SALVADOR H. LAUREL, PETITIONER, VS. RAMON GARCIA, AS HEAD OF THE ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, RAUL MANGLAPUS, AS SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CATALINO MACARAIG, AS EXECUTIVE …

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin
respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding
for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi,
5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo,
Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.  We granted the prayer for a temporary
restraining order effective February
20, 1990.  One of the
petitioners (in G. R. No. 92047) likewise prays for a writ of mandamus
to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their
decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi
property inspite of strong public opposition and to
explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino
citizens and entities in the bidding process.

The oral arguments in G. R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia,
et al. were heard by the Court on March 13, 1990. 
After G. R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary
Macaraig, et al. was filed, the respondents were required to file a comment by
the Court’s resolution dated February
22, 1990.  The two petitions were consolidated on March
27, 1990 when the
memoranda of the parties in the Laurel case were deliberated upon.

The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the
respondents filed a motion for an extension of thirty (30) days to file comment
in G. R. No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an extension of another
thirty (30) days which we granted on May 8, 1990, a third motion for extension
of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of time which
we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the respondents to the length of time the
petitions have been pending.  After the
comment was filed, the petitioner in G. R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days
to file a reply.  We noted his motion and
resolved to decide the two (2) cases.

I

The subject property in
this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under
the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:

(1)  The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai?machi,
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of approximately
2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy
Chancery;

(2)  The Kobe Commercial
Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an an area of around 764.72 square meters and categorized as a
commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate
staff; and

(3)  The Kobe Residential
Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a
residential lot which is now vacant.

The properties and the capital goods and services procured from
the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property
and their suffering during World War II.

The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at
$550 million would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed
by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2, Reparations
Agreement).  Rep. Act No. 1789, the
Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization
of reparations and development loans. 
The procurements are divided into those for use by the government
sector and those for private parties in projects as the
then National Economic Council shall determine. 
Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale to
Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in
national development projects.

The Roppongi
property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year
Schedule and listed under the heading “Government Sector”, through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27,
1958.  The Roppongi
property consists of the land and building “for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy” (Annex M-D to Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503).  As intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai
on July 22, 1976
when the Roppongi building needed major repairs.  Due to the failure of our government to
provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has
remained undeveloped since that time.

A proposal was presented
to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine
Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a
lease agreement with a Japanese firm – Kajima Corporation – which shall
construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1)
building in Nampeidai and renovate the present
Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai.  The consideration of the construction would
be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be
constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai.  The other
building in Roppongi shall then be used as the
Philippine Embassy Chancery.  At the end
of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used
by the Philippine government.  No change
of ownership or title shall occur.  (See
Annex “B” to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all
throughout the lease period and thereafter. 
However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal which
is pending approval and ratification between the parties.  Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe,
Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders
Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.

On July 25, 1987,
the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or
entities to avail of reparations’ capital goods and services in the event of
sale, lease or disposition.  The four
properties in Japan
including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in
the first “Whereas” clause.

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the
government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the
reparations properties starting with the Roppongi
lot.  The property has twice been set for
bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million.  The first bidding was a failure since only
one bidder qualified.  The second one,
after postponements, has not yet materialized. 
The last scheduled bidding on February
21, 1990 was restrained by this Court.  Later, the rules on bidding were changed such
that the $225 million floor price became merely a suggested floor price.

The Court finds that each
of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. 
The petitioner in G. R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone while the petitioner in G. R.
No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged unjustified bias of
the Philippine government in favor of
selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities.  These petitions have been consolidated and
are resolved at the same time for the objective is the same — to stop the sale
of the Roppongi property.

The petitioner in G. R.
No. 92013 raises the following issues:

(1)  Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by
the Philippine Government?; and

(2)  Does the Chief
Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to
sell the Roppongi property?

Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G. R. No.
92047, apart from questioning the authority of the government to alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 296 in making the property available for sale to
non-Filipino citizens and entities.  He
also questions the bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or
Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in Japan
for being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities
by denying them the right to be informed about the bidding requirements.

II

In G. R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel
asserts that the Roppongi property and the related
lots were acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for
diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine government.  Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion,
and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See infra).

The petitioner submits that the Roppongi
property comes under “property intended for public service” in paragraph 2 of
the above provision.  He states that
being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not
even by the State.  The Roppongi and related properties were acquired for “sites
for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other
improvements” (Second Year Reparations Schedule).  The petitioner states that they continue to
be intended for a necessary service. 
They are held by the State in anticipation of an opportune use.  (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66).  Hence, it
cannot be appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more
simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts
(Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]).  Noting the non-use of the Roppongi
property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains
property of public dominion so long as the government has not used it for other
purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its original purpose
or use.

