JOSE F. S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V. E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, …

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring the petitioners to
testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity
of Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez
to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine
(39) corporations.

On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, repre­sented by
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the
Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs.
Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez
et. al.”, for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages.

The complaint was amended several times by impleading
new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations therein.  Under the Second Amended Complaint,^[1]
the herein petitioners were impleaded as party
defendants.

The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as
defendants, alleges among others that:

“14. Defendants
Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez
and Juliette Gomez Romualdez,
acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and
taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the
latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people,
among others:

(a)  obtained, with the active collaboration of
Defendants Senen J. Gabaldon,
Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno,
Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely:  Edil­berto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando
V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas
and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as
Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and
Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the
Philippines, such as the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), Benguet
Consolidated Mining Corporation (BENGUET), Pilipinas
Shell Corporation and the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by
employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the
massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible
‘cash-out’ from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez.  x x x

x x
x

(m)  manipulated, with the support, assistance and
collaboration of Phil-guarantee officials led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc.
led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the
formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc.
without infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors
Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of
P527,387,440.71 within sufficient securities/collaterals just to enable
Erectors Inc. to appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that its
obligation with Philguarantee has reached a total of
more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.

(n)   at the onset of the present Adminis­tration
and/or within the week following the February 1986 People’s Revolution, in
conspiracy with, support, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon
Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon,
Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr.
manipulated, schemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to conceal
and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry
and juris­diction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
herein Defendants individual and collective funds, properties, and assets
subject of and/or suited in the instant Complaint.

(o)   maneuvered, with the technical know-how and
legalistic talents of the FMMC senior managers and some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto
S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V.
Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of
defendant Benjamin Romualdez’s interests in the (i) Professional Managers, Inc., (ii) A & E Inter­national
Corporation (A & E), First Manila Management Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Maguindanao Navigation (MNI), (v) SOLOIL, Inc. (SOLOIL),
(vi) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36
corpo­rations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (whose purported incorporators are
all members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon’s law firm)
for only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or three days after the creation of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole
purpose of deceiving and pre­empting the Government, particularly the PCGG, and
making it appear that defend­ant Benjamin Romualdez
had already divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in
fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with
the FMMC senior managers who still control and run the affairs of said
corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitious
sale, the above-named defend­ants offered P20 million as ‘donation’ to the
Government;

(p)   misused, with the connivance, support and
technical assistance of the Bengzon law firm
represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal
counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea,
Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho and Senen J. Gabaldon as members of
the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund
(Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by causing it to be invested in
the PCIB and through the Bank’s TSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity
at 50% each, thee Fund’s (a) 8,028,011 common shares in the Bank and (b)
‘Deposit in Subscription’ in the amount of P4,929,­972.50 but of the agreed
consideration of P28 million for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI
Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment
and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind
its assignment, and the consequent reversion of the assigned shares brought the
total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the
voting stock of the PCIB, and this development (which the defendants
themselves orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse for
the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund’s 10 million shares for
allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the
General Banking Act, although, they know for a fact that what the law declares
as unlawful and void ab initio
are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling ‘to the extent of the excess
over any of the ceilings prescribed …’ and not the whole or entire
stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to
March 24, 1986);

(q)   cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate
entity, through the use of the names and managerial expertise of the FMMC
senior managers and lawyers iden­tified as Jose B. Sandejas,
Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S. Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose
M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon
II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers,
such as Attys. Jose. F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E.
Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr. and Leonardo C.
Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez
including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the names
of Trans Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which
they refused to surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and
continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and
Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for
the claim of P70 million of a ‘merger company of the First Manila Management
Corp. group’ supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said
firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.

x  x  x“

On 28 September 1988, petitioners (as defendants) filed their
respective answers.^[2]
Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by
the PCGG of the “Romualdez corporations”
were carried in various metropolitan newspapers.  Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romualdez firms had not been sequestered because of the
opposition of certain PCGG officials who “had worked previously as lawyers
of the Marcos crony firms.” Another daily reported otherwise, while others
declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986
revolution, the “Romualdez companies” were
sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa,
the President’s brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even
pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same price
of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets.^[3]

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan
Ponce Enrile delivered a speech “on a matter of
personal privilege” before the Senate on the alleged “take­over of
SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management of Companies
(FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa” and called upon
“the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case,
particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.”^[4]

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by
the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon
Committee).^[5]
Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the
matter.  Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it
and testify on “what they know” regarding the  “sale of the thirty-six (36)
corporations belonging to Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez.”

