HEIRS OF MAXIMO REGOSO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND BELEN CRUZ REGOSO, RESPONDENTS.

The heirs of Maximo Regoso seek a review of the resolution dated
October 9, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 20183 dismissing the
appeal filed by Regoso’s former counsel.

The case involves an action for judicial partition of property
with accounting and damages (Civil Case No. 1464-V-81), which was filed by
Belen Cruz-Regoso against her husband, Maximo Regoso, in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XV of Malolos, Bulacan.

On November 14, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant, as follows:

“1. Declaring the
land situated at Sampalukan, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan as paraphernal of
the plaintiff and the building and improvement thereon as conjugal property of
the parties;

“2. Declaring the
properties situated at Galas, Quezon City and Echague, Isabela as conjugal
properties of the parties;

“3. Requiring the
defendant to render an accounting of all income derived from the aforementioned
properties; and

“4. Adjudging the
defendant to pay the following amounts:

“a) P5,000.00 as moral damages;

“b) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

“c) P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

“With costs against the
defendant.” (p. 25, Rollo.)

Regoso died on January 17, 1985 after the case had been submitted
for decision, but he was not substituted as defendant by his heirs because,
apparently, the trial court was not informed of his death until the decision
had been promulgated on November 14, 1988.

On November 29, 1988, Regoso’s counsel, Attorney Adriano Javier,
Sr., filed a notice of appeal which the trial court approved. The appeal was docketed in the Court of
Appeals as CA-G.R. No. 20183.

The plaintiff, Belen Cruz-Regoso, through counsel, moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the deceased defendant ceased to have
legal personality and that Attorney Javier’s authority to represent him was
terminated or expired upon his demise, hence, the notice of appeal filed by
said counsel was invalid, a worthless piece of paper.

The Court of Appeals issued a resolution on October 6, 1989,
dismissing the appeal. It held:

“It is a well-established rule that a lawyer-client
relationship is terminated upon the death of the client. The lawyer’s authority to appear for his
client automatically ceases (5 Am. Jur. 282). The only exceptions are when there is a contract for the lawyer’s
services up to judgment, or when his fees are on a contingent basis, and also
when his appearance is coupled with an interest (7 CJS 945, 946). Since not one of the above exceptions
obtains in this case, it is obvious that when Attorney Javier filed the notice
of appeal after his client’s death, he no longer had any authority to appear
for him. Hence, the notice of appeal
filed by him was a mere scrap of paper and without any legal effect.

“WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.” (pp.
27-28, Rollo.)

The motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs’ new counsel
was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, the present petition in which the petitioners, as heirs of
the late Maximo Regoso, allege that the Appellate Court erred in dismissing
their appeal and in not declaring that the judgment which the trial court
rendered after the death of said defendant, was null and void.

The petition has no merit.

Under the rules, it is the duty of the attorney for the deceased
defendant to inform the court of his
client’s death and to furnish the court with the names and residences of the
executor, administrator, or legal representative of the deceased. Sections 16 and 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provide:

“Sec. 16. Duty of
attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. – Whenever a party
to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the
duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or
incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative.

“Sec. 17. Death of
party. — After a party dies and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice,
the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for
the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted. If the legal representative
fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time
to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to
be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.”

The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the
deceased party is in a better position than the attorney for the adverse party
to know about the death of his client and to inform the court of the names and
addresses of his legal representative or representatives.

In the case at bar, no such notice of death, nor a motion for
substitution of the deceased defendant, was ever made. Hence, the trial court could not be expected
to know or take judicial notice of the death of defendant, Maximo Regoso,
without the proper manifestation from his counsel. It must be remembered that the fault or negligence was Attorney
Javier’s alone (Llantero vs. Court of Appeals, 105 SCRA 609; Chittick vs. Court
of Appeals, 166 SCRA 219; Pulido vs. CA, 122 SCRA 63).

The supervening death of the defendant, Maximo Regoso, did not
extinguish his wife’s action for partition of their conjugal assets, for it is
an action that survives. The trial of
the case on the merits was already finished before the defendant died. Since it was not informed about that event,
the trial court may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without
ordering the substitution of the deceased defendant. Its judgment is valid and binding upon the defendant’s legal
representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the
property subject of the action is concerned (Florendo, et al. vs. Coloma, et
al., 129 SCRA 304).

Attorney Javier’s appeal from the decision of the trial court was
correctly dismissed by the appellate court for upon the death of Maximo Regoso,
Attorney Javier’s authority to represent him also expired. The notice of appeal which Attorney Javier
filed on behalf of the decedent was an unauthorized pleading, hence, invalid
(Barrameda, et al. vs. Barbara, et al., 90 Phil. 718; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19
SCRA 462).

However, the validity of the judgment of the trial court was not
affected by the defendant’s demise for the action survived. The decision is binding and enforceable
against the successors-in-interest of the deceased litigant by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action [Section 49(b) Rule 39, Rules of Court; Florendo,
et al. vs. Coloma, et al., 129 SCRA 304].

This is in line with the following provisions of the Rules of
Court:

“Sec. 49. EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS. – The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, maybe as follows:

“xxx                                       xxx                                        
xxx

“(b) In other cases the judgment or order is,
with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors-in?interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same
capacity.” (Section 49(b), Rule 39, New Rules of Court.)

Thus, a judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only
against defendants therein but also against the members of their family, their
relatives, or privies who derived their right of possession from the defendants
(Ariem vs. De los Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). The same rule applies to the successors-in-interest of a deceased party
in an action that survives, if the decision should go against the latter
(Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, 129 SCRA 304, 305.)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Medialdea, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.