UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., RESPONDENTS.

This special civil action of certiorari assails the
resolution (dated June 5, 1989)
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) relative to Certified Case
No. 0522, the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration (dated August 8, 1989).

The antecedents are:

On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of Filipro
Employees, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file
employees of Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed a Notice of Strike
at the Department of Labor raising the issues of CBA deadlock and unfair labor
practice.

The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) invited the
parties for a conference on February 4,
1988 for the purpose of settling the dispute.  The private respondent however, assailed the
legal personality of the proponents of the said notice of strike to represent
the Nestle employees.  This
notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to attend the
conciliation meetings and to which private respondent failed to attend contending
that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated
in accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws.

 The records show that
before the filing of said notice of strike, or on June 30, 1987, the respective CBAs
in the four (4) units of Nestle, in Alabang/Cabuyao, Makati, Cagayan
de Oro and Cebu/Davao work
locations had all expired.  Under the
said CBAs, Alabang/Cabuyao
and Makati
units were represented by the UFE; the Cagayan de Oro unit was represented by WATU; while the Cebu/Davao was represented by TUPAS.  Prior to the expiration of the CBAs for Makati
and Alabang/Cabuyao, UFE submitted to the company a
list of CBA proposals.  The company on
the other hand, expressed its readiness to negotiate a new CBA for Makati and Alabang/Cabuyao
units but reserved the negotiation for Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao considering
that the issue of representation for the latter units was not yet settled.  On June
10, 1987 and July 28, 1987,
UFE was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao units, respectively.

On September 14, 1987, the Company terminated from employment all
UFE Union officers, headed by its president, Mr. Manuel Sarmiento,
and all the members of the negotiating panel for instigating and knowingly
participating in a strike staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro on September 11,
1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the
purpose.

On September 21, 1987,
the union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.  The Labor Arbiter, in a decision dated January 12, 1988, upheld the validity
of the dismissal of said union officers. 
The decision was later on affirmed by the respondent NLRC en banc,
on November 2, 1988.

Respondent company contends that, “with the dismissal of UFE officers
including all the members of the union negotiating panel as later on confirmed
by the NLRC en banc, said union negotiating panel thus ceased to exist and its
former members divested of any legal personality, standing and capacity to act
as such or represent the union in any manner whatsoever.”

The union officers, on the other hand, asserted their authority
to represent the regular rank-and-file employees of Nestle,
Philippines, being
the duly elected officers of the union.

In  the meantime, private respondent
sought guidelines from the Department of Labor on how it should treat letters
from several splinter groups claiming to have possessed authority to negotiate
in behalf of the UFE.  It is noteworthy
that aside from the names of the negotiating panel submitted by one UFE
officials, three (3) other groups in the Nestle plant in Cabuyao
and two groups in the Makati
office have expressed a desire to bargain with management professing alleged
authorization from and by the general membership.  These groups however, it must be noted,
belong to just one (1) union, the UFE.

In a letter dated August
20, 1988, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja advised:

“Any attempt on the part of management to directly deal with any of
the factions claiming to have the imprimatur of the majority of the employees,
or to recognize any act by a particular group to adopt the deadlock counter
proposal of the management, at this stage, would be most unwise.  It may only fan the fire.” (Rollo, pp. 61-62)

On March 20, 1988
and August 5, 1988, the
company concluded separate CBAs with the general
membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro units,
respectively.  The workers thereat
likewise conducted separate elections of their officers.

Assailing the validity of these agreements, the union filed a
case of ULP against the company with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch on November 16, 1988.

Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by the NCMB
but yielded negative result because of the irreconcilable conflicts of the
parties on the matter of who should represent and negotiate for the workers.

On October 18, 1988,
petitioner filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties.  On October
28, 1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon
certified to the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and Nestle,
Philippines, the relevant
portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this office hereby
certificates the sole issue of deadlock in CBA negotiations affecting the Makati, Alabang
and Cabuyao units to the National Labor Relations
Commission for compulsory arbitration.

