G.R. No. 91023. July 13, 1990

METROPOLITAN TRAFFIC COMMAND WEST TRAFFIC DISTRICT, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 8 AT MANILA, A…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions July 13, 1990 EN BANC CRUZ, J.:
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CRUZ, J.:


We deal here with a practice known to many motorists in Metro
Manila:  the removal of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles. 
This was challenged by the private respondent in the regional trial
court of Manila, which held the practice unlawful.  The petitioner is now before us, urging
reversal of the decision for grave abuse of discretion.

The original complaint was filed with the said court on August 10, 1989, by Dante S. David, a
lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate of his car was removed by the
Metropolitan Traffic Command while the vehicle was parked on
Escolta.  He
questioned the petitioner’s act on the ground not only that the car was not
illegally parked but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance or law
authorizing such removal.  He asked that
the practice be permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued.

Judge Arsenio M. Gonong
issued a temporary restraining order on August
14, 1989, and hearings on the writ of preliminary injunction were
held on August 18, 23, and 25, 1989.  The
writ was granted on this last date.  The
parties also agreed to submit the case for resolution on the sole issue of
whether there was a law or ordinance authorizing the removal of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles.  The
parties then submitted simultaneous memoranda in support of their respective
positions, following which the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision.

In ruling for the complainant, Judge Gonong
held that LOI 43, which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it “to
detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked
and unattended as in the case at bar.  It
merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free
passage or continued flow of traffic on
streets
and highways.” At any rate,
he said, the LOI had been repealed by PD 1605. 
Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or
regulation or to any city ordinance to justify the questioned act.  On the allegation that the practice was
“the root cause of graft and corruption or at the very least the
equivalent of street racket among defendant’s deployed agents,” His Honor
made the following pointed observations:

At this juncture, it may not be amiss to say, that if the arbitrary
and capricious detachment and confiscation of vehicles plates illegally parked
and unattended as in the act complained of in the instant case, the image of the
man clothed in a traffic or police uniform will be greatly impaired if not
cursed with disrespect on the part of those who have suffered at his
hands.  Worse, he will cease (if he had
not already ceased) to be the law-abiding, courageous and valiant protector of
a citizen of the Republic that he is meant to be, and instead his real
oppressor and enemy, thereby fortifying the contemporaneous public perception
that he is a dyed-in-the-wool extortionist if not an unmitigated chiseler.
[1]

It bears noting that this petition should have been filed first
with the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court on decisions of the regional trial
courts involving questions of law. 
However, in view of the importance of the issue raised, we have decided
to take cognizance thereof under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so we can
address and resolve the question directly.

Upon the filing of this petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order dated February 6,
1990, to prevent enforcement of the said decision until further
orders from this Court.  Thereafter, we
required a comment from the private respondent, to which the petitioner filed a
reply as also directed.

The petitioner reiterates and reinforces its argument in the
court below and insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite the issuance of PD
1605.  It contends that there is no
inconsistency between the two measures because the former deals with illegally
parked vehicles anywhere in the Philippines
whereas the latter deals with the regulation of the flow of traffic in the
Metro Manila area only.  The two measures
may be enforced together because implied repeals are not favored and,
furthermore, to look at them another way, LOI 43 is the special law dealing
only with illegal parking while PD 1605 is the general law dealing with all
other kinds of traffic violations.  The
special law must of course prevail over the general law.  The petitioner also deplores the above-quoted
remarks of the trial judge, pointing out that the parties had agreed to limit
the issue to whether there was a statutory basis for the act complained
of.  And even assuming that abuses have
been committed in the enforcement of LOI 43, the remedy is not to disregard it
or consider it revoked but to prosecute the guilty parties.

In his comment, the private respondent argues that LOI 43 has
been repealed by PD 1605, which specifies all the sanctions available against
the various traffic violations, including illegal parking.  He stresses that removal and confiscation of
the license plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of them, the
penalties being limited in the decree to imposition of fine and suspension or
revocation of driver’s licenses or certificates of public convenience, etc.  Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius
. 
He agrees that the special law prevails over the general law but
maintains it is PD 1605 that is the special law because it is applicable only
in Metro Manila and LOI 43 that is the general law because it was intended to
operate throughout the country.  As for
his allegation that the challenged practice is
a source of graft, he
maintains that it was not improper to discuss it in his memorandum because it
was pertinent to the central issue under consideration.  Finally, he claims that removal and confiscation
of the license plate without notice and hearing violates due process because
such license plate is a form of property protected
by the Bill of Rights against unlawful deprivation.

In its reply, the petitioner faults the private respondent for
belatedly raising the constitutionality of LOI 43, suggesting faintly that this
should not be permitted.  In any case, it
maintains, the license plate is not property in the constitutional sense, being
merely the identification of      the
vehicle, and its “temporary confiscation” does not deprive the owner
of the use of the vehicle itself.  Hence,
there is no unlawful taking under the due process clause.  The petitioner also takes issue with the
contention that it is PD 1605 that should be considered the special law because
of its limited territorial application. 
Repeal of LOI 43 on that ground would run counter to the legislative
intention as it is in fact in Metro Manila that the problem of illegal parking
is most acute.

