CORAZON PERIQUET, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND THE PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (FORMERLY CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORP. OF THE PHILS., RES…

It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind
but this is usually allowed only in affairs of the heart where the rules are
permissibly inconstant.  In the case
before us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner, exercised this privilege
in connection with her work, where the rules are not as fickle.

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines,
private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and unauthorized
possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during a surprise
inspection.  Claiming she had been
“framed,” she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was
sustained by the labor arbiter, who
ordered her reinstatement within ten days “without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and with full back wages to be computed from the
date of her actual dismissal up to the date of her actual reinstatement.”^[1]
On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto
by public respondent NLRC on August
29, 1980. ^[2]

On March 11, 1989,
almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution of the decision.  The motion
was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an order dated June 26, 1989,
which required payment to the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42 “by way
of implementing the balance of the judgment amount” due from the private
respondent.^[3]
Pursuant thereto, the said amount was
garnished by the NLRC sheriff on July 12,
1989^[4]. On September 11, 1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of
the CDCP and set aside the order dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June 26,
1989, and the notice
of garnishment.^[5]

In its decision, the public
respondent held that the motion for execution was time-barred, having
been filed beyond the five-year period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and the Labor Code.  It also rejected the petitioner’s claim that
she had not been reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she
had signed waiving her right to reinstatement and acknowledging settlement in
full of her back wages and other benefits.

The petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal. 
We shall affirm instead.

Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 6.  Execution by motion or by independent
action. – A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.  After the lapse of such time, and before it
is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as
amended by RA 6715, viz.

ART. 224.  Execution of
decision, orders, awards.  – (a) The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or
any Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu proprio, or
on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment
within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory,
requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce a final
decision, order or award.  x x x

The petitioner argues that
the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception allowed in Lancita v. Magbanua,^[6]
where the Court held:

Where judgments are for money only and are wholly unpaid, and
execution has been previously withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor,
which is in financial difficulties, the court has no discretion to deny motions
for leave to issue execution more than five years after the judgments are
entered.  (Application of Molnar, Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S. 2d
866)

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution,
although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there
should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of
the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or
writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by
the death of a party, or otherwise.  Any
interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within
which the writ may be issued without scire facias.

x x
x

There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept
on their rights to have the judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. 
The statute of limitations has not been devised against those who wish
to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their control.

Periquet insists it was the private
respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the judgment in her
favor, but that is not the way we see it. 
The record shows it was she who dilly-dallied.

The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten
days from receipt thereof following its affirmance by
the NLRC on August 29, 1980,
but there is no evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained
when her demand was rejected.  What
appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with CDCP where she
waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the sum of
P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to the
date of the agreement.^[7]

Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims
she was actually reinstated only on March 16, 1987, and so should be granted
back pay for the period beginning November 28, 1978, date of her dismissal,
until the date of her reinstatement.  She
conveniently omits to mention several significant developments that transpired
during and after this period that
seriously cast doubt on her candor and bona fides.

After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent
and waiving her right to reinstatement in the compromise agreement, the
petitioner secured employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she worked from October 1982 to March
1987. 
According to the certification issued by that business,^[8] she received a monthly compensation of
P1,904.00, which was higher than her salary in the CDCP.

For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for
re-employment with the CDCP and was on March
16, 1987, given the position of xerox
machine operator with a basic salary of P1,030.00 plus P461.33 in allowances,
for a total of P1,491.33 monthly.^[9]

On June 27, 1988,
she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the rights granted her
by the decision dated August
29, 1980, be
recognized because the waiver she had signed was invalid.^[10]

On September 19, 1988,
the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent (now Philippine National
Construction Corporation) recommended the payment to the petitioner of the sum
of P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back pay for three years at
P654.00 per month (minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid).^[11]

On November 10, 1988,
the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed another Quitclaim and
Release reading as follows:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No.
87 Annapolis St., Quezon
City, hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of
PESOS:  NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY
FOUR PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00) Philippine currency, representing the unpaid
balance of the back wages due me under the judgment award in NLRC Case No.
AB-2-864-79 entitled “Corazon Periquet vs.
PNCC-TOLLWAYS” and I further manifest that this payment is in full satisfaction
of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. 
Likewise, I hereby manifest that I had voluntarily waived reinstatement
to my former position as TOLL TELLER and in lieu thereof, I sought and am
satisfied with my present
position as XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office.

Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after
finality of the Decision dated 10
May 1979 was due to my own fault and that PNCC is not liable
thereto.

I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its
officers from money and all claims by way of unpaid wages, separation pay, differential pay, company,
statutory and other benefits or otherwise as may be due me in connection with
the above-entitled case.  I hereby state
further that I have no more claims or right of action of whatever nature,
whether past, present, future or contingent against said corporation and its
officers, relative to NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of
November 1988 at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.  (Emphasis supplied.)^[12]

The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for
in the memorandum she sent the PNCC Corporate Legal Counsel on November 24, 1988,^[13]
she said in part:

Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitute
to you and all others who have helped me and my family enjoy the fruits of my
years of stay with PNCC by way of granting an additional amount of P9,544.00
among others x x x

As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now
occupying the position of xerox machine operator and
is (sic) presently receiving a monthly salary of P2,014.00.

Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay,
yearly company increases and other statutory benefits, the private respondent
adjusted her monthly salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00 monthly.

Then the lull.  Then the
bombshell.

On March 11, 1989,
she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this petition.

It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who
has blown hot and cold, as if she does not know her own mind.  First she signed a waiver and then she
rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on
the ground that she had been deceived. 
In her first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of the judgment in
her favor, and then in the second waiver, after accepting additional payment,
she again acknowledged full settlement of the same judgment.  But now she is singing a different tune.

In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and
claiming that the earlier payments, both of which she had accepted as
sufficient, are insufficient.  They were
valid before but they are not valid now. 
She also claimed she was harassed and cheated by the past management of
the CDCP and sought the help of the new management of the PNCC under its
“dynamic leadership.” But now she is denouncing the new management
for also tricking her into signing the second quitclaim.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public
policy.  If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.  It is only where there is clear proof that
the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul
the questionable transaction.  But where
it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and
binding undertaking.  As in this case.

The question may be asked: 
Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement of September 16, 1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment in
consideration of the cash settlement she received?  It must be remembered that on that date the
decision could still have been elevated on certiorari before
this Court and there was still the possibility of its reversal.  The petitioner obviously decided that a bird
in hand was worth two on the wing and so opted for the compromise
agreement.  The amount she was then
waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come up to the exorbitant sum of
P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight years.

The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us.  We
have held in countless cases that this should be limited to three years from
the date of the illegal dismissal, during which period (but not beyond) the
dismissed employee is deemed unemployed without the necessity of proof.^[14]
Hence, the petitioner’s contention that she should be paid from 1978 to 1987
must be rejected, and even without regard to the fact (that would otherwise
have been counted against her) that she was actually employed during most of
that period.

Finally, the petitioner’s invocation of Article 223 of the Labor
Code to question the failure of the private respondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken.  As the Solicitor General correctly points
out, the bond is required only when there is an appeal from the decision with a
monetary award, not an order enforcing the decision, as in the case at bar.

As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise
their clients against making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones
raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of
this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the
respondents.  Lawyers are not merely
hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however
unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the
pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence.  Counsel must counsel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.  It is so ordered.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision dated May 10, 1979,
penned by Labor Arbiter Mirasol Corleto.

^[2]
Decision rendered by NLRC, First Division.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 9.

^[4]
Ibid., p. 10.

^[5]
NLRC Decision dated September 11, 1989
penned by Encarnacion, Presiding Commissioner, with Bonto-Perez and Maglaya,
Commissioners, concurring, rollo, pp. 20-32.

^[6]
7 SCRA 42.

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 12, 22 and 64.

^[8]
NLRC Decision dated September 11, 1989,
p. 3, rollo, p. 22.

^[9]
Ibid., p. 4; ibid., p. 23.

^[10]
Id., id.

^[11]
Id., p. 5; id.,
p. 24.

^[12]
Id., p. 6, id.,
p. 25.

^[13]
Id., p. 7, id.,
p. 26.

^[14]
Mercury Drug Co., Inc. v. CIR, 56 SCRA 694; Feati
University Faculty Club v. Feati University,
58 SCRA 395; Mariners Polytechnic School v. Leogardo,
Jr., G.R. No. 74271, March 31, 1989; Central Azucarera
de Tarlac v. Sampang, G.R. No. 84598, May 29,
1989, Third Division, Minute Resolution.