“The NLRC is further directed to call all the parties immediately
and resolve the CBA deadlock within twenty (20) days from submission of the
case for resolution.” (Rollo, p. 225)

On June 5, 1989,
the Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution granting wage increase
and other benefits to Nestle’s employees, ruling on
non-economic issues, as well as absolving the private respondent of the Unfair
Labor Practice charge.  The dispositive portion states as follows:

“WHEREFORE, as aforestated, the parties
are hereby ordered to execute and implement through their duly authorized
representatives a collective bargaining agreement for a
duration of five (5) years from promulgation of this Resolution.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo,
p. 180)

Petitioner finds said resolution to be inadequate and
accordingly, does not agree therewith.  lt filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was, however, denied on August  8, 1989.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner originally raised 13 errors committed by the public
respondent.  However, in its Urgent
Manifestation and Motion dated September
24, 1990, petitioner limited the issues to be resolved into six
(6).  Thus, only the following shall be
dealt with in this resolution:

1.  WHETHER OR NOT THE SECOND
DIVISION OF THE NLRC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION.  THE SAME BEING RENDERED ONLY
BY A DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND NOT BY EN BANC;

2.  WHETHER OR NOT THE
RESPONDENT NLRC SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CBA TO BE SIGNED BY THE
PARTIES SHALL COVER SOLELY THE BARGAINING UNIT CONSISTING OF ALL REGULAR
RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE RESPONDENT COMPANY AT MAKATI, ALABANG AND
CABUYAO;

3.  WHETHER OR NOT THE
RESPONDENT NLRC HAD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERRORS IN FACT AND IN LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CBA IS EFFECTIVE ONLY UPON THE
PROMULGATION OF THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION;

4.  WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENT HAD SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S DEMAND FOR A CONTRACT
SIGNING BONUS AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE LONG PRACTICE AND TRADITION IN
COMPANY WHICH AMOUNT TO DIMINUTION OF EMPLOYEES BENEFITS;

5.  WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE UNIONS DEMAND FOR A  “MODIFIED UNION SHOP” SECURITY CLAUSE IN THE
CBA AS ITS RULING CLEARLY COLLIDES WITH SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;

6.  WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ERRED IN ENTIRELY ABSOLVING THE COMPANY FROM THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE CHARGE AND IN DISREGARDING THE SUBSTANTIAL INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE
RELATIVE THERETO; (p. 9, Petitioner’s Urgent Manifestation and Motion dated
September 24, 1990).

Counsel for the private respondent company filed a motion for
leave of court to oppose the aforesaid urgent manifestation and motion.  It appearing that
the allowance of said opposition would necessarily delay the early disposition
of this case, the Court Resolved to DISPENSE with the filing of the same.

We affirm the public respondent’s findings and rule as regards
the issue of jurisdiction.

This case was certified on October 28, 1988 when existing rules prescribed that, it
is incumbent upon the Commission en banc to decide or resolve a
certified dispute.  However, R.A. 6715
took effect during pendency of this case.  Aside from vesting upon each division the
power to adjudicate cases filed before the Commission, said Act further
provides that the divisions of the Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over cases within their respective territorial jurisdiction.

Section 5 of RA 6715 provides as follows:

“Section 5.  Article 213 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
as amended, is further amended to read as follows:

Art. 213.  National Labor
Relations Commission.  – There shall be a
National Labor Relations Commission which shall be attached to the Department
of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only, composed of
(a) Chairman and fourteen (14) Members.

Five (5) members each shall be chosen from among the nominees of
the workers and employers organizations, respectively.  The Chairman and the four (4) remaining
members shall come from the public sector, with the latter to be chosen from
among the recommendees of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.

Upon assumption into office, the members nominated by the workers
and employers organizations shall divest themselves of any affiliation with or
interest in the federation or association to which they belong.

The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each
composed of three (3) members.  The
Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and
regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its
divisions and regional branches and formulating policies affecting its
administration and operations.  The
Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and
all other powers, functions and duties
through its divisions. 
Of the five (5) divisions, the first and second divisions shall handle
cases coming from the National Capital Region and the third, fourth and fifth
divisions, cases from other parts of Luzon, from the Visayas and Mindanao,
respectively.  The divisions of the
Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases within their
respective territorial jurisdiction.

The concurrence of two (2) Commissioners of a division shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment or resolution.  Whenever the required membership in a
division is not complete and the concurrence of two (2) commissioners to arrive
at a judgment or resolution cannot be obtained, the Chairman shall designate
such number of additional Commissioners from the other divisions as may be
necessary.

The conclusions of a division on any case submitted to it for
decision shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a
member for the writing of the opinion. 
It shall be mandatory for the division to meet for purposes of the
consultation ordained therein.  A
certification to this effect signed by the Presiding Commissioner of the
division shall be issued, and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case
and served upon the parties.

The Chairman shall be the Presiding Commissioner of the first division,
and the four (4) other members from the public sector shall be the Presiding
Commissioners of the second, third, fourth and fifth divisions,
respectively.  In case of the effective
absence or incapacity of the Chairman, the Presiding Commissioner of the second
division shall be the Acting Chairman.