LOI 43, entitled Measures to Effect a
Continuing Flow of Transportation on Streets and Highways, was issued on November 28, 1972, with the
following pertinent provisions:

Motor vehicles that stall on the streets and highways,
streets and sidewalks, shall immediately be removed by their owners/users; otherwise
said vehicles shall be dealt with and disposed in the manner stated hereunder;

1.  For the first offense the
stalled or illegally parked vehicle
shall be removed, towed and impounded
at the expense of the owner, user or claimant;

2. For the second and subsequent offenses, the registry plates of
the vehicles shall be confiscated and the owner’s certificate of registration cancelled. 
(Emphasis supplied).

PD 1605 (Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central
Powers Related to Traffic Management, Providing Penalties, and for Other
Purposes) was issued, also by President Marcos, on November 21, 1978, and pertinently provides:

Section 1. 
The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines
and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations
of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties
as are herein prescribed.
  For this
purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of
Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof
are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission.  When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension
or revocation of driver’s license or certificate of public convenience
, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke
such license or certificate.  The
suspended or revoked driver’s license or the report of suspension of revocation
of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land
Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be,
for their records update.

x          x          x

Section 3. 
Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed
within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee,
shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows:  P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the
second offense, P50.00 for the third offense,
a one-year suspension of driver’s
license for the fourth
offense, and a revocation of the driver’s license for the fifth
offense:  Provided, That the Metropolitan
Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for
violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain
public roads, streets or thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.

x          x          x

Section 5. 
In case of traffic violations, the driver’s license shall not be
confiscated
but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic
citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall
state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and
an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the
violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine
Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of
the citation ticket.

If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period
herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law-enforcement
agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate
proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic
court, city or municipal court.

If at the time a driver renews his driver’s license and records show that he
has an unpaid fine, his driver’s license shall not be renewed until he has paid
the fine and corresponding surcharges.

x          x          x

Section 8. 
Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.  (Emphasis
supplied).

A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and
confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not among
the specified penalties.  Moreover,
although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is authorized by the decree to
“otherwise discipline” and “impose higher penalties” on
traffic violators, whatever sanctions it may impose must be “in such
amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed.” The petitioner
has not pointed to any such additional sanctions, relying instead on its
argument that the applicable authority for the questioned act is LOI 43.

The petitioner stresses that under the decree, “the powers
of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation over such
violations and punishment thereof are (hereby) transferred to the Metropolitan
Manila Commission,” and one of such laws is LOI 43.  The penalties prescribed by the LOI are
therefore deemed incorporated in PD 1605 as additional to the other penalties therein
specified.

It would appear
that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense.  A violation imports an intentional breach or
disregard of a
rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against
a known and usually visible prohibition. 
Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does not punish illegal
parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that involuntarily stop on the road due
to some unexpected trouble such as engine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured
tires, or other similar cause.  The
vehicle is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic,
but only because it has stalled.  The
obstruction is not deliberate.  In fact,
even the petitioner recognizes that “there is a world of difference between
a stalled vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one” and suggests
a different
treatment for either.  “The first
means one which stopped unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one
which stopped to accomplish something, including temporary rest.”[2]

LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles “that stall on the streets
and highways” and not those that are intentionally parked in a public
place in violation of a traffic law or regulation.  The purpose of the LOI evidently is to
discipline the motorist into keeping
his vehicle in good condition before going out into the streets so as not to
cause inconvenience to the public when the car breaks down and blocks other
vehicles.  That is why, for the first
offense, the stalled vehicle is immediately towed at the owner’s expense to
clear the street of the traffic obstruction. 
Where it appears that the
owner has not learned from his first experience because the vehicle has stalled
again, presumably due to his failure to repair it, the penalty shall be
confiscation of the license plate and cancellation of the certificate of
registration.

It is worth noting that it is not the driver’s license that is
confiscated and canceled when the vehicle stalls on a public street.  The LOI goes against the vehicle itself.  The object of the measure is to ensure that
only motor vehicles in good condition may use the public streets, and this is effected by confiscating the license plates and canceling
the certificates of registration of those vehicles that are not roadworthy.

In the case of the private respondent, it is not alleged or shown that his vehicle stalled
on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic.  The charge against him is that he purposely
parked
his vehicle in a no-parking area (although this is disputed by
him).  The act, if true, is a traffic
violation that may not be punished
under LOI 43.  The applicable law is PD
1605, which does not include removal and confiscation of the license plate of
the vehicle among the imposable penalties.

Indeed, even if LOI 43 were applicable, the penalty of
confiscation would still not be justified as it has not been alleged, much less
shown, that the illegal parking was a second or subsequent offense.  That circumstance must be established at a trial before a court of justice
where the vehicle owner shall have a right
to be heard in his defense.  The second or subsequent offense cannot be
simply pronounced by the traffic authorities without hearing and without
proof.  Confiscation of the registry
plate without a judicial finding that the offense charged is a second or
subsequent one would, unless the owner concedes this point, be invalid.

