MELANIO N. ESQUIG, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND EDNA D. FERRER, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner, Melanio Esquig, had been the Land Registration Examiner in the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA) since
1984.  Edna Ferrer
was a Senior Clerk at the NALTDRA office in Lingayen,
Pangasinan.  In
1983, the position of Records Officer IV in the office of the Register of Deeds
in Lingayen, Pangasinan,
became vacant.  Both Esquig
and Ferrer applied for promotion to that position.

On October 27, 1987,
the Secretary of Justice appointed Ferrer to the
vacant position.  Esquig
sought a reconsideration of the Secretary’s action but
without success.

He appealed to the Merit Systems Promotion Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service
Commission.  On January 18, 1989, the MSPB decided in his
favor.  It was Ferrer’s
turn to ask for a reconsideration, but the MSPB denied
her motion on May 12, 1989.  On June
8, 1989, she appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).  On November 21, 1989, the CSC decided in her
favor on the ground that as both Esquig and Ferrer possess the qualification standards for the position
in question and neither of them is next-in-rank* to the vacant position of Records Officer IV, the appointing
authority has discretion to choose whom he deems to be best qualified and the
loser who is not next-in-rank is without legal personality to protest against
the Secretary’s choice.  The relevant
observations of the Commission are quoted hereunder as follows:

“x x x Esquig has no legal personality to question the appointment
of Edna Ferrer, on the ground that he is not a
next-in-rank employee as erroneously pointed out by the Board in its decision
dated January 18, 1989.  On this point
Section 14 of Resolution 83-343 states in part:

‘x x x a next-in-rank employee
who is competent and qualified and who feels aggrieved by the promotion of
another may file a protest.  x x x’

Stated in another manner, if one is not a
next-in-rank employee, he is not within the contemplation of this particular provision.

“Taking this into consideration, the Commission finds that the
appointing official has not acted in grave abuse of discretion in selecting the
appointee for the position.  That being
so, and as the protestant-appellee is not an employee
next-in-rank, the choice of the appointing authority must not be disturbed and
should be upheld.  On this point, it is
said thus: ‘The power to appoint is, in essence discretionary.  The appointing power has the right of choice
which he may exercise freely according to his judgment deciding for himself who
is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities. (Pamantasan ng Lunsod ng Maynila v.
Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 22.)

“Thus, aside from the fact that the promotional appointment of
Ferrer to the position of Records Officer IV is found
to be within the sound discretion of the appointing authority, Protestant Esquig is found to have no personality to question the
same.” (pp. 22-23, Rollo.)

Esquig’s motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Commission, hence, this petition for review.

The only issue raised in the petition is the CSC’s
jurisdiction to review the decision of the MSPB since, as found by the latter, Ferrer’s appeal was “a scrap of paper” because
she did not furnish the appellee (Esquig)
with a copy of her appeal (p. 17, Rollo).

The Commission held, however, that Ferrer’s
omission to furnish the appellee with a copy of her
appeal “would not stop the Commission in deciding the case on the
merits” for “we do not strictly adhere to legal technicalities”
(p. 21, Rollo). 
That ruling is supported by jurisprudence (Sunga,
et al. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 82278, May 12, 1989; ASPREC vs. Itchon,
16 SCRA 921; Mangubat vs. De Castro, 163 SCRA 608).

On the timeliness of Ferrer’s appeal to
the CSC, the latter found:

“x x x
contrary to the allegation of Esquig that Ferrer filed her appeal beyond the reglementary
period, the records reveal that Ferrer received a
copy of the MSPB decision on her motion for reconsideration dated May 12, 1989
only on May 30, 1989.  The appeal was
filed on June 5, 1989 which
is well within the 15-day reglementary period.” (p. 26, Rollo.)

This factual finding, based on the records of the case, is
presumed to be correct (Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 154 SCRA 368). 
Moreover, administrative proceedings are not bound by the rigid
requirements of the Rules of Court (Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. Amores, 152 SCRA 237). 
The important consideration is that both parties were afforded an
opportunity to be heard and they availed themselves of it to present their
respective positions on the matter in dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of
merit.  Costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

* next-in-rank is Records Officer
II