G.R. No. 92159. July 01, 1993

LEDITA BURCE JACOB AND BUENAVENTURA JACOB, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO, ALCERA FALCON, TRINIDAD ALCERA CRUZ AND PURIFICACION ALCERA CHAY, REP. BY TRINIDAD ALCERA …

Decisions / Signed Resolutions July 1, 1993 FIRST DIVISION CRUZ, J.:
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CRUZ, J.:


On November 12, 1984, the
private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of possession and
ownership of a parcel of land located in Tagas, Tabaco, Albay, with an area of
approximately 794 square meters.

The complaint was filed
by Rosario Alcera Falcon, Trinidad Alcera Cruz, and Purificacion Chay,
grandchildren of Agaton Boragay and Manuela Bobiles.
[1] Of the eight defendants, only Ledita
Burce Jacob and Buenaventura Jacob, the herein petitioners, filed their answer.[2]
The other six were declared in default.[3]

The plaintiffs alleged
that the land was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-3334 issued
in the name of Manuela Bobiles on June 30, 1932. The spouses Agaton Boragay and Manuela Bobiles had only one child
named Gregoria Boragay. When the
parents died, the property passed on to Gregoria who stayed on the land
together with her husband, Alejandro Alcera, and their three children. When the Alcera children got married, they
left the property and lived with their respective husbands.
[4]

In 1974, Venancio Bonto and Felicidad Boragay constructed a
shanty on the subject property. In
1977, Bonifacio Bobiles and Rosalina Base also built their house on the said
lot. In the same year, OCT No. RO-3334
was canceled and TCT No. T-50318 in the name of the private respondents was
issued. In 1981, two more houses were
erected on the land by Buenaventura Jacob, Ledita Burce, Edilberto Bonto and
Elena Borebor.[5]

In May, 1984, Trinidad Alcera Cruz demanded verbally that the petitioners vacate the
premises but the latter refused. It was then that the complaint was filed
against them in the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay.

For their part, the
defendants claimed that the spouses Agaton Boragay and Manuela Bobiles sold the
subject lot to Leon Cabida in an
Escritura de Venta Con Pacto de Retro concluded in 1933. On July 15,
1948, Cabida sold the land to Emilio Bonto, husband of Rosario Burce. On October 31, 1956, Emilio Bonto executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ricardo Burce and Consolacion Burce Elaco
covering 595 square meters of the said lot. Emilio Bonto retained the 199 square meters. In 1980, Consolacion Burce Elaco, with the conformity of the
heirs of her brother Ricardo, verbally ceded to her niece Ledita Burce Jacob
the 595-square meter portion of the subject property. This was confirmed and ratified by Consolacion in
a document executed on January 15, 1985.[6]

The defendants also
averred that they had been in actual and physical possession of the property
under claim of ownership for more than 51 years. Taxes on the property had been paid since 1948 by their
predecessors-in-interest. It was only
in 1976 that the private respondents came to know of the subject lot. When Consolacion
Burce Elaco worked for the registration of the
595-square meter portion of the lot, she was informed by the Registrar of Deeds
that Lot No. 2365 had a title in the name of Manuela Bobiles on file with the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Tabaco, Albay. She went to that office and was advised to secure
a waiver from the heirs of Agaton Boragay. Accordingly, she sent a letter to Rosario Alcera Falcon asking
her to execute a document ratifying and confirming the sale of the lot by their
grandparents in favor of Leon Cabida. Falcon asked for an additional amount of
P6,000.00 as purchase
price of the subject property, but Consolacion refused to pay the same.[7]
One year later, the property was transferred and registered in the name of the
private respondents.[8]

On the basis of the
evidence adduced by the parties, Judge Oscar B. Pimentel rendered judgment on
August
8, 1986,[9] dismissing the complaint and declaring
Leditha Jacob and Buenaventura Jacob “to be in lawful possession and
owners of the 297.5 portion of the lot in question which came from Consolacion
Burce Elaco and the other 297.5 xxx belongs to the vendee thereof, Ricardo
Burce or his heir, which is presently legally possessed by defendants Ledita
Jacob and Buenaventura Jacob.” The remaining area of 199 square meters was
declared as belonging to Emilio Bonto.

