FRANCIS LEE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PELAGIA PANLINO DE CHIN, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 29, 1989 which reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 129 at Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and reinstated as well as affirmed in
toto the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2, same city. The RTC decision found the petitioner guilty of the crime of light
coercion, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“IN VIEW OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified. The accused Francis Lee is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of light coercion, as penalized under paragraph 2 of Article
287 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
TWENTY (20) DAYS of ARRESTO MENOR and to pay one-third (1/3) of the
costs.” (p. 40, Rollo)

On the other hand, the MTC decision convicted the petitioner of
the offense of grave coercion, the pertinent portion of the same is hereby
quoted as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
Francis Lee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave Coercion,
as charged, defined and penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, and
is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of THREE (3) MONTHS, of arresto
mayor, medium, and to pay a fine of P250.00, with cost.

“The accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended
party, Pelagia Paulino de Chin, by way of civil liability the sum of P5,000.00
as moral damages amd the sum of P2,000.00 as exemplary damages.

“x x x.” (p. 33, Rollo)

The facts as stated by the respondent Court of Appeals are
undisputed, thus:

“At about 10:00 o’clock in the morning of June 20, 1984, the
complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, 23 years old, was fetched from her
house at 112 BLISS Site, 8th Avenue, Caloocan City by Atanacio Lumba, a bank
employee, upon the instruction of the petitioner Branch Manager Francis Lee of
Pacific Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as bank). Upon arriving at the office of Pacific
Banking Corporation located at Caloocan City, petitioner Francis Lee did not
attend to her immediately. After an
hour later, the petitioner confronted the complainant about a forged Midland
National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794, which the latter allegedly deposited
in the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting
at her with piercing looks and threatened
to file charges against her unless and until she returned all the money
equivalent of the subject cashier check. Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a prepared withdrawal
slip, and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank’s lawyer, where she was made
to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the money equivalent of
the spurious check. During her stay at
the said bank, the complainant, who was five (5) months in the family way, was
watched by the bank’s employees and security guards. It was about six o’clock in the afternoon of the same day when
the complainant was able to leave the bank premises.

“Upon the other hand, the petitioner, 37 years old, presented
his version, basically a denial of the charges, to wit: he was the Branch Bank Manager of Pacific
Banking Corporation. After having been
informed that Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794 was dishonored
for being spurious, he examined the relevant bank records and discovered that
complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin was instrumental in inducing their
bank to accept the subject dollar check and was also the one who withdrew the
proceeds thereof, by utilizing a withdrawal slip purportedly signed by Honorio
Carpio. Petitioner, thru Atanacio
Lumba, invited the complainant to his office. Responding to his invitation, the complainant arrived at the bank before
noon of June 20, 1984, but was not attended to immediately as the petitioner
had to attend to other bank clients. The complainant was merely informed about the subject fake dollar check
that was deposited with said bank upon her assurance that it was genuine. The complainant was not compelled into
signing the withdrawal slip, but she acted freely and voluntarily in executing
her affidavit and in returning the money equivalent of the subject check. There was nothing unusual during her lengthy
stay in the bank.” (pp. 44-45, Rollo)

The sole issue posed in this petition is whether or not the acts
of petitioner in simply “shouting at the complainant with piercing
looks” and “threats to file charges against her” are sufficient
to convict him of the crime of grave coercion (p. 6, Rollo).

Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

“ART. 286. Grave
coercions. — The penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.

“If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling
another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from so doing, the
penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.”

Considering that the present case does
not involve violence but intimidation, the provisions of Article 1335 of the
New Civil Code on intimidation are relevant. It states:

“Art. 1335. x x x.

“There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is
compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil
upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.

“To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and
condition of the person shall be borne in mind.

“A threat to enforce once’s claim through competent authority,
if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.”

As a general rule, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
command utmost respect. However, such
findings are disregarded if there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted that, if considered, would affect
the result of the case (see San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 84401, May 15, 1991).

While the appellate court emphasized the pregnancy and feminine
gender of the complainant, it overlooked other significant personal
circumstances which are material in determining the presence of coercion in
this case.

The records show that complainant is a highly educated person who
is familiar with banking procedures. She is a graduate of
Business Administration major in Banking and Finance from NCBA. She also finished one semester of MA in
graduate school. In 1983, complainant
worked with the Insular Bank of Asia and America as a bank teller (TSN,
November 20, 1984, pp. 5-7; Records, pp. 96-98).

