AUGUSTO L. GASPAR, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, AND ZENAIDA F. LANTING, RESPONDENTS.

Augusto L. Gaspar
seeks the setting aside of the Decision of the Civil Service Commission dated
July 19, 1985 (affirmed by the Court of Appeals), which revoked his appointment
as Administrative Officer II of the Parks Development Office, Manila, and
directed the appointment of Zenaida F. Lanting as such, in his stead.

Gaspar was
the Chief of the Security Section of the Parks Development Office of the City
of Manila when Executive Order No.
81-01 was issued by the Governor of the Metro Manila Commission on May 24, 1981.  The Executive Order established a
comprehensive position classification and pay plan for MMC officers and
employees, and contained a provision reclassifying Gaspar’s
position of Chief, Security Section, to Administrative Officer II.  On April
25, 1983, Gaspar was appointed to that
position of Administrative Officer II, effective on October 1,1982.

Zenaida F. Lanting,
then Senior Accounting Clerk in the same Parks Development Office, filed with
the Merit Systems Board a protest against
Gaspar’s appointment as Administrative Officer II,
contending that she was better qualified for, and should have been named to,
the office.

After due proceedings, the Merit Systems Board (MSB) revoked Gaspar’s appointment and directed Lanting’s
appointment to the office of Administrative Officer II, in a decision rendered
on November 28 1984.  Gaspar
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

After initially sustaining Gaspar (in
Resolution No. 85-177, May 21, 1985), the CSC ultimately affirmed the judgment
of the MSB by Resolution
numbered 85-291 promulgated on July 19, 1985 and, as the MSB had done, directed
“the appointment of ** Lanting to the position
of Administrative Officer II in the Parks Development Office **.” The CSC
said:

“A comprehensive evaluation of the qualifications of the
parties would show that while both are at par in experience and training, Lanting has an edge over Gaspar
in education. Her masteral degree in Public
Administration as compared to 36 academic units in Business Administration course
earned by Gaspar provide her with the required
knowledge in management principles and techniques as well as substantial
preparation to assume higher duties and responsibilities taking into account
the supervisory nature of the position. 
It can therefore be concluded that Lanting is
better qualified and more competent for appointment as Administrative Officer
II.  Such being the case, Lanting has better potentials to assume the duties and
responsibilities of this contested position.”

There is no intimation whatever that Gaspar
is not qualified for the position of Administrative Officer II.  On the contrary, it seems quite evident that
the Civil Service Commission considers both him and Lanting
to possess the minimum qualifications for the office, but that, in the
Commission’s view, “Lanting has an edge over Gaspar in education” and “has better potentials
to assume the duties and responsibilities of ** (the) contested position.”

The same situation was presented to this Court in a case decided
on August 5, 1986, Luego v. Civil Service Commission, and Felicula Tuozo.^[1]
It will therefore be in accordance with the doctrine therein that the appellate
proceeding at bar will be resolved.

In Luego, the
appointment by the City Mayor of Cebu of Felimon Luego as Administrative
Officer II, Administrative Division, Cebu City,
was protested by Felicula Tuozo
and another employee.  The issue
presented was identical to that posed in the case at bar.  It was, according to the Court, “starkly
simple:  Is the Civil Service Commission
authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this
finding, order his replacement by the latter?”

The Court ruled that under the circumstances, and in light of the
relevant legal provisions, “all the Commission is actually allowed to do
is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility or the required qualifications. 
If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved.  No other
criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on
— or as the (Civil Service Decree says, ‘approves’ or ‘disapproves’ — an
appointment made by the proper authorities.”

The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of
this nature, according to Luego, is to
review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service
Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal
requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to
the appointment.  Luego finally
points out that the recognition by the Commission that both the appointee and
the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from
acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the former’s
appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it
considers another employee to be better qualified for that would constitute an
encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing authority.

The doctrine has since
been subsequently applied, in Central Bank of the Philippines,
et al. v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989, and Maximo
Gabriel v. Hon. Eufemio Domingo, et al., etc., G.R. No. 87420, September 17, 1990.^[2]

The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant
position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the
Department Head or appointing authority and not in the Civil Service
Commission.  Every particular job in an
office calls for both formal and informal qualifications.  Formal qualifications such as age, number of
academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable
but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy,
initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests of
the service.  Given the demands of a
certain job, who can do it best should be left to the Head of the office
concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied.  The Civil Service Commission cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard.

In the case at bar, therefore, the respondent Commission acted
beyond the scope of its authority and with grave abuse of discretion in
revoking the petitioner’s appointment and directing the appointment in his
stead of the private respondent.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 85-291 of the respondent Civil
Service Commission, dated July 19, 1985, is SET ASIDE and the petitioner, Augusto L. Gaspar, is hereby
declared to be entitled to the office of Administrative Officer II of the Parks
Development Office of the City of Manila by virtue of the appointment extended
to him on April 25, 1983, effective on October 1, 1982.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras
and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.

^[1] G.R. No. 69137, 143 SCRA 327, per Cruz, J.

^[2] Both per Gancayco, J.;
See also, Resolutions in Pintor v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 84022 and 85804, March 9,
1989; Saet v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 82862, Sept.
26, 1988; Remigio v. Chairman, Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 86324, July 6, 1989; Cacatian v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No 87343, July 18, 1989; Galura
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 85812, June 1, 1989; Zulueta v. Mamangun, G.R.
No. 85941, June 15,1989.