G.R. No. 90478. November 21, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT), PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. AND DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, RESPONDENTS.
NARVASA, J.:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R.
Santiago — together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria
Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda — are defendants in Civil
Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was
denominated one “for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages,” and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive
Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco,
Jr. and Santiago,
instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a “MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME
PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS”
dated Nov. 3, 1987.[1]
The PCGG filed an opposition thereto,[2]
and the movants, a reply to the opposition.[3]
By Order dated January 29, 1988,
the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave
the PCGG forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific
certain allegations.[4]
Tantoco and Santiago
then presented a “motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25
of the Rules of Court” dated February
1, 1988, and “Interrogatories under Rule 25.”[5]
Basically, they sought an answer to the question: “Who
were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz,
who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs.
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr.
and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in the **
case?”[6] The PCCG
responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion
and interrogatories as being impertinent, “queer,” “weird,”
or “procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is
improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise.”[7]
On March 18, 1988,
in compliance with the Order of January
29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint.[8]
As regards this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago
reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through a Manifestation dated April 11, 1988.[9]
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988,[10]
the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out,
for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to
be without legal and factual basis. Also
denied was the PCGG’s motion to strike out
impertinent pleadings dated February 9,
1988. The Sandiganbayan declared inter
alia the
complaint to be “sufficiently definite and clear enough,” “there are
adequate allegations ** which clearly portray the supposed involvement and/or
alleged participation of defendants-movants in the
transactions described in detail in said Complaint,” and “the other
matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature which should be
ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper ** .” It also opined that
“(s)ervice of interrogatories before joinder of issue and without leave of court is premature *
* (absent) any special or extraordinary circumstances * * which would justify *
* (the same).”
Tantoco and Santiago
then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under date of July 18, 1988.[11]
In response, the PCGG presented a “Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss
Compulsory Counterclaim.”[12]
The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989.[13]
On July 25, 1989, the PCGG
submitted its PRE-TRIAL BRIEF.[14]
The pre-trial was however reset to September
11, 1989, and all other parties were required to submit pre-trial
briefs on or before that date.[15]
On July 27, 1989
Tantoco and Santiago
filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
“Interrogatories to Plaintiff,”[16]
and on August 2, 1989, an
“Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff”[17]
as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.[18]
The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details
relative to specific averments of PCGG’s amended
complaint, through such questions, for instance, as –
“1. In connection with the allegations ** in
paragraph 1 ** , what specific property or properties does the plaintiff
claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco,
Jr. and Santiago for being ‘ill-gotten’?”
“3. In connection with the allegations ** in
paragraph 10 (a) ** , what specific act or acts ** were committed by defendants
Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in ‘concert with’ defendant
Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic plan
of said defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?”
“5. In connection with ** paragraph 13 ** , what
specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, Jr.
and Santiago ** were
committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the alleged plan to
conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?”
“7. In connection with ** paragraph 15 (c) ** is
it plaintiff’s position or theory of the case that Tourist Duty Free Shops,
Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially owned by
either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other
stockholders of record of the same corporation are mere ‘dummies’ of said
defendants Ferdinand and/or Imelda R. Marcos?”
On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of
documents prayed for examination and copying of ?
1)
the “official records and
other evidence” on the basis of which the verification of the Amended
Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are “true and
correct;”
2)
the documents listed in PCGG’s Pre-Trial Brief as those “intended to be
presented and ** marked as exhibits for the plaintiff;” and
3)
“the minutes of the meeting
of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and the decision (of the
Chairman and members) to file the complaint” in the case at bar.
By Resolutions dated August
21, 1989 and August 25,
1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of
documents (production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989),
respectively.
On September 1, 1989
the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989 (allowing production
and inspection of documents). It argued
that
1)
since the documents subject
thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial on September 11, 1989 anyway, the order
for “their production and inspection on September 14 and 15, are
purposeless and unnecessary;”
2)
movants
already know of the existence and contents of the documents which “are
clearly described ** (in) plaintiffs Pre-Trial Brief;”
3)
the documents are “privileged
in character” since they are intended to be used against the PCGG and/or
its Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order No. 1, viz.:
“(a) No civil action shall lie against the
Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge
of the task contemplated by this Order.