The Chairman, aided by the Executive Clerk of the Commission, shall
have administrative supervision over the Commission and its regional branches
and all its personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor
Arbiters.

The Commission when sitting en banc, shall be assisted by the same
Executive Clerk, and, when acting thru its Divisions, by said Executive Clerk
for its First Division and four (4) other Deputy Executive Clerks for the
Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions, respectively, in the performance of
such similar or equivalent functions and duties as are discharged by the Clerk
of Court and Deputy Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals.” (Underscoring
supplied)

In view of the enactment of Republic Act 6715, the aforementioned
rules requiring the Commission en banc to decide or resolve a
certified dispute have accordingly been repealed.  This is supported by the fact that on March 21, 1989, the Secretary of Labor, issued Administrative Order No. 36 (Series of 1989),
which reads:

“2.   Effective March 21, 1989, the date of the effectivity of Republic Act 6715, the Commission shall
cease holding en banc sessions for purposes of adjudicating cases
and shall discharge their adjudicatory functions and powers through their
respective Divisions.”

Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, the above-cited
Administrative Order is valid, having been issued in accordance with existing
legislation as the Secretary of Labor is clothed with the power to promulgate
rules for the implementation of the said amendatory law.

Section 36 of R.A. 6715 provides:

“Section 36.  Rule-Making Authority.  – The Secretary of Labor and Employment is
hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to implement the provisions of this Act.”

Moreover, it is to be emphasized and it is a matter of judicial
notice that since the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many
cases have already been decided by the five (5) divisions of the NLRC.  We find no legal justification in
entertaining petitioner’s claim considering that the clear intent of the
amendatory provision is to expedite the disposition of labor cases filed before
the Commission.  To rule otherwise would
not be congruous to the proper administration of justice.

As to the second issue, the Court is convinced that the public
respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving only the sole
issue certified to by the Secretary and formulating a CBA which covers the
bargaining units consisting of all regular rank-and-file employees of the
respondent company at Makati,
Alabang and Cabuyao only.

In its assailed resolution, public respondent stated:

“A perusal of the records and proceedings of this case reveals that
after the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of his Order dated 28 October 1988
certifying the dispute to Us, the Union filed an Urgent Manifestation seeking
the modification of the certification order to include the Cebu/Davao
and Cagayan de Oro
divisions, the employees/workers therein being all bonafide
members of the Union which is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
of all the regular rank-and-file workers of the company nationwide.  Their non-inclusion in the certification
order, the Union argues, would give premium to the alleged unlawful act of the
Company in entering into separate ‘Collective Bargaining Agreements’ directly
with the workers thereat.

“In the same vein, the union manifested its intention to file a
complaint for ULP against the company and its officers responsible for such
act, which it eventually did.

“Considering that the Union had reserved the right to prosecute the
Company and its officers responsible for the alleged unlawful execution of the
CBA directly with the union members in Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao units, as it
has in fact filed a case which is now pending with our Arbitration Branch, the
issue as to whether such acts constitute ULP is best heard and decided
separately from the certified case, not only because of the evidentiary need to
resolve the issue, but also because of the delay that may ensue in the
resolution of the present conflict.

“Furthermore, the consolidation of the issue with the instant case
poses complicated questions regarding venue and joinder
of parties.  We feel that each of the
issues propounded by the parties shall be better dealt with separately
according to its own merits.

“Thus, We rule to resolve the sole issue
in dispute certified to this Commission, i.e., the deadlock in the collective
bargaining negotiations in Cabuyao/Alabang and Makati units.” (Rollo, pp. 174-176)

We agree.  Public
respondent’s resolution is proper and in full compliance with the order of the
Secretary of Labor.  The concomittant delay that will result in resolving
petitioner’s motion for the modification of the certification order to
determine whether to include Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro Divisions or not
will defeat the very purpose of the Secretary of Labor’s assumption of
jurisdiction and his subsequent certification order for compulsory arbitration.

The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor over
labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power measure.  It cannot be denied that the private
respondent is engaged in an undertaking affected with public interest being one
of the largest manufacturers of food products. 
The compelling consideration of the Secretary’s assumption of
jurisdiction is the fact that a prolonged strike or lockout is inimical to the
national economy and thus, the need to implement some measures to suppress any
act which will hinder the company’s essential productions is indispensable for
the promotion of the common good.  Under
this situation, the Secretary’s certification order for compulsory arbitration
which was intended for the immediate formulation of an already delayed CBA was
proper.