At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa
declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may “unduly
prejudice” the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. 
Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise
refused to testify invoking his constitutional right to due process, and
averring that the publicity generated by respondent Committee’s inquiry could
adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are
his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry
and directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional
issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution^[6]
dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioners’ plea to be excused from
testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of
the matter.  Senator Neptali
Gonzales dissented.^[7]

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to
subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before
the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear
and blatant disregard of their Constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief.

Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before
the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas,
filed with the Court a motion for intervention,^[8]
which the Court granted in the resolution^[9]
of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committe to comment on the petition in intervention.  In compliance therewith, respondent Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee filed its comment^[10]
thereon.

Before discussing the issues raised by petitioners and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional
question raised by the respondent Committee.

In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this Court
cannot properly inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting
legislative investigations, much less can it enjoin the Congress or any of its
regular and special committees — like what petitioners seek — from making
inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers,
which obtains in our present system of government.

The contention is untenable. 
In Angara vs. Electoral Commission,^[11]
the Court held:

“The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government.  It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.  Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.  But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.  The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings
of the various departments of the government. 
x x x.

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

“But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government.  The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several depart­ments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other
begins.  In times of social disquietude
or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.  In cases of conflict, the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.  Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers?  The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.  And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.  This is in truth all that is involved in what
is termed ‘judicial supremacy’ which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Consti­tution.  Even then, this
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the consti­tutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented.  Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.   Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. 
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controver­sies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.”

The “allocation of constitutional boundaries” is a task
that this Court must perform under the Constitution.  Moreover, as held in a recent case,^[12]
“(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial  determination of the rival
claims.  The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.  It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated
by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.”^[13]

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction
over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and
extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries
into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.

Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners
contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has no valid
legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale
or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a
“purely private transaction” which is beyond the power of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right
to due process.

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legis­lation.^[14]
Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of
procedure.  The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”^[15]

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited.  Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution.  Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected”.  It follows then that the rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process
and the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is
specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation.  Such inquiries may
refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with
any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation.  They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al.,^[16]
the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it,
must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to
any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which
in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation.  In order therefore to ascertain the character
or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under
which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile
reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement
which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr.
Ricardo “Baby” Lopa of “having taken
over the FMMC Group of Companies.” As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile
on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had “taken over”
the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself
categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7
on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa);
and that these repeated alle­gations of a “takeover” on his (Lopa’s) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.

The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September
1988, to avail of the privilege hour,^[17] so
that he could respond to the said Lopa letter, and
also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines,
considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile’s) charges that he (Lopa)
had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are “baseless” and
“malicious.” Thus, in his speech,^[18]
Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:

“Mr. President, I rise this afternoon on a matter of personal
privilege; the privilege being that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated
September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa,
a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denies categori­cally
that he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which
includes SOLOIL Incorporated.

xxx               xxx                   xxx                   xxx

“In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote
pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential Commission
on Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose
Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII:  In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then
Governor Ramirez stated that when he
and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on the
management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte,
management officials assured him that relatives of the President of the
Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the
order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo
A. Lopa.

“I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramirez’ memorandum.

