THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO ROSALES ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

For violation of paragraph 4, section 30, of the Election Law by having sworn
that they were not delinquent in the payment of taxes, when they really were,
thus taking a false oath, Pedro Rosales, Peliciano C, Veloria, and Florentino
Buquingo were sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Surigao to the penalty
of ?200 and the payment of one- fourth of the costs each.

It is a fact beyond all discussion that the appellants took in due form
before a competent officer the oath required by law for voting in the general
election held on May 4, 1912. The only matter to be discussed is whether their
oath was or was not false, whether they were or were not delinquent in the
payment of their taxes.

Pedro Rosales alleges that on March 30, 1910, he had ceased to be the owner
of the land on which he is made to owe land tax on May 4, 1912, because he had
on that date, March 30, 1910, sold it to Alejandro Villanueva, the reason
wherefor he had after that date ceased to pay the land tax.

Feliciano C. Veloria has set up the same defense, presenting an instrument of
sale in which it is set forth that on April21, 1911, he sold the land on which
he is made to owe land tax on May 4,1912. Pedro Palillo, the vendee, testified
that he had made the purchase from Veloria and paid the taxes. (Exhibits 3 and
4.)

Florentino Buquingo also sets up the same defense—that is, that he had sold
the land on which he is made to owe land tax on May 4, 1912. (Exhibit 1.)

The municipal treasurer of Agusan, Butuan, certified that Pedro Rosales,
delinquent in payment of his tax for the year 1911, paid it on June 29, 1912
(Exhibit E); that Feliciano C. Veloria in the same condition paid it on June 6,
1912 (Exhibit F); and that Florentino Buquingo in the same condition paid it on
June 13, 1912 (Exhibit H). The fact then is that May, 1912, the last month for
paying, passed without any of the defendants’ having done so.

It is alleged that it is necessary that the false statement was
knowingly made in the oath; but it has already been decided that such
is the presumption unless there is evidence to the contrary, under the
presumption that every voluntary act implies. (17 Phil. Rep., 303.)

The judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.