposed upon them.  In fact, two
of the complainants, xxx, admitted in their testimonies that they were made to
choose between the two (2) options xxx. 
And if they eventually chose the alternative of resigning from the
company with greater benefits, as in this case, the complainants cannot
subsequently repudiate their choice nor be heard to say later on that they were
terminated without just cause.  It is
inconsistent with dismissal (where the concerned employee is left with no
option).  In termination cases, the
employer decides for the employee and not the other way around.  In the instant case, the complainants decided
to resign.

“xxx. In their resignation letters, they all acknowledged
receipt of substantial amounts of money plus the transfer of the company car
assigned to them as part of their compensation package.  There is also no dispute that this package is
greater than that provided by law or the separation pay that may be due on account of the reorganization.  These benefits, in turn, were obtained by the complainants through
negotiations and haggling with the company xxx.  Under the circumstan­ces,
it is difficult to believe that the complainants were really forced to resign
so as to render their act nugatory.  It
must be noted that it took the complainants at least one day before they signed
their resignation letters.  In the
interim, complainant Manahan even admitted that he had already consulted his
lawyer before he signed his resignation letter the following day xxx.  Considering the lapse of time, it is evident
that the complainants had the opportunity to carefully deliberate on their choices and evaluate the
consequence thereof.  In short, there
intervened a sufficient period
of time that enabled the complainants to meditate and decide on their
action.  xxx.  Moreover, the absence of force or compulsion
is also evident from the fact that complainants did not sign their resignation
letters on that meeting of
August 24, 1987 but rather, they stalled and executed the said documents only
the following day.  xxx.  We take note that the complainants were not
ordinary laborers who may not be able to fully appreciate the consequences of
their acts.  They were all admittedly
managerial employees holding responsible positions.  Well-educated and experienced in various
business dealings on account of their high positions, complainants very well
know that their resignation constituted a bar against any charge of unlawful
dismissal and they cannot now be allowed to conveniently invalidate or
disregard the same.  xxx.

“xxx.

“In this connection, we also doubt the accuracy of the
impression of the Labor Arbiter a quo that the company’s act was
in retaliation to the actions taken by the complainants against Mr.
Brobeck.  xxx.  xxx, had the respondent company really wanted
to retaliate against the complainants, then they should have been terminated
outrightly by virtue of the reorganization, rather than being given the
opportunity to voluntarily resign and receive higher financial compensation
packages.  Certainly, this act of the
respondent company negates any allegation of vindictivenes or retaliatory
attitude.

“All told, it is
evident that the surrounding circumstances of the case indubitably point to the
conclusion that complainant’s resignation from the company was valid and hence,
operated to effectively sever the
employment rela­tionship.  xxx.

“Finally, the fact that complainant Samaniego, on September
1987, immediately assumed the position of Chief Executive Officer of Universal
Sales, Inc., a corporation similar to, if not in competition with, respondent
company, is highly indicative of his intention
to really leave the company and work elsewhere xxx.  His subsequent employment thereat as one of
the highest executives barely a few days after he tendered his resignation is
an unmistakable sign of his decision to relinquish his position at the company
and sever his employment relationship.”^[3]

On May 4, 1990, the petitioners
elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant petition.^[4] It is alleged therein that the decision of
the NLRC is contrary to law and is not supported by the
evidence on record.  It is also alleged
therein that the decision of the NLRC will cause grave and irreparable injury
to the petitioners and that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
resolving the case against the petitioners.^[5]

The private respondents
filed their comment on the petition, reiterating therein their position on the
matter.^[6] The Office of the Solicitor General filed
its “Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment” praying therein that the challenged
resolution be set aside and the decision of the labor arbiter be
reinstated.  The Solicitor General opines
that the petitioners did not voluntarily resign from the company inasmuch as
they were forced to choose between two extreme choices, and that the receipt of
separation benefits does not bar them from contesting the validity of their
dismissal.^[7] Considering the position taken by the
Solicitor General, the NLRC,
through counsel, filed its memorandum reiterating therein the discussion in the
challenged resolution.^[8]

In due time, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.

After a careful
evaluation of the entire record of the case, the Court finds the petition
devoid of merit.

