PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICTOR BELLO, WILLIAM LARA Y MONTILLA ALIAS INSO, ABDUL SALIGAN Y HAIDER ALIAS BOY MUSLIM, AND RUDY LARA Y MONTILLA, ACCUSED, …

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 47, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 4782, finding appellant guilty of the
crime of murder.

We affirm the decision of the trial court.

I

The information filed in Criminal Case No. 4782, charged William
Lara y Montilla alias “Inso,” Abdul Saligan y Haiden alias
“Boy Muslim,” Rudy Lara y Montilla (at large) and herein appellant of
the crime of murder and alleged:

“That on or about June 19, 1985, in
the evening thereof, at Barangay Pangle, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused
confederating together, helping one another with intent to kill, evident
premeditation, treachery, superiority of strength and taking advantage of
nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with a gun one Benjamin Lachica, hitting the latter on the
different parts of the body thereby inflicting wounds which caused his death
several minutes thereafter” (Rollo, p. 3).

Appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Accused William Lara and Abdul
Saligan, who also entered a plea of not guilty, died during the pendency of the
trial; hence, the case against them was dismissed.

On February 9, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the guilt of accused Victor
Bello y Ocampo for the offense charge of murder qualified by treachery, was
established beyond reasonable doubt, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum
of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer
the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the costs. Accused Victor Bello y Ocampo is credited
four-fifth (4/5) of the period of his preventive suspension.

As prayed for by Public Prosecutor Alberto Alforte, the case of
accused William Lara y Montilla alias Inso, who died on April 5, 1986, was
ordered dismissed on June 26, 1986. As
the guilt of the other accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt,
they are hereby acquitted of the offense charged, and their bondsmen are
released on their obligations appertaining thereto” (Rollo, p. 17).

II

On June 19, 1985, at around 8:00 P.M., Wilfredo Espaldon went to
the house of Benjamin Lachica in Barangay Pangle, Aroroy, Masbate to visit his
sick brother, Walter. Walter was the son-in-law
of Benjamin. At around 9:00 P.M.,
somebody called for Benjamin three times. Benjamin asked Wilfredo to open the door. There were two lighted kerosene lamps in the room and Wilfredo
took one of them before opening the door. When Wilfredo opened the door, he recognized appellant as the one who
called for Benjamin. Appellant, who had
three companions with him, introduced himself as a constabulary soldier. He then fired a warning shot which hit
Benjamin on the back. Benjamin was
about one meter from appellant. After
Benjamin fell on the floor, three more shots were fired at him. Appellant and his companions then left,
going towards Barangay Mabari-an.

Wilfredo and Walter reported the incident to the Barangay Captain
of Pangle, who rushed to the crime scene. The Barangay Captain and Wilfredo tried to bring Benjamin to a hospital
but he died on the way. His body was
thereafter brought to the house of Salvador Espaldon.

Wilfredo knew appellant because they used to be neighbors in
Barangay Pangle, Aroroy, Masbate.

Josefa Lachica, Benjamin’s wife, corroborated Wilfredo’s
testimony that appellant was the one who shot her husband. She also testified that prior to the incident, Benjamin and appellant had quarreled
regarding the latter’s failure to make the plow ordered by the former.

Appellant interposed the twin defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that on June 19, 1985, at around
6:00 P.M., he, together with his wife and children, was in their house at
Barangay Madangcalan, Baleno, Masbate. He was making a scabbard for his bolo, when Ignacio, his brother,
arrived bringing with him a gallon of tuba. They drank the tuba until 11:00 P.M. He, then, slept until 5:00 A.M.

The other defense witness, Luis Manlapaz, the Barangay Captain of
Madangcalan, vouchsafed the good moral character of appellant.

III

In his appeal, appellant claims that the trial court erred in
giving credence to the inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. He contends that the
contradictions in the testimonies of Wilfredo Espaldon and Josefa Lachica, are
so irreconcilable that serious doubt is engendered as to the veracity
thereof. He claims that while Wilfredo
testified that the family of the victim were eating their supper when the
shooting occurred, Josefa testified that she was already lying down ready to go
to sleep.

Testimonial discrepancies on minor details tend to strengthen
rather than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of any rehearsal
before the witnesses testified in court. It would perhaps have been more suspicious if the prosecution witnesses
had been able to describe with precision the exact sequence of events (People
v. Pasco, 181 SCRA 233 [1990]). Furthermore, total recall or perfect symmetry in the testimony of
witnesses is not required. As long as
the witnesses concur on material points, slight differences in their
recollection of the details do not reflect on the essential veracity of their
testimonies (People v. Avila, 192 SCRA 242 [1990]). In the case at bench, both prosecution witnesses are one in
saying that four shots were fired by appellant and that all shots hit the
victim.

Appellant further contends that since the house of the victim is
elevated two feet above the ground, then the flooring of the house in relation
to the assailant would be more or less at the assailant’s waist. He claims that at that position, the
assailant could not have aimed directly at the victim because his line of sight
would have been distracted by the light of the lamp which was held by Espaldon
when he opened the door.

It is difficult to follow the line of reasoning of
appellant. The situation described by
him does not establish that the assailant’s vision would be affected by the
light from the lamp.

Another inconsistency pointed out by appellant was that it was
unlikely for him to have shot the victim four times, without also hitting the
other members of the family, who were then taking their supper.

The victim was only one meter away from appellant when the latter
fired his gun. All the shots fired hit
their mark. This explains why no stray
bullets hit any of the members of the family. Besides, there was no evidence presented to show the relative positions
of the other members of the family when the shooting occurred to warrant the
possibility of hitting anyone of them.

Appellant asserts that since Wilfredo claimed that he witnessed
the shooting at close range, he should have known the kind of gun used in
committing the crime. What Wilfredo
testified was that appellant used a gun about ten inches in length.

We do not expect a mere farmer of a remote barrio to be an expert
at firearms identification so as to be able to describe in detail the kind of
gun used. What is essential is that he
saw a gun which was fired by appellant. The caliber, make or the kind of gun
is not an element of the crime of murder. A person not dealing in firearms and ammunition is not expected
to know the specific description of a weapon.

Lastly, appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because it failed to present both the medical
certificate or autopsy report to show that indeed the victim’s death was caused
by bullet wounds, as well as the gun used by appellant.

While the testimony of a medico-legal expert is preferred as to
the injuries suffered by the victim in a case of murder or homicide, it is not
the only competent evidence to prove the injuries and the fact of death. The testimony of a lay person is equally admissible regarding the
fact of the victim’s demise and the surrounding circumstances thereof (People
v. Baybayon, 184 SCRA 13 [1990]).

For purposes of
conviction, it is enough that the prosecution establishes by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and the accused is the author
thereof. The production of the weapon
used in the commission of the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of such burden, for the
same may not have been recovered at all from the assailant (People v. Florida,
214 SCRA 227 [1992]).

Anent the defense of denial, as between a categorical testimony
which has a ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the
former is generally held to prevail (People v. Biago, 182 SCRA 411 [1990];
People v. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530 [1989]).

We agree with the trial court that the presence of treachery
qualified the crime to murder. In the
instant case, the victim was sitting with his back towards the door when he was
shot by appellant. It has been held
that there is treachery when the victim was shot from behind without risk to
his assailants (People v. Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304 [1992]; People v. Melgar,
157 SCRA 718 [1988]).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with
the modification that the indemnity for the death of the victim be increased to
P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.