PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RICARDO ALCORIZA LASCUNA, ROSITA DIONISIO VILLENA, CELSO CANO ALGOBA AND PLACIDO AQUINO PALANGOY, ACCUSED.  PLACIDO AQUINO PAL…

Accused Ricardo Alcoriza Lascuna, Rosita Dionisio Villena, Celso
Cano Algoba and Placido Aquino Palangoy^[1] were
charged on 16 January 1989 with robbery with homicide, rape and physical
injuries before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in an
information^[2]
with the following accusatory portion:

“That on or about the 16th day of October, 1988, in the
municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with Danilo
Lagasca who is still at large and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been
completed by the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, with intent of (sic) gain and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, rob and carry away with them toys, cash, assorted clothes, wrist watches
and valuable documents worth P4,900.00, all belonging to Luisa A. Villena,
to the damage and prejudice of the said Luisa A. Villena in the total amount of
P4,900.00; that by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery, the
above-named accused, with Danilo Lagasca who is still at large as aforesaid, in
furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill one Honesto Altiche, attack, assault and
strangle the said Honesto Altiche, thereby resulting to his death; did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with force and intimidation and
with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of Luisa A. Villena against her will;
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
strangle the said Luisa A. Villena, inflicting on her slight physical injuries
which required medical attendance and incapacitated her from performing her
customary labor for a period of nine (9) days.

Contrary to law.”

Each of the four accused
pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned on 1 February 1989.^[3]

On 10 February 1989, the
trial court directed the assistant public prosecutor to amend the information
by including Danilo Lagasca as co-accused.^[4]

On 17 March 1989, after the principal prosecution witness, Luisa
Villena y Altiche, had completed her testimony on direct examination, accused
Ricardo Lascuna and Celso Algoba sought leave of court to change their not
guilty plea to guilty. The trial court
granted the request, re-arraigned them and issued an order^[5] the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment of conviction is imposed upon the accused
Ricardo Alcoriza Lascuna and Celso Cano Algoba by (sic) proof beyond reasonable
doubt are found guilty and they are sentenced to a straight penalty of 12 years
and 1 day to 20 years.

SO ORDERED.”

Thereupon, trial proceeded against accused Rosita Villena and
Placido Palangoy. Aside from Luisa
Villena y Altiche, the other witnesses presented by the prosecution were
Patrolmen Felicito de Belen, Oscar Enriquez and Jose Marcelino, Jr. of the
Integrated National Police (INP) of Malolos, Bulacan, Dr. Juanito Sacdalan, Dr.
Rolando Victoria, Dr. Isadora Gatbonton and Eduardo Vinuya, a neighbor of the
victims. The defense, on the other
hand, presented Celso Algoba who was by then already serving sentence, Rosita
Villena and Placido Palangoy. Accused
Ricardo Lascuna, who was
likewise serving sentence, was subpoenaed but failed to appear. Apparently, on 26 July 1989, he escaped from
detention.^[6]

The prosecution’s evidence establishes the following facts:

