ROBINSON V. CASIÑO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GINGOOG GALLERA, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND MANAGER, LINDY L. DE LARA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review the decision^[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-156966 which affirmed the judgment^[2]
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, declaring the city
mayor’s permits^[3]
issued in favor of petitioner Robinson V. Casiño as null and void, and ordering
him, his agents, and/or authorized representatives and all persons acting in
his behalf, to desist from further operating the cockpit in question, known as
the Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum (hereinafter, Coliseum).  However, the writ of preliminary injunction ordered by the trial court to be made
permanent was deleted in the appealed decision, the former having theretofore
been dissolved.

Prior to the passage by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City of Resolution No. 49, Code
Ordinance, Series of 1984, the Coliseum, located on Block 125 at the corner of
Lugod and Jadol Streets, Gingoog City and owned by petitioner, was a licensee
of a cockpit under Sections 2285 to 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.  Thereafter, the aforesaid resolution
classified certain areas of the city as residential zones, declaring, among others, the site of Coliseum as
such.  The classification led to the
cancellation of petitioner’s license to operate the cockpit.

Article 10, Section 6.44 of
the same resolution provides:

“Section 6.44.  Amendments to
the zoning ordinance. – Changes in the zoning ordinance as a result of the
review by the Local Review Committee shall be treated as an amendment provided
that any amendment to the zoning ordinance or provision thereof shall be
carried out through a resolution of three fourths vote of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod.  Said amendments shall take
effect only after approval and authentication by the HSRC.”

On August 13, 1985, Resolution No. 378, Code Ordinance, Series of
1985, reclassified Block 125 as within the recreational zone, thus allegedly
amending Resolution No. 49.  Nine (9)
members of the said sangguniang panlungsod, participated, with
four (4) members voting for the amendment, while four (4) voted against, and
with one (1) abstention.  The vice-mayor,
as presiding officer, broke the deadlock by voting for the amendment.

When Resolution No. 378 was transmitted to then City Mayor Miguel
Paderanga for approval, he returned the same to the sangguniang panlungsod
within ten days, without any action, stating that his approval thereof was not
necessary since it did not involve a disposition of city government funds, as
provided by Section 180 of the Local Government Code and Section 14 of the
charter of Gingoog City.

By virtue of said Resolution No. 378, the succeeding city mayor,
Arturo S. Lugod, issued to petitioner the afore­-stated permit to operate a
cockpit dated April 2, 1986, which was renewed by another permit issued on
January 5, 1987.^[4]

Private respondent Gingoog Gallera, Inc., (hereafter, Gallera)
protested the operation of Coliseum before the Philippine Gamefowl Commission
(PGC, for short).  The protest was
founded on the fact that no certificate of registration had as yet been issued
by the PGC,^[5]
although city mayor’s permits were issued to petitioner.  On April 11, 1986, the PGC, through OIC
Pacifico L. Orog sent a telegram to the Station Commander of Gingoog City to
suspend in the meantime the operation
of the cockpit.  On April 24, 1986, the
PGC eventually sent a telegram to the city mayor to stop any cockfight in the
Coliseum in view of its failure to register with the PGC.^[6]

Thereafter, Special Civil Action No. 86-020 for prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction was filed by Gallera before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XXVII, Gingoog City, against petitioner,^[7]
on the ground that Resolution No. 378, purportedly amending zoning Ordinance
No. 49, is invalid.  It asserted that the
classification of Coliseum’s site as still within the residential zone of
Gingoog City was accordingly maintained and unchanged, thereby rendering the
mayor’s permits issued to the latter null and void for being in violation of
Section 6 of the Rules and Regulations of the PGC.

On April 25, 1986, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining petitioner to desist from operating the Coliseum until the
PGC shall have finally decided the controversy between petitioner and private
respondent Gallera.

Resolving the case on July 25, 1988, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of private respondent, declaring the aforesaid mayor’s
permits null and void and ordering herein petitioner and all persons
representing him or acting in his behalf
from further operating the cockpit in question.

