G.R. No. 89684. September 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GERARDO SAZON, ALIAS “INSIK,” ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
REGALADO, J.:
For the death of Wilfredo Longno, alias “Inday,”
on September 17, 1983 at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo
City, herein accused-appellant
Gerardo Sazon, alias “Insik,”
and Cornelio Altejos, alias “Toto,” were
charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,[1]
in an amended information dated October
18, 1983.[2]
However, only herein accused was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty, since
Cornelio Altejos was not apprehended and has since
remained at large.
After trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to serve
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs of
the deceased the amount of P16,628.40 representing hospital bills, expenses for
the coffin, tomb, wake and attorney’s fees, and P30,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of the victim.
The antecedental facts which led to the
filing of the criminal action below are hereinunder
set forth as synthesized by the court a quo from the testimonies
of the witnesses,[3]
and as clarified and amplified by us from the transcripts of the notes of the
hearings.
On September 15, 1983,
in the barangay aforementioned, a certain Ernesto Romualdez was accosted by appellant near the barangay hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that
appellant and his companions were engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez which caused the latter to fall. Wilfredo Longno, who was then present at the scene, approached and
helped the fallen Romualdez and pushed appellant
away. This apparently angered appellant
who, in his native dialect said, “Andam ka lang Inday kay
patyon ta guid,” (“Watch out Inday
for I will kill you”) to which Longno
retorted. “Just do it.”
Two days later, or on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 o’clock
P.M., appellant and his cousin, Cornelio Altejos,
were drinking softdrinks at the store of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed
by. Thereupon, appellant and Altejos left their softdrinks
half-consumed and followed Longno.
Longno eventually reached the bench
near the public faucet where the group of Massulini Dullete, Samuel Canoso and
Nathaniel Ramos were sitting. He joined
the group in their conversation by saying, “Upod
ako dira,” (“I’ll
go with what you say.”). Shortly
thereafter, appellant and Altejos arrived and
appellant accosted and pointed a gun at Longno,
saying, “Maano ka?” (“What are you
going to do?”). Longno
then faced appellant and said, “Brod, tiruha lang.” (“Brod,
just shoot.”)
Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun,
hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete, Canoso and Ramos then scampered for safety as appellant and
the wounded Longno grappled for the gun. It was while the two were thus struggling
that Altejos stabbed Longno
in the chest, after which both appellant and Altejos
ran away.
Longno then came out of the footwalk shouting, “Tay,
tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno
ako ni Toto.”
(“Father, I was shot by Insik and stabbed by
Toto.”). He was able to run about
thirty (30) meters before he fell. His
father, Julio Longno, ran to his son who was then
lying sprawled on ground. Rushed to the St.
Paul’s Hospital, Wilfredo Longno died. Later,
it was established that the cause of death was hemorrhage, secondary to stab
wound.
Appellant’s version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot Longno
but pleads self-defense. He claims that
on September 17, 1983, he
left the house of his father-in-law at about 8:00
o’clock P.M. with his cousin, Altejos. The latter had asked for help to have a .22
caliber revolver repaired and appellant was taking the revolver to a policeman
friend of his. On their way, appellant
saw Longno from a distance. Upon his approach, Longno
allegedly said, “Insik, I heard that you are not
afraid of me. Maybe you want to be
taught a lesson.”[4]
Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in his
waist and was about to draw the same. He, therefore, parried the gun but it fired
hitting one of appellant’s left fingers which was later amputated. It was then that appellant pulled out his gun
and shot Longno in the forearm. Appellant and Longno
afterwards grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to separate appellant and Longno but he was brushed aside by the latter. In the course of their struggle, Altejos then shouted to appellant, “I stabbed Inday, run,” and so he and Altejos
ran away.[5]
Appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignment of
errors:
1.
The trial court erred in not acquitting the
accused-appellant for having acted in complete self-defense.
2.
