G.R. No. 9241. February 13, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ARCADIO RAMIREZ AND MARIANO SERADOY, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
TRENT, J.:
of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan convicting them of the theft of
large cattle.
It is urged that the trial court erred: (1) in convicting the two accused
because their counsel was not present during the time in which more than
one-half of the testimony was being taken (citing U. S. vs. Gimeno, 1
Phil. Rep., 236, and U. S. vs. Palisoc, 4 Phil. Rep., 207); and (2) in
convicting these two appellants because the evidence introduced was not
sufficient with respect to the appellants to establish their guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The record shows that the appellants were arraigned on August 5, 1913, and
pleaded not guilty; that the court appointed Mr. Denison counsel de
oficio; and that Denison did not arrive until after the examination of the
first witness and the direct examination of the second witness had terminated.
But the appellants interposed no objection to proceeding with the trial in the
absence of their counsel. Mr. Denison had an opportunity to cross-examine both
witnesses after his arrival.
In the case of United States vs. Gimeno, supra, the court said:
“Upon an examination of the record we discover that the defendant applied to the
Court of First Instance for assignment of counsel for his defense at the trial
of the case, and in accordance with the application an attorney was assigned for
his defense. Notwithstanding this, it seems that the attorney failed to appear
at the trial to represent him, and the burden fell upon him to make his own
defense. Under General Orders, No. 58, if the defendant appears without counsel
he must be informed by the court that he has a right to have counsel before
being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he
desires and is unable to. employ counsel the court must assign counsel to defend
him. (Sec. 17.) This is a right which the defendant should not be deprived of,
and the failure of the court to assign counsel or, after counsel has been
assigned, to require him to perform this duty by appearing and defending the
accused would be sufficient cause for the reversal of the case. For this reason
it will be necessary to remand this case for a new trial, at which the defendant
must be assigned counsel for his defense.”
In the case of United States vs. Palisoc, supra, the court said:
“The provisions of sections 16, 17, and 18 of General Orders, No. 58, are
mandatory in their terms, and for the reason that the court did not comply with
the provisions of these sections, the judgment of the court with reference to
Rufino Lavarias is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan for the purpose of a new
trial.”
We do not now question the correctness of the doctrine enunciated in these
two cases. In the cause at bar the court complied with the-provisions of section
17 of General Orders, No. 58, by appointing Mr. Denison to defend the appellants
and requiring him to appear and perform the duty assigned to him. It is true as
before stated that Mr. Denison was not present when the trial began but he
appeared later and took charge of the defense. If it were error for the court to
commence the trial in the absence of counsel this was cured by the latter’s
subsequent appearance, who had an opportunity to cross-examine the two
witnesses. This case is therefore clearly distinguishable from the case of
United States vs. Gimeno. In both counsel were appointed. In the one he
appeared subsequent to the commencement of the trial and took charge of the
defense. In the other he did not appear at all.
In regard to the appellants’ contention that the evidence is not sufficient
to warrant their conviction, it is sufficient to state that if the evidence of
record be given credence the appellants were properly convicted. The defense
introduced no evidence and made no effort to impeach the witnesses for the
prosecution. There is no reason shown why the prosecution’s witnesses should not
be believed. The positive and direct testimony of these witnesses stands
uncontradicted. The guilt of the appellants has been established beyond
question. The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed, with costs.
Arellano, C. J., and Araullo, J., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.