As correctly pointed out
by the NLRC, the issue to be resolved is not whether the company reorganization
is valid, but whether or not the petitioners voluntarily resigned from the
company.

The discussions relating
to the validity of the company reorganization are, therefore, immaterial.  This matter is pertinent only if the
petitioners were indeed dismissed from their employment due to such reorganization.  The Court is
convinced that this is a case of voluntary resignation on the part of the
petitioners.

It should be emphasized
that notwithstanding the intended reorganization of the company, the
petitioners were given the option to resign from the company with corresponding
benefits attending such option.  They
opted for resignation on account of these negotiated benefits.  In termination cases, the employee is not
afforded any option; the employee is dismissed and his only recourse is to
institute a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer, assuming of
course that there are valid grounds for doing so.  In this particular case, the petitioners were
given the option to resign.  It was the
option they chose.  Thus, there is no
illegal dismissal to speak of.

The record is devoid of
any indication that the petitioners were coerced into resigning from the
company.  On the contrary, the record supports the view that the petitioners chose to
resign without any element of coercion attending their option.  The petitioners negotiated for an improvement
of the resignation package offered to them. 
The negotiations lasted for at least two days.  As a matter of fact, they
managed to obtain a better package under the voluntary resignation option.  Petitioner Manahan even admitted that he
consulted his lawyer before he signed his resignation letter.^[9]
Some of the petitioners managed to obtain ownership rights over the company
vehicles originally assigned to them. 
The petitioners admittedly deposited the checks given to them by the
company in their respective bank accounts. 
If their intention was to receive
their benefits in protest, they could have just held on to the checks instead
of depositing the same.  Although the
resignation letters signed by the petitioners were apparently prepared by the
company, it is important to note that the petitioners signed the same
voluntarily.

It must he emphasized as
well that the petitioners are not ordinary laborers or rank-and-file personnel
who may not be able to completely comprehend and realize the consequences of their acts.  The petitioners are managerial employees holding responsible
positions.  They are educated
individuals.  For his part, petitioner
Samaniego immediately assumed a ranking position in a competing company after
his resignation from Sandvik Philippines, Inc. 
Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that they were coerced
into resigning from the company.

The Solicitor General
maintains that receipt of separation pay is not a bar to contesting the
legality of dismissal from employment.^[10] The observation is beside the point.  As stated earlier, there is no illegal
dismissal in the case at bar.

From the foregoing, it
clearly appears that the petitioners voluntarily resigned from the company for
a valuable consideration.  The quitclaim
they executed in favor of the company amounts to a valid and binding
compromise agreement.  To allow the
petitioners to repudiate the same will be to countenance unjust enrichment on
their part.  The Court will not permit
such a situation.

 At this juncture, We find it appropriate to
call attention to Our pronouncement in Periquet v. National Relations
Commission,^[11] to wit —

“Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public
policy.  If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settle­ment, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.  It is only where there is clear proof that
the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable
on its face, that the law will step
in to annul the questionable transaction. 
But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so
voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction
must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.  xxx.”

This observation holds
true for the case at bar.

Finally, the remedy of certiorari does
not lie absent any showing of abuse of power properly vested in the Ministry (now
Department) of Labor and
Employment.^[12] No such abuse or jurisdictional infirmity on
the part of the NLRC has been demonstrated in this case.  Accordingly, the writ of certiorari
sought will not issue.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.  The Court makes no
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., no part.

^[1]
Pages 59 to 66, rollo.

^[2]
Pages 30 to 45, rollo. 
Commissioner Romeo B. Putong of the First Division of the NLRC wrote the
resolution.  Presiding Commissioner
Bartolome S. Carale and Commissioner Vicente Veloso III concurred.

^[3]
Pages 35 to 43, rollo.

^[4]
Pages 2 to 9, rollo.

^[5]
Page 5, rollo.

^[6]
Pages 83 to 96, rollo.

^[7]
Pages 103 to 119, rollo.

^[8]
Pages 281 to 296, rollo.

^[9]
TSN, July 7, 1988, page 68.

^[10]
Citing Raposon v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 176 SCRA 549 (1989).

^[11]
186 SCRA 724 (1990).  Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz wrote the
decision.

^[12]
Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr., 131
SCRA 151 (1984).