(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall
be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”
It also filed on September
4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories,[19]
which the Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of August
21, 1989 (admitting the Amended Interrogatories). The opposition alleged that –
1)
the interrogatories “are not
specific and do not name the person to whom they are propounded ** ,” or
“who in the PCGG, in particular, ** (should) answer the
interrogatories;”
2)
the interrogatories delve into
“factual matters which had already been decreed ** as part of the proof of
the Complaint upon trial ** ;”
3)
the interrogatories “are
frivolous” since they inquire about “matters of fact ** which
defendants ** sought to ** (extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of
Particulars;”
4)
the interrogatories “are
really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed and
irregularly utilized ** (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first
present its evidence.”
Tantoco and Santiago
filed a reply and opposition on September
18, 1989.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September
29, 1989, the first, denying reconsideration (of the Resolution
allowing production of documents), and the second, reiterating by implication
the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).[20]
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be
nullified because rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction. More particularly, it
claims –
a) as regards the
order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff PCGG:
1)
that said interrogatories are not
specific and do not name the particular individuals to whom they are
propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG;
2)
that the interrogatories deal with
factual matters which the Sandiganbayan (in denying
the movants’ motion for bill of particulars) had
already declared to be part of the PCGG’s proof upon
trial; and
3)
that the interrogatories would
make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive
Order No. 14 and related issuances;
and
b) as regards the
order granting the motion for production of documents:
1)
that movants
had not shown any good cause therefor;
2)
that some documents sought to be
produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked
preliminarily as PCGG’s exhibits, and the movants had viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections
thereto and made comments thereon; and
3)
that the other documents sought to
be produced are either –
(a)
privileged in character or
confidential in nature and their use is proscribed by the immunity provisions
of Executive Order No. 1, or
(b)
non-existent, or mere products of
the movants‘ suspicion and fear.
This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing the Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its questioned
resolutions of September 29, 1989
in Civil Case No. 0008.[21]
After the issues were delineated and argued at no little length
by the parties, the Solicitor General withdrew “as counsel for plaintiff *
* with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478,
the provisions of Executive Order No. 292, as well as the decisional law of ‘Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,’ (G.R. No.
92561, September 12, 1990)[22]
to submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this **
Court if called for by circumstances in the interest of the Government or if he
is so required by the Court.”[23]
This, the Court allowed by Resolution dated January 21,1991.[24]
Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo
A. Maceren advised the Court that the cases from
which the Solicitor General had withdrawn would henceforth be under his (Maceren’s) charge “and/or any of the following private
attorneys: Eliseo
B. Alampay, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko,
Mario Jalandoni and such other attorneys as it may
later authorize.”[25]
The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties
have fully ventilated their respective positions, the Court now proceeds to
decide the case.
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of
discovery provided in the Rules of Court:
interrogatories to parties,[26]
and production and inspection of documents and things.[27]
Now, it appears to the Court that among
far too many lawyers (and
not a few judges), there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even
outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and operation of the modes of
discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them
— which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the
deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the
experience of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively
shorten the period of litigation and speed up adjudication.[28]
Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison
d’etre of
courts. This essential function is
accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from
the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after
that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of the
law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively,
definitively and finally.
It is for this reason that a
substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied
with assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for
obviously, to the extent that adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete
facts, to that extent there is faultiness in the approximation of objective
justice. It is thus the obligation of
lawyers no less than of judges to see that this objective is attained; that is
to say, that there be no suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or
distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material and
relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to
his attention during the trial.[29]
Seventy-one years ago, in Alonso v. Villamor,[30] this Court
described the nature and object of litigation and in the process laid down the
standards by which judicial contests are to be conducted in this
jurisdiction. It said:
“A litigation is not a game
of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays
before the court the facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial
and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done on the merits.
