REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU: THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), AFP ANTI-GRAFT BOARD, COL. ERNESTO A. PUNSALANG AND PETER T. TABANG, PETITIONERS, VS. HO…

This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through the New Armed Forces of the Philippines
Anti-Graft Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”), to investigate and cause the prosecution of
petitioner, a retired military officer, for violation of Republic Acts Nos.
3019 and 1379.

Assailed by the Republic in this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order are the orders of
respondent judge in Civil Case No. 57092 Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Metro Manila:  (1) dated June 23, 1989, denying petitioners’
Motion to Dismiss and Opposition, and (2) dated June 26, 1989, granting private
respondent’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.  Thus, the petition seeks the
annulment of the two orders, the issuance of an injunction to enjoin respondent
judge from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092 and, finally, the dismissal of
the case before the trial court.

The controversy traces its roots to the order of then PCGG
Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
dated May 13, 1986, which
created the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board.  The Board was created to “investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in
active service.” The order further stated that “[t]he Board shall be primarily
charged with the task of investigating cases of alleged violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended) and shall make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate government agencies and instrumentalities with
respect to the action to be taken thereon based on its findings.”

Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the
acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was
required by the Board to submit his explanation/comment together with his
supporting evidence by October 31, 1987 [Annex “B”, Petition.] Private
respondent requested, and was granted, several postponements, but was unable to
produce his supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of
his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.

Just the same, the Board
proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, dated June 30,
1988, recommending
that private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No.
3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.

The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG.  Private respondent moved to dismiss the case on
the following grounds:  (1) that the PCGG
has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against him under Rep.
Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3)
that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379
on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having
retired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act
No. 3019.  The Board opposed the motion
to dismiss.

In a resolution dated February
8, 1989, the PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit.  Private respondent moved for
reconsideration but this was denied by the PCGG in a resolution dated March 8, 1989.  Private respondent was directed to submit his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence on
March 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m.

On March
13, 1989, private
respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with
the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila.  The case was docketed as Case No. 57092 and
raffled to Branch 151, respondent judge’s court.  Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and
opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
the principal ground that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the
Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pena, G.R.
No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556. 
Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.  Petitioner replied to the opposition.

On June   23, 1989, respondent judge denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss.  On June 26, 1989, respondent judge
granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining petitioners from investigating or prosecuting private respondent
under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Hence, the instant petition.

On August
29, 1989, the Court
issued a restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing his orders
dated June 23, 1989
and June 26, 1989 and from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

Private respondent filed his comment, to which petitioners filed
a reply.  A rejoinder to the reply was
filed by private respondent.  The Court
gave due course to the petition and the parties filed their memoranda.  Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.

The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

I

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING
JURISDICTION OVER AND INTERFERING WITH THE ORDERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT.

II

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED JUNE 26, 1989 ENJOINING PETITIONERS FROM INVESTIGATING
AND PROSECUTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND REPUBLIC ACT NO.
1379, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT FOR THE FORFEITURE OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED
PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19.]

As to the first issue, petitioner contends that following the
ruling of the Court in PCGG v. Pena the Board, being a
creation and/or extension of the PCGG, is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.  On the second
issue, petitioner strongly argues that the private respondent’s case falls
within the jurisdiction of the PCGG.

The pivotal issue is the
second one.  On this point, private
respondent’s position is as follows:

1.  . . . he is not one of the subordinates
contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts
being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means
while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own
alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or
subordinate as the petition does not allege so. 
Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him. . . .

If indeed private respondent amassed wealth beyond his legal means,
the procedure laid down by Rep. Act 1379 as already pointed out before be
applied.  And since, he has been
separated from the government more than four years ago, the action against him
under Republic Act 1379 has already prescribed.

2.  . . . no action can be filed anymore against
him now under Republic Act 1379 for recovery of unexplained wealth for the
reason that he has retired more than four years ago.

3.  The order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board
(Annex “A”, Petition) is null and void. 
Nowhere in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A is
there any authority given to the commission, its chairman and members, to
create Boards or bodies to be invested with powers similar to the powers
invested with the commission. . . . [Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo,
pp. 117-118.]

1.  The most important
question to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondent may
be investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the
PCGG, for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379.  According to petitioners, the PCGG has the
power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he
is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos. They cite the PCGG’s jurisdiction over –

(a)  The
recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by
them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.  [E. O. No. 1, sec. 2.]

Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done
during the administration of Pres. Marcos. 
However, what has to be inquired into is whether or not private
respondent acted as a “subordinate” of Pres. Marcos within the
contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG, when he allegedly
unlawfully acquired the properties.

A close reading of E.O. No. 1 and related executive orders will
readily show what is contemplated within the term “subordinate.”

The Whereas Clauses of E.O. No. 1 express the urgent need to
recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.

E.O. No. 2 freezes “all assets and properties in the Philippines
in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates,
business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or
participation.”

Applying the rule in
statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is –

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things,
by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned
[Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Register of Deeds of Davao,
96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954), citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203.]

the
term “subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a
close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar
to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and
the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.

Thus, as stated by the
Court in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering
Co., Inc. v. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987,
150 SCRA 181, 205-206:

The situations envisaged and sought to be governed [by Proclamation
No. 3 and E.O. Nos. 1, 2 and 14] are self-evident, these being:

1)   that
“(i)ll-gotten properties
(were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime”;

a)       
more particularly, that “(i)ll-gotten wealth (was)
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, * * located in the Philippines or
abroad, * * (and) business enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or
controlled by them, during * * (the Marcos) administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship;”

b)       
otherwise stated, that “there are
assets and properties pertaining to former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees
which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a
result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the
Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their
office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their
unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines”;

c)       
that “said assets and properties
are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks,
buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and
other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various
countries of the world;” and

2)   that certain “business enterprises and
properties (were) taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or
by entities or persons close to former President Marcos.” [Footnotes deleted.]

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or
was a government official or employee during the administration of former Pres.
Marcos.  There must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.  This is so because otherwise the respondent’s
case will fall under existing general laws and procedures on the matter.  Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, penalizes the corrupt practices of any public officer.  Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring
Forfeited in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property
shall be presumed, prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired
[Sec. 2.] The Solicitor General shall file the petition and prosecute the case
in behalf of the Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or
city prosecutor (Ibid.)

Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being
investigated for unlawfully acquired wealth under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379,
and not under E.O. Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

Since private respondent was being investigated by the PCGG
through the AFP Anti-Graft Board it would have been presumed that this was under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 in
relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. 
But the record itself belies this presumption:

(a)   The letter of the chairman of the AFP
Anti-Graft Board to private respondent, dated October 16, 1987, states: 
“This letter is in connection with the alleged information received by
the AFP Anti-Graft Board indicating your acquisition of wealth beyond legal
means of income in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.” [Rollo, p. 39.]

(b)    The
Resolution dated June 30, 1988
of the Board categorically states:

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:

This refers to the case against Col Troadio
B Tecson PC (Ret) for alleged unexplained wealth
pursuant to R.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and R.A. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the “Act for
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property”. 
[Rollo, p. 43.]

The resolution alleges
that private respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by taking advantage of
his office as Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary.  No attempt is made in the Board’s resolution
to link him or his accumulation of wealth to former Pres. Marcos and/or his
wife.

(c) The letter of the Board chairman to the chairman of the PCGG,
dated July 28, 1988, is clear:

Respectfully transmitted herewith for the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan is the case folder of COLONEL TROADIO TECSON
(Ret) who after preliminary investigation of the case by the Board, found a prima facie evidence against
subject officer for violating Section 8, R.A. 3019, as amended by BP 195,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379,
otherwise known as an Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.”
[Rollo, p. 46.]

Moreover, from the
allegations of petitioner in its memorandum, it would appear that private
respondent accumulated his wealth for his own account.  Petitioner quoted the letter of Ignacio Datahan, a retired PC sergeant, to General Fidel Ramos, the
material portion of which reads:

. . .  After an official in
the military unit received an Allotment Advice the same signed a cash advance
voucher, let us say in the amount of 5,000.00.  Without much ado, outright, Col. Tecson paid the amount. 
The official concerned was also made to sign the receipt portion on the
voucher the amount of which was left blank. 
Before the voucher is passed for routine processing by Mrs. Leonor Cagas, clerk of Col. Tecson and its facilitator, the maneuver began.  The amount on the face of the cash advance
voucher is altered or superimposed.  The
original amount of P5,000.00 was now made say,
P95,000.00.  So it was actually the
amount of P95,000.00 that appeared on the
records.  The difference of P90,000.00 went to the syndicate.

. . .  Boy Tanyag, bookkeeper in Col. Tecson’s
office took care of the work.