The trial court erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime of murder and in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua when the prosecution has not
established by competent evidence the existence of conspiracy and the presence
of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength.[6]
Appellant’s version does not inspire credence. Well-entrenched is the rule that where the
accused invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. For, even if the prosecution evidence is
weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the
killing.[7]
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of unlawful aggression is
a condition sine qua non.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim
has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.[8]
In the present case, the burden of evidence having been shifted,
we hold that the defense failed to establish the primary element of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim and, therefore, the plea of self-defense
must fail. The narrations of the
sequence of events by the accused, and by the lone alleged eyewitness for the
defense, Jose Randera, are unconvincing primarily on
account of their inherent inconsistency and conflict with each other.
Appellant on cross-examination testified as follows:
“Q How far were you
from Inday Longno when he
allegedly fired a shot at you?
A One (1) meter.
Q At one (1) meter distance
did (sic) you not able to recognize what kind of a gun was that allegedly used
by Inday Longno?
A No, sir, at first I only
saw the handle of the gun and I did not see the body of the gun.
Q But you can recognize
between a pistol and a revolver?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that allegedly
used by Inday Longno, was
that a pistol or a revolver?
A Because immediately
after he said those words ‘Maybe you want to learn a lesson’ he immediately
drew his gun and I was able to parry.
x x x
Q When you fired at Inday Longno hitting him on his
left arm near the elbow, was he still holding that gun he used in shooting you
hitting you at the left palm?
A No, sir, because of too
much force the gun fell.
Q Did you not pick up the
gun?
A No, sir.”[9]
On the other hand, defense eyewitness Jose Randera
stated in his testimony:
“ATTY. SORONGON: (To
the witness)
Q While Wilfredo
Longno alias Inday was
pointing a gun at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, what was Gerardo Sazon
doing?
WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:
A When Inday
said something, Insik Sazon
brushed aside the gun and the gun fired.
x x x
Q You said, that Wilfredo Longno alias Inday pointed a gun at Gerardo Sazon
alias Insik, with what hand was he holding that gun
when he was pointing that gun to Gerardo Sazon?
WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:
A His right hand.
ATTY. SORONGON: (To the
witness)
Q You said, that Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun which was being pointed to him,
what hand did Gerardo Sazon used (sic) in brushing
that gun?
A His left hand.
Q When Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun pointed to him, what else if
any did he do?
A Insik
also drew a gun and shot Inday.
COURT: (To the witness)
Q What hand?
A Right hand. He drew a gun with his right hand and shot Inday.
x x x
ATTY. SORONGON: (To the
witness)
Q You said that there was a
brushing who was brushing aside and who was brushed aside?
WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:
A Inday
parried Cornelio Artejos (sic).
COURT: (To the witness)
Q And, what happened next?
A Cornelio Artejos (sic) pulled out a knife and stabbed Inday.
Q This happened when Inday was already hit by Sazon?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. SORONGON: (To the
witness)
Q When Cornelio Artejos (sic) stabbed Wilfredo Longno alias Inday, what was
Gerardo Sazon and Wilfredo Longno doing if they were doing anything?
A They were graffling of (sic) the weapon.
Q You are referring to
whose weapon they were graffling (sic) at that time?
A Inday’s weapon.”[10]
The testimonies aforequoted reveal an
inconsistency on the matter of the gun for which appellant and the victim
supposedly grappled. While appellant
claimed that the victim’s weapon fell to the ground, witness Randera stated that appellant and the victim still grappled
for the latter’s gun. The latter
statement is itself difficult to imagine since appellant at that precise moment
was also allegedly holding with his right hand the gun which he used in
shooting Longno.
It is necessary to stress that such inconsistency cannot be
considered a minor detail since the homogeneity of the answers to the inquiry
could very well have established the existence of not only a single gun. Had this prevarication not been exposed, said
testimonies could have bolstered the defense theory that the victim himself
carried a gun which he used to assault the appellant and thus establish the
element of unlawful aggression contrived by the defense.
