TRINIDAD H. PARDO DE TAVERA, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE GARCIA VALDEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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Pardo de Tavera versus Valdez
The Case
This is the case of Pardo de Tavera versus Valdez, a criminal prosecution for the offense of injurias graves, which is grave insult or grave defamation under the old Spanish Penal Code. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, a recently appointed member of the United States Philippine Commission, complained that Vicente Garcia Valdez, as editor of a Manila periodical called Miau, published an article holding him up to public contempt. The case matters for two reasons. First, it fixes the standard for when written insults become grave and punishable. Second, and more important for the Bar, it is the classic early ruling on the interplay between a later libel statute and a pending prosecution, and on the retroactive effect of penal laws that favor the accused.
Procedural History
The case began in the Court of First Instance, which found Valdez guilty of injurias graves under articles 457 and 458 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to pay a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment and costs. Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court. The private prosecutor appealed on the sole question of whether the penalty imposed was proper. The defendant also appealed, but he filed no brief and did not appear, personally or through counsel, on the day fixed for argument. The Court noted that his appeal could have been dismissed for lack of prosecution, but it chose instead to decide the whole case on the merits.
Facts
In September 1901, Valdez was the editor of Miau, a periodical published and circulated in Manila. In the issue of September 15, 1901, the periodical carried an article written in grossly abusive language, in terms not capable of being misunderstood. The article charged Pardo de Tavera, who had then recently been appointed a member of the United States Philippine Commission, with having displayed cowardice at the time of the murder of his mother and sister, and with having afterwards entered into intimate political relations with the assassin. The article contained other derogatory statements and imputations as well.
The prosecution was pending when Act Number 277 of the United States Philippine Commission, the law defining libel and reforming the Spanish law on calumnia and injurias, took effect on October 24, 1901, after the article had been published. The trial court, applying the general rule that penal laws are retroactive when they favor the accused, concluded that the penalty of the Penal Code could not be inflicted in its full extent. That ruling on the penalty is what the private prosecutor brought to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether or not the published statements constitute the offense of injurias graves under article 457 of the Penal Code.
- Whether or not the defendant's offer to prove the truth of the statements was properly rejected.
- Whether or not the penalty for the offense is governed by the Penal Code or by Act Number 277, given that the statute took effect during the pendency of the prosecution.
- Whether or not the official position of the offended party is a qualifying rather than a generic aggravating circumstance.
Applicable Provisions
Article 457 of the Penal Code classifies injurias graves under four heads:
(1) The imputation of a crime of the class not subject to prosecution de oficio. (2) That of a vice or moral shortcoming, the consequences of which might seriously injure the reputation, credit, or interests of the person offended. (3) Injurias which by reason of their nature, occasion, or circumstances are commonly regarded as insulting. (4) Those which may be reasonably classified as grave in view of the condition, dignity, and personal circumstances of the injured party and the offender.
The Court used the third and fourth heads to classify the article as grave insult.
Article 458 of the Penal Code fixes the penalty for written and published injurias graves:
injurias graves, put into writing and made public shall be punished with the penalty of destierro in its medium to its maximum degree, and a fine of from 625 to 6,250 pesetas.
This is the penalty the Court ultimately applied, in its medium grade.
Section 13 of Act Number 277 contains the repealing clause and its proviso:
All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall operate as a repeal of existing laws in so far as they are applicable to pending actions or existing causes of action, but as to such causes of action or pending actions existing laws shall remain in full force and effect.
This proviso preserves the old Penal Code penalty for the pending prosecution, defeating the trial court's reliance on the more favorable new law.
Article 22 of the Penal Code states the rule on retroactivity:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a crime or misdemeanor.
The trial court invoked this rule, but the Court held it could not operate because the saving proviso kept the former law intact for pending actions.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court sustained the conviction. The statements did not impute a crime, and possibly not a vice or moral shortcoming in the strict sense, but they were obviously calculated to bring the person attacked into public obloquy and contempt, especially given his position as a high official of the Government. They therefore fall clearly under the third and fourth heads of article 457.
On the second issue, the Court held that the defendant's offer to prove the truth of the statements was properly rejected, citing article 460 of the Penal Code.
On the third issue, the Court ruled for the private prosecutor. The trial court overlooked or misconstrued the proviso in section 13 of Act Number 277. The Court read the proviso broadly:
The language is general and embraces, we think, all actions, whether civil, criminal, or of a mixed character.
Because the former law remained in full force for pending actions, there was no occasion to ask whether the new penalties were more favorable to the accused. The punishment must be determined exclusively by the former law.
On the fourth issue, the Court was inclined to think that the official position of the private prosecutor is a qualifying rather than a generic aggravating circumstance, referring to article 78 of the Penal Code.
Doctrine
First, written imputations that by their nature, occasion, or circumstances are commonly regarded as insulting, or that are grave in view of the condition, dignity, and personal circumstances of the parties, constitute injurias graves under article 457 of the Penal Code, even without imputing a crime or a vice in the strict sense.
Second, the retroactive operation of a penal law that favors the accused under article 22 of the Penal Code yields to an express saving clause. Where a later statute provides that existing laws remain in full force as to pending actions and existing causes of action, the former law governs the penalty, and the court need not compare which penalty is more favorable.
Third, the official position of the offended party in a prosecution for grave insult is qualificative rather than generic, and is absorbed in the nature of the offense rather than treated as a separate aggravating circumstance.
Disposition
The conviction was sustained, but the judgment was modified: the Court imposed four years of destierro and a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary liability of one day of banishment for every twelve and one half pesetas unpaid, plus the costs of both instances, and returned the record to the trial court for execution of the sentence as modified.
Remember This
The one line to memorize is that a saving clause in a later penal statute keeps the old law in full force for pending actions, so the rule of retroactivity in favor of the accused never comes into play. Examiners use this case to test the interaction of the retroactivity rule with a repealing clause, and to test the classification of written insults as injurias graves.