Corollarily, the NLRC was thereby
charged with the task of implementing the certification order for compulsory
arbitration.  As the implementing body,
its authority did not include the power to amend the Secretary’s order
(University of Santo Tomas v. National Labor Relations Commission, UST Faculty
Union, G.R. No. 89920, October 18, 1990).

For the same reason, We rule that the
prayer to declare the respondent company guilty of acts of unfair labor
practice when it allegedly resorted to practices designed to delay the
collective bargaining negotiations cannot be subsumed in this petition, it being
beyond the scope of the certification order.

Petitioner argues that because of the public respondent’s
actuation in this regard, it committed grave abuse of discretion as it allowed
multiplicity of suits and splitting causes of action which are barred by
procedural rule.

We cannot subscribe to this argument.  In the recent case of the Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court had occasion
to define what a compulsory arbitration is. 
In said case, this Court stated:

“When the consent of one of the parties is enforced by statutory
provisions, the proceeding is referred to as compulsory arbitration.  In labor cases, compulsory arbitration is the
process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the
authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the
parties.  (G.R. 55159, 22 Dec. 89).”

When sitting in a compulsory arbitration certified to by the
Secretary of Labor, the NLRC is not sitting as a judicial court but as an
administrative body charged with the duty to implement the order of the
Secretary.  Its function only is to
formulate the terms and conditions of the CBA and cannot go beyond the scope of
the order.  Moreover, the Commission is
further tasked to act within the earliest time possible and with the end in
view that its action would not only serve the interests of the parties alone,
but would also have favorable implications to the community and to the economy
as a whole.  This is the clear intention
of the legislative body in enacting Art. 263 paragraph
(g) of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 27 of R.A. 6715, which provides:

(g)   When, in his opinion,
there exists a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction
over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration.  Such assumption
or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
order.  If one has already taken place at
the time of assumption or certification, all striking or lockout employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike or lockout.  The Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with
such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.  (Underscoring supplied)

In view of the avowed but limited purpose of respondent’s
assumption of jurisdiction over this compulsory arbitration case, it cannot be
faulted in not taking cognizance of other matters that would defeat this
purpose.

As regards the third issue raised by petitioner, this Court finds
the provisions of Article 253 and Article 253-A of the Labor Code as amended by
R.A. 6715 as the applicable laws, thus:

“Art. 253.  Duty to bargain
collectively when there exists a collective bargaining
agreement.  When there is a collective
bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that
neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its
lifetime.  However, either party can
serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60)
days prior to its expiration date.  It
shall be the duty of both parties
to keep the status quo and to continue
in full force and effect the terms
and conditions of the existing agreement
during the 60–day period and/or
until a new agreement is reached by
the parties.

“Art. 253-A.  Terms of a collective
bargaining agreement.  – Any
Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,  insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years.  No petition questioning the majority status
of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification
election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside
of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year
term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 
All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be
renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.  Any agreement on such
other provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement entered into within six (6)
months from the date of expiry of
the term of such other provisions as
fixed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
shall retroact to the day immediately
following such date. 
If any such agreement is entered
into beyond six months, the parties shall
agree on the duration of retroactivity
thereof.  In case of a deadlock in
the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties may
exercise their rights under this Code.” (Underscoring supplied)

In the light of the foregoing, this Court upholds the
pronouncement of the NLRC holding the CBA to be signed by the parties effective
upon the promulgation of the assailed resolution.  It is clear and explicit from Article 253-A
that any agreement on such other provisions of the CBA shall be given
retroactive effect only when it is entered into within six (6) months from its
expiry date.  If the agreement was
entered into outside the six (6) month period, then the parties shall agree on
the duration of the retroactivity thereof.

The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed
by the parties was promulgated June 5,
1989, and hence, outside the 6 month period from June 30, 1987, the expiry date of the
past CBA.  Based on the provision of
Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be agreed upon by the parties.  But since no agreement to that effect was
made, public respondent did not abuse its discretion in giving the said CBA a
prospective effect.  The action of the
public respondent is within the ambit of its authority vested by existing laws.

In assailing the public respondent’s actuation, the Union
cites the case of Villar v. Inciong
(121 SCRA 444) where this Court ruled:

“x x x.  While
petitioners were charged for alleged commission of acts of disloyalty inimical
to the interests of the Amigo Employees Union – PAFLU in the Resolution of February
14, 1977 of the Amigo-Employees Union-PAFLU and on February 15, 1977, PAFLU and
the company entered into and concluded a new collective bargaining agreement,
petitioners may not escape the effects of the security clause under either the
old CBA or the new CBA by claiming that the old CBA had expired and that the
new CBA cannot be given retroactive enforcement.  To do so would be to create a gap during
which no agreement would govern, from the time the old contract expired to the
time a new agreement shall have been entered into with the union.  x x x “

In the aforecited case, the Court only
pointed out that it is not right for union members to argue that they cannot be
covered by the past and the new CBAs both containing
the same closed-shop agreement for acts committed
during the interregnum.  What was
emphasized by this Court is that in no case should there be a period in which
no agreement would govern at all.  But
nowhere in the said pronouncement did
We rule that every CBA
contracted after the expiry date of the
previous CBA must retroact to the day
following such date. 
Hence, it is proper to rule that in the case at bar, the clear and
unmistakable terms of Articles 253 and 253-A must be deemed controlling.