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts.
There should be no vested right in technicalities. * * .”
The message is plain. It
is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue — fully and fairly; i.e., to present
to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or
concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit
manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting
all the facts within his knowledge.
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court
is accomplished by the pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only in a very
general way. Only ”ultimate facts”
are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the factual
basis of a party’s claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading “shall
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement
of the ultimate facts on which die party pleading relies for hits
claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts.”[31]
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the
ultimate facts are alleged too generally or “not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable ** (an adverse party) properly to
prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial,” a bill of
particulars seeking a “more definite statement” may be ordered by the
court on motion of a party. The office of a bill of particulars is,
however, limited to making more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a
pleading. It is not its office to supply
evidentiary matters. And the common
perception is that said evidentiary details are made known to the parties and
the court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact
arising from the pleadings.
The truth is that “evidentiary matters” may be inquired
into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the
law that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the
pre-trial — should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to
the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to
their adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be
carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through
the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has
been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished
one of the most necessary ends of modern procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issues
from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to
play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair
settlement before trial is measurably increased. * * .”[32]
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was
designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore
performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve
(1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for
ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable
the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent
that said trials are carried on in the dark.[33]
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions
or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a
witness to testify orally at trial. The
inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or
evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party
the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as
to obtain evidence for use upon said trial.
The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions)[34] which generally allows the examination of a
deponent ?
1)
“regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense
of any other party;”
2)
as well as:
a)
“the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things” and
b)
“the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of relevant facts.”
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of
information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things.
Hence, “the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the
other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of
trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise. *
* . “[35]
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the
deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions
(whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b)
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under
Rule 26, may be availed of without leave
of court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court
explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes
of discovery after an answer to the
complaint has been served.[36] It is only when an answer has not
yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or
property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of
these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not
yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.[37]
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards
discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or things in accordance
with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28,
which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes
of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious
sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the
action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against
the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of
the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a
court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as
established in accordance with the
claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party
support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or
parts thereof; staying further proceedings.[38]
Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when
permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial
intervention. “As indicated by
(the) Rules * *, limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry.[39]
And * * further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon
the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.”[40]
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh
unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not
privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the
law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the
deposition-discovery mechanism, in relation of course to the particular rules
directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be resolved.
The petitioner’s objections to the interrogatories served on it
in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained.
It should initially be pointed out — as regards the private
respondents’ “Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories” dated
February 1, 1988[41]
— that it was correct for them to seek leave to serve interrogatories, because
discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In
such a situation, i.e., “after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property subject of the action” but before answer, Section
1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule 25
(dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires “leave of
court.”[42] But there was no need for the private
respondents to seek such leave to serve their “Amended Interrogatories to
Plaintiff” (dated August 2, 1989[43]) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG’s complaint, just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
1. The petitioner’s first contention — that the
interrogatories in question are defective because they (a) do not name the
particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the
PCGG, and (b) are “fundamentally the same matters ** (private
respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted Motion ** for Bill of
Particulars” — are untenable and quickly disposed of.
The first part of petitioner’s submission is adequately confuted
by Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the party served with
interrogatories is a juridical entity such as “a public or private
corporation or a partnership or association,” the same shall be
“answered ** by any officer thereof competent to testify in its
behalf.” There is absolutely no reason why this proposition should not be
applied by analogy to the interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the interrogatories are addressed only
to the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner or officer thereof, is
utterly of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the interrogatories shall
be answered “by any officer thereof competent to testify in its
behalf.”
That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same
matters subject of a prior motion for bill of particulars addressed to the PCGG’s amended complaint — and denied for lack of merit —
is beside the point. Indeed, as already
pointed out above, a bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts,
not so-called evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt proper subject
of discovery.[44]
Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories
lack specificity. The merest glance at
them disproves the argument. The
interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG’s expanded complaint and inquire about details of the
ultimate facts therein alleged. What the
PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the interrogatories, on
the ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being
made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it.[45] But until such an objection is
presented and sustained, the obligation to answer subsists.
2. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part
of the PCGG’s proof upon trial, is not ground for
suppressing them, either. As already
pointed out, it is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge
of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this
being deemed essential to proper litigation.
This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts
he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made
is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.
3. Also unmeritorious is the objection that the interrogatories would make
PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order
No. 14 and related issuances. In the
first place, there is nothing at all wrong in a party’s making his adversary
his witness.[46] This is expressly allowed by Section 6,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
“SEC. 6. Direct
examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. -? A party may * * call an adverse
party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and
interrogate him by leading questions and
contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by
or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse
party only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.”
The PCGG insinuates that the private respondents are engaged on a
“fishing expedition,” apart from the fact that the information sought
is immaterial since they are evidently meant to establish a claim against PCGG
officers who are not parties to the action.
It suffices to point out that
“fishing expeditions” are precisely permitted through the modes of
discovery.[47] Moreover, a defendant who files a
counterclaim against the plaintiff is allowed by the Rules to implead persons (theretofore strangers to the action) as
additional defendants on said counterclaim.
This may be done pursuant to Section 14, Rule 6 of the Rules, to wit:
“SEC. 14. Bringing new parties. –When the presence of parties other than
those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in
the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall
order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be
obtained.”
The PCGG’s assertion that it or its
members are not amenable to any civil action “for anything done or omitted
in the discharge of the task contemplated by ** (Executive) Order (No.
1),” is not a ground to refuse to answer the interrogatories. The disclosure of facts relevant to the
action and which are not self-incriminatory or otherwise privileged is one
thing; the matter of whether or not liability may arise from the facts
disclosed in light of Executive Order No. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may properly
be set up by way of defense in the action.
The apprehension has been expressed that the answers to the
interrogatories may be utilized as foundation for a counterclaim against the
PCGG or its members and officers. They
will be. The private respondents have
made no secret that this is in fact their intention. Withal, the Court is unable to uphold the
proposition that while the PCGG obviously feels itself at liberty to bring
actions on the basis of its study and appreciation of the evidence in its
possession, the parties sued should not be free to file counterclaims in the
same actions against the PCGG or its officers for gross neglect or ignorance,
if not downright bad faith or malice in the commencement or initiation of such
judicial proceedings, or that in the actions that it may bring, the PCGG may
opt not to be bound by rules applicable to the parties it has sued, e.g., the
rules of discovery.
So, too, the PCGG’s postulation that
none of its members may be “required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial * * proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance,” has no application to a judicial proceeding it has itself
initiated. As just suggested, the act of
bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence; by
bringing suit it brings itself within the operation and scope of all the rules
governing civil actions, including the rights and duties under the rules of
discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would
have to be conceded, that while the parties
it has impleaded as defendants may be required to
“disgorge all the facts” within their knowledge and in their
possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion.
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it
cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent.
But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level
of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot
claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to
represent or act for the State.[48]
The suggestion[49]
that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when
in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or
non-governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction without
support in principle or precedent. On
the contrary –
“The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be
manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a
contract.”[50]
“’The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of
the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of
the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an
action against the private parties, the state surrenders its privileged
position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within
certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might
have against the state. * * * (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth Ed., pp. 36-37,
citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899)’”[51]
It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent
domain, the State exercises its jus imperii,
as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area,
it has been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation
without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot
be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner.[52]
The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG’s other principal contention, of the nullity of the Sandiganbayan’s Order for the production and inspection of
specified documents and things allegedly in its possession.
The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents
sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and
marked preliminarily as PCGG’s exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered
objections thereto and made comments thereon.
Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these
documents. No serious objection can
therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies
of those documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them
during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.
The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can allege in response to the
corresponding question in the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction
for doing so unless it is subsequently established that the denial is false.
The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive
Order No. 1 has already been dealt with.
The PCGG is however at liberty to allege and prove that said documents
fall within some other privilege, constitutional or statutory.
