PANGASINAN III ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. (PANELCO III), VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (MANILA), AND ITS SUB-REGIONAL ARBITRATION BRANCH I (DAGUPAN), LABOR ARBITER IREN…

The Court is once again called upon to determine the validity of
an employee’s dismissal. The facts
leading thereto are briefly narrated.

Sometime in September, 1984, when petitioner Pangasinan III
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PANELCO) was on the brink of bankruptcy, the
National Electric Administration (NEA) took over its management. Among the initial measures it adopted were
the performance audit of all PANELCO’s employees and the inspection of the
kilowatt hour meters of all its consumers, including its employees.

Luzon Perejas, the
herein private respondent, had been employed as a meter reader of PANELCO since
December 21, 1981. In the course of his
examination, it
was discovered that between April
1984 to November, 1984, he manipulated the kilowatt hour meter readings
of his co-employees by underreading their electric consumptions. He was also found to have a jumper wire
attached to his electric kilowatt hour meter in his house.

On December 1, 1984, Perejas received a memorandum from the
petitioner requiring him to explain within twelve hours the presence of the tampered
KWH meter in his residence.^[1] He
did not bother to answer. On December
3, 1984, another memorandum again directed him to submit his explanation in
writing, also within twelve hours.^[2] The
following day, he wrote PANELCO a letter admitting the charge. He promised never to commit the infraction again.^[3]

On December 6, 1984, the private respondent was issued another
memorandum,^[4]
this time requiring him to explain within six hours why he manipulated the KWH meter readings of his
co-employees. He submitted a written
explanation the next day also admitting the said act. ^[5]

On that same date, the petitioner issued a notice to him
terminating his employment effective at the close of office hours on December
8, 1984.^[6]

On January 3, 1985, Perejas filed with the National Labor Relations Commission of Dagupan
City a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and underpayment
of wages and allowances. On April 18,
1985, the petitioner lodged a criminal complaint against him in the Municipal Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan,
for theft of electric current with the use of a jumper.

On December 10, 1986, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando rendered a decision
directing the petitioner to: 1) reinstate the private respondent
without loss of seniority rights; 2) pay him back wages from the date of
dismissal up to the time of reinstatement; and 3) pay him the sum of P675.00 as
salary and emergency cost-of-living allowance
differentials.^[7]

On appeal, this decision was modified by the respondent National
Labor Relations Commission with the reduction of the award of back pay to only
six months.^[8]
It was affirmed in all other respects. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, PANELCO has come to
this Court, imputing to the NLRC grave abuse of discretion in upholding
Perejas.

Specifically, PANELCO claims that, contrary to the findings of
the NLRC, the evidence against Perejas was sufficient to justify his dismissal.

We find that there was just cause for his dismissal.

Perejas readily admitted the first charge against him, saying in
his written explanation:

Ito po ay may kinalaman sa sulat na natanggap ko mula sa inyo noong kayo ay magpalit ng
mga metro ng lahat ng mga empleado.

Noong Nobiyembre 30, 1984, pinalitan ang metro sa aming bahay at
natuklasan na ang aking metro ay may jumper. Inaamin ko pong nagawa ko iyon at nababatid na ako pala ay nakagawa ng
malaking pagkakasala sa Kooperatiba at sa batas. Ako po ay mahirap lamang may limang (5) anak. Sa kaunti ko pong kinikita ay nais kong makatipid kaya nagawa ko
po ang paglalagay ng jumper sa
aking metro. Isinusumpa ko po sa inyo hindi ko na po uling gagawin
iyon.

Humihingi po ako ng
malawak na pang-unawa sa inyo. Ano man po ang igagawad ninyong parusa sa akin ay malugod ko pong tatanggapin. Ipinapakiusap ko po lamang na sana ay hindi ito makaapekto sa aking
trabaho.

