SALVADOR M. MISON, IN HIS CAPA­CITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAN CHIU, AND CHEUNG I, RESPONDENTS.

In Customs Case No. 813, the Commissioner of Customs rendered a
decision on August 11, 1969, declaring illegal the seizure by elements of the
Philippine Navy of the M/V “Hyojin Maru” a vessel of Japanese registry, and ordered the
release of the vessel and its cargo to the claimants, Chan Chiu On and Cheung
I.^[1]
Return of the cargo as thus ordered was effected pursuant to a directive of the
Secretary of Finance dated February 5, 1970.^[2]
Release of the vessel, however, was never effected; it
sank while yet in the custody of the Bureau of Customs, and requests by the
Bureau to the Philippine Navy and the CADA to refloat
or salvage the ship could not be complied with for lack of funds.^[3]

Chan Chiu On and Cheung I then filed a claim with the Commission
on Audit for the payment of the value of the vessel.^[4]
Acting thereon “(b)y authority of the Acting Chairman,” Mr. Rogelio
B. Espiritu, Manager, Technical Service Office of the
COA, denied the claim for the reasons set forth in his registered letter to the
claimants’ lawyer dated November 3, 1977 — captioned “Decision No.
77-142.”^[5]
Another letter, dated December 9, 1977,
this time signed by Acting COA Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico,
was also sent to claimants’ counsel, Atty. Juan David, enclosing “a copy
of Decision No. 77-142 of this Commission, contained in a letter dated November 3, 1977, which is
self-explanatory.”^[6]

Atty. David moved for reconsideration by letter dated February 6, 1978.  Acting COA Chairman Tantuico
denied the motion, in his own letter dated April 17, 1978 on the ground that it had been filed beyond
the reglementary period of 30 days from the date of
receipt of a copy of the subject Decision which, in consequence, had
“already become final and executory.”^[7]
In a letter dated May 10, 1978, Mr. David replied that said Decision No. 77-142
— rendered only by the Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, and
“not (by) the Acting Chairman, much less ** the Commission on Audit”
— was void because the matter could validly be acted upon only by “the
Commission on Audit duly constituted, by the appointment and qualification of
its Chairman and two Commissioners,” “as specifically provided by
Section 2, Article XII-D of the (1973) Constitution.”^[8]
Commissioner Tantuico wrote back on August 24, 1978 informing Mr. David
that “this Commission finds no cogent reason that would justify a reversal
of its stand on the matter.”^[9]

Again Atty. David moved for reconsideration, by letter dated
April 5, 1979, reiterating the view that Acting Chairman Tantuico
lacked constitutional authority to act on the claim on its merits, and
requesting that “the same be submitted for resolution by the Commission on
Audit, after the appointment of the two (2) commissioners thereof, as required
by Section 2, Article XII-D of the Constitution.”^[10]
In another communication dated April
20, 1981, Mr. David reiterated his request that his application for
reconsideration be acted on, considering that “a Commissioner has
(already) been appointed as member of said Commission.” It does not appear
that either letter was acted on.^[11]

On November 17, 1986, the Commission on Audit having been fully
constituted with the appointment of the Chairman and two (2) members, Mr. David
wrote still another letter to it,^[12]
drawing attention once again to his clients’ claim for payment of the
“nominal depreciated value ** (of their vessel) in the sum of
US$50,000.00, plus the amount corresponding to legal interest.” An
acceptable alternative based on “established practice,” according to
David, would be the conveyance to his clients by the Bureau of Customs of
“forfeited merchandise, the value of which shall correspond to the nominal
depreciated value of said vessel, plus legal interest * *
.”

In a 4th Indorsement
dated June 22, 1987
addressed “to the Auditor, Bureau of Customs,” Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting “FOR THE COMMISSION,”
reconsidered Decision No. 77-142 of Acting Commissioner of Audit Tantuico, supra.  He
declared that the vessel sank
while in illegal custody of the Bureau of Customs, which “should have
pre-eminently taken adequate measures to preserve” it but did not; hence,
he declared that “this Commission will interpose no objection” to the
instant claim, subject to the usual auditing and accounting requirements.”^[13]

