PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE BURGOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU, BRANCH 17, SIEGFRED DEDURO Y DELFIN ALIAS “RAUL DELFIN Y ZER…

On 2 September 1989,
an information for violation of Republic Act No. 1700, as amended^[1]
was filed against the nine (9) private respondents by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu. 
The information recommended no bail on the ground that the offense
charged in said information was non-bailable, the
respondents allegedly being leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

After arraignment, private respondents filed petitions for their
temporary liberty on bail pending trial of the criminal case.  There being no opposition from the
prosecution to the petition for bail of private respondent Catalina Peras, who was then in her eighth month of pregnancy,
respondent Judge fixed bail for her at P10,000.00.  In respect of the other private respondents,
their petitions for bail were opposed by the prosecution.

While the prosecution was still presenting its evidence in
support of its opposition to the petitions for bail, respondent Judge issued an
Order dated 5 April 1990 fixing bail at P30,000.00 each for the temporary
liberty of five (5) of the remaining eight (8) private respondents,
namely:  Cynthia Aguirre, Thelma Guanzon, Edwin Lopez, Abundio Amante and Fr. Leonardo Sison.  The applications for bail of the three (3)
other private respondents (Siegfred Deduro, Auxilium Toting Olayer and Federico Guanzon) were
denied on the ground that insofar as these particular respondents were
concerned, the evidence of guilt was strong.

The prosecution opposed the 5 April 1990 Order upon the ground
that issuance thereof was premature, considering that the prosecution was then
still in the process of presenting its evidence in support of its opposition to
the applications for bail.  Respondent
Judge, rather than ruling outright on petitioner’s opposition, ordered it to
file a motion for reconsideration in writing.  In the same proceeding, respondent Judge
disallowed petitioner’s request for its witness, Eulogio
Llego, a computer programmer, to print out in open
court the material encoded in certain diskettes seized from private respondents
by virtue of a search warrant.

Instead of filing a written motion for reconsideration,
petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari questioning:  (1) the Order dated 5 April 1990 granting
bail; and (2) the oral order of respondent Judge given in open court during the
hearing on the same date preventing the prosecution from holding an actual
demonstration in court by printing out data from the seized diskettes.

Deliberating on the instant Petition for Certiorari, the
Court considers that respondent Judge has committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing his Order dated 5 April 1990.

It was grave abuse on the
part of respondent Judge to issue the 5
April 1990 Order.  That
order, which was issued while the prosecution was still in the process of
presenting other evidence, was clearly premature and deprived the People of its
right to present its evidence relating to the applications for bail.  In People
v. Dacudao,^[2]
this Court, citing People v. San Diego,^[3]
held:

“The question
presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due
process.  The answer is in the
affirmative.  We are of the considered
opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of
a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail.  If as in
the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural
due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void
on that ground.  x x x” (Underscoring supplied).

Moreover, the Order of 5
April 1990 failed to comply with the following requirement set
forth in the above-cited case:

“The court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must
be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence for the prosecution;
otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical.  Hence, the court’s order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.  The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968,
granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance
because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the
prosecution.  They only contain the
court’s conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong.  Being thus defective
in form and substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this ground, be
allowed to stand.” (Underscoring supplied)

In the present case, the Order dated 5 April 1990 only sets out a conclusion that the evidence
of guilt is strong but does not contain a summary of the evidence presented and
considered.  The Order states:

“After due consideration of the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution thru its witnesses x x
x, this Court finds reasonable ground to believe that
so far, strong evidence exists as against the three accused Siegfred
Deduro alias ‘Vic,’ alias ‘Tomas Magtanggol,’
alias ‘Raul Delfin,’ Auxilium
Toling Olayer, alias ‘Maria
Consuelo Valente,’ alias ‘Choy,’ alias ‘Choling‘ and Federico Guanzon.

IN VIEW THEREOF, the petitions for bail are DENIED with respect to
the above-named accused.  The rest of the
accused are granted bail which is hereby fixed at P30,000.00
each for their provisional release x x x.”

Being prematurely issued and having failed to include a summary
of the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for bail, the 5 April 1990 Order must be set aside.

Petitioners also question the order also dated 5 April 1990 given in open court by
respondent Judge.  Said order disallowed
a prosecution witness from holding an actual demonstration in court by printing
out the contents of the seized diskettes using the very same computer seized
from the accused on the ground that they could be “manipulated.” The
Order stated:

“COURT:

It has been a common
knowledge of both prosecution and
defense that these diskettes have been in possession of the prosecution since
the start and anything may happen while they are in their possession, so much
so that the witness admitted that the diskettes can be manipulated or altered.