The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner’s
contention by saying that the subject property is not governed by our Civil
Code but by the laws of Japan
where the property is located.  They rely
upon the rule of lex situs
which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition,
transfer and devolution of the title to a property.  They also invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of
1988, dated January 27, 1988
of the Secretary of Justice which used the lex
situs in explaining the inapplicability of
Philippine law regarding a property situated in Japan.

The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument
that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi
property has ceased to become property of public dominion.  It has become patrimonial property because it
has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over
thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because the intention
by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it
to private use has been manifested by overt acts, such as,
among others:  (1) the transfer of the
Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai; (2) the issuance of
administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the four government
properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the
enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a provision stating that funds may
be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5) the
holding of the public bidding of the Roppongi
property but which failed; (6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55
of the bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of the
government’s intention to remove the Roppongi
property from the public service purpose; and (7) the resolution of this Court
dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding
Committee, et al., G. R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin
the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled
on March 30, 1989.

III

In G. R. No.
92047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this
Court to rule on the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296.  He had earlier filed a petition in G. R. No.
87478 which the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989.  He now avers that the executive order
contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national
patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution.  It also allegedly violates:

 (1)  The reservation of the ownership and
acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens.  (Sections 2 and 3, Article
XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141).

(2)  The preference for
Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);

(3)  The protection given
to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices;

(4)  The guarantee of the
right of the people to information on all matters of public concern (Section 7,
Article III, Constitution);

(5)  The prohibition
against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not wholly owned by
Filipino citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines under the
Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and

(6)  The declaration of the
state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest (Section 28, Article II, Constitution).

Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of
public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional executive order is a
misapplication of public funds.  He
states that since the details of the bidding for the Roppongi
property were never publicly
disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days before the scheduled
bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo, and the
accomplishment of requirements and the selection of qualified bidders should be
done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not
have the chance to comply with Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi.  Worse, the
Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum price of $225
million from which price capital gains tax under Japanese law of about 50 to
70% of the floor price would still be deducted.

IV

The petitioners and
respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi
site and the three related properties were acquired through reparations
agreements, that these were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated
under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy.

The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly
spelled out.  It is dictated by
the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese
government.

There can be no doubt
that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property
has become patrimonial.  This, the
respondents have failed to do.

As property of public
dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man.  It cannot be alienated.  Its ownership is a special collective
ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group.  The purpose is not to serve the State as a
juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public
welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.  (Taken from 3 Manresa,
66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).

The applicable provisions
of the Civil Code are:

“ART. 419.    Property is
either of public dominion or of private ownership.

“ART. 420.    The following
things are property of public dominion:

“(1)    Those intended for
public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;

“(2)    Those
which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

“ART. 421.    All other
property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property.”

The Roppongi
property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

Has the intention of the
government regarding the use of the property been changed because the lot has
been idle for some years?  Has it become
patrimonial?

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.  Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen
and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]).  A property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership “until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such
(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).

The respondents enumerate
various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change of
intention.  We emphasize, however, that
an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article
422 of the Civil Code must be definite.  Abandonment cannot be inferred from the
non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government’s
own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to
repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino
Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]).  Abandonment must be a certain and positive
act based on correct legal premises.

A mere transfer of the
Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not
relinquishment of the Roppongi property’s original
purpose.  Even the failure by the
government to repair the building in Roppongi is not
abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of government
funds.  The recent Administrative Orders
authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but
did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.

Executive Order No. 296,
though its title declares an “authority to sell”, does not have a provision in
its text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured
from Japan for
the government sector.  The executive
order does not declare that the properties lost their public character.  It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not
to Filipinos alone in case of a sale,
lease or other disposition.  It merely eliminates the restriction under
Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens
and one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities.  The text of Executive Order No. 296 provides:

“Section 1.  The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as
amended, and of other laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the abovementioned
properties can be made available for sale, lease or any other manner of
disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino
citizens.”

Executive Order No. 296
is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi
and the three other properties were earlier converted into alienable real
properties.  As earlier stated, Rep. Act
No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the government sector and the
private sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789).  Only the private sector properties can be
sold to end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos.  It is this nationality provision which was
amended by Executive Order No. 296.

Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act. No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which
provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of
the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries, did
not withdraw the Roppongi property from being
classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties
abroad.  Section 63 (c) refers to
properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or
service.  Rep. Act No. 6657, therefore,
does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi
property.  It merely enumerates possible
sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform
Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. 
Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped
as a source of funds.

The respondents try to get
around the public dominion character of the Roppongi
property by insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply.

It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of
all people, should be the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely valuable
government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail. 
The Japanese law — its coverage and effects, when enacted, and
exceptions to its provisions — is not presented to the Court.  It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or
Japanese law should apply without stating what that law provides.  It is assumed on faith that Japanese law
would allow the sale.