The plaintiffs (now
herein
private respondents) appealed to respondent court,
which reversed the decision
of the trial court on the following grounds:

(1)     The ownership of the land had been
established preponderantly and more particularly by the Certificate of Title in
the name of herein private respondents.

(2)     The Certificate of Title serves as evidence
of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein.

(3)     The Land Registration Act provides for
judicial hearing before the issuance of a certificate of title. Persons claiming title over the property
involved are given the opportunity to oppose the issuance of said title. Petitioners never filed any opposition to
the issuance of TCT No. 50318 in the name of private respondents, hence, they
are forever barred to contest the validity of such title.

(4)     A decree of registration and title may be
attacked on grounds of actual fraud within one year from the date of its entry.

(5)     Tax receipts are not evidence of ownership
of a parcel of land for which payment is made especially when the land is
covered by a Torrens Title in the name of another.

The case is now before
this Court in this petition for review
by the Jacobs, who aver that the Court of Appeals erred in: 1) disregarding the Escritura
de Venta Con Pacto de Retro
(Deed
of
Sale with Right to
Repurchase); 2) not concluding that the private respondents
committed bad faith in transferring the property in
their names; 3) not finding private respondents guilty of laches; and 4)
concluding that Leon Cabida was but an administrator and therefore could not
acquire the property under his
administration.

The petition will fail.

The respondent court was
only applying the
settled rule
when it declared:

x x x It is a fundamental principle in Land
Registration that the Certificate of Title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. After the expiration of the
one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes
and Nadres vs. Borbon and Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et
al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G.
2186, April 15, 1957; Bruzuela, et al. vs. Ciriaco vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G.
2822, May 15, 1957). Furthermore, a
title, once registered under the Torrens System of land registration, cannot be
defeated, even by adverse, open and notorious possession, neither can it be
defeated by prescription. A certificate
of title, once registered, is notice to the world and as such all persons are
bound by such notice and no one can plead ignorance of the registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil.
590).

Defendants-appellees in this case claimed that
plaintiffs-appellants came to know of the property only in 1975. Consolacion Burce Elaco, the alleged former
owner of the property prior to the defendants-appellees, tried to seek waiver
from herein plaintiffs-appellants in order to transfer the property under the
former’s name. The property was
transferred in the name of herein plaintiffs-appellants in November, 1977. The Land Registration Act provides for judicial hearing before
the issuance of a certificate of title. In such proceeding, any person claiming title over the property involved
is given the opportunity to oppose the issuance of said title. In the case at bar, herein
defendants-appellees never filed any opposition to the issuance of said
Certificate of Title, hence, they are forever barred to contest the validity of
such title. Thus, in De los Reyes vs.
Paterno, 34 Phil 420, it was held that claimant having failed to present his
answer or objection to the registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens
System or to question the validity of such registration within a period of one
year after the certificate of title of registration had been issued, had
forever lost his right in said land, even granting that he had any right
therein.

By their own admission,
Rosario Alcera Falcon was approached by Consolacion Burce Elaco in 1976 for a
waiver when she sought to have the subject lot registered in her name. This request was refused, allegedly because
she was unwilling to pay the petitioners an additional amount of P6,0
00.00 as part of the purchase price for the lot. If this be true, then the petitioners should have been on their
guard against whatever action the private respondents would take to secure
their claim to the land. Forewarned
that the private respondents were intending to hold on to the property, the
petitioners should have taken steps to prevent the latter from registering it
in their name.

As might be expected, it was so registered, in 1977.[10] Yet, although the registration
proceedings were in rem and there is no dispute as to the proper
publication of the required notices, the petitioners did not file any
opposition. Thereafter, TCT No. T-50318
having been issued in the name of the private respondents, the petitioners did
not move for its annulment on
their alleged ground of fraud until the prescribed period of one year expired. To repeat, it was only in 1984, when the complaint against them
was filed, that the petitioners
bestirred themselves.