Petitioner appealed the said unfavorable judgment to respondent
court which, on May 30, 1989, issued the decision under consideration.  Hence, this present recourse, after
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit on October
27, 1989.^[8]

In his memorandum, petitioner takes issue with what he conceives
as respondents’ erroneous contentions that:

(1)   the Philippine Gamefowl Commission controls
the operations of the Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum with respect to the
local/ordinary cockfights during Sundays, holidays and fiestas in Gingoog City,
despite the fact that the Mayor of Gingoog City issued a mayor’s permit for
1986 and 1987 (Exhs. “1” and “9”) with the concurrence of the sangguniang
panlungsod (Exhs. “20”, “21”, and “22”); and

(2)   the mayor’s permits (Exhibits “1” and “9”)
issued by the Mayor of Gingoog City for the years 1986 and 1987 are allegedly
null and void because Resolution 378 (Exh. “O”) did not amend Section 6.44 of
Resolution 49 (Exh. “L”), Code Ordinance of 1984, the three-fourths (3/4) votes
not having been obtained in passing said Resolution 378.^[9]

On the first objection of petitioner, it is true that the PGC has
the power not of control but only of review and supervision.  This power was validly exercised by said
commission over Coliseum when it sought to stop the former’s operations through
the local officials.  It did not
whimsically order the suspension and the consequent stoppage of Coliseum’s
operations.  Rather, PGC only exercised
its power of review over the acts performed by the local authorities in
relation to or which affect the exercise of its functions.

Review is a reconsideration or re-examination for purposes of
correction.  The power of review is
exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the
subordinate and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance with law^[10].  This the PGC did by bringing to the attention
of the local authorities the non-compliance by petitioner with the rules
involved in this case which we find reasonable and necessary in the discharge
of the regulatory functions of PGC.  PGC
may, for that purpose and as it did here, indicate its disapproval of the acts
of the local officials concerned^[11]
to stress and perform its role with respect to the regulation of cockpits.

On this aspect of the corresponding powers of the PGC and the
local authorities, respondent court amply clarified in its resolution of
October 27, 1989 the position it had taken in its main opinion, thus:

“With respect to private
respondent?appellant’s (herein petitioner) Motion for Reconsideration his
interpretation that the decision of the First Division of this Court,
promulgated on April 28, 1989, in CA-G.R. SP No. 15024, entitled Gingoog
Gallera, Inc. vs. The Philippine Gamefowl Commission is ‘diametrically opposed
to’ the decision rendered in this case in regard to the primacy of the
power/authority between the local officials of the City of Gingoog and the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) is erroneous.

“Both decisions are in accord
with one another.  The decision of the
First Division that it is the Municipal/City Mayor with the authorization of
the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the
operation of ordinary cockpits is of the same tenor and effect as the decision
of this case as can be seen in the following wordings:

‘The task of granting licenses to operate cockpits is lodged with
City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective
Sanggunians.  This is specifically
granted to them by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1802 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1802-A which states:

“Sec. 4.  City and Muni­cipal
Mayors with the concurrence of their respective Sanggunians shall have the
authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and
supervision.”

‘This is not to say that the power to grant licenses is
absolute.  It must be noted that certain requirements
must be complied (with) before a license may issue.  First, the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Commission in connection with the operation of cockpits must be
observed.  And second, that there must be
concurrence of the Sanggunians.  (Decision, p. 6)

“While this Court agrees with the movant that a mayor’s
permit/license is a condition precedent to the issuance of the PGC Registration
Certificate, in the case at bar, the city mayor’s permits issued to movant were
null and void as they were granted pursuant to Resolution No. 578 which never
took effect because of non-compliance with the procedure prescribed in
Resolution No. 49.  And because of the
nullity of the Mayor’s permits, the Registration Certificate No. C-86-816
issued to movant is likewise null and void. 
The spring cannot rise higher than its source.” ^[12]

The foregoing discussion brings us to the determinant legal query
to be resolved, which is the validity of Resolution No. 378.  Petitioner argues for the legality of
Resolution No. 378 because the same was passed by the sanggunian by a majority of five
(5) affirmative votes as against four (4) negative votes.  He contends that the three-fourths vote
requirement under Section 6.44, Resolution No. 49, aside from its being merely
a formal requirement, is an enactment of the sanggunian which is ultra vires.