Likewise, it appears that complainant actively participated in
the deposit and withdrawal of the proceeds of the controversial check. We find that she told Honorio Carpio
(Carpio, for short), a relative and payee of the check, to open a savings
account with the Pacific Banking Corporation (Bank, for short) and accompanied
him; that subsequently, she presented a Midland National Bank Cashier’s check
payable to Carpio in the sum of $5,200.00 to Mr. Lamberto R. Cruz (Cruz, for
short), PRO Manager, Foreign Department; that she claimed that she was
requested by her uncle to deposit the check for collection; that she was a bank
depositor and she “knew somebody downstairs”; that she assured Cruz
that the check would be honored between banks (TSN, April 15, 1985, pp. 89-92;
Records, 180-183); that on June 11, 1984, the bank, after the usual clearing
period, sent out a notice to Carpio that the proceeds of the check were already
credited to his account but the same was returned to the bank because the
address was false or not true; that the total amount of the check in pesos was
P92,557.44; that the total deposit of Carpio was P92,607.44, his initial
deposit of P50.00 being added to the amount of the check; that on the same day,
complainant personally inquired from the bank whether the proceeds of the check
have already been credited to Carpio’s account (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 163,
records. p. 163); that upon an affirmative answer, the bank records show that
on that day, the complainant withdrew the sum of P12,607.00 thru a withdrawal
slip purportedly signed by Carpio; that in the interim, Carpio allegedly left
abroad (Annex C, p.17, Records); that on June 13, 1984, she withdrew the sum of
P80,000.44 from Carpio’s account by means of a withdrawal slip allegedly signed
by Carpio and then, she closed his account; that out of the said amount, she
redeposited the sum of P50,000.00 to her own savings account and received in
cash the remaining balance of P30,000.44; and on June 15 and 18, 1984,
complainant withdrew the amounts of P2,000.00 and P18,000.00, respectively from
her savings account (Exh. “3”, Records, p. 15, in relation to TSN,
October 8, 1985, pp. 194-195, Records, pp. 286-287).

In the light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner’s demand
that the private respondent return the proceeds of the check accompanied by a
threat to file criminal charges was not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. In the case of Berg v. National City Bank of
New York (102 Phil. 309, 316), We ruled that:

“x x x It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by
individuals to demand payment of their accounts with the threat that upon
failure to do so an action would be instituted in court. Such a threat is proper within the realm of
the law as a means to enforce collection. Such a threat cannot constitute duress even if the claim proves to be
unfounded so long as the creditor believes that it was his right to do
so.”

The Solicitor General argues that the complainant was intimidated
and compelled into disclosing her time deposit, signing the typewritten
withdrawal slip and the affidavit by the petitioner’s threat to detain her at
the bank.

At this point, there is a need to make a distinction between a
case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and against his good sense
and judgment and where he gives no consent at all, as where he acts against his will under a
pressure he cannot resist. Thus, in
Vales v. Villa (35 Phil. 769, 789), We ruled:

“x x x It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently
in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he
acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly
against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with
them. Between the two acts there is no
difference in law. But when his sense,
judgment, and his will rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as requested, but
is nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to such an extent that he
becomes a mere automaton and acts mechanically only, a new element enters,
namely, a disappearance of the personality of the actor. He ceases to exist as an independent entity
with faculties and judgment, and in his place is substituted another — the one
exercising the force or making use of the intimidation. While his hand signs, the will which moves
it is another’s. While a contract is
made, it has, in reality and in law, only one party to it; and, there being
only one party, the one using the force or the intimidation, it is
unenforceable for lack of a second party.

“From these considerations it is clear that every case of
alleged intimidation must be examined to determine within which class it
falls. If it is within the first class
it is not duress in law, if it falls in the second, it is.”

The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant,
despite her protestations, indeed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, consented to
do all the aforesaid acts.

Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and encashment of
the check, the complainant admitted to being nervous upon being informed that
the check was spurious (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 15; Record, p. 106)

We find that complainant’s lengthy stay at the bank was not due
to the petitioner’s threat. It was
rather due to her desire to prove her innocence. Her testimony on this point is a revelation:

“Atty. Dizon: (counsel for petitioner)

You are always talking
of signing the withdrawal slip by force, is it not that earlier you admitted
that no actual force was employed upon you in connection with the signing of
this document and the force that you are claiming was the alleged shouting
against you coupled with the statement that you could not leave?

“A.   Yes,
Sir.

“Q.  When
Mr. Lee was requiring you to sign the withdrawal slip did it not occur to you
to leave the bank?

“Atty. Pangilinan:

The question has already
been answered she said she cannot leave because she is being threatened.

“Atty. Dizon:

That
was during the time when she first met Mr. Lee.

“Court:

Witness may answer.

“A.   When
I was about to sign the withdrawal slip I inquired from him if I signed it I
can leave already but he insisted that I should not leave, Sir.