We see no reason why a
conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation
exists.  A conflict of law situation
arises only when:  (1) There is a dispute
over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the
capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential
validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of
a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private
International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law
on land ownership and its conveyance is
asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.  Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply.

In the instant case, none
of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title.  There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines.  The
issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State.  And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its
sale.  This is governed by Philippine
law.  The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced.  The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties
procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to
sell them.  In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that
it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the
public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is
inapplicable.  We see no point in belaboring
whether or not this opinion is correct. 
Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi
lot when there is no showing that it can be sold?

The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino
of the recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least,
conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. 
Moreover, the approval does not have the force and effect of law since
the President already lost her
legislative powers.  The Congress had
already convened for more than a year.

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is
another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.

There is no law authorizing
its conveyance.

Section 79 (f) of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides:

“Section 79 (f).  Conveyances and contracts
to which the Government is a party.  In cases in which the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying
the title to real estate or to any other property the value of which in excess
of one hundred thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall
prepare the necessary papers which, together with the proper recommendations, shall
be submitted to the Congress of the
Philippines for approval by the same.  Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be
executed and signed by the President of the Philippines
on behalf of the Government of the Philippines
unless the authority therefor be
expressly vested by law in another officer.” (Underlining supplied)

The requirement has been
retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292).

“SEC. 48.  Official Authorized
to Convey Real Property.  – Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the
deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:

“(1)  For
property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
by the President, unless the authority therefor is
expressly vested by law in another officer.

“(2)  For
property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
but titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency
or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.”
(Underlining supplied)

It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of
the government on his or her own sole will. 
Any such conveyance must be
authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress.  It requires executive and legislative
concurrence.

Resolution No. 55 of the
Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from
public domain much less authorize its sale. 
It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the
public character of the Roppongi property.  In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations is conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises
serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of the
circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government properties
in Japan.

The resolution of this
Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee,
et al., supra, did not pass upon the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 296.  Contrary to
respondents’ assertion, we did not uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi
property.  The Court stated that the
constitutionality of the executive
order was not the real issue and that resolving the constitutional
question was “neither necessary nor
finally determinative of the case.” The Court noted that “[W]hat petitioner
ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property.” In emphasizing that “the decision of
the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to
finance the CARP x x x
cannot be questioned” in view of Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court
did not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable nor did it indicate
that the President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi
property.  The resolution should be read
to mean that in case the Roppongi property is
re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds
of a sale may be used for national economic development projects including the
CARP.

Moreover, the sale in
1989 did not materialize.  The petitions
before us question the proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi
property.  We are resolving the issues raised in these petitions, not the
issues raised in 1989.

Having declared a need
for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative
authority to allow the sale of the property, we see no compelling reason to
tackle the constitutional issues raised by petitioner Ojeda.

The Court does  not ordinarily  pass
upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised
in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of
the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). 
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground
such as the application of a statute or
general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, [1909],
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 [1941]).

The petitioner in G. R.
No. 92013 states why the Roppongi property should not
be sold:

The Roppongi property is not just like
any piece of property.  It was given to
the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died
and suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of
widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other
properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war.  The Tokyo
properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people
in the face of an invader; like the monuments of Rizal,
Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect economic
or financial benefits from them.  But who
would think of selling these monuments? 
Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we keep our properties
in Japan as
memorials to the countless Filipinos who died and suffered.  Even if we should become paupers we should
not think of selling them.  For it would
be as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our countrymen.  (Rollo G. R. No.
92013, p. 147)

The petitioner in G. R.
No. 92047 also states:

“Roppongi is no ordinary property.  It is one ceded by the Japanese government in
atonement for its past belligerence, for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb
and for deaths, physical dislocation and economic devastation the whole
Filipino people endured in World War II.

“It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring
back to life, that its significance today remains undimmed, inspite
of the lapse of 45 years since the war ended, inspite
of the passage of 32 years since the property passed on to the Philippine
government.

“Roppongi is a reminder that cannot —
should not — be dissipated.  x x x.” (Rollo
– 92047, p. 9)

It is indeed true that
the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because
of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo
but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos – veterans and
civilians alike.  Whether or not the Roppongi
and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and
Congress must concur.  Considering the properties’ importance and value,
the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be
faithfully followed.

WHEREFORE,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the petitions are GRANTED.  A writ of
prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale
of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan.  The
February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa,
Gancayco, Cortes, and
Medialdea, JJ., join Justice Feliciano’s dissent.

Cruz, J., See concurrence.

Feliciano, J., See separate dissent.

Padilla, J., See concurring statement.

Sarmiento, J., See concurring opinion.