While it is true that the license plate is strictly speaking not
a property right, it does not follow that it may be removed or confiscated
without lawful cause.  Due process is a
guaranty against all forms of official arbitrariness.  Under the principle that ours is a government
of laws and not of men, every official must act by and within the authority of
a valid law and cannot justify the lack of it on the pretext alone of good
intentions.  It is recalled that more
than seventy years ago, the mayor of Manila
deported one hundred seventy prostitutes to Davao for the protection of the
morals and health of the city.  This
Court acknowledged his praiseworthy purpose but just the same annulled his
unauthorized act, holding that no one could take the law into his own hands.[3]
We can rule no less in the case before us.

We find that there is no inconsistency between LOI 43 and PD
1605, whichever is considered the special law either because of its subject or
its territorial application.  The former
deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on a public road while the
latter deals with motor vehicles that have been deliberately parked in a
no-parking area; and while both cover illegal parking of motor vehicles, the
offense is accidental under the first measure and intentional under the
second.  This explains why the sanctions
are different.  The purpose of the LOI is
to discourage the use of the public streets by motor vehicles that are likely
to break down while that of the decree is to penalize the driver for his
defiance of the traffic laws.

As it has not been shown that the private respondent’s motor
vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and, no less importantly, that it had
stalled on the road for a second or subsequent time, confiscation of the
license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43. 
And neither can that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly
provides that “in case of traffic violations, (even) the driver’s license
shall not be confiscated,” let alone the license plate of the motor
vehicle.  If at all, the private
respondent may be held liable for illegal parking only and subjected to any of
the specific penalties mentioned in Section 3 of the decree.

We recognize the problem of the traffic policeman who comes upon
an illegally parked and unattended vehicle and is unable to serve a citation on
the offending driver who is nowhere in sight. 
But that problem is not addressed to the courts; it is for the
legislative and administrative authorities to solve.  What is clear to the Court is that the
difficulty cannot be avoided by the removal of the license plate of the
offending vehicle because the petitioner has not shown that this penalty is
authorized by a valid law or ordinance.

The petitioner complains that the respondent judge did not
confine himself to the issue agreed upon by the parties and made gratuitous
accusations that were not only irrelevant but virtually condemned the whole
traffic force as corrupt.  Assuming that
this issue was indeed not properly raised at the trial, the Court is
nevertheless not inhibited from considering it in this proceeding, on the basis
of its own impressions on the matter.

This Court is not isolated from the mainstream of society and
secluded in a world of its own, unconcerned with the daily lives of the rest of
the nation.  On the contrary, the members
of this Court mix with the people and know their problems and complaints.  And among these are the alleged abuses of the
police in connection with the issue now before us.

It is claimed that the removal of the license plates of illegally
parked motor vehicles in Metro Manila has become a veritable gold mine for some
police officers.  To be sure, we do not
have hard, provable facts at hand but only vague and unsubstantiated rumors
that could be no more than malicious and invented charges.  Nevertheless, these accusations have become
too prevalent and apparently too persuasive that they cannot be simply swept
under the rug.

The widespread report is that civilian “agents,” mostly
street urchins under the control and direction of certain policemen, remove
these license plates from illegally parked vehicles and later discreetly
suggest to the owners that these may be retrieved for an unofficial fee.  This ranges from P50.00 to P200.00, depending
on the type of vehicle.  If the owner
agrees, payment is usually made and the license plate returned at a private
rendezvous.  No official receipt is
issued.  Everything is done quietly.  The owners, it is said, prefer this kind of
fast settlement to the inconvenience of an official proceeding that may entail
not only the payment of a higher fine but also other administrative
impositions, like attendance at a traffic seminar.

The Court is not saying that these reports are true nor is it
stigmatizing the entire police force on the basis of these unsubstantiated
charges.  But it does believe and stress
that the proper authorities should take official notice of these reports
instead of blandly dismissing them as mere canards that do not deserve their
attention and concern.  An inquiry is in
our view indicated.  The old adage that
where there’s smoke there’s fire is not necessarily true and can hardly be the
rationale of a judicial conclusion; but the Court feels just the same that
serious steps should be taken, especially because of the persistence of these
charges, to determine the source of the smoke.

We realize the seriousness of our traffic problems, particularly
in Metro Manila, and commend the earnest efforts of the police to effect a smoother flow of vehicles in the public thoroughfares for the
comfort and convenience of the people. 
But we must add, as a reminder that must be made, that such efforts must be
authorized by a valid law, which must clearly define the offenses proscribed
and as clearly specify the penalties prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.  The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but may
be applied only against motor vehicles that
have
stalled in the public streets due to some involuntary cause and not
those that have been intentionally parked in violation of the traffic
laws.  The challenged decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in so far as
it enjoins confiscation
of
the private respondent’s license plate for alleged deliberate illegal parking,
which is subject to a different penalty. 
The temporary restraining order dated February 6, 1990, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.


[1]
Rollo, p. 56.

[2]
Ibid., p. 104.

[3]
Villavicencio v. Lukban,
39 Phil. 778.