The Court finally finds that contrary to the petitioner’s theory,
there is good cause for the production and inspection of the documents subject
of the motion dated August 3, 1989.[53]
Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended
complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said
complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be
used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is
matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of
discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and
trial. The only other documents sought
to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their
disclosure may not be opposed.
One last word. Due no
doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and
operation of the modes of discovery earlier mentioned,[54]
there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of said
modes is a complicated matter, unduly expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For example, as will already have been noted
from the preceding discussion, all that is entailed to activate or put in
motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of
the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter
setting forth a list of questions with the request that they be answered
individually.[55]
That is all. The service of such a
communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of
answering the questions “separately and fully in writing under oath,”
and serving “a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service of the interrogatories **.”[56] The sanctions for refusing to make
discovery have already been mentioned.[57]
So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than the
service on a party of a letter or other written communication containing a
request that specific facts therein set forth and/or particular documents
copies of which are thereto appended, be admitted in writing.[58]
That is all. Again, the receipt of such
a communication by the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation
of serving the party requesting admission with “a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting
forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters,” failing in which “(e)ach of the matters of which admission
is requested shall be deemed admitted.”[59]
The taking of depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral
examination or by written interrogatories) while somewhat less simple, is
nonetheless by no means as complicated as seems to be the lamentably extensive
notion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement
as to costs. The temporary restraining
order issued on October 27, 1989
is hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., see concurring
opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, J., joins J. Cruz
in his concurring opinion.
Romero, J., no part.
[1]
Petition, Annex D
[2]
Id., Annex E
[3]
Id., Annex F
[4]
Rollo, p. 7
[5]
Id., pp. 7, 145
[6]
Id., p. 7
[7]
Petition, Annex G
[8]
Rollo, pp. 56-87
[9]
Petition, Annex H
[10]
Id., Annex I
[11]
Id., Annex J
[12]
Id., Annex K
[13]
Rollo, p. 9
[14]
Petition, Annex L
[15]
Id., Annex M
[16]
Rollo, p. 9
[17]
Petition, Annex N
[18]
Id., Annex 0
[19]
Petition, Annex R; Rollo,
p. 220
[20]
Id., Annexes A and B; Rollo, p. 11
[21]
Rollo, pp. 244, 245, 245-A
[22]
189 SCRA 459
[23]
Id., p. 317.
The Solicitor General also
withdrew his appearance in other cases involving the PCGG, to wit: G.R. Nos. 74302 (Tourist
Duty-Free Shops, Inc. v. PCGG); 86949 (Placido
L. Mapa v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,
et al.); 86926 (Cesar E. A. Virata v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.); 89425 (Republic, etc., et al. v. Sandiganbayan **, et al.); 90478 (Republic v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,
etc., et al.); 93694 (Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, etc., et al. v. PCGG, et al.)
[24]
Id., p. 320
[25]
Id., pp. 328 et seq
[26]
Governed by Rule 25
[27]
Governed by Rule 27
[28]
Moran (Comments on the Rules of Court,
1979 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 5-6), for instance, points out — citing the recommendations
of the committee of the American Judicature Society that drafted the Model Rules
of Civil Procedure — that “The English and Canadian experience has been of
more value than any other single procedural device, in bringing parties to a
settlement who otherwise would have fought their way through to trial.”
N.B. Actions could very
well be ended by summary judgments (Rule 34) on the basis of the results of
discovery.
[29]
Surprises, it has been observed, are
“most dangerous weapons” in a “judicial duel” (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., Vol. 2, p. 6).
[30]
16 Phil. 315, 322 (July 26,
1910): italics supplied
[31]
Section 1, Rule 8, Rules of Court
[32]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 5-6; see footnote
28, supra
[33]
SEE Hickman v. Taylor, et
al., U.S. Sup.
