PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ESMENIO DE LA PEÑA Y BEDRIO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus de la Peña

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Esmenio de la Peña, a criminal appeal from a conviction for selling marijuana in a buy-bust operation conducted by the Narcotics Command in Iloilo City. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must hold together: it draws the classic line between entrapment, which the law allows, and instigation, which the law forbids, and it shows that even a valid conviction can be built only on evidence that respects the accused's rights, because the Court struck down the receipt he signed after arrest yet affirmed his guilt on the strength of other proof.

Procedural History

After the arrest, the appellant executed a counter-affidavit denying culpability. The Third Assistant City Prosecutor recommended dismissal, on the ground that the appellant had been instigated by the Narcom officers. The City Prosecutor reversed that recommendation and ordered another prosecutor to file the Information. A petition for review was denied by the Department of Justice, which ruled that there was sufficient evidence of probable cause and that the question of instigation or entrapment is for the Court, not for the investigating fiscal, to determine. Upon arraignment the appellant pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution rested, he filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to produce conviction; the trial court denied dismissal and ordered the reception of evidence for the accused. The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City then convicted him, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and a fine of 20,000 pesos. He appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning errors against the credence given to the prosecution evidence, against the finding of entrapment rather than instigation, and against the sufficiency of the evidence overall.

Facts

On 24 March 1988, at about two o'clock in the afternoon, Lieutenant Eleuterio Salde of the Narcotics Command received a telephone call from a concerned citizen that a certain Esmie, later identified as the appellant, was selling marijuana at Punta Baluarte, Molo, Iloilo City. He immediately organized a team of six for a buy-bust operation. Arriving at the place at about five o'clock, Sergeant Francisco Allaga, the designated poseur-buyer, went to a sari-sari store and asked a child about Esmie. The child pointed to the appellant, seated about ten meters away. Allaga approached and asked if he could score, the lingo for buying marijuana. The appellant asked how much he wanted, and Allaga answered thirty pesos. Asked to wait, Allaga gave the money, and the appellant left and returned after five minutes with a parcel wrapped in a Camel cigarette pack, which he handed over. Allaga opened it, saw marijuana, and arrested him.

At headquarters, Lieutenant Salde marked the package and kept it in a padlocked steel cabinet. He issued a receipt for fifteen sticks of marijuana, witnessed by Allaga and signed by the appellant. Laboratory tests were positive for marijuana.

The appellant's version was that he was washing clothes at his aunt's house when Allaga arrived asking where marijuana could be bought; he said he did not know, and when Allaga insisted that he needed it as medicine, he still disowned knowledge. He then told passersby Aris Magarse and Angeles Octavio of the need, Aris volunteered to look for marijuana, was given money by Allaga, and returned with it, which the appellant handed to Allaga, who then identified himself and arrested him. Angeles Octavio corroborated him. The trial court rejected this version as replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities and gave credence to Allaga.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution evidence rather than to the appellant's corroborated testimony.
• Whether or not the circumstances leading to the appellant's apprehension constitute instigation rather than a valid entrapment.
• Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted in the face of the alleged weakness of the prosecution evidence.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Presidential Decree Number 1675, the provision under which the Court corrected the penalty, provides:

Section 4. Section 4 of Republic Act Number 6425, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, distribute or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

This is the offense charged and the source of the penalty, which the Court held should be life imprisonment and not reclusion perpetua.

On the signature taken after arrest, the Court applied the constitutional guarantee, quoted in the decision through the case it cited, that:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The Court held that the appellant's signature on the receipt of the seized property was obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation, there being nothing to show he was assisted by counsel, and so it is inadmissible against him.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court could not be faulted for crediting Sergeant Allaga. Although uncorroborated, his testimony is positive and credible and sufficient to support conviction. He established the details convincingly: he was present when the information was received, he was the principal actor and poseur-buyer, he made the arrest after confirming the parcel contained marijuana, he witnessed the receipt which the appellant signed, and he was with Lieutenant Salde when the marijuana was delivered to the crime laboratory. There was no showing of improper motive, and he is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty. The Court also held that the marijuana identified in court was the same item seized, since proper safeguards were taken: it was marked, kept in a padlocked steel cabinet, and taken to the laboratory four days later. The appellant's story pointing to Aris Magarse as the supplier was not credible, given his inconsistencies: in his counter-affidavit he said he was watching friends play mahjong when approached, in court he said he was washing clothes, and his own witness placed him on a footpath conversing with Allaga. His counter-affidavit even admitted he returned with fifteen sticks of marijuana cigarettes, while in court he blamed Aris entirely. The Court added that instant rapport was established when he understood the word score, a term alien to one not engaged in the trade.

On the second issue, the Court held that the operation was entrapment, not instigation, and stated the distinction as a rule:

In entrapment, mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officers conceive the commission of the crime and suggest it to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.

Entrapment is sanctioned by the Revised Penal Code; instigation is tabooed. Allaga's inquiry was a query, not a suggestion. The appellant needed no prodding, no inducement, and much less instigation; his reaction was natural to one already engaged in the illicit trade, and all that Narcom did was to catch him in the act.

On the third issue, the Court held that under the circumstances the appellant does not deserve acquittal. It stressed, however, that his signature on the receipt, a procedural step after arrest, is not a factor in his conviction and is inadmissible against him, his guilt having been adequately established by other evidence of record.

Doctrine

First, the difference between entrapment and instigation lies in the origin of the criminal intent: in entrapment the mens rea, the guilty mind, originates from the mind of the criminal, while in instigation the law officers conceive the crime and suggest it to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. Entrapment is sanctioned; instigation is tabooed. Second, the question of instigation or entrapment is for the Court, not for the investigating fiscal, to determine. Third, the testimony of a poseur-buyer, though uncorroborated, may suffice for conviction where it is positive and credible, absent any showing of improper motive, and where the integrity of the seized exhibit is preserved by marking and safekeeping. Fourth, a signature obtained from a person under custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible against him, but the conviction may stand on other evidence of record. Fifth, the penalty for selling a prohibited drug under the governing decree is life imprisonment, not reclusion perpetua.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, correcting the penalty to life imprisonment instead of reclusion perpetua, with costs against the appellant.

Remember This

Memorize the line: in entrapment the criminal intent originates from the mind of the criminal, while in instigation the law officers conceive the crime and suggest it to the accused. Examiners use this case to test the entrapment and instigation distinction, the sufficiency of an uncorroborated poseur-buyer's testimony, and the inadmissibility of a signature taken during custodial investigation without counsel.