Petitioner Mison sought clarification
of “the legal implication of the 4th Indorsement
dated June 22, 1987,”
in two (2) letters dated November 8,
1988 and November 16,
1988.^[14]
The response was a letter dated May
19, 1989, entitled “COA
Decision No. 992,” signed
by “the full complement of three (3) members of the Commission on
Audit.”^[15]
Said COA Decision No. 992 pointed out that the earlier decision, No. 77-142,
was “open to question and cannot be recognized by the present
Commission” because signed merely by the then Manager of the Technical
Service Office,” who evidently “was not acting for the Commission but
only for the then Acting Chairman.” It therefore held that the 4th Indorsement dated June
22, 1987 should be “deemed for all legal intents and purposes
as the final decision on
the matter * * .” This letter -­- Decision No.
992 — was received by the Bureau of Customs on June 22, 1989.^[16]

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on August 30, 1989.^[17]
The motion was denied by letter dated October 20, 1989, denominated “COA Decision No. 1053,” also
signed by the Chairman and the two (2) Members of the Commission, notice of
which was received by the petitioner on December 4, 1989.^[18]

Petitioner seasonably filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to nullify said COA Decisions No.
992 and 1053, pursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.^[19]

1. The first point that the petitioner would make is that COA
Decision No. 77-142, although signed only by the Manager, Technical Service
Office of the COA, was ratified or made
valid because it “was
adopted in toto as a decision of the COA in the
letters dated December 9, 1977, April 17, 1978, and August 24, 1978 of then COA
Chairman Francisco T. Tantuico, Jr. to Atty. Juan T.
David.” The point cannot be conceded.

In the first place the “Espiritu
decision” was void ab initio.  As
manager of the COA Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu
obviously had no power whatever to render and promulgate a decision of or for
the Commission.  Indeed, even the
Chairman, alone, had not that power.  As
clearly set out in the Constitution then in force, the power was lodged in the
Commission on Audit, “composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners.”^[20]
It was the Commission, as a collegial body, which then as now, had the
jurisdiction to “(d)ecide any case brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
resolution,” subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari.^[21]

Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu
decision by the Acting COA Chairman was inconsequential.  Ratification cannot validate an act void ab initio because
done absolutely without authority.  The
act has to be done anew by the person or entity duly endowed with authority to
do so.

Moreover, even conceding the contrary, no proper ratification or
validation could have been effected by the Acting Chairman since he was not the
Commission, and he himself had no power to decide any case brought before the
Commission, that power, to repeat, being lodged only in the Commission itself,
as a collegial body.

Parenthetically, the proposition advocated in this connection
that Chairman Domingo may no longer question the validity of the Espiritu Decision” (No. 77-142) because in assailing
it, he had referred to it as “a decision of the Commission on Audit and
not merely of its then Acting Chairman,” is so patently unmeritorious as
to deserve scant consideration.

2. The petitioner argues that to sanction the foregoing principle
would result in the invalidation of “hundreds of decisions and orders
signed by or signed by authority of the Acting Chairman Tantuico
(alone),” considering that there was an appreciable interval during which
only an Acting Chairman had been designated and no other Commissioner had been
appointed or was otherwise acting as such. 
It suffices to rule, as this Court has already had occasion to in an
analogous case, that the principle should logically apply only to those
particular instances where there was a timely and specific challenge to the
authority of the Acting COA Chairman to exercise the power of adjudication or
decision; it should not affect all other cases where the parties expressly or
by implication accepted the adjudicative authority of the Chairman.^[22]

3. The petitioner next contends that the objection — that the
“Espiritu Decision” was “technically invalid
due to ** lack of collegiality” — was waived by failure of Atty. David to
raise it in his motion for reconsideration, in which motion he confined his
arguments to the merits of the decision, and additionally, by his failure,
after denial of his motion for reconsideration, to appeal to the Supreme Court,
with the result that the judgment became final and executory
as of October 7, 1978.

The contention is also without merit.  The record shows ­– although the petition
does not allege^[23]
— that in a letter dated May 10, 1978, Mr. David did dispute Decision No.
77-142 because rendered only by the Manager, Technical Service Office of the
COA, and “not (by) the Acting Chairman, much less ** the Commission on
Audit” “duly constituted, by the appointment and qualification of its
Chairman and two Commissioners,” “as specifically provided by Section
2, Article XII-D of the (1973) Constitution.” He reiterated the challenge
to Acting Chairman Tantuico’s constitutional
authority to act on the claim on its merits, in his letter dated April 5, 1979,
and requested that “the same be submitted for resolution by the Commission
on Audit, after the appointment of the two (2) commissioners thereof, as
required by Section 2, Article XII-D of the Constitution.”^[24]
And in another communication dated April 20, 1981, Mr. David once more
requested that his application for reconsideration be acted on collegially,
considering that “a Commissioner has (already) been appointed as member of
said Commission.”