Furthermore, the credibility of witness Randera
is shattered by this finding of the trial court which is sustained by the
evidence:
“The testimony of security guard Jose Randera
deserves scant consideration not only because he admitted that he was one of
those threatened by the deceased Wilfredo Longno but also because he wilfully
falsified the truth when he testified that the deceased was shot and hit by the
accused on the body and that he saw blood come out just below the right breast
of the deceased. The physical evidence
in this case showed that there was no wound on the right breast of the deceased
nor on any part of his body. The gunshot
wound sustained by the deceased was only on his left forearm. Considering that he testified that there were
no other persons there during the incident except the accused, the deceased and
Cornelio Altejos when the overwhelming weight of
evidence is that there were a lot of other people during the incident (this)
showed that this witness had small regard for the truth.”[11]
Coming back to appellant’s representations in court, his
vacillation as to what he allegedly did after Altejos
stabbed the victim is another instance which renders his version highly
suspect. While stating on direct
examination that he ran to the main road,[12] he
claimed on cross-examination that he only walked a short distance and then went
to the hospital upon seeing that his hand was wounded.[13]
The latter statement is itself inconsistent with his earlier declaration during
the same proceeding that he was brought by a policeman to the hospital.[14]
This irresolution on the part of the appellant was obviously to avoid any
imputation of guilt against him arising from his flight.[15]
At any rate, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is
further negated by the physical evidence in the case. Again, we quote the trial court with
approval:
“The testimony of the accused Gerardo Sazon
that the deceased was armed with a gun and fired at him is not borne out by the
physical evidence in this case. The
paraffin test conducted on the cadaver of the deceased showed that the hands of
the deceased were negative for gunpowder residues indicating that he did not
fire a gun during the incident. The
other parts of his body like his forearm and his abdomen bore strong traces of
gunpowder residues because of the burst of the gun of the accused. The court is convinced beyond reasonable
doubt that there was only one gun during the incident and that the gun belonged
to and/or was used by the accused Gerardo Sazon. That apart of one of his fingers was blown
off at very close range, according to Dr. Ely Canja,
strongly indicated that the accused accidentally hit his finger when he and the
deceased grappled for the possession of the gun.”[16]
In contrast, appellant was found positive for the presence of
gunpowder residues (nitrates). While the
presence or absence of nitrates cannot indeed be considered conclusive proof
that one has or has not fired a gun, the following testimony on direct
examination by prosecution witness Zenaida Sinfuego, a forensic chemist whose expertise on the matter
was sufficiently established, yields this verification:
“Atty. E. Original:
Q Now,
have you conducted also a paraffin examination on the person of Wilfredo Longno?
COURT:
On the cadaver?
Atty. E. Original:
Q On
the cadaver?
A Yes,
Sir.
Q Have
you brought with you the result of that examination?
A Yes,
Sir.
Q Now I have here a carbon original of
Chemistry Report No. C-200-83, result of the paraffin test on the cadaver of Wilfredo Longno, please compare
this carbon original to the original copy in your possession whether it is the
same?
A The same.
x x x
Q This report says specimen submitted, one
pair of paraffin casts taken from the left and right hands of the cadaver of
one Wilfredo Longno, one
piece of paraffin cast taken from left forearm of same subject and one piece
paraffin cast taken from the left side of the abdomen. Purpose of laboratory examination: to determine the presence of gunpowder
residues (nitrates) on the above-mentioned specimens. Findings, cast from hands – negative for the
presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates).
Cast from forearm – positive for the presence of gunpowder residues
(nitrates) in the 1 1/2 in, 2 1/2 in, 3 in, and 4 in radius. Cast from the left side of the abdomen –
positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the center and in
the 1 and 2 in radius. In the layman’s
language Mrs. Sinfuego, will you please explain to
the Honorable Court these findings 1, 2 and 3?
A Casts
from the hands, negative for the presence of gunpowder residues that means
that, no blue specks were found in the hands of the cadaver.
COURT:
Q Before
we go on, what is the implication when the finding is negative?
A Probably,
the subject never fired a gun.
Q Within
what time-span?
A The
gunpowder will stay only within three days.
Q When
was this examination conducted?
A Last
September 18, 1983.