Hanggang dito na po lamang at ako ay umaasa ng inyong malawak na pang-unawa.^[9]

Strangely, however, the Labor Arbiter completely overlooked this
document and observed instead that:

With respect to the memorandum on the tampered meters, there was no
showing that the meters were indeed being used by complainant. The evidence does not show that such was
tampered by him, or that he had participation in the doing of the same. The employer failed to substantiate this
charge.

The private respondent also admitted the second charge of
manipulation of the electric consumption of his co-employees. His admission was also in writing.^[10]
Again, however, the Labor Arbiter practically disregarded it, holding that it
could not by itself alone support the said charge. His ruling was that the partial schedule of meter reading
irregularities was not the best evidence and that what the petitioner should
have presented was the billing or meter reading cards accomplished by the
private respondent.

It is settled that in administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the
legality of an employer’s dismissal of an employee.^[11]
Not even a preponderance
of evidence is necessary as substantial evidence is considered sufficient.^[12]

We note the relevant fact that on July 11, 1990, the private
respondent was convicted in the criminal case filed against him for illegal use
of a jumper.^[13]
While this is admittedly a supervening event, it nevertheless shows that the
administrative charge against him for the same offense was not unfounded. Perejas was held guilty of the criminal case not by only substantial or preponderant
evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In the view of the Court, the two written admissions of
respondent Perejas constitute substantial evidence of the charges against
him. The meter reading cards could have
been submitted by the petitioner but this became unnecessary because of the
admission of the private respondent. It is an elementary principle of law that an
allegation does not have to be proved if it has already been admitted.^[14]

The Labor Arbiter faulted the petitioner for failing to prove the
extent and value of the malversation, but this was not really material as
Perejas was not being made to account for it. It was enough to show that he had committed a dishonest act as a
justification for his dismissal.

Let it be repeated that the petitioner was then in financial
straits. Compelling it to continue with
the employment of a person who had contributed to its plight would have been oppressive. We have held that the law, in protecting the
rights of the laborer, does not authorize the destruction of the employer.^[15]

The public respondent
tries to justify Perejas’s conduct, claiming that necessity forced him to
commit the offenses and that he had promised not to repeat them. It invokes in this connection the ruling
in San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor,^[16] to
wit:

x x x in view of the high cost of living and the difficulties of supporting a family, it is not
surprising that members of the wage-earning class would do anything possible to
augment their small income. (Compare
with People v. Macbul, 74 Phil. 436)

Taking into account the circumstances of the case, particularly
Yanglay’s initial attitude of confessing that his error was dictated by
necessity and his promise not to repeat the same mistake, we are of the opinion
that his dismissal was a drastic punishment. x x x

The discharged employee in that case committed only one misdeed,
that of trafficking in company-supplied drugs, which, while contrary to company
policy, was nevertheless not illegal. In
the present case, the offenses Perejas committed constituted theft of
electricity and were not only prejudicial to the petitioner but clearly
criminal.

The public respondent’s reliance on the case of Almira v. B.F.
Goodrich Phil.^[17]
is also misplaced in view of its entirely different factual background. What was involved there was the dismissal of laborers who had
participated in a strike, the Court declaring that their conduct did not
warrant such a severe penalty. None of
the strikers was guilty of dishonesty, as is the herein private respondent.

On the issue of procedural due process, however, we must affirm
the findings of the Labor Arbiter.

We
agree that the petitioner did not comply with the procedure laid down in
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, particularly
Sections 5 and 6, which provide:

SEC. 5. Answer and
hearing. The worker may answer the
allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable
period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

SEC. 6. Decision to
dismiss. The employer shall
immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating
clearly the reasons therefor.

The petitioner submits that the three memoranda issued to the
private respondent are equivalent to the “notice of dismissal”
envisioned under Section 2 of Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing the Labor
Code. They were in writing; they stated
specifically the acts constituting the ground for dismissal; and they even required the employee to explain
the charges. Even if the charges
leveled against the private respondent were staggered in the sense that the
charge of underreading/manipulation of the KWH meters of his co-employees was
not included in the December 1 and 3, 1984
memoranda although this was discovered in late November, 1984, there was still no
denial of due process. The separation
of the charges was in fact advantageous to Perejas because he had a better
chance to explain each offense separately. Besides, nowhere in the
rules is an employer mandated to incorporate all the charges under one notice
of dismissal.