Luisa Villena y Altiche, together with her eight-month-old
daughter and brother Honesto Altiche, was in her house at Bgy. Cofradia,
Malolos, Bulacan on the night of 16 October 1988. Honesto was staying with her since her husband was working abroad. While both Honesto and Luisa were watching a
television show at around 7:00 o’clock, the latter’s sister-in-law, Rosita
Villena, knocked on the door of the house. When Luisa opened the door, Rosita came in with her daughter and four
strangers, three of whom the former later identified in court as the accused
Celso Algoba, Ricardo Lascuna and Placido Palangoy. The fourth person, identified as Danilo Lagasca, was not present
in court. Ricardo Lascuna and Danilo
Lagasca were both carrying knives which they poked at Luisa and Honesto while Celso
Algoba and Placido Palangoy started ransacking the house. Luisa and her brother were then gagged and
their hands and feet were tied.^[7] Both
were herded inside the bedroom where Luisa was raped by Ricardo Lascuna while
Honesto was asked to turn his back. Thereafter, Luisa was dragged into the kitchen^[8] where
she heard her brother, who was still inside the bedroom with Danilo Lagasca and
Ricardo Lascuna, start moaning. She
then lost consciousness and was left for dead after being strangled with pieces
of cloth. Before this, however, Luisa
noticed that Rosita Villena was the person giving out instructions to her
co-accused. Luisa claims that she was
able to recognize the persons who entered her house since they stayed there
from 7:00 o’clock in the evening of 16 October 1988 up to 2:00 o’clock in the
morning of the following day. Based on
what she heard from them, it appears that the accused could not leave earlier
because of a checkpoint in the area. It
was only after regaining consciousness at around 3:00 o’clock that same morning
that Luisa was able to free herself. Upon doing so, she proceeded to the bedroom where she found her brother
who was already dead. She also discovered
that an instamatic camera, a man’s gold ring, a gold wrist watch, assorted
clothes, a ladies’ gold ring, P400.00 in cash and a pair of toy
walkie-talkies were missing. All told,
her loss amounted to P4,900.00.^[9] Luisa
then sought the help of a neighbor, Eduardo Vinuya. Vinuya brought her to his house and, together with his cousin and
nephew, later proceeded to her house; upon reaching the house, they discovered
its kitchen and living room in disarray. Inside the bedroom, they found the body of Honesto with an electric cord
tied around his neck. They immediately
reported the crime to the barangay captain of Cofradia and the police
authorities.^[10]
As a result thereof, a police team was dispatched to the scene of the
crime. At around 6:00 o’clock that same
morning, Luisa Villena was questioned in the police station where she revealed
that one of the persons who entered her house was her sister-in-law, Rosita
Villena. A police team was thus
dispatched to apprehend the latter in Bgy. Ibayo, Marilao, Bulacan. While being ferried to the station in the
police car, Rosita, when asked who her companions were, implicated Celso Algoba
— her live-in partner — a certain Dong, Placido (Palangoy) and Danny (Danilo
Lagasca). She then led the policemen to
the latter’s respective houses. With
the exception of Danilo Lagasca who was able to escape, the other accused were
apprehended and brought to the police station where they were identified by
Luisa.^[11]
At the station, accused Palangoy was wearing a polo shirt and a pair of pants
(Exhibits “F-2” and “F-3”) which were among the items taken
from Luisa’s house.^[12]

Pat. Jose Marcelino, Jr., a member of the team dispatched to the
crime scene, prepared a sketch of the house where the crime was committed. He likewise stated that the house was in
disarray when he entered it and that the body of Luisa’s brother was inside the
bedroom with its hands bound together by an electric cord; an electric cord was
also coiled around its neck. For her
part, accused Rosita Villena admitted participating in the commission of the
crime but such admission was not reduced to writing.^[13]

The autopsy of Honesto Altiche’s body, conducted by Dr. Juanito
Sacdalan, Municipal Health Officer of Malolos, Bulacan, revealed that there
were marks on the neck and wrists of the victim. Honesto’s death was attributed to “[A]spyxia (sic) due to
occluded trachea and esophagus,” and the breaking of the trachea as a
result of strangulation.^[14]

On the other hand, Dr. Rolando Victoria found abrasions in the
neck of Luisa Villena^[15]
while Dr. Isadora Gatbonton’s internal examination revealed “a normal
looking external genitalia; labia minora and majora; clitoris were all intact
with superficial abrasion 0-3 cm. over the posterior fourchette; negative
bleeding; x x x nagative (sic) tenderness, negative abnormal cischarge (sic); x
x x negative spermatozoa.”^[16] Dr.
Gatbonton declared that the superficial abrasion “could possibly be
secondary to irritation wherein a patient has a tendency to scratching (sic) so
that abrasion is brought about and another possible cause is violent (sic)
attempt of penetration or insertion of any object.”^[17]