As they were actually in possession of the disputed lot, the
petitioners should have been especially vigilant against any adverse claim that
might be made thereto, especially from the private respondents. Yet, although they were aware of the private respondents’ original registration, the
petitioners made no effort to have the registration transferred in their name
after the sale of the land to their predecessor-in-interest. In fact, there was no change of registration
when, as they alleged, the land passed from Agaton Boragay and Manuela Bobiles
to Leon Cabida in 1933; then to Emilio Bonto in 1948; then to Ricardo Burce and
Consolacion Burce Elaco in 1956; then to Ledita Burce Jacob in 1985. All this time, the property remained
in
the name of Manuela Bobiles under OCT
No. RO-3334.

The contention that the private respondents knew about the property only in 1976 is an
irrelevant argument. Even
assuming this allegation to be true, we fail to see how this would affect the ownership of the disputed
land. Title
to registered land is not lost by ignorance. The simple fact is that the subject property
was in the name of the private respondents’ ancestors under an original
certificate
of title when they
secured the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in their name.

The Court of Appeals
erred when it disregarded the
Escritura de Venta con Pacto de Retro
as a mere scrap of paper. In fact, it was an important piece of
evidence that it should not have dismissed out of hand.

Rule 132, Section 22, of
the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 22.        Evidence of execution
not necessary. – Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any
alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution
and authenticity need be given.

The Escritura complied with all the requisites laid down
in the above provision. It was more
than 51 years old when it was presented in court; it was produced by the proper
custodians thereof who were the heirs of the person who would validly keep it;
and there is no question it was
unblemished by any suspicious alteration or erasure. It was therefore unnecessary to prove its execution and
authenticity as evidence of the transfer
of the disputed property
to Leon Cabida, the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest.

Even so, that document cannot prevail against the transfer
certificate of title in the name of the private respondents, who remain and are
recognized as the registered owners of the disputed land. That title is good as against the whole
world.

And then there is laches. Laches is defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to
an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.[11]
The petitioners invoke laches against the private respondents for their failure
to protest their occupation of the subject lot, but they did not have to do this under the circumstances because they had
the protection of the Torrens system.

If anyone is guilty of
laches, it is the petitioners themselves for their failure to register the land
in their name after the conclusion of the
Escritura and the successive transfers of the property
and to oppose the registration of the land in the name of private respondents
in 1976. And if, as they now say, such
registration was made fraudulently, what they should have done was file a
petition for its annulment within a period of one year in accordance with
Section 38 of the Land Registration Decree.
[12] They did absolutely nothing until they were
sued for recovery of the possession and ownership of the land by the private
respondents in 1984.

Assuming that the
petitioners had a right to the property by virtue of the Escritura, they
slept on that right until they forfeited it by their inaction. When they asserted it in 1984, fifty-one
years after the Escritura was executed and seven years after the subject
land was registered in the name of the private respondents, they were invoking
a title that had long vanished.

Vigilantibus, et non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt
. The vigilant, and not the sleepy, are
assisted by the laws. So it must be in
the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.


[1]
Orig. Rec., pp. 1-6.

[2]
Ibid., pp.
16-19.

[3]
Id., pp. 169-170.

[4]
id., p. 168.

[5]
Rollo, p. 50.

[6]
Exhibit “K,” Orig. Rec., p.
131.

[7]
Rollo, p. 10.

[8]
Orig. Rec., p. 158.

[9]
Ibid., pp. 167-188.

[10]
Exhibit “F,” Orig. Rec., p.
158.

[11]
Heirs of Batiog Lacamen vs.
Heirs of Laruan, 65 SCRA 605.

[12]
Sec. 38. If the court after hearing
finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his
application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of
confirmation
and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind
the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the
following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and
all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice,
or citation, or included in the general description “To all whom it may
concern.” Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of
any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file
in the competent Court of First Instance a
petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided
no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title
issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree
of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect
forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or
certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be
cancelled or annulled. But any person
aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the
decree. Whenever the phrase
“innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.