. . .  In the liquidation of
the altered cash advance amount, names of persons found in the Metropolitan Manila
Telephone Directory with fictitious addresses appeared as recipients or
payees.  Leonor
and Boy got their shares on commission basis of the looted amount while the
greater part went to Col. Tecson.  [Rollo, pp.
184-185.]

Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that
contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

2.   It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG
Chairman, dated May 13, 1986,
creating the Board and authorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service, to
support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private
respondent.  The PCGG cannot do more than
what it was empowered to do.  Its powers
are limited.  Its task is limited to the
recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses,
their relatives and cronies.  The PCGG
cannot, through an order of its chairman, grant itself additional powers –
powers not contemplated in its enabling law.

3.   Petitioner assails the trial court’s cognizance
of the petition filed by private respondent. 
Particularly, petitioner argues that the trial court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the PCGG.  This matter
has already been settled in Pena, supra, where the Court ruled
that those who wish to question or challenge the PCGG’s
acts or orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan,
which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction.  The Sandiganbayan’s
decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by this Court.  [Ibid,
at pp. 564-565.]

The ruling in Pena
was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R.
No. 77816, June 30, 1988, 163
SCRA 363, Soriano III v. Yuzon, G.R.
No. 74910 (and five other
cases), August 10, 1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer
v. RTC, NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No. 81385, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 478, among others,
to enjoin the regional trial courts from interfering with the actions of the PCGG.

Respondent judge clearly acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 57092 and issued the
writ of preliminary injunction against the PCGG.

4.   Thus, we are confronted with a situation
wherein the PCGG acted in excess
of its jurisdiction and, hence, may be enjoined from doing so, but the court
that issued the injunction against the PCGG
has not been vested by law with jurisdiction over it and, thus, the
injunction issued was null and void.

The nullification of the assailed order of respondent judge issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
is therefore in order.  Likewise,
respondent judge must be enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and
1379, the PCGG must also be
enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that
may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency.  The rule of law mandates that an agency of
government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted it.

5.   The pronouncements made above should not be
taken to mean that the PCGG’s creation of the AFP
Anti-Graft Board is a nullity and that the PCGG has no authority to investigate
and cause the prosecution of members and former members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines
for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379. 
The PCGG may investigate and cause the prosecution of active and retired
members of the AFP for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 only in
relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, i.e., insofar as they involve the recovery of the
ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos and his family and “cronies.” But the
PCGG would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling under Rep. Acts
Nos. 3019 and 1379, as in the case at bar. 
E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A did not envision the PCGG as the
investigator and prosecutor of all unlawful accumulations of wealth.  The PCGG was created for a specific and
limited purpose, as we have explained earlier, and necessarily its powers must
be construed with this in mind.

6.   In his pleadings, private respondent contends
that he may no longer be prosecuted because of prescription.  He relies on section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379
which provides that “[t]he right to file such petition [for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired wealth] shall prescribe within four years from the date of
resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the officer
or employee concerned.” He retired on May 9, 1984, or more than six (6) years
ago.  However, it must be pointed out
that section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 should be deemed amended or repealed by
Article XI, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “[t]he
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall
not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.” Considering that sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 was
deemed amended or repealed before the prescriptive period provided therein had
lapsed insofar as private respondent is concerned, we cannot say that he had
already acquired a vested right that may not be prejudiced by a subsequent enactment.

Moreover, to bar the Government from recovering ill-gotten wealth
would result in the validation or legitimization of the unlawful acquisition, a
consequence at variance with the clear intent of Rep. Act No. 1379, which
provides:

SEC. 11. 
Laws on prescription. –
The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions cannot
be invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent, in respect to any
property unlawfully acquired by him.

Thus, we hold that
the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e., the city
or provincial prosecutor and the Solicitor General under sec. 2 of Rep. Act No.
1379, may still investigate the case and file the petition for the forfeiture
of unlawfully acquired wealth against private respondent, now a private
citizen.  (On the other hand, as regards
respondents for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 who are still in the
government service, the agency granted the power to investigate and prosecute
them is the Office of the Ombudsman [Rep. Act No. 6770].) Under Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as amended, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 violations of
Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 shall be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

7.   The Court hastens to add that this decision
is without prejudice to the prosecution of private respondent under the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other related penal laws.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated June 26,
1989 in Civil Case No. 57092 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.  Respondent judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil
Case No. 57092.  The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court on August 29, 1989 is MADE
PERMANENT.  The PCGG is ENJOINED from
proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent in I.S.
No. 37, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the
appropriate prosecution agency.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Grino-Aquino,
Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., on leave.