Q Now before we go on, on
that Chemistry Report which has been marked as Exhibit ‘D’ regarding the
paraffin test conducted on the right hand of the accused Gerardo Sazon, your finding there states, positive for gunpowder
residues, what is the implication?
A The
implication states positive, that Sazon have (sic)
fired a gun.
Q Within
what time-span?
A Within
three days.
Q Within
three days?
A Within
three days.
Q From
the examination?
A Three
days from the subject firing of a gun.
Q And
when was the examination conducted?
A Last
September 19, 1983, Your
Honor.
Q September?
A Nineteen.
Q So
he could have fired a gun on September
17, 1983?
A I
think that depends, Your Honor on the requesting party.
Q I am asking you if it was
possible that he fired a gun which left the powder burns, was it possible that
he fired a gun on September 17?
A Yes, Your Honor.”[17]
On cross-examination, Sinfuego further
testified as follows:
“Q Is
it possible for a person who has not fired a firearm and could be (sic)
positive for nitrates?
A Yes,
Sir.
Q In
what instance?
A For example, if he is
near to the person firing a gun it is possible that it was carried by the wind.
Q So
that is the only case wherein you find nitrates on the person who has not fired
a gun?
A Also
from the fertilizer.
Q You
mean, a person handling fertilizers could also be positive for nitrates?
A Yes, Sir but we have to
consider also the time of reaction, from contaminance
(sic) for the nitrates will take effect between two to three minutes.
COURT:
Q Can you determine on your
examination whether the nitrates found was (sic) the nitrates left by gunpowder
residues or by fertilizer can you distinguish that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this (sic) nitrates
found on the hands of the accused, could you determine where did it (sic) come
from?
A Gunpowder
residues.”[18]
Parenthetically, it is true that the bad moral character of the
offended party may be proven in evidence to establish in any reasonable degree
the probability of the offense charged,[19]
e.g., the quarrelsome nature of the victim may tend to establish that he
started the unlawful aggression.
Nonetheless, such evidence, seeking to establish as it does only a
probability, cannot prevail over facts sufficiently proven by the prosecution
during the trial belying such aggression.
These observations find application in the instant case where the
defense presented and now argue on character evidence consisting of criminal
charges involving minor offenses which had been filed against the deceased, but
not one of which resulted in conviction and were in fact dismissed, except for
one case which was sent to the archives.[20]
Obviously, whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is
essentially a question of fact. Being so
and in the absence of any showing that the court a quo failed to
appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have
altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses
during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, lies for
this Court to disturb the trial court’s finding that appellant did not act in
self-defense.[21]
The Court, however, holds that appellant, albeit guilty, can only
be convicted of homicide and not murder.
The trial court correctly held that the killing was not accompanied by
treachery. It, however, ruled that there
was evident premeditation on the part of appellant. We find the records sorely wanting in
evidence to support the latter conclusion.
The fact that appellant told the deceased that he would kill him
and that two days later, after the deceased passed by the store where appellant
and Altejos were drinking softdrinks
the latter followed the former and inflicted the fatal blows, cannot adequately
sustain a conclusion of premeditated killing.
To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the
time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[22]
In the case at bar, the first and second elements are
lacking. The angry outburst of appellant
in that incident of September 15, 1983,
warning the victim that the former would kill him, does not convince us that,
under the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already decided
to kill the victim. A homicidal
premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that
and, worse, publicly announced. It was
more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado on the part of
appellant.
Again, the circumstance that appellant and Altejos
were by chance at the store when the victim passed by cannot be taken as
manifestly indicating that appellant had clung to his determination to kill the
victim. No evidence was presented to
show that appellant purposely waited there for the deceased. Nor was there any showing that the deceased
frequently passed by the same route as to warrant and explain appellant’s
waiting for the former at that place.
Indeed, that the meeting may have been purely accidental is not a remote
possibility. We are more inclined to
believe that it was the belligerent and defiant demeanor of the victim when
confronted by appellant near the public faucet that precipitated the assault.
Under such considerations and there being no other evidence to
prove that the death of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or
reflection, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing
to murder.[23]
The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be proved in an
evident and incontestable manner. They
must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense.[24]
Thus, for the same reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength cannot be appreciated in this case.