Ct. Rpts., 91 Law Ed., 451, 455, cited in Feria, Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 435; 35A CJS Sec. 527,
pp. 785-786; 23 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 156, p. 493
[34]
Sec. 5, Rule 25 (“Interrogatories to Parties”) also allows inquiry as
“to any matters that can be inquired into under section 2 of Rule 24 **
“
[35]
Feria, op. cit., p. 436, citing Hickman v. Taylor,
et al., supra; SEE 23 Am Jur 2d., Sec. 150, pp. 484-487
[36]
Sec. 1, Rule 24; Sec. 1, Rule 25; Sec. 1, Rule 26
[37]
SEE Everett v. Asia Banking
Corp., 49 Phil. 512.
[38]
Rule 29
[39]
SEE Secs. 16 and 18, Rule 24
[40]
Hickman v. Taylor, et al., supra, cited in Feria, op. cit., p. 436
[41]
SEE footnote 5, supra
[42]
Cf. Uy Chao v. de la
Rama Steamship Co., Inc., 6 SCRA 69
[43]
SEE footnote 17, supra
[44]
SEE discussion at page 8, and footnote 30 and related text, supra
[45]
Cf. Lopez,
etc., et al. v. Maceren, etc., et al. 95 Phil.
754; Cojuangco v. Caluag,
97 Phil. 982 (unrep.); Villalon
v. Ysip, 98 Phil. 997; Caguiat
v. Torres, 30 SCRA 109-110; Jacinto v. Amparo,
93 Phil. 693
[46]
SEE Cason v. San Pedro, 9 SCRA
925, where such objections as that the interrogatories transferred the onus probandi from plaintiffs to defendants, or
the latter were being made to prove the former’s
case, or that anyway, the facts may be proven by plaintiffs through their own
evidence, were overruled
[47]
SEE Tan Chico v. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 141 (1922)
[48]
It should be pointed out that the rulings in PCGG v. Peña, 159 SCRA 556 (1988) and PCGG
v. Nepomuceno, etc., et al., G.R. No. 78750, April 20, 1990 are
not inconsistent with that in this proceeding, the facts and basic issues
therein involved being quite distinct from those in the case at bar. Unlike the present case, where the PCGG
instituted a civil action against Tantoco, et al. in
the Sandiganbayan, neither Peña nor Nepomuceno involved any suit filed by the PCGG,
the acts therein challenged being simply its extrajudicial orders of
sequestration; and in both said cases, the Regional Trial Courts issued writs
of preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement and implementation of the
sequestration orders. This Court
nullified those injunctive writs on the ground that the PCGG, as an agency
possessed of primary administrative jurisdiction (particularly concerning
sequestration) and exercising quasi-judicial functions, was co-equal to a
Regional Trial Court which therefore had no jurisdiction to review or otherwise
restrain or interfere with its acts, that power being exclusively lodged in the Sandiganbayan, subject only to review by this Court. In Nepomuceno, it was additionally
ruled that there was prima facie basis for the challenged order of
sequestration; that the take-over of the property in question by the PCGG
fiscal agents was necessitated as much by the resistance and defiance of the
holders thereof to the PCGG’s authority as by the
desire of the PCGG to preserve said property; and that since the power to seize
property to conserve it pending the institution of suit for its recovery
was sanctioned by the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, the PCGG
must be deemed immune from any suit which would render that authority inutile
or ineffectual.
[49]
Of the Solicitor General in his Reply to Answer, etc.: Rollo, pp.
168-169
[50]
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1991 ed., p. 33.
SEC. 5, Act No. 3083 (eff., March 16, 1923) provides that, “When the
Government of the Philippine Islands is plaintiff in an action instituted in
any court of original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to
assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between
private parties.”
[51]
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95
Phil. 905, 912
[52]
Ministerio vs. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, cited with approval in Santiago vs. Republic, 87 SCRA 294.
[53]
Petition, Annex O, pp. 206-208
[54]
At page 6, last pragraph, supra
[55]
Sec. 1, Rule 25, Rules of Court
[56]
Sec. 2, Rule 25
[57]
SEE footnote 38 and related text
[58]
Sec. 1, Rule 26
[59]
Sec. 2, Rule 25; see also footnote 38 and related text, supra