THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CARLITO MARTOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In an ordinary appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 53 of Rosales, Pangasinan, herein petitioner seeks the reversal
of the same, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds Carlito Martos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of selling marijuana, defined and penalized
under Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P30,000.00, and to pay the
costs.”^[1]

According to the Information dated March 20, 1989, the crime was
committed as follows:

“That on or about the 1st day of February 1989, in barangay
Carmen East, municipality of Rosales, Pangasinan, New Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, give away and deliver fifty (50) grams of dried marijuana leaves worth
P50.00 to MSgt. Rogelio Raguine, an incognito NARCOM agent, a prohibited drug
and without any authority of the law.”^[2]

The facts according to the version of the prosecution, reveal
that on February 1, 1989, acting on the tip of a confidential informer (C.I.)
or asset, a team from the First Narcotics Regional Unit based in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, composed of Sgts. Rogelio Raguine, Peregrino Benito and Ramon
Padilla, went to Bgy. Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan at about 4:00 o’clock in
the afternoon, in pursuit of a certain “Lito” who was engaged in
selling marijuana to students and adults alike.

“Lito”, whose full name is Carlito Martos, was washing
his feet at the water pump near his house when Sgt. Raguine and the CI
approached him. Sgt. Raguine, acting as
posuer-buyer, was introduced by the CI to “Lito”. The former then inquired if “Lito”
had “stuff” for sale, and upon eliciting an affirmative answer,
ordered P50.00 worth of stuff.

Lito went inside his house and returned after a while to where
Sgt. Raguine and the CI were. He handed
the stuff contained in a small plastic bag, to Sgt. Raguine while the latter
gave Carlito Martos a P50.00 bill, which serial number was earlier recorded by
him in a log book.^[3]
After being convinced that the content of the plastic bag was marijuana, Sgt.
Raguine immediately signalled Sgts. Benito and Padilla, who were then positioned
in separate places some 10 meters away from the water pump, to close in and
effect arrest.

After identifying themselves as NARCOM agents, Sgts. Benito and
Padilla seized Carlito Martos, but the latter was able to wrench himself free
from his captors and escaped. The three
agents pursued him, but when Carlito Martos heard a shot, he stopped running,
raised his hands and surrendered. It
turned out that the shot was fired from the gun of Sgt. Padilla which
accidentally hit the CI on the left arm.^[4]
Thereupon, Carlito Martos was brought to the NARCOM office in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan.

The stuff, which was marked as Exhibit “D” was turned
over to the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, for analysis.^[5]  Lauena Layador, Assistant Chief of the
Chemistry Branch of PC/INP Crime Laboratory Service conducted a microscopic,
chemical and chromatographic examination, to determine whether the specimen
submitted was marijuana.^[6] The
report, Exhibit “C” confirms the fact that the stuff was marijuana.^[7]

In his defense, Carlito Martos, a jeepney conductor, testified
that in the afternoon of February 1, 1989, between 4:00 and 5:00 o’clock, as he
was washing his feet at a pump well, some 3 meters away from his house, he
heard a person shout, “dadiay ni, dadiay ni, paltogan yon.” He
then saw three men coming down from the dike, two of whom drew their guns. Frightened, he tried to run away, but when
he heard a shot, he stopped and raised his hands.

When the three men overtook him, one of them handcuffed him while
the other two started hitting him with the butt of their guns, boxing and
kicking him. As a tricycle was being
called, one of the men took “a plastic bag with leaves inside” from
his pocket and placed it in his hands.^[8]
Carlito refused to hold it and instead dropped the thing.^[9] The
above testimony was corroborated by two other defense witnesses.^[10]

At the NARCOM station in Urdaneta, the agents tried to force
appellant to sign a document, but the latter refused. The agents even called a CLAO lawyer who also insisted that he
sign the documents since “there is nothing wrong” about it.^[11]
He claims that he was also forced to sign his name on a cellophane^[12]
and cajoled to settle the case for P25,000.00.^[13] He
was then jailed and only released at 1:00 o’clock the following day.^[14]

In his appeal, Carlito Martos’ argues that the evidence adduced
by the prosecution is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime he was convicted of.^[15] The
Solicitor General joins the appellant in the latter’s plea for acquittal.^[16]
They alleged that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are highly
improbable, self-contradictory and contradictory. Thus, they outlined several inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses.

There is no question that persons who sell prohibited drugs
deserve the severest sanctions of the law for the misery they caused our
people, especially the youth, many of whom have lost their future because of
the evil influence of drugs. While this
Court strongly commends the efforts of the law enforcement officers who are
engaged in the difficult and dangerous task of apprehending and prosecuting
drug traffickers, the Court cannot simply disregard the many reports of false
arrest of innocent persons for extortion and blackmail.^[17]

There is no dispute that the findings of facts of the trial
courts deserve great weight and respect for they have the privilege of
examining the demeanor of the witnesses while on the witness stand and
determine the veracity of the their testimonies. The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, such as (1) when
the conclusion is a finding based entirely on speculations; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee.^[18]

The case at bar calls for a careful scrutiny of the records due
to the irreconcilable differences in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which weakens the case for the People. We cannot but observe that the trial judge did a poor analysis
and synthesis of the facts as to deserve admonition.