Articles 253 an 253-A mandate the parties to keep the status
quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of
the existing during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA
and/or until a now agreement is reached by the parties.  Consequently, there being no new agreement
reached, the automatic renewal clause provided for by the law which is deemed
incorporated in all CBAs, provides the reason why the
new CBA can only be given a prospective effect.

Petitioner claims that because of the prospective effect of the
CBA, union members were deprived of substantial amount of monetary benefits
which they could have enjoyed had the CBA be given retroactive effect.  This would include backwages,
the immediate effects of the mandated wage increase on the fringe benefits such
as the 13th and 14th month pay, overtime premium, and right to differential
pay, leaves, etc.  This Court, is not unmindful of these.  Nevertheless, We are
convinced that the CBA formulated by public respondent is fair, reasonable and
just.  Even if prospective in effect,
said CBA still entities the Nestle workers and employees reasonable
compensation and benefits which, in the opinion of this Court, is one of the
highest, if not the highest in the industry. 
Petitioner did not succeed in overcoming the presumption of regularity
in the performance of the public respondent’s functions.  Even if the resolution fell short of meeting
the numerous demands of the union, the petitioner failed to establish that
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving the CBA a
retrospective effect.

The fourth and fifth assignment of errors should be resolved
jointly considering that they are the terms and conditions of the CBA.

According to petitioner, the terms and conditions thereof are
inadequate, unreasonable, incompetitive and thus,
prejudicial to the workers.  It further
decries public respondent’s alleged taking side with the private
respondent.  Petitioner contends that in
issuing the assailed resolutions, public respondent considered only the
position of the private respondent and totally disregarded that of the
petitioner.  It further avers that the
awards are bereft of any factual and legal basis.

Petitioner made so many claims and statements which were adopted
and asserted without good ground.  It
fails to substantiate why, in not granting its demands for the inclusion in the
CBA of a “Contract Signing Bonus” and a “Modified Union Shop Agreement,” the
assailed resolutions were erroneous and were drawn up arbitrarily and
whimsically.

In the case of Palencia v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 75763, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 247, We
ruled that the findings of fact of the then Court of Industrial Relations (now
NLRC), are conclusive and will not be disturbed.  Thus:

“Following a long line of decisions this Court has consistently
declined to disturb the findings of fact of the then Court of Industrial
Relations whose functions the NLRC now performs.  [Pambusco Employees
Union Inc.  v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 68 Phil. 591 (1939); Manila Electric Co. v. National Labor Union, 70
Phil. 617 (1940); San Carlos Milling Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 111
Phil. 323 (1961), 1 SCRA 734; Philippine Educational Institution v. MLQSEA
Faculty Assn., 135 Phil. 282 (1968), 26 SCRA 272; University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan and NLRC, G.R. No. 63122, February 20, 1984, 127
SCRA 6911.  The findings of fact are
conclusive and will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that there has
been grave abuse of discretion. 
[Philippine Educational Institution v. MLQSEA Faculty Association, 26
SCRA 272, 276] and there being no indication that the findings are
unsubstantiated by evidence [University of Pangasinan
Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan and NLRC,
G.R. No. 63122, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 694, 704].”

Moreover, the NLRC is in the best position to formulate a CBA
which is equitable to all concerned. 
Because of its expertise in settling labor disputes, it is imbued with
competence to appraise and evaluate the evidence and positions presented by the
parties.  In the absence of a clear
showing of grave abuse of the discretion, the findings of the respondent NLRC
on the terms of the CBA should not be disturbed.

Taken as a whole, the assailed resolutions are after all
responsive to the call of compassionate justice observed in labor law and the
dictates of reason which is considered supreme in every
adjudication.

ACCORDINGLY, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is
DISMISSED.  The Resolutions of the NLRC,
dated June 5, 1989 and August 8, 1989 are AFFIRMED, except
insofar as the ruling absolving the private respondent of unfair labor practice
which is declared SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., no part. Related to one of the counsel.