FISCAL MARCOS:

Since they are the exhibits for the prosecution, naturally they are in
our possession, just like the exhibits for the defense.  They are in their possession.

COURT:

To let this witness operate the computer is very dangerous, because the
witness said that these diskettes can be manipulated.  So the motion of the prosecution to let this
witness have an actual demonstration before the court on the computer is denied.”

In his Comment, respondent Judge reiterated that he did not allow
the printing out of the contents of the seized diskettes because they could be
“manipulated” which would be prejudicial to the rights of the
accused.

Respondent Judge’s insinuation or speculation that the
prosecution, considering the fact that it had the diskettes in its possession
prior to the hearing, may have tampered with them appears absolutely baseless
and quite unfair to the prosecution. 
Such statement had in fact no basis in the evidence before the
respondent Judge.  There was neither
testimonial evidence nor any physical evidence on the diskettes themselves
which might indicate they had actually been tampered or their contents altered
in order to secure the conviction of the accused.  Respondent Judge was in effect charging the
prosecution with fabricating evidence against the private respondents, which
constitutes serious misconduct and quite possibly a criminal offense.

The mere fact that the diskettes had been in the possession of
the prosecution does not necessarily imply that it had altered or tampered with
the evidence to suit its prosecutorial objectives.  Indeed, the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed prevails, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary.

We, therefore hold that the printing out of data (if any) encoded
in the diskettes should be
allowed.  Respondent Judge’s asserted
apprehension that the witness brought in by the prosecution to undertake the printing
out of the diskettes’ contents could himself “manipulate” said
diskettes during the actual printing out in court may very easily be relieved
by designating a competent
person agreeable to both parties, and especially to respondent Judge, who can
perform the task of printing out the contents of the diskettes.  Respondent Judge’s ostensible lack of
confidence in the prosecution witness should not in any way affect the
integrity of the diskettes themselves or the right of the prosecution to show
the contents of the diskettes subject, of course, to applicable rights of the accused.

Moreover, contrary to
private respondents’ contention that the diskettes themselves should be deemed
inadmissible in evidence because they were not included in the things mentioned
in the search warrant, we find that these diskettes had been sufficiently
described in the search warrant.  The
search warrant states:

“You are, therefore, hereby commanded to make immediate search
at any time of the day or night of Rm. 3-1 of the third floor of said building
where the persons or suspects above-named are presently occupying and to seize
and to take possession of the following properties used or intended to be used
as the means of committing violation of RA 1700 and/or Art. 142 of the Revised
Penal Code:

‘Incendiary or subversive documents, pamphlets;
books, computer print-outs and subversive materials, and computer machine used in printing seditious or subversive
literature.'” (Underscoring
supplied)

The phrase “computer machine used in printing seditious or
subversive literature” is appropriately regarded as necessarily including
diskettes into which data is encoded and stored, such as those seized in the
present case on the same occasion
the computer itself was seized, for indeed a computer system cannot store and
print out any data without diskettes. 
Technically and realistically speaking, diskettes are deemed integral
parts of a computer system, the diskettes constituting one of the “input-output
devices” or “peripherals,” in the same manner that the keyboard
is an “input-output device” and the monitor, keyboard and printer are
“peripherals” in relation to the memory or central processing unit
(CPU) of a computer system.^[4]

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Certiorari
and to SET ASIDE and ANNUL the Order dated 5 April 1990.  Respondent Judge is hereby ORDERED forthwith
to continue hearing the motions for bail and to allow the prosecution to finish
presenting its evidence.  Respondent Judge is also ORDERED to cause the
re-arrest of the five (5) private respondents previously ordered released in
the 5 April 1990 Order.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Bidin, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
As restored and re-established
in its original tenor by Executive Order No. 167, dated 5 May 1987.  Section 4 of R.A. No. 1700 as amended by Executive Order No. 276 dated 15 July 1987
imposes the penalty of prison mayor to reclusion perpetual upon officers and
ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any subversive
organization as defined in the Act.

^[2]
170 SCRA 489 (1989).

^[3]
26 SCRA 522 (1968).

^[4]
See:  Goldschlager
and Lister, Computer Science:  A Modern
Introduction (1988); Sanders, Computers Today (1985); Dumas, Fundamentals of
Basic Programming (1984); Givone and Roesser, Microprocessors/Microcomputers:  An Introduction (1983).