These are ingenious arguments but not persuasive. The simple undeniable fact is that Perejas
was not given the “ample opportunity” required by the above-quoted
Section 5 to enable him to prepare an adequate defense.

The memorandum dated December 1, 1984, required Perejas to
explain within twelve hours the presence of a jumper in his house. The second memorandum dated December 3,
1984, again required him to explain the same charge, also within twelve
hours. The memorandum of December 6,
1984, was more abrupt; he was given only six hours to explain why he manipulated the
meter readings of his co-employees.

It is established that Perejas admitted the first charge on
December 4, 1984, and so had in effect three days from December 1, 1984, date
of the first memorandum, to defend himself against that charge. That was a sufficient period. To answer the second charge, however, he was
given only six
hours and, upon his admission thereof the following day, was immediately
dismissed. There was no investigation
or formal hearing conducted on either of the charges. The petitioner relied solely on Perejas’s admissions.

In Abiera v. NLRC,^[18] the
Court held that “ample opportunity” connotes every kind of assistance
that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately
for his defense, including legal representation. The record does not show that Perejas was extended or even
offered such assistance nor does it appear that he waived the right to a formal
hearing. It is true that the charges
were admitted by Perejas. Nevertheless,
it is also true that the employee was not given a chance to consult a lawyer
before making his admissions.

We feel that even with such admissions, the petitioner should
have held an investigation where, at the very least, Perejas should have been
informed of his right to counsel and warned of the consequences of such
admissions. The petitioner chose
instead to summarily dismiss him. Given the admissions, the petitioner really
had no reason for its hasty
action. These admissions had after all
already established the employee’s guilt and all the petitioner had to do was
to present them at the formal investigation if it had been duly called. Perejas might have subsequently withdrawn
them, but his letters would still have remained in the record as telling
evidence he would have been hard put to refute. Meantime, he could have been preventively suspended only instead
of being dismissed outright.

The Court is not unaware of its ruling in Philippine Airlines,
Inc. v. NLRC,^[19]
also decided through its First Division, where we held that “since De
Veyra admitted in her sworn statement having used tickets bearing the upgraded
priority classification; the documentary evidence of PAL already proved the
falsity of the tickets; and De Veyra
was aware of this falsity, there was no necessity for the parties to undergo
the ritual of holding a hearing.”

The facts of that case
are, however, vastly different from those in the case at bar. In that case, the employee was given enough
time and opportunity to defend herself as early as on the company level and
indeed even asked for extension of time to answer the charges against her. At this stage, she was already
represented by counsel, and she continued to be so in the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter, where she filed a lengthy position paper in her
defense. By contrast, there is no showing that the herein private
respondent had legal assistance when he made his admissions, and the record
shows that the processes and pleadings in the proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC were sent to him directly and not through counsel. Even in his petition now before us, in fact,
no lawyer has entered his appearance for
Perejas, which is probably the reason why he did not file his own
comment on the petition, relying only on the comment of the Solicitor General
on behalf of the public respondent.

We cannot blink away the
petitioner’s cavalier manner in terminating the private respondent’s
employment. Denial of due process is an offense for which PANELCO has incurred liability to Perejas, conformably
to Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC.^[20] In that case, we required the employer to
indemnify the employee in the sum of
P1,000.00 for depriving
him of the right to notice and hearing
before his dismissal. We shall impose a
similar sanction in the case at bar, repeating that:

However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for
failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The
dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due
process. Petitioner committed an
infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an
investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from
employment. Considering the
circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the
amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends on
the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the
employer.