Superior strength may aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is
clearly shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of it.[25]
In the absence of any evidence to show that the accused purposely sought to use
their superior strength to their advantage in the present case, a finding to
that effect by the trial court cannot be sustained.
Finally, the fact that appellant did not inflict the mortal wound
upon the deceased is of no moment, since the existence of conspiracy was
satisfactorily shown by the evidence.
The coordinated acts of appellant and Altejos
of immediately following the victim and jointly confronting him thereafter
reveal a concordance and unity of thought which resulted in the encounter. The circumstances that after the accused shot
the victim in the forearm and, while he and the victim were grappling for
appellant’s gun, Altejos stabbed the victim to death,
indicate closeness and coordination of their action geared towards a common
purpose, that is, to kill the victim.[26]
Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is not absolutely essential
to establish a conspiracy. It is
sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective,[27]
as such circumstance is invariably indicative of a conspiratorial agreement.
It bears mention, at this point, that while we have ruled out
evident premeditation in the case, this does not negate the existence of a
conspiracy. True, conspiracy generally
involves evident premeditation, but this circumstance requires for its raison
d’etre a sufficient time in a juridical sense
for the accused to meditate and reflect on the consequences of his intended
action. Such time element is not an
indispensable requirement for a conspiracy to exist.[28]
Consequently, we find that there was a conspiracy between appellant and Altejos although, for lack of conclusive showing, we cannot
consider evident premeditation against appellant.
The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to
who inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction.[29]
The act of one in killing the victim becomes the act of all the accused. Insofar as Cornelio Altejos
is concerned, however, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over him and
he can neither be convicted nor exculpated herein. References in this judgment to him are,
therefore, obiter and with no binding effect on him.[30]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED. Accused–appellant Gerardo Sazon is declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
The award by the lower court of the items of civil liability to
be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs of the deceased is hereby MODIFIED by
disallowing the grant of attorney’s fees for lack of basis, and increasing the
death indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy adopted by the
Court en banc on August 30, 1990.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.
Paras, J., on leave.
[1]
Judge Sixto R. Guanzon,
presiding.
[2]
Original Record, 15.
[3] Rollo, 32-35.
[4] Ibid.,
38-39.
[5] Ibid.,
39.
[6] Ibid.,
56.
[7]
People vs. Bayocot, G.R. No. 55285, June 28, 1989.
[8]
People vs. Batas, et al., G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989.
[9]
TSN, March 1, 1988, 16-17.
[10]
TSN, September 17, 1985, 10-14.
[11] Rollo, 40.
[12]
TSN, October 12, 1987, 244.
[13]
TSN, March 1, 1988, 270.
[14] Ibid.,
264.
[15]
See U.S. vs.
Alegado, 25 Phil. 510 (1913).
[16] Rollo, 41-42.
[17]
TSN, February 8, 1984, 30-32.
[18] Ibid.,
34-35,
[19]
Section 51, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[20]
TSN, February 26, 1988, 231-233.
[21]
People vs. Alvarez, etc., 163 SCRA 745 (1988).
[22]
People vs. Talla, et al., G.R. No. L-44414, January 18, 1990.
[23] U.S.
vs. Balagtas, et al., 19 Phil. 164 (1911).
[24]
People vs. Tiongson, 130 SCRA 614 (1984);
People vs. Atienza, 148 SCRA 147 (1987).
[25]
People vs. Salcedo, et al., 172 SCRA 78
(1989).
[26]
People vs. Kindo, et al., 95 SCRA 553 (1980).
[27]
People vs. Abueg, 145 SCRA 622 (1986); People vs.
Cantre, et al., G.R. No. 70743, June 4, 1990.
[28]
People vs. Custodio, et al., 97 Phil. 698
(1955); People vs. Arcamo, etc., et al., 105
SCRA 707 (1981).
[29]
People vs. Tala, et al., 141 SCRA 240 (1986)
[30]
People vs. Eswan, et al., G.R. No. 84713, June 4, 1990.