For instance, the P50.00 bill which was supposed to have been
offered to the accused-appellant to purchase the marijuana was not formally
offered in evidence^[19]
although it was marked as exhibit for the prosecution during the testimony of
Sgt. Raguine.^[20]
Notwithstanding, the trial court referred to it as Exhibit “C”^[21]
in one part of its decision, then again as Exhibit “D” in another
part^[22]
and even relied on it to support its findings that said evidence consummated
the transaction.^[23]
The decision further states that the confidential informer was wounded on the
right arm,^[24]
when all the testimonies of both the prosecution and defense witnesses
consistently state that the informer was hit on the left arm.

Our Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a “judge should
be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.”^[25]
He is expected to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary such that he is likewise expected to be studious and cautious
in making decisions. He should exhibit
an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him. Sadly, the same is wanting among the virtues
of the trial judge in the case at bar.

We agree with the appellant and the Solicitor General that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are replete with inconsistencies. One point raised is that in the testimony of
Sgt. Raguine, it was not established whether the P50.00 bill was really handed
to the appellant. Although he related
in his direct examination that he gave the bill to the accused before giving
the signal to his companions,^[26] he
did not reiterate this fact during the cross-examination and instead insisted
that upon ascertaining that the stuff was marijuana he immediately gave the
pre-arranged signal to his men. No
corroboration on the handling of the P50.00 bill to the accused was made by the
other two prosecution witnesses, Sgts. Benito and Padilla who were likewise
present.

Sgt. Raguine further testified that he recorded the serial number
of the P50.00 bill in their logbook before the buy-bust operation was to take
place.^[27]
But strangely enough, in his subsequent testimony, he was not able to produce
the logbook, allegedly because it could no longer be found in their office.^[28]
Sgt. Raguine also testified that the P50.00 bill was surrendered by the accused
when they were at their headquarters,^[29] yet
in his later testimony he gave another version and said that the bill was
recovered in “(the appellant’s) right front pocket of his pants”
right after his arrest “at the vicinity of his house” (sic).^[30]

Sgt. Raguine was supposed to be the star witness of the
prosecution, having acted as the posuer-buyer, but, in a short span of time^[31]
he seems to have had a poor recall of the incidents relative to the arrest of
accused-appellant. Not only that: he hedged, hesitated and involved himself in
apparent inconsistencies in his relation of the facts:

Q.   And
according to you, you found the accused standing near his residence?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   As
a matter of fact, he was then in a place where an artesian well was situated,
am I correct?

A.    I
don’t know exactly sir.

Q.   But
the accused was then in a process of washing his face and hands at that time,
is that not correct?

A.    I
did not notice, sir.^[32]

x x x

Q.   Now
according to you, your CI contacted the accused?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   How
did your CI contacted (sic) the accused?

A.    Because
he was standing when we reached the vicinity, he approached him immediately,
sir.

Q.   How
far were you to the CI and the accused when the accused was contacted by your
CI?

A.    About
one (1) meters (sic), sir.

Q.   So,
you heard the conversation between your CI and Martos?

A.    Yes,
sir.^[33]

x x x

Q.   When
the CI introduced you to the accused, what kind of dialect did he use?

A.    We
used Tagalog, sir.

Q.   Now,
Mr. Witness, what kind of dialect did the CI use in talking to the accused?

A.    I
can no longer remember what kind of dialect, sir.

Q.   You
cannot remember whether the CI talked in Ilocano or Tagalog to the accused when
he was introducing you to him?^[34]

x x x

Q.   You
said that the accused brought to you a 50 kilogram marijuana, where was this 50
kilogram placed. What was the
container?

A.    It
was wrapped in a plastic cellophane. I
am sorry, your Honor, but I could no longer remember the container.

Q. Your have a poor memory. You
know that you are going to be called as witness in Court and you did not take
note of all those things? So you are
not sure as to what was the container?

A.    I
am not sure, you Honor.^[35]

These are merely excerpts of Sgt.
Raguine’s testimony, during the cross, re-direct and re-cross examination. Considering the nature of his testimony, We
cannot but question his credibility.

The Solicitor General further observed that “there was no
evidence presented to prove that the marijuana, marked as Exhibits “D” to “D-4” (inclusive) in
court is the same marijuana allegedly sold by the accused-appellant to the
buy-bust team.”^[36] To
substantiate his observation, the Solicitor General called attention to the
fact that the endorsement letter was first sent to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet, without the alleged marijuana stuff. Luena Layador, the chemist who conducted the examination of the
specimen, testified that she had to go personally to Camp Dangwa to get the
specimen, together with other specimens;^[37] that
she can only identify the said specimen through the names written on the
plastic bag;^[38]
and that she does not know, however, those persons whose names appear on the
said plastic bag.^[39] Nevertheless,
examination of this witness reveals that:

PROSECUTOR ISRAEL:

Q.   I
show you this plastic bag, Madam Witness, will you please state the names of
the members of the unit?

ATTY. MICU:

The
witness will be incompetent to testify on that because definitely this witness
does not know who were the members of unit that delivered that specimen to Camp
Dangwa, your Honor.