Testifying for the defense, Celso Algoba admitted that he robbed
Luisa Villena’s house on 16 October 1989 together with Ricardo Lascuna, Danilo
Lagasca and another person whose name he does not know. Celso, however, denied that Rosita Villena
— his live-in partner — and accused Placido Palangoy were with them at the
time. According to him, Rosita was in
their apartment in Marilao, Bulacan at the time of the commission of the crime. While claiming to have no knowledge of
Luisa’s rape, Algoba declared that Ricardo Lascuna and Danilo Lagasca strangled
the latter and killed Honesto Altiche. When presented with an item recovered from Placido Palangoy, Algoba
stated that he sold the same to the latter for P60.00.^[18]

For her part, Rosita Villena denied any participation in the
crime. She testified that she was at
home with her daughter on the night of 16 October 1988 and that when she woke
up at 7:00 o’clock the next morning, some policemen arrived, searched their
things and took the toy walkie-talkies from them. She averred that it was Celso who brought the said toy
walkie-talkies home and recounted to her the robbery staged in the house of
Luisa Villena. Although she wanted to
report the matter to the authorities, Rosita desisted because Celso threatened
her.^[19]

Placido Palangoy also denied participating in the commission of
the crime. He claimed that on the night
of 16 October 1988, he was washing his child’s diapers upon orders of his wife. After doing so, he went to sleep. The next morning, after hanging the diapers
out to dry and taking a bath, he was approached by a stranger who sold him
clothes for P60.00. A few
moments later, the same stranger returned to Palangoy’s house with some policemen. Palangoy was thereupon brought to the police
station with three other men; in the station, they were confronted by a lady
who declared that they were the persons who robbed her house.^[20]

On 21 August 1989, immediately after accused Rosita Villena and
Placido Palangoy had finished testifying and the prosecution had announced that
it had no rebuttal evidence to present, the trial judge declared:

“COURT:

Promulgation of Judgment.

By proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds both accused,
Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, Rape and Serious Physical Injuries covered by Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code and applying Art. 294 paragraphs 1 and 2. They are sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the family of the deceased Honesto Altiche the amount
of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.”^[21]

Thereafter, the trial court promulgated a
10-page decision,^[22] the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Rosita Dionisio Villena
and Placido Aquino Palanggoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the Information and hereby sentences each of them to suffer life
imprisonment (reclusion perpetua) in accordance with Art. 294, pars. 1 and 2;
and to indemnify the family of the deceased the amount of P30,000.00
each.”

Accused Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy filed their notice of
appeal on 23 August 1989.^[23] The
records of the case were, however, erroneously forwarded to the Court of
Appeals which, upon orders of the Presiding Justice thereof, properly
transmitted the same to this Court on 30 October 1989.^[24]
We accepted the appeal on 29 May 1991.^[25]

On 16 March 1992, accused-appellant Rosita Villena filed a motion
to withdraw her appeal^[26]
which this Court granted on 3 March 1991.^[27] In
view thereof, this decision concerns only the accused Placido Palangoy,
hereinafter referred to as the Appellant.

In his Brief, the appellant avers that the RTC erred:

“1.1.

… IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE ACCUSED’S ALLEGED ADMISSION OF GUILT

1.2.

… IN HOLDING AGAINST APPELLANT PLACIDO PALANGGOY THAT HE WAS
WEARING THE PANTS AND SHIRT TAKEN FROM THE VILLENA HOUSEHOLD AT THE TIME OF
(HIS) APPREHENSION

1.3.

… IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO PLACIDO PALANGGOY’S DEFENSE OF ALIBI

1.4.

… IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED AGAINST LUISA VILLENA

1.5.

… IN HOLDING AS AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT PALANGGOY THAT THE
HOMICIDE AND RAPE WAS (sic) PART OF THE CONSPIRACY

1.6.

… IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 13, PAR. 3 OR 10 (OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE), AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE (sic)
FOR ACCUSED-APPELLANT

1.7.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED APPELLANT HIS (sic) RIGHT TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BY DISPLAYING MANIFEST BIAS AGAINST ACCUSED AND
PREJUDGING THE CASE.”

Subject to the observations and modifications hereinafter
indicated, we are left with no choice but to affirm the judgment of conviction.