“Q.  When
he told you that did it not occur to you to stand up and go out of the bank?

“A.   No,
Sir.

“Q.  Why?

“A.   He
was insisting that I return the amount
I have withdrawn especially on June 18
when I withdrew P18,000.00, Sir.

“COURT

The question is why did
you not leave and disregarded him?

“A.   Because
I cannot just leave him that way,
Your Honor.

“Atty. Dizon:

Why? hat was the reason that you cannot leave him?

“A.   Because
he is insisting that the responsibility
of one person be my responsibility and
at that time I was feeling nervous
and he did not tell me to stand
up and leave, Sir.” (ibid, pp. 18-20,
Records, pp. 109-111)

In her insistence to clear up her name,
it is not farfetched for Us to think that the complainant voluntarily but
grudgingly returned the money to show good faith. Thus, it was she who informed the petitioner about the existence
of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate (Exh. “A”, pp. 4-5,
Records). The allegation that she did
so because of petitioner’s threats came from the complainant herself. She has not been able to present any other
witness to buttress her claim.

Further, We find that contrary to complainant’s allegations in
her affidavit (ibid, p.
5) it was not the petitioner who suggested the encashment of the RCBC Time
Deposit Certificate but her sister; and that again, it was not the petitioner
who agreed to the sister’s suggestion but Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign
Department of the bank (TSN, January 8, 1985, pp. 40- 41, Records, pp.
131-132).

Moreover, while complainant claimed that her freedom of movement
was restrained, she, however, was able to move about freely unguarded from the
office of the petitioner situated at the ground floor to the office of Cruz at
the mezzanine floor where her sister found her (ibid, pp. 39-40, Records, pp. 130-131). Undoubtedly, during that time, there were
many bank clients who transacted business with the bank (TSN, November 20,
1984, p. 21; Records, p. 112). The bank
security guards then were at their posts. Complainant herself admitted that they manifested no overt acts to
prevent her from leaving despite the alleged loud threats of the petitioner (ibid,
pp. 20-21, Records, pp. 111-112) which could be heard considering that the door
to petitioner’s office was kept open (TSN, October 8, 1985, p. 184, Records, p.
276). Given such atmosphere, the
complainant still did not leave the bank.

The respondent court cited the prepared typewritten withdrawal
slip and the non-presentation of the complainant’s passbook as indicators of
her involuntary acts.

We disagree. The
petitioner testified that the general rule was that the bank requires the
presentation of the passbook whenever withdrawals are made. However, there was an exception to this
rule, i.e. when the depositor is a regular customer in depositing or
withdrawing money in the bank (TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 189-190, Records, pp.
281-282). The prosecution failed to
submit evidence to rebut his contentions. Besides, the trial court’s conclusion that the withdrawal slip was
typewritten was without basis considering that the complainant merely averred
that the withdrawal slip was already prepared when she signed it (Exh.
“A”, Records, p. 4).

We also take exception to the following ruling of the appellate
court:

“It must be noted that the position of a bank manager is one
of prestige and dignity and when the said bank was cheated or swindled it
certainly reflects on the capability and efficiency of the manager and one can
just imagine the kind of mental attitude and feeling of anger the latter would
have towards the alleged swindler. Shouting, raising of voice and dagger looks are common characteristics
of an angry man and that was what accused Lee exhibited to a fragile weaker sex
and pregnant offended party. It would
be natural to get angry with someone who had victimized you. Naturalness, however is not always
righteous. It is like taking the law
into your hands and that was what the accused Lee did.” (CA Decision, pp.
11-12, Rollo, pp. 52-53)

This pronouncement creates an impression
that the petitioner had made a personal case out of the situation. However, the evidence does not support this
view. We find that at the time the
check was deposited and encashed, the petitioner was then on leave (TSN, June
11, 1985, p. 156; Records, p. 248). Under this circumstance, it is not fair to consider the bank’s mistake
in accepting and paying the check as the petitioner’s mistake which could
militate against his efficiency. The
petitioner attributed the mistake in the payment of the forged check to the
usual risks in banking business. He
stated:

Atty. Pangilinan, Private prosecutor
(authorized by the Fiscal to prosecute the case in the latter’s stead)

“Q   So
you no longer consider him (Carpio) as entitled in (sic) the proceeds of the
chek (sic) and therefore at that point of (sic) time you will now concede that
the payment made by you to him
was a big mistake?

“A    When
we were asking for the respondent and we were locating Honorio Carpio and we
cannot locate him, I consider that a mistake, Sir.

“Q   It
was a big mistake as a matter of fact?

