THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BUENAVENTURA SARMIENTO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The defendant and appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of
the crime of seduction (estupro) and sentenced to imprisonment for a
period of four months, to pay the sum of P500 to the complaining witness
Petronila Silverio by way of civil indemnification for the injury done her, to
support the offspring of the illicit relations between the parties, if. any
there be, and to pay the costs of the trial.

The evidence of record conclusively establishes that the accused and the
young woman whom it is alleged he seduced were both employees of the Alhambra
tobacco factory, and that friendly if not intimate relations had been
established between them while at work in the factory; that at an early hour on
the morning of April 29, 1913, and long before the factory opened, they met in
the street at a point some little distance from the factory, and almost
immediately thereafter entered a street vehicle, which was called and hired by
the accused; that they drove to the house of one Jacinto Rodriguez, a friend of
the accused, who provided him with a room in which the couple stayed for about
an hour; that during that period they had carnal relations with each other; that
thereafter they had breakfast with the family of Rodriguez and later went to the
factory, arriving there about 8 o’clock; that the young woman went to her home
about 1 o’clock, and returned to the factory that afternoon, accompanied by her
aunt and some ten or twelve other relatives and friends; that finding the
accused the party demanded that he go at once to a minister and marry the girl;
that despite some protests, the party compelled him to go with them; that the
minister declined to marry the couple, it appearing from the cedula of the
accused that he was a married man; and that thereafter these criminal
proceedings were instituted at the instance of the young woman and her aunt.

The information charges that the accused induced the young woman to have
sexual intercourse with him “by means of deceit, to wit, under promise of
marriage.” The only evidence of record in support of this allegation is the
testimony of the young woman herself. In her first account of the incident she
stated that the promises of marriage were made “while he was having intercourse
with me,” but later on in the course of her testimony, and in reply to a
question as to whether the accused had made any such promises on any other
occasion, she said that he had also promised to marry her while they were in the
street vehicle, on the way to the house of Jacinto Rodriguez.

We do not think that a conviction of the crime of estupro
(seduction) can be sustained on this evidence. To constitute seduction there
must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement, and the woman
must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust, and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction. (43 Cent. Digest, tit. Seduction, par. 56.) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions,
or wiles, which are calculated to have, and do have that effect, and which
result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer. (People vs. Smith, 132 Mich., 58.) The penalty prescribed in
the third paragraph of article 443 of the Penal Code, which defines and
penalizes this offense, cannot be imposed unless it appears that the alleged
seduction was accomplished “by means of deceit.” That is to say, of course, that
the penalty cannot be imposed unless it appears that the woman was induced to
yield her body to the seducer by means of some deceit. Hence, where the deceit
alleged is a promise of marriage, it must appear that the woman was induced to
yield her body to the seducer by means of such promise, and that she surrendered
her virtue in reliance upon its fulfillment. Manifestly a promise of marriage
made after sexual intercourse has taken place, or after the woman has yielded
her body to the man’s illicit embraces, cannot be held to have induced the woman
to surrender her virtue. Nor can a promise of marriage made by a married man,
where the woman knows that he is married before she surrenders herself, be said
to.have induced her so to do; for m such a case it is clear that there was no
reliance on the promise. And, indeed, it has frequently been held that in any
case wherein it appears that the surrender of the woman was not made in reliance
upon a promise of marriage, a conviction of the crime of seduction cannot be
sustained on the ground that such a promise had been made, though proof of a
promise of marriage followed by carnal relations will generally be sufficient to
sustain the inference that they were induced by such promise, in the absence of
affirmative evidence to the contrary. See many cases cited under Note 80, 35
Cyc., 1335.

In the case at bar the evidence in support of the alleged promises of
marriage is neither satisfactory nor convincing ; and even if the testimony of
the woman in this regard be accepted as true, it raises a grave doubt as to
whether she was in fact induced to yield her body by means of the promises to
which she testified. Upon her own testimony, the first promises of this nature
were made after she had voluntarily, and of her own free will, gotten into the
street vehicle. No satisfactory explanation of the conduct of the young woman,
in accompanying the accused in the street vehicle, was offered at the trial, nor
does one suggest itself at this time, other than that she had already made up
her mind to enter into illicit relations with the accused when she entered the
vehicle. Having in mind the friendly if not amorous relations already existing
between the couple; the early hour at which they met, long before the opening of
the factory in which they were employed; the short discussion, promptly followed
by the calling of a street vehicle; the ready acquiescence of the young woman in
getting into the vehicle and driving to the house of a friend of the accused,
where they were evidently expected; and all that occurred thereafter; we are
strongly inclined to believe that everything had been planned the night before,
the early hour and the place of meeting having been selected and agreed upon so
that the couple might consummate their amorous relations without fear of
discovery by the young woman’s family. But however this may have been, we think
that the weight of the evidence sustains a finding that the intercourse between
the couple was induced by niutual desire, and that she had made up her mind to
surrender herself to her lover before she got into the vehicle, and before the
alleged promises were made by him, if indeed it be a fact that he made any such
promises.

There is evidence in the record to the effect that She knew the accused was a
married man, long before they had their illicit relations, and this evidence,
though hardly sufficient to sustain an affirmative finding on this point, tends”
to confirm us in our doubt of the truth of her statement that she was induced to
yield her virtue to the accused by the alleged promises of marriage.

Let judgment be entered reversing the judgment entered in the court below,
and acquitting the defendant and appellant of the offense with which he is
charged in the information, with the costs in both instances de
offlcio.

Arellano, C. J., Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.

Judgment reversed; defendant acquitted.