The first assigned error results from a misreading of the
challenged decision for as correctly contended by the appellee, the appellant’s
conviction is not based on the admissions of the accused Rosita Villena. It appears that the appellant’s conclusion
proceeds from the trial court’s summary of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses found under the sub­-heading PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE. It is to be observed that the court’s own
findings of fact, capsulized under the sub-heading FINDINGS AND FACTS, do not
even make any reference to any admission made by the appellant.

At the bottom of the second imputed error lies the issue of the
sufficiency of the appellant’s explanation of his possession of the pair of
“maong” pants and polo shirt which were among the personal items
taken from Luisa Villena’s house on the night of the incident. The appellant claims to have purchased the
same from Celso Algoba in the morning of 17 October 1988 while he (appellant)
was drying his child’s diapers. We are
not persuaded at all by this concocted story. At the police station’s information section where he was seen by Luisa
Villena wearing the said items of clothing, the appellant did not even
volunteer the information that Celso had sold the clothes to him. The latter only offered his explanation when
he testified in court. As hereinafter
discussed, he was positively identified by Luisa Villena as one of the
perpetrators of the robbery. Thus, he
miserably failed to overcome the presumption that a person found to be in
possession of the effects belonging to a person robbed and killed is considered
the author of the aggression, death of the person and the robbery committed.^[28]

In his third assigned error, the appellant faults the trial court
for not giving due weight to his alibi and contends that he was not positively
and clearly identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime; he avers that
Luisa Villena did not single him out from a police line-up. Moreover, he claims that Luisa
Villena did not know, with the exception of Rosita Villena — her
sister-in-law, any of the accused before they were presented to
her. Again, we are not persuaded. In the first place, while it is true that
Rosita was the only person whom Luisa knew by name, it does not necessarily
follow that the latter could not identify the rest of the accused. In fact, Luisa did just that at the police
station and in court during trial. Secondly, it was Rosita Villena who revealed the identities of her
co-accused and even led the police team to the latter’s houses where they, with
the exception of Danilo Lagasca, were apprehended.

There is no doubt in our
minds that Luisa Villena was able to positively identify the appellant when he
was inside her house since he and his co-accused stayed there from 7:00 o’clock
in the evening of 16 October 1988 to 2:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day. In fact, she remembered the appellant very
well because while the latter was inside the house, he changed into the very
pair of maong pants and polo shirt which he was wearing when apprehended.^[29] It is a fundamental juridical dictum that
the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused.^[30]

Appellant’s arguments in
support of his fourth assigned error are no more persuasive than those invoked
to buttress the earlier errors. We cannot
agree with his proposition that the
evidence presented does not support the trial court’s conclusion that rape was
committed. According to him, the
details of the alleged sexual assault were supplied only through the leading
and misleading questions propounded by the court to the witnesses. Dr. Victoria, the physician who examined
Luisa in the morning after the incident, testified that the latter did not
complain to him that she had been raped; on the other hand, Dr. Gatbonton, the
obstetrician who examined Luisa in the afternoon, could not say whether the
latter was raped or not. Hence, the
appellant concludes that any doubt should be resolved in his favor.

Luisa Villena
satisfactorily explained that she did not initially report the rape committed
against her because she was ashamed to admit it.^[31] When she testified in open court, however,
she did not waver in her account of the assault on her. In fact, the overzealous defense counsel
elicited, during cross-examination,
further details on how the despicable deed was consummated:

“ATTY. DELA CRUZ:

Q How can the accused Lascuna be able
to rape you when you said that your brother was beside you and your child who
may be one year old beside (sic) you?

A     What
can my brother do, he was tied up?

ATTY. DELA CRUZ:

Q    Assuming
that your brother did not do anything but your child is beside you, is it not?

A     Ricardo
Lascuna made me lie down and he was thrusting the knife on my neck, sir.

Q    And
you did not struggle, is it not?