“A    When
it comes to the falling of the
business considering the big amount I
would say big mistake but only a
mistake, it was a usual risk in
banking business, Sir.

“Q   But
of course Mr. Lee, being a mistake that mistake will harm and tense your
personality as a Bank Manager?

“A    It
is up to our
Manager to decide but when it comes
to other transactions I am handling Three
Million Plus and considering that check
I don’t think with all modesty it
will affect me, Sir.

“Q    But
you are called upon to try to recover any money which was in your judgment was unlawfully
taken from you by anybody?

“A    When
it comes to procedure I don’t think it was unlawfully taken, as a matter of
fact it was our bank who credited this account, Sir.

“Q   So
it is your bounded (sic) duty to recover money which was paid to someonelse
(sic) which payment is not due to him, am I correct?

“A    It
is the duty of our lawyer to recover it, Sir.

“Q   Is
it not a fact that your lawyer is only your agent?

“Atty. Dizon:

I think we are going too
far, it has nothing to do with the particular incident subject matter of the
criminal offense.

“Court:

I see the point of the
defense but the witness is very intelligent, I can see the point of counsel,
because in order not to effect his integrity he resorted to this, for example in
case of a bank employee who stole P500.00 and the other one is P200.00, it
could have the same mistake which is supposed to be admonished by removal. You answer.

“A    Yes
that is the same case whether it is small or big but when it comes to the
Manager the Head Office is very understanding when it comes to bogus checks and
of course my work is a supervisory, Sir.” (ibid, pp. 170-171;
Records, pp. 263-264)

The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the
fact that the complainant refused to sign the promissory note in spite of the
alleged threats of the petitioner (TSN, January 8, 1985, p. 48; Records, p.
139). American authorities have
declared that “(t)he force which is claimed to have compelled criminal
conduct against the will of the actor must be immediate and
continuous and threaten grave
danger to his person during
all of the time the act is being
committed. That is, it must be a
dangerous force threatened ‘in praesenti.’ It
must be a force threatening great bodily harm that remains constant in
controlling the will of the unwilling
participant while the act is being performed
and from which he cannot then withdraw
in safety.” (State v. Hood, 165 NE 2d, 28, 31-32,
Underlining ours).

The complainant proferred excuses for her action. For one, she claimed that her sister’s
presence helped her recover her composure (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 29 Records, p. 120).

We are not persuaded. If
indeed she had recovered her composure because of her sister’s presence, she
could have just left the premises in a huff without encashing the RCBC Time
Deposit Certificate or if they (complainant and sister) were already at the
RCBC, they could have desisted from encashing the check and then could have
left for home notwithstanding the alleged presence of Mr. Lumba who was no
longer in his own bank but among the RCBC clients or she could have refused to
sign the affidavit which was handed to her first before the promissory
note. Yet, she did neither of these
logical possibilities.

Secondly, she averred that she refused to sign the promissory
note because she was able to read its contents unlike the affidavit and she
realized that she would have a great responsibility to return the amount taken
by Carpio (ibid, pp.
27-28, Records, pp. 118- 119).

Such an excuse is flimsy and weak. It is strange that
complainant’s, sister, who was with her, failed to corroborate her statement
that she was denied the opportunity to read the affidavit. Her bare assertion simply confirms the
voluntariness of her actions. All her
disputed acts were geared towards proving her good faith. Complainant was willing to return the sum of
P48,000.00 she took since it was only
up to this amount where her involvement lies. However, as soon as she realized that she would have the enormous
task of reimbursing the bank the balance of the proceeds of the forged check
allegedly taken by Carpio, she refused to cooperate any further. Notwithstanding the alleged threats of
petitioner, she did not budge. Thus, We
find it as a logical consequence that she merely asked for the receipt of the P18,000.00 she deposited rather than the
cancellation of her earlier withdrawal. On this point, complainant claimed that after her refusal to sign the
document, she no longer insisted on the return of the money because she felt
that it was the only way she could leave the bank premises (TSN, November 20,
1984, p. 31, Records, p. 120). This
pretense, however, was belied by her subsequent actuations. We find that she and her sister left the
bank unescorted to eat their snack; that they were required by the petitioner
to come back; and that they decided not to eat but instead went home (TSN,
November 20, 1984, pp. 31-32, Records, pp. 122-123 and January 8, 1965, pp.
49-50, Records, pp. 140-141). With such
behavior, We are at a loss to understand how coercion could attach in this
case. Obviously, the complainant has
not been cowed into submission.

Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion did not exist in
this case. Consequently, the petitioner
should be acquitted.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and a new one hereby, entered ACQUITTING the accused of the crime of grave
coercion.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and
Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.