COURT:

Just to read the
names.

ATTY. MICU:

If just to read, I
will not object, your Honor.

WITNESS:

A.    Sgt.
Padilla and M/Sgt. Raguine.

PROSECUTOR
ISRAEL:

Your
Honor please, I would like to mark the names of the members of the unit
appearing in the plastic bag as Sgt. Padilla, Sgt. Benito and Sgt. Raguine be
marked as Exhibits “D-“, “D-3” and “D-4” (sic).

COURT:

Mark them.^[40]

Notwithstanding, during the prosecution’s formal offer of
evidence, Exhibit “D” was offered and admitted as follows:

“PROSECUTOR ISRAEL:

After the testimony of the prosecution Chemist, the prosecution is
now ready to rest its case, but before doing so, the prosecution would like
that the following documentary exhibits be admitted:

x x x

Exhibit “D” is the subject marijuana leaves and Exh.
“D-1” is the Chemistry Report No. 132-89; Exhs. “D-2”,
“D-3” and “D-4” are the names of the persons appearing in
the plastic bag are the same persons who apprehended the accused during the
incident. (underscoring ours)^[41]

Despite the vehement objections of the
counsel for the defense, the court admitted all exhibits “for the purpose
they are offered in evidence.”^[42]

In prosecuting a case for violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act 6425, the prosecution must be able to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the person charged at a particular time, date and
place committed any of such unlawful acts.^[43] As
it is, We are not convinced that the evidence of the prosecution could stand
ground sufficient to convict herein appellant. We cannot even presume that official duty was regularly performed by the
arresting officers, for it cannot by itself prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence accorded an accused person. “If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.”^[44] The
accused is not even called upon to offer evidence on his behalf. His freedom is forfeited only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.^[45]

As manifested by the Solicitor General in his
“Manifestation” for accused-appellant’s acquittal:

“x x x An assiduous and thorough analysis of the evidence on
record disclosed that accused-appellant’s conviction has no basis. The prosecution’s evidence in support of its
theory is not convincing. If there was
any evidence presented, it was so slender and shaky, not presented with care
and thoroughness which the gravity of the offense demanded and, taken in its
entirety, is utterly insufficient to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.”^[46]

All considered, We hold that the guilt of appellant Carlito
Martos has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Decision, p. 5.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 5

^[3]
TSN, August 9, 1989, p. 14.

^[4]
TSN, ibid, p. 39, August 24, 1989, p. 30.

^[5]
TSN, October 30, 1989, p. 6

^[6]
TSN, ibid, p. 9-10.

^[7]
Exhibit “C”.

^[8]
TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 40.

^[9]
Ibid, p. 51.

^[10]
See TSN, October 31, 1989, Testimonies of Dionisio Seguba, Jr. (pp. 2-18) and
Armando Javier (pp. 18-31)

^[11]
Ibid, p. 43.

^[12]
Id.

^[13]
Ibid, p. 44.

^[14]
Id.

^[15]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 1.

^[16]
Solicitor General’s Manifestation, Rollo, pp. 33-79.

^[17]
People v. Zapanta y Centeno, G.R. No. 90853, 195 SCRA 200 (1991); People
v. Kalubiran, G.R. No. 84079, 196 SCRA 644, (1991).

^[18]
People v. Canada, L-63728, 144 SCRA 121, (1986); People v. Taruc,
L-74655, 157 SCRA 178 (1988).

^[19]
TSN, October 30, 1989, p. 20-21; see also conflict in minutes of the hearing
dated August 24, 1989 and October 30, 1989.

^[20]
TSN, August 24, 1989, p. 3.

^[21]
Decision, Footnote 2, p. 2.

^[22]
Ibid, p. 5.

^[23]
Ibid, p. 4, 5.

^[24]
Decision, p. 2.

^[25]
Canon 1, Rule 1.01.

^[26]
TSN, August 9, 1989, p. 14.

^[27]
Ibid., p. 17.

^[28]
TSN, August 24, 1989, p. 3.

^[29]
TSN, August 9, 1989, p. 17.

^[30]
TSN, August 24, 1989, p. 5.

^[31]
More of less six months, from the time the crime was supposed to have been
committed to the time he gave his testimony in court.

^[32]
TSN, August 9, 1989, p. 27.

^[33]
Ibid, p. 28.

^[34]
Ibid, p. 36.

^[35]
Ibid, pp. 40-41.

^[36]
Manifestation, p. 41.

^[37]
TSN, October 30, 1989, p. 12.

^[38]
Ibid, p. 13.

^[39]
Ibid, p. 19.

^[40]
Ibid, p. 18

^[41]
Ibid, p. 19-21.

^[42]
Ibid, p. 22.

^[43]
People v. Rojo, G.R. No. 82737, 175 SCRA 119 (1989).

^[44]
People v. Taruc, supra; People v. Parayno, 24 SCRA 3;
People v. Palana, 47 Phil 48.

^[45]
People v. Malilay, 63 SCRA 420.

^[46]
Page 67, Rollo.