A     I
was struggling, sir, but what can I do I am just a woman and I have a weaker
strength (sic).”^[32]

It is settled that when a woman says that she had been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that she had indeed been raped,
and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the victim’s
testimony.^[33]
There is no reason for Luisa Villena to claim that she had been raped if it was
not true. Considering a Filipina’s
inbred modesty and antipathy in airing publicly things that affect her honor,
it is hard to conceive that Luisa would undergo the expense, trouble and
inconvenience of a public trial, suffer the scandal, embarrassment and
humiliation such action would indubitably invite and allow the examination of
her private part if she had not been raped and her motive was other than to
bring to justice the person who committed the crime.^[34]

While it is true that the examining obstetrician declared that
she was not sure whether Luisa had actually been raped, the former nevertheless
admitted that it was possible that she was.

And even if the trial court had indeed asked “leading and
misleading questions,” it is now too late for the appellant to raise his
objection thereto in this appeal. His
counsel should have interposed the appropriate objections to such questions at
the time they were asked.

In support of his fifth assigned error, the appellant contends that granting, arguendo, that he was
indeed one of the malefactors, the trial court nonetheless erred in finding him
guilty of rape and homicide since no evidence was presented to show his
participation in or knowledge of the commission thereof. He adds that the doctrine in this
jurisdiction — that when the homicide takes place as a consequence of or on
occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty as
principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, unless proof is presented
that the accused tried to prevent the killing — should not be applied to him
since he could not have prevented someone from doing something which he
(appellant) was not even aware of in the first place.

Such reasoning is terribly flawed. The general rule is that whenever a homicide is committed as a
consequence, or on occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are
liable as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, although some did
not actually take part in the homicide.^[35] Besides,
it is difficult to believe that the appellant was not aware of the killing of Honesto Altiche. Luisa Villena’s house was not large enough
to allow any of the accused to have his privacy as the same is a mere one
bedroom affair, with a sala and kitchen which have no partitions at all.^[36] During the seven hours that they were inside
Luisa’s house, each of them had access to all the areas therein. When Honesto was killed, the bedroom door
was even ajar.^[37] It is likewise not believable that the
appellant did not know that Luisa was also strangled because this was done in
the kitchen.

For his sixth ascribed
error, the appellant would have us credit him with the mitigating circumstances
described under either paragraph 3 or 10, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code;^[38] he asseverates that if such circumstances
are not appreciated in his favor, an injustice would result since a light
sentence was meted out to Ricardo Lascuna, Luisa’s actual rapist.

Paragraph 3, Article 13
of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of the offender at
the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act, and not to
his intention during the planning stage.^[39] Thus, while it may be argued that the
agreement was only to rob the victims, the perpetrators’ acts at the time of
the incident show that the conspiracy not only contemplated the commission of
the robbery, but also the elimination of any witnesses to the crime. Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated in favor of
the appellant. Besides, conspiracy
having been proven in this case, the act of one is the act of all. Corollarily, the circumstance of “analogous
circumstances” cannot find application in the instant case.

We find, however, the
straight penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years imposed on Ricardo Lascuna
and Celso Algoba after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty,
to be erroneous. The penalty for
robbery with homicide under the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since, as hereinafter discussed, the rape
committed against Luisa aggravated the crime, the imposable penalty would have
been death had its imposition not been prohibited by Section 19(1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly,
the penalty that should have been imposed upon them is reclusion
perpetua. Additionally, both should
have been made civilly liable for their acts. While we are not concerned here with accused Lascuna and Algoba as the
judgment against them has become final by their service of sentence, the trial
court’s mistake in imposing the said penalty on the two cannot now benefit the
appellant.

Finally, we find
ourselves unable to accommodate the appellant in his last assigned error. He claims that he was denied due process
because the trial judge displayed manifest bias and prejudice against him by
asking questions which led witnesses to a preconceived notion of what the facts
are, and of promulgating a judgment “right in the hearing when the defense
presented its case and within seconds after both sides rested their
cases.”^[40]

While the trial court’s
decision leaves much to be desired, we cannot agree with the appellant’s
sweeping conclusion. The questions
propounded by the trial judge merely sought to clarify important matters. Judges are not mere referees like those of a
boxing bout, only to watch and decide the results of a game; they should have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of
evidence, calling the attention of such counsel to points at issue that are
overlooked, directing them to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the
issues involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses and so on.^[41]

It is true that as
earlier adverted to, the trial court
orally “promulgated” its judgment by dictating the same to the
stenographer on 21 August 1989 after the completion of the testimonies of both
Rosita Villena and the appellant and the prosecutor’s manifestation that no
rebuttal evidence was to be presented. Thus:

“COURT:

Promulgation of Judgment.

By proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court
finds both accused, Rosita Villena and Placido Palanggoy guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, Rape and Serious Physical Injuries covered by Art. 48 of
the Revised Penal Code and applying Art. 294 paragraphs 1 and 2. They are sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the family of the deceased Honesto Altiche the amount of P30,000.00.”^[42]

Such behavior does not manifest bias or
prejudice per se for in view of the fact that the parties did not opt to
submit their respective memoranda, the court forthwith considered the case
submitted for decision. A trial judge
who has painstakingly listened to the testimonies of the witnesses, taken notes
of such testimonies and meticulously observed the latter’s deportment and
manner of testifying may logically be presumed to have properly made up his
mind on what the decision should be. What may therefore remain for him is the actual writing of the
decision. Judges are not required to
await the transcription of the stenographic notes before they can render their
decisions;^[43]
if this were so, there would be undue delays in the criminal justice system with judges easily finding
justification for failing to comply with the mandatory period to decide
cases. Hence, the promulgation of
judgment by a Judge who, on the same hour, had first considered the case
submitted for his decision, does not ipso facto warrant a presumption of
bias. This is true in the instant case
where our own review of the evidence sustains beyond reasonable doubt the
judgment of conviction.

It must, however, be stressed here that the “verbal”
judgment promulgated by the trial court was incomplete as it does not contain
findings of fact and is not signed by the Judge. The Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.^[44] In
criminal cases, Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court requires that a
“judgment must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and
distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the
law upon which the judgment is based.” Be that as it may, the infirmity
was corrected by the trial court itself when it subsequently issued a
full-blown Judgment — dated 21 August 1989 — which contains a summary of the
evidence for the parties, findings of fact and the signature of the Judge. The records do not, however, yield any proof
that this full-blown Judgment was promulgated. Such a promulgation was necessary considering that the sentence dictated
by the trial judge on 21 August 1989 is not similar in all respects to the
dispositive portion of the full-blown decision. In view of the fact that in the Notice of Appeal, the appellant
explicitly refers to the Judgment dated 21 August
1989, it is logical to presume that the same was properly promulgated.

In any event, we take this opportunity to advise Judges to
strictly comply with the rules on the form of judgments and their rendition.

We agree with the Solicitor General’s observation that the crime
committed was erroneously designated as robbery with homicide, rape and
physical injuries. The proper
designation is robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and homicide co-exist in the
commission of robbery, it is the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code which applies, the rape to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.^[45]
The physical injuries inflicted on Luisa Villena and the killing of Honesto
Villena should be merged in the composite, integrated whole — that is, robbery
with homicide — it being clear that both the killing and physical injuries
were perpetrated with the end in view of removing all opposition to the
robbery, suppressing the relevant evidence or both.^[46]

Once again, we note in this case the imposition by a trial judge
of the penalty of “life
imprisonment (reclusion perpetua)” in a manner that would make the former
seem equivalent to or synonymous with the latter. Not only have we repeated in a number of cases that the two
penalties are not synonymous, we have likewise advised Judges to apply the
appropriate penalty and even warned them against lapsing into the same error.^[47]
All trial judges should seriously take heed of our pronouncement on this
matter.

We also observe that the trial court failed to order the accused
to pay the offended party actual damages in the amount of P4,900.00
representing the cash and the value of the articles taken by them.