Furthermore, it must be made clear that the Espiritu
Decision was not merely “technically invalid,” as the petitioner
describes it.  It was substantively void ab
initio, because rendered without
jurisdiction.  It had an essential
inherent defect that could not be cured or waived.

5. The petitioner also maintains that if the Espiritu
Decision, or Decision No. 77-142 be held void because
adopted and signed only by Acting COA Chairman Tantuico,
then the decision embodied in the 4th Indorsement
dated June 22, 1987, signed
only by incumbent COA Chairman Domingo, should also be pronounced void.  There is no parity in situation.  In the first place, when Decision No. 77-142
was rendered, there was no commissioner in the Commission on Audit except the
Acting Chairman himself.  On the other
hand, when the 4th Indorsement dated June 22, 1987 was rendered, there
were two (2) members of the Commission: 
the Chairman, and Commissioner Fernandez, clearly a number sufficient to
satisfy the constitutional requirement for collegial action.  Moreover, it is made clear in said 4th Indorsement that the decision therein embodied was that of
the Commission, composed of Chairman Domingo and Commissioner Fernandez.  The phrase therefore, by which Chairman
Domingo describes the capacity in which he acted, i.e., “FOR THE
COMMISSION,” must be taken as entirely accurate, not only because of the
familiar presumption of regularity of performance of official functions, but
because the records do show Commissioner Fernandez’ full concurrence with the
decision in said indorsement.  Besides, said 4th Indorsement
was ratified and reaffirmed by “COA
Decision No. 992” of May 19, 1989 signed by “the full
complement of three (3) members of the Commission on Audit,”^[25]
to the effect inter alia that the 4th Indorsement
dated June 22, 1987 (of Chairman Domingo and Commissioner Fernandez) should be
“deemed for all legal intents and purposes as the final decision on
the matter * * .”

It thus appears that not only does the petition fail to show any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Commission in the
rendition of its decision embodied in the 4th Indorsement
dated June 22, 1987 and its Decision No. 992 of May 19, 1989, but that those
judgments are in fact in accord with the relevant facts and applicable legal
principles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit,
without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 10

^[2]
Id., pp. 10, 116

^[3]
Id., pp. 10, 116-117

^[4]
Id., pp. 10, 117

^[5]
Id., pp. 10-13, 117-118

^[6]
Id., pp. 13, 118

^[7]
Id., pp. 13-14, 118

^[8]
Id., pp. 14, 119

^[9]
Id., pp. 15, 119-120

^[10]
Id., pp. 120-121

^[11]
Id., pp. 121-122

^[12]
Id., pp. 122-124

^[13]
Id., pp. 15-16, 124-125

^[14]
Id., pp. 16-17, 125

^[15]
Id., pp. 17-18, 125-126

^[16]
Id., p. 126

^[17]
Id., pp. 18, 126

^[18]
Id., p. 1

^[19]
” * * .  Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission (Civil Service Commission, Comission on
Elections or Commission on Audit) may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

^[20]
Sec. 1, XII-D, 1973 Constitution

^[21]
Sec. 2, XII-D, 1973 Constitution.  N.B. Under the 1987
Constitution, the COA en banc, like the other constitutional
commissions (Civil Service Commission and the COMELEC) is granted express
authority to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before
it or before any of its offices (Sec. 6, ART. IX), and “shall decide
by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution,” subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari (Sec. 7, id.) (emphasis supplied).

^[22]
In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 79690-707, and Zaldivar v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. 80578, May 19, 1988, the Court decreed that its ruling that the
officer then exercising the office and functions of the Tanodbayan
was a usurper, having no authority to conduct preliminary investigations,
“shall apply (only) prospectively to cases filed in Court after the
promulgation of its ruling but shall not apply to cases filed in Court prior to
said resolution and pending trial nor to convictions or acquittals pronounced
therein. The exception is where there has been a timely and specific challenge (to such lack of
authority).”

^[23]
SEE page 2, supra

^[24]
Id., pp. 120-121

^[25]
Id., pp. 17-18, 125-126