We do not
agree.  Resolution No. 378 was declared
invalid by the Court of Appeals for failure to comply with the required votes
necessary for its validity.  Although the
charter of the City of Gingoog and the Local Government Code require only a
majority for the enactment of an ordinance, Resolution No. 49 cannot be validly amended by the resolution in
question without complying with the categorical requirement of a three-fourths
vote incorporated in the very same ordinance sought to be amended.  The pertinent provisions in the aforesaid
city charter and the Local Government Code obviously are of general application
and embrace a wider scope or subject matter. 
In the enactment of ordinances in general, the application of the
aforementioned laws cannot be disputed. 
Undeniably, however, Section 6.44 of said ordinance regarding amendments
thereto is a specific and
particular provision for said ordinance and explicitly provides for a different
number of votes.  Where there is in the
same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which its most
comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the
particular enactment must be operative, and the general statement must be taken
to affect only such cases within its language as are not within the provisions
of the particular enactment.^[13]

In the instant case, although the general law on the matter
requires a mere majority, the higher requisite vote in Resolution No. 49 shall
govern since municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the
evils sought to be prevented by the inclusion or incorporation of particular
provisions in enacting a particular statute and, therefore, to pass the
appropriate ordinance to attain the main object of the law.^[14]
This more stringent requirement on the necessary votes for amendments to
Resolution No. 49 apparently forestalled the apprehended contingency for, to
borrow the words of respondent court, “in an apparent attempt to get rid of
this legal stumbling block (the prohibition against a cockpit in a residential
zone under Proclamation 49), the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Gingoog City passed
Resolution No. 378, Code Ordinance, series of 1985,” x x x “thereby
reclassifying Block 125 into a recreational zone.”^[15]
Withal, it is legally permissible, as exceptions to the general provisions on
measures covered by city charters and the Local Government Code, that the vote
requirement in certain ordinances may be specially provided for, as in the case
of Section 6.44 of Resolution No. 49, instead of the usual majority vote.^[16]

In sum, Block 125 where Coliseum is located remains classified as
a residential area, hence the operation of a cockpit therein is
prohibited.  This weighty consideration,
which should actually be the principal basis for the nullification by
respondent court of the two mayor’s permits issued to petitioner (private
respondent-appellant therein), was explained as follows:

“The rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission on June 1,
1981 in connection with the operation of all cockpits in the Philippines
particularly Section 6 and 12 thereof reads as follows:

‘Sec. 6.  Site and
Constructions of cockpits. – Cockpits shall be constructed and operated within
the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning laws or ordinances.

‘Sec. 12.  Registration of
cockpits. – All cockpits in the Philippines shall register with the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission not later than September 30, 1981.  No cockpit shall be allowed to operate without
the proper registration certificate being secured annually, not later than
January 31.’

x x x.

“In the case at bar, there was no registration certificate issued,
much less authorization to operate given by the PGC to the private
respondent-appellant, a condition precedent before a grant of mayor’s permit or
license to conduct cockfighting. 
Therefore, the mayor’s permits issued to private respondent are null and
void.

“Obviously, the PGC did not grant the private respondent-appellant
the proper registration certificate to operate his cockpit because the same was
not constructed within the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning laws or
ordinances of Gingoog City pursuant to Section 6 of Rules and Regulation of the
PGC.  x x x”^[17]

It bears mention, however, that the issue in this case is the
validity of the city mayor’s permits of April 22, 1986 and January 5, 1987 and
the nullity whereof is affirmed in this opinion.  Respondents observe that they see no
useful purpose in having said permits declared null and void since they are
already functus officio.  We agree, however, with the stance taken by
respondent court that this adjudication would still be in order since it can
hereafter serve as a guide for the proper and legal issuance of mayor’s permits
to cockpit owners.  As pertinently quoted, justice demands that
we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged rights, though gone,
but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.^[18]

IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the
petition is hereby DENIED.  The decision
of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 30, 1989 and its resolution
dated October 27, 1989 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Fidel P. Purisima and Hector C. Fule; Rollo,
10-19.

^[2]
Per Judge Pedro R. Luspo, Sr.; Original Record, 396.

^[3]
Exhibits “1” and “9”.

^[4]
Rollo, 10-11.

^[5]
PGC Reg. Cert. No. C-85-816 was issued to petitioner on April 30, 1987.  See Rollo, 36, 45.

^[6]
Rollo, 12.

^[7]
Original Record, 1.

^[8]
Rollo, 21-23.

^[9]
Ibid., 103.

^[10]
Philippine Gamefowl Commission vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
146 SCRA 294 (1986).

^[11]
Cootuaco vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 162 SCRA 122 (1988).

^[12]
Rollo, 21-22.

^[13]
Manila Railroad Company vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 52 Phil. 950
(1929).

^[14]
See Martin, Public Corporations, 1985 Edition, 69.

^[15]
Rollo, 16.

^[16]
See Sec. 224, Revised Administrative Code.

^[17]
Rollo, 121.

^[18]
Javier vs. Commission on Elections, et al., 144 SCRA 194 (1986).