Finally, conformably with the current policy of this Court, moral
damages in the amount of P40,000.00 should be awarded to the rape
victim, Luisa Villena y Altiche while the indemnity for the death of Honesto
Altiche should be increased to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 15 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan
in Criminal Case No. 105-M-89 is AFFIRMED subject to the above
modifications. As modified, Appellant
PLACIDO AQUINO PALANGOY (or PALANGGOY) is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal, of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
aggravated by rape under the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
all its accessories, indemnify the heirs of Honesto Altiche in the amount of P50,000.00
and pay Luisa Villena y Altiche the sums of P4,900.00 as actual damages
and P40,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Or Palanggoy, as it appears in the appealed decision and transcripts of the stenographic notes of his testimony.

^[2]
Original Records (OR), 1-2.

^[3]
OR, 9.

^[4]
Id., 12. It appears, however,
that instead of filing an amended information, the public prosecutor filed a
separate information against Danilo Lagasca, dated 4 April 1989, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 532-M-89 (Id., 75- 76).

^[5] OR, 32.

^[6]
Id., 69.

^[7]
TSN, 10 February 1989, 3-6.

^[8]
TSN, 17 March 1989, 4; 11; 12.

^[9]
TSN, 10 February 1989, 6-11.

^[10]
TSN, 19 June 1989, 3-8.

^[11]
TSN, 10 February 1989, op. cit., 12-15.

^[12]
TSN, 17 March 1989, 18; 24-25; 28.

^[13]
TSN, 10 May 1989, 4; 7-8; 19.

^[14]
TSN, 2 June 1989, 5-6; Exhibit “A.”

^[15]
TSN, 14 July 1984, 4; Exhibit “B.”

^[16]
Exhibit “H.”

^[17]
TSN, 12 May 1989, 5.

^[18]
TSN, 14 August 1989, 2-10.

^[19]
TSN, 21 August 1989, 2-8.

^[20]
TSN, 21 August 1989, 12; 15; 18.

^[21]
Id., 23-24.

^[22]
OR, 79-88; Rollo, 19-28.

^[23]
OR, 90.

^[24]
Rollo, 1.

^[25]
Id., 31.

^[26]
Id., 59.

^[27]
Id., 61.

^[28]
People vs. Repuela, 183 SCRA 244 [1990]; see also, People vs.
Newman, 163 SCRA 496 [1988]; People vs. Palino, 183 SCRA 680 [1990].

^[29]
TSN, 10 February 1989, 10; TSN, 17 March 1989, 26.

^[30]
People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232 [1980] and the citations therein; People
vs. Clores, 184 SCRA 638 [1990]; People vs. Arceo, 187 SCRA 265
[1990]; People vs. Beringuel, 192 SCRA 561 [1990].

^[31]
TSN, 17 March 1989, 10.

^[32]
TSN, 17 March 1989, 14-15.

^[33]
People vs. Rabanes, 208 SCRA 768 [1992].

^[34]
People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 [1991].

^[35]
People vs. Solis, 128 SCRA 217 [1984]; People vs. Salvador, 163
SCRA 574 [1988]; People vs. Bartulay, 192 SCRA 621 [1990]; People vs.
Nunag, 196 SCRA 206 [1991]; People vs. Hasiron, 214 SCRA 586 [1992].

^[36]
See sketch, Exhibit “G,” Folder of Exhibits, 17.

^[37]
TSN, 10 February 1989, 7.

^[38]
Paragraph 3 refers to lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, while paragraph 10 refers to circumstances similar and analogous
to those already mentioned.

^[39]
AQUINO, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, vol.
1, 1987 ed., 251.

^[40]
Brief for the Appellant, 31.

^[41]
Ventura vs. Yatco, 105 Phil. 287 [1959], cited in People vs.
Ibasan, 129 SCRA 695 [1984] and People vs. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1 [1992].

^[42]
TSN, 21 August 1989, 23-24.

^[43]
Balagot vs. Opinion, 195 SCRA 429 [1991].

^[44]
Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

^[45]
People vs. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979], and the citations therein;
People vs. Aspili, 191 SCRA 530 [1991] and People vs. Plaga, 202
SCRA 53 [1991].

^[46]
People v. Madrid, 88 Phil. 1 [1951].

^[47]
People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 [1991];
People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 [1992]; People vs.
Carpio, 207 SCRA 569 [1992]; People
vs. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 [1992].