P.T. CERNA CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PETER SCHEIDER AND JUAN BUNYI, RESPONDENTS.

The instant Petition seeks the review of the Decision*of the
Court of Appeals, dated August 9, 1989 and of its Resolution^[1]
dated December 21, 1989, both regarding CA-G.R. CV No. 05089.^[2]

The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads:

“HENCE, there being no reversible error on the appealed
judgment, the same is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against appellant.

SO
ORDERED.”^[3]

Respondent court’s Resolution of which a review is also sought,
denied petitioner-appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the abovecited
decision for lack of merit.

This case originated from a complaint for Replevin filed by P.T.
Cerna Corporation against Peter Scheider and Juan Bunyi. Consonant with the factual findings of the
trial court, respondent court found that the subjects of this case are three (3)
personal properties, all of which are “jaw crushers.” The first one
is a rock crusher, jaw size 34″ x 33″, purchased from Bormaheco, Inc.
for P165,000.00. The other two are US
Mfg. jaw crushers, both purchased from the International Tractor Sales, each
for P111,000.00.

Both parties, petitioner and private respondent Scheider, claim
ownership over the three jaw crushers. Petitioner anchored its claim of ownership of the first rock crusher on
the “Customer’s Copy” of Invoice No. 43984, dated January 24, 1984
issued in the name of the corporation by Bormaheco, Inc. for P165,000.00. As to the other two crushers, it presented
Invoice No. 601-A, dated March 30, 1984, by International Tractor and Equipment
Sales, for the total purchase price of P222,000.00. All of these purchases were purportedly paid through the
corporation checks duly signed by Noe de la Cerna and Edwin Tiu, its President
and Vice-President, respectively.

Petitioner’s president alleged further that sometime in late
1983, an agreement was entered into by private respondent Scheider to quarry
stones and crush them for sale to the public; that he was able to find a
suitable land for the quarry and had negotiated for its lease. Private respondent Scheider, as per
agreement, was supposed to be the technical man, and was thus in possession of
said machineries for a complete check-up. However, allegedly, private respondents Scheider and Bunyi took
advantage of their possession and proceeded to organize their own company,
together with Scheider’s in-laws and other private persons, to engage in the
quarrying of stones and rocks and without the knowledge of the corporation,
using the litigated rock crushers for said purpose.

Private respondent Scheider, on the other hand, claimed that the
three rock crushers were actually purchased by him and in reality are owned by
him. He presented the “Sales
Department Copy” of the same Invoice No. 43984, which was in his name
properly countersigned by Mr. Cervantes, the President of Bormaheco. He also presented a notarized deed of sale
of said rock crushers executed by Bormaheco in his favor and a further
certification by Mr. Cervantes, dated August 3, 1984, stating that the
purchaser and owner of said equipment was Mr. Peter Scheider. For the two rock crushers, he also managed
to present a notarized deed of sale executed by Mr. Virgil Lundberg in his
favor. In connection with this, he
presented a delivery receipt and a certification by Mr. Virgil Lundberg
attesting that Mr. Peter Scheider is the purchaser and owner of the two rock
crushers.

Private respondent Scheider, however, admitted that the purchase
price of the crushers were paid for by petitioner, but only to set off
outstanding obligations of the same to him due to various spare parts sold to
petitioner, prior to the dispute, amounting to over P500,000.00.

On August 1, 1984, the trial court issued a Replevin Order,
requiring delivery to petitioner of possession of the three (3) rock
crushers. Pursuant to said Replevin,
the Deputy Sheriff of Rizal was able to take possession of one of the three rock
crushers, and was able to eventually transfer possession thereof to
petitioner. Private respondents
Scheider and Bunyi filed a “Motion for Reconsideration,” dated August
7, 1984, of the Replevin Order. After
several hearings were held on the motion, the trial court on December 21, 1984,^[4]
gave due course to the motion and set aside and revoked the Replevin Order
dated August 1, 1984. The sheriff, in
the same order, was directed to immediately restore physical possession to
private respondent Scheider of the rock crusher seized by him. The same order dismissed the complaint as
the cause of action which was the question of ownership had been accordingly
resolved in favor of then defendants, herein private respondents.

On January 3, 1985, petitioner filed with the trial court a
notice of appeal of said order.

Petitioner also filed, on the same day, a petition against the
Hon. Antonio Y. Benedicto, the presiding judge; the Deputy Provincial Sheriff
of Rizal (RTC, Antipolo, Rizal); Peter Scheider and Juan Bunyi, for “Certiorari
and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order,”
praying for the annulment of the trial court’s order of December 21, 1984
insofar as it ordered the immediate restoration of the replevined property to
the private respondent. Said Certiorari
Case was docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 05066.