“The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I
quote, Mr. President:

‘Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan,
Leyte was not heeded by
management because they said another representation was being made to this
Commission for the eventual lifting of our
sequestration order.  They even assured
us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping
Cojuangco were personally discussing and representing
SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted.  While we attempted to carry on our order,
management refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to make
available to us the records of the company. 
In fact it was obviously clear that they will meet us with force the
moment we insist on doing normally our assigned task.  In view of the impending threat, and to avoid
any untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is
a more categorical stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly
influential representation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue our
work.’

“Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph
five, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President:

‘The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I
understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez
including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment,
and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo
Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law of
the President.  They even went further by
telling us that even Peping Cojuangco
who we know is the brother of her excellency is also
interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL.  When he demanded for supporting papers which
will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa,
Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently to submit
these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted directly to this
Commission.  To our mind their continuous
dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even to the President if
our desire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government.’

“The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now
Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.

xxx       xxx       xxx       xxx

“Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr.
Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya
headlined ‘On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms.’

“Mr. Lopa states in the last
paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:

’12.   As of this writing, the sales agreement is
under review by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriate price.  The sale of these companies and our prior
right to reacquire them have never been at issue.’

“Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious
statements.”

Senator Enrile
concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:

“Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look
into the possible violation of the law in the case particularly with regard to
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:

‘Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful
for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the
Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the
Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene directly
or indirectly, in any business, trans­action, contract or application with the
Government:  Provided, that this section
shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption of office of any of
the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the
Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or
application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary on the part
of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requi­sites
provided by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or
in the exercise of a profession.’

“Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to
myself.  I leave it to this august Body
to make its own conclusion.”

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile
contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words,
the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon Committee
was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law
in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez
to the Lopa Group. 
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.

The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee’s
argument that the questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212.  The said resolution
was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the
representations made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of
non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports
Development, to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3)
stockholders of Oriental Petroleum, i.e., that it had adopted a
“get-rich-quick scheme” for its nominee-directors in a sequestered
oil, exploration firm.  The pertinent
portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:

x x x       x x x     x x x

“WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the
Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least three
Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of
‘ineptness, incompetence and corruption’ and that the Sandiganbayan
has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it had
adopted a ‘get-rich-quick scheme’ for its nominee-directors in a sequestered
oil exploration firm;

“WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth
of non-governmental organization had made representations to the Senate
Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges against PCGG
since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the
EDSA revolution took place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will
fund priority projects which will benefit our people such as CARP, free
education in the elementary and secondary levels, reforestation, and employment
generation for rural and urban workers;

“WHEREAS, the government and the present leadership must
demonstrate in their public and private lives integrity, honor and efficient
management of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and lose
hope and return to an ideology and form
of government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic partici­pation and
human rights:  Now, therefore, be it.

“Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government be investigated by the appropriate
Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of
the Constitution.” ^[19]

Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into
the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of
the Constitution.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on
the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile,
i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin
“Kokoy” Romualdez
to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to
Senate Resolution No. 212, because, firstly, Senator Enrile
did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa
nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private
citizens.

It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by
respondent Committee is not really “in aid of legislation” because it
is not related to a purpose within the juris­diction of Congress, since the aim
of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the
President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5
of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter
that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature.  Besides, the Court may take
judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.  In John T. Watkins vs.
United States,^[20]
it was held:

“xxx.  The power of
congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.  That power is broad.  It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.  It includes surveys of defects in our social,
econo­mic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy
them.  It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or
waste.  But broad as is this power of
inquiry, it is not unlimited.  There
is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without
justification in terms of the functions of congress.  This was freely conceded by the Solicitor
General in his argument in this case. 
Nor is the Congress a law enforce­ment or trial agency.  These are functions of the executive and
judicial departments of government.  No
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a
legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal
aggrandizement of the investigators or to ‘punish’ those investigated are
indefensible.” (underlining supplied)

It can not be overlooked that when
respondent Committee decided to conduct its investigation of the petitioners,
the complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.  A
perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action
against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the
36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin “Kokoy”
Romualdez. 
Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of
petitioners’ respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by
the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by
the Sandiganbayan. 
In short, the issue has been pre-empted by that court.  To allow the respondent Committee to conduct
its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan
would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a
legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee’s judgment
were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan,
the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of
the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.