But the procedural defect notwithstanding, the validity of the
cause of his dismissal remains unimpaired. That flaw
has not washed clean the sin of his dishonesty. His conviction of the same charge of stealing
electric current from the petitioner only bolsters our finding that there was
indeed lawful cause for his dismissal. As for his appeal for sympathy, we reiterate what we said in PLDT v. NLRC,^[21] thus:

x
x x Social justice cannot be permitted to be a refuge of scoundrels any
more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so
only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because
they happen to be poor. This great
policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have
proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause
of labor with the blemishes of their own character.

One last point. The Labor
Arbiter classified PANELCO III as a commercial utility firm and thus applied the rates for non-agricultural workers (outside Metro Manila) in Wage Orders
Numbers 4, 5, and 6 which are P31.00/day, P34.00/day and P36.00/day, respectively. This resulted in an award of:

1) P156.00 as salary differential and P39.00 as deficiency in
emergency cost of living allowance for the month of November;

2) P441.00 as salary differential for the second half of the month
of June up to October 31, 1984, and

3) P39.00 as salary differential for the period covering May up
to June 15, 1984.

Significantly, while the public respondent initially classified the petitioner as a commercial
entity, it now recognizes in its Comment that PANELCO is a retail establishment as defined in
the rules implementing the questioned orders, to wit:

“Retail Establishment” is one principally engaged in the
sale of goods to endusers for personal or household use.

From the aforequoted definition, PANELCO should have indeed been
classified as a retail establishment or a service entity, pursuant to Sections 3 and 35 of P.D. 269
providing as follows:

Sec. 3. Definitions.

(c) “Public service entities” shall
mean (1) a cooperative, (2) the NPC, and (3) local governments and privately-owned
public service entities in operation which furnish and are empowered to furnish
retail electric service.

Sec. 35. Non-profit, Non-discriminatory, Area
Coverage Operation and Service. – A cooperative shall be operated on
non-profit basis for the mutual benefit of its members and patrons.

Accordingly, what should have
been applied was the rate for retail/service establishments (outside
Metro Manila with more than ten (10) workers) which under Wage Order No. 4 is
only P27.00/day, and under Wage Order No. 5 is P30.00/day. There was no underpayment since Perejas was
then receiving P30.00 per day. However,
under Wage Order No. 6, which took effect on November 1, 1984, he was underpaid
by P2.00/day, not by P6.00/day as held by the Labor Arbiter, since the minimum
daily wage for workers of retail entities was only P32.00 then.

WHEREFORE, the private respondent having been
dismissed for lawful cause, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Nevertheless, as the manner of his dismissal did not conform to the
procedural requirements, the petitioner is required to pay directly to Luzon
Perejas, by way of indemnity, the sum of P1,000.00 for violation of his right
to due process. PANELCO shall also pay
him the amount of FIFTY TWO PESOS (P52.00) as salary differential and THIRTY NINE PESOS (P39.00) as deficiency in the emergency cost-of-living allowance for the month of
November, 1984, with legal interest from the said date until actual
payment. It is so ordered.

Padilla, Griño-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rollo,
p. 28.

^[2]
Annex “B,” Rollo, p. 16.

^[3]
Annex “C,” Rollo, p. 17.

^[4]
Annex “D,” Rollo, p. 18.

^[5]
Annex “E,” Rollo, p. 19.

^[6]
Annex “F,” Rollo, p. 20.

^[7]
Annex “J-1,” Rollo, p. 25.

^[8]
Annex “L-1,” Rollo, p. 53.

^[9]
Annex “C,” supra.

^[10]
Annex “E,” supra.

^[11]
Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 681; Golden Farms, Inc. v.
Bughao, 195 SCRA 322; Reyes v.
Zamora, 90 SCRA 92.

^[12]
Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, supra.

^[13]
Rollo, p. 124.

^[14]
Rule 129, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.

^[15]
Del Carmen v. NLRC, 203 SCRA 245.

^[16]
64 SCRA 56.

^[17]
58 SCRA 120.

^[18]
G.R. No. 102023, promulgated November 6, 1992.

^[19]
198 SCRA 761.

^[20]
170 SCRA 69.

^[21]
164 SCRA 671.