THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. JAIME UBINANA; DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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United States versus Ubinana
The Case
This is a criminal prosecution for libel brought by the United States against Jaime Ubinana. The alleged libel was a letter written by the defendant to the wife of the private prosecutor, in the course of an illicit correspondence, and later discovered by the husband in his wife's possession. The case matters because it fixes two rules every reviewee must carry into the examination room: that the presumption of malice under the libel law is not rebutted by the private, confidential, and secret character of the writing, and that publication is complete when the accused knowingly parts with the custody of the libel under circumstances exposing it to be read by another.
Procedural History
The defendant was prosecuted in the court below under the new libel law, the Act of the United States Philippine Commission, Number 277. The trial court found him guilty and rendered judgment against him. He appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning as first error that the court below did not permit him to testify at the trial in his own behalf, and as second error that the court permitted the wife of the private prosecutor to testify without the previous consent of both spouses. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and affirmed the judgment.
Facts
The defendant carried on an illicit correspondence with the wife of the private prosecutor. In the course of that correspondence he wrote the letter complained of, and the evidence shows that he himself wrote it and sent it to her.
The wife received the letter and read it. It remained in her possession until her husband discovered it there. The letter contained an alleged libel upon the private prosecutor.
At the trial the language of the letter was not disputed to be defamatory. What the defense argued was that the private, confidential, and secret character of the letter was enough to rebut the presumption that its publication was malicious, and that it was not shown that the defendant parted with the custody of the letter under circumstances in which, as a natural and logical consequence, it might be read by a third person.
Issues
- Whether or not the private, confidential, and secret character of the letter rebuts the presumption of malice that the libel law attaches to an injurious publication.
- Whether or not the defendant published the libel within the meaning of the libel law when he knowingly parted with the custody of the letter under circumstances that exposed it to be read by a person other than himself.
- Whether or not the court below erred in not permitting the defendant to testify in his own behalf, and in permitting the wife of the private prosecutor to testify without the previous consent of both spouses.
Applicable Provisions
Section 3 of the Act of the United States Philippine Commission, Number 277, the new libel law, provides:
An injurious publication is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable motive for making it is shown.
This is the presumption the defense sought to rebut by pointing to the confidential character of the letter.
Section 5 of the same libel law provides:
To sustain a charge of publishing a libel, it is enough that the accused knowingly parted with the immediate custody of the libel under circumstances which exposed it to be read or seen by any other person than himself.
This is the test of publication against which the defendant's act of sending the letter to the wife is measured.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the presumption of malice was not rebutted. The law attaches that presumption to an injurious publication if no justifiable motive for making it is shown. Without undertaking to state what motives may be deemed justifiable under the act, the Court said it would involve a contradiction in terms to hold that the letter in question, a solicitation to commit adultery, was published with justifiable motives. There was nothing in the case to rebut the presumption of malice arising from the mere fact of publication.
On the second issue, the Court held that publication was complete. The circumstances of the case fully met the conditions of Section 5. The defendant knowingly parted with the immediate custody of the letter when he sent it to the wife, and it was in fact read by her, a person other than himself.
On the third issue, the Court held that the assignments of error rested on statements that were not true in point of fact. An examination of the record showed that the court below did permit the defendant to testify in his own behalf, and that the claim about the wife's testimony without the consent of both spouses was likewise contrary to the record.
Doctrine
First, the presumption of malice in libel is not rebutted by the private, confidential, and secret character of the writing. A letter that is a solicitation to commit adultery cannot, without contradiction in terms, be said to have been published with a justifiable motive.
Second, publication in libel is complete when the accused knowingly parts with the immediate custody of the libel under circumstances which exposed it to be read or seen by any other person than himself. It is enough that the writing left the accused's hands in such circumstances; actual reading by a third person, as happened here when the wife read the letter, satisfies the rule.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court below, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every 12½ pesetas, not to exceed six months in all, and returned the record for execution of the judgment.
Remember This
Memorize this line: a confidential letter that solicits adultery cannot be published with justifiable motive, so the presumption of malice stands. Examiners use this case to test the statutory definition of publication in libel and the meaning of justifiable motive under the presumption of malice.