In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into
the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.  In Baremblatt
vs. United States,^[21]
it was held that:

“Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without
limitations.  Since Congress may only
inves­tigate into those areas in which it may poten­tially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into
matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of
the government.  Lacking the judicial
power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are
exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. 
Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the
Executive.  x x
x.”

Now to another matter.  It
has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to inquire is
‘subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental
action,’ including ‘the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights’.” ^[22]

In another case –

“. . . the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify
an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. 
The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed
to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling
witness.  We cannot simply assume, however,
that every congresssional investigation is justified
by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected.  To do so would be to abdicate the
responsibility placed by the
Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not
unjustifiably encroach upon an individual’s right to privacy nor abridge his
liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.”^[23]

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an
individual is the right against self-incrimination.^[24]
This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of
by the accused in a criminal case; but it may be invoked by other witnesses
only as questions are asked of them.

This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez
vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.^[25]
thus-

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection
from an ordinary witness.  Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take
the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness
stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.”

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in
administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a
criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding.  In Galman
vs. Pamaran,^[26]
the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapunan  (6 SCRA 1059) to illustate
the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only
in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit.

It was held that:

“We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and
the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand
and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only
when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him.  Clearly then, it is not the character of the
suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls.  The privilege has consistently been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or
not.”

We do not here modify these doctrines.  If we presently rule that petitioners may not
be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce
evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is
not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative
of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the
judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Court holds that, under the facts,
including the circumstance that petitioners are presently impleaded
as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan,
which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry
before the respondent Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is
hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor
to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr. and Cruz, JJ., see
dissenting opinion.

Narvasa, J., joins J. Gutierrez, Jr. and
J. Cruz in their dissenting opinion.

---

^[1] Annex “A”, Rollo,
p. 38

^[2] Annexes “B”, “C” and
“D”, Rollo, pp. 98, 114 and 128

^[3] Rollo, pp. 219-220

^[4]
Annex “E-1”, Rollo, p. 143

^[5] Annex “E”, Rollo,
p. 142

^[6] Annex “H-1”, Rollo,
p. 162

^[7] Annex “H-2”, Rollo,
189

^[8] Rollo, p. 264

^[9] Ibid., p. 263

^[10] Ibid., p. 284

^[11] 63 Phil. 139, 156, 157, 158-159

^[12] Neptali A. Gonzales, et al. vs. Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., et al.,
G.R. No. 87636, 19 November 1990, 191 SCRA 452, 463

^[13] Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides:

“Section 1. The judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

“Judicial Power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

^[14] In Arnault
vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court held
that although there was no express provision in the 1935 Constitution giving
such power to both houses of Congress, it was so incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied.

^[15] This was taken from Section 12(2), Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution.

^[16] No. L-3820, July 18, 1950, 87 Phil. 29

^[17]
“Questions of privilege are those affecting the rights, privileges,
reputation, conduct, decorum and dignity of the Senate or its Members as well as
the integrity of its proceedings.” (Sec. 8, Rule XXXIX, Rules of the
Senate.)

^[18] Annex – 2, Rollo,
p. 242

^[19] Sec. 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution
provides:  “The authority to issue
sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3, dated March 24, 1986
in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not
more than eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution.  However, in the national interest, as
certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period.”

^[20]
354 U.S. 178, 1 L. ed. 2d 1273 (1957)

^[21] 360 U.S. 109, 3 L ed. 2d 1115, 69 S CT 1081
(1959)

^[22] Maurice A. Hutcheson vs. U.S., 369 US
599

^[23] Watkins vs. US, 354 USS 178 citing US vs.
Rumely, 345 US 41

^[24] Sec. 17, Article III of the Constitution provides:

“No person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself.”

^[25] G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA
663

^[26] G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985, 138 SCRA
294

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