On January 4, 1985, the Court of Appeals, in AC-G.R. SP No. 05066
issued a Resolution enjoining the respondents therein “from enforcing that
part of the order dated December 21, 1984 directing the return to respondents
of the replevined property, until further orders or notice from this
Court”.

On January 9, 1985, the trial court issued an Order stating that
no further action shall be taken on the case until the certiorari case
shall have been resolved by the appellate court.

On May 3, 1985, the Court of Appeals promulgated in AC­-G.R. SP
No. 05066, a Decision setting aside the order of December 21, 1984, insofar as
it directed the immediate restoration of the replevined property to private
respondents.

The appeal of petitioner from the Order of December 21, 1984 was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 05089. The
judgment regarding this appeal and the subsequent denial by respondent court of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration are being challenged in this petition.

This Court is called upon to finally settle the question of
ownership of the three jaw crushers. Who, as between the claimants, is the rightful owner?

We rule in favor of private respondent Scheider.

Petitioner relies heavily on the invoices as evidence of purchase
and delivery. Petitioner’s theory is
correct, but only up to this point. However, as to its claim that said invoices vested in the corporation
ownership over the disputesd equipment, We simply cannot agree.

It has been held time and again that the issuance of a sales
invoice does not prove transfer of ownership of the thing sold to the
buyer. An invoice is nothing more than
a detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold and has
been considered not a bill of sale.^[5]

Thus, petitioner’s contention that the issuance of the invoices
in its name occurred much earlier than the execution of the Deeds of Sale
between private respondent Scheider and the vendor corporations, becomes
inconsequential. Inasmuch as
petitioner’s invoices are mere statements regarding the thing sold, as opposed
to private respondent Scheider’s Deeds of Sale which are public documents,
petitioner’s claim of ownership cannot prosper.

The Deeds of Sale, being notarial documents, are evidence of the
facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. As such, they have in their favor, the presumption of regularity.^[6]

To contradict facts in a notarial document and the presumption of
regularity in its favor, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant.^[7] As
borne out by the records of the case, petitioner challenged the authenticity of
the invoices presented by private respondent Scheider, alleging falsification
of the same. The ruling however of this
court with respect to this matter still would not affect the evidentiary value
of the Deeds of Sale. Petitioner should
have attacked private respondent Scheider’s deeds of sale on which the latter
anchors his claim. Instead, petitioner
did not even present the signatories to the contracts of sale to successfully
rebut the presumption of regularity accorded the deeds of sale. Consequently, petitioner failed miserably to
overcome the binding force and effect of the deeds of sale.

Petitioner also attempted to discredit the sale of the equipment
to private respondent Scheider by alleging fraud employed by private
respondents Scheider and Bunyi, who purportedly reneged on their obligations
with respect to an alleged joint venture. The latter undertaking, as professed by petitioner, was entered into by
herein claimant parties, with private respondents as the technical
partners. However, petitioner failed to
substantiate this claim. No sufficient
evidence, as held by the trial court, was adduced to even prove the existence
of said agreement. To prove fraud, it
has been held that full and convincing evidence is required.^[8]
This again, petitioner was not able to accomplish.

It bears reiterating at this point that in civil cases, the burden
of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature
of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.^[9]
In this case, the burden lies on the petitioner, who is duty bound to prove the
allegations in its complaint. As this
Court has held, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.^[10] A
careful evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner reveals its
insufficiency to detract from the evidentiary force of the public instrument which
appears on its face, as having been drawn up with all the formalities
prescribed by the law. This leads Us to
the inescapable conclusion that private respondent Scheider is the owner of the
litigated properties. To hold otherwise
would mean establishing a very dangerous precedent that would open the door to
fraud.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and finding no
reversible error committed by respondent Court, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision of respondent
Court dated August 9, 1989 and its resolution of December 21, 1989 are both
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Associate Justice
Eduardo R. Bengzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Manuel C. Herrera and
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy. Rollo, pp.
58-64.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 66.

^[2]
The case was entitled: P.T. Cerna,
plaintiff-appellant, versus Peter Scheider & Juan Bunyi,
defendants-appellees.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 64.

^[4]
Order of Regional Trial Court, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 71, Antipolo, Rizal. Rollo, p. 118.

^[5]
Norkis Distributors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 694 (1991).

^[6]
6 M.V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 118 (1980).

^[7]
Yturralde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407 (1969); F. GUPIT, JR., REVISED RULES
ON EVIDENCE 57 (1991); 4 R.G. MARTIN, RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES 587
(1989).

^[8]
F. GUPIT, supra note 7.

^[9]
Ramcar, Inc. vs. Garcia, 4 SCRA 1087 (1962).

^[10]
Rodriguez vs. Valencia, 81 Phil. 787 (1948); Legasca vs. de Vera,
79 Phil. 376 (1947).