PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROSALINO DUNGO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the
Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting
the accused of the crime of murder.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

On March 24, 1987,
the prosecuting attorney of the Province
of Pampanga
filed an information charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of
murder, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the
Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife,
with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest, stomach,
throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds
which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino
Sigua.

“All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation and the generic aggravating
circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the
field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities are
engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength
and cruelty.” (Record, p. 2)

On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino
Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.  Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that
on March 16, 1987 between
the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, a male person,
identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua
was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit,
Pampanga. 
After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was
carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times.  Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down
the staircase and out of the DAR’s office with blood
stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon.  (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN,
pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).

The autopsy report (Exh. “A”)
submitted by Dra. Melinda dela
Cruz Cabugawan, reveals that the victim sustained
fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased,
testified that, sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the
actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so many documents from the
accused.  Rodolfo Sigua
explained to the accused the procedure
in the Department of Agrarian
Reform but the latter just said “never mind, I could do it my own
way.” Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his
wife’s annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of P75,000.00 for
the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of his wife.  (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was
insane at the time of the
commission of the offense.

The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused.  According to her, her husband had been
engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went
to Lebanon for
six (6) months.  Later, in December 1983, her husband again
left for Saudi Arabia
and worked as welder.  Her husband did
not finish his two-year contract because he got sick.  Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. 
He was confined for one week at the Macabali
Clinic.  Thereafter he had his monthly
check-up.  Because of his sickness, he
was not able to resume his farming.  The
couple, instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend.  Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she
noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children
when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers
even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when their children quarreled
with other children.  There were also
times when her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire
when in truth they were not.  On the
fateful day of March 16, 1987,
at around noon time, her husband
complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not bother to buy medicine
as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein.  Thereafter, he went back to the store.  When Andrea followed him to the store, he was
no longer there.  She got worried as he
was not in his proper mind.  She looked
for him.  She returned home only when she
was informed that her husband had arrived. 
While on her way home, she heard from people the words “mesaksak” and “menaksak”
(translated as “stabbing” and “has stabbed”).  She saw her husband in her parents-in-­law’s
house with people milling around, including the barangay
officials.  She instinctively asked her
husband why he did such act, but he replied, “that is the only cure for my
ailment.  I have a cancer in my
heart.” Her husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the
victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even
in jail.  The testimony on the statements
of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their
conversation.  (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July
10, 1987).  Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, “here is my
wallet, you surrender me.” However, the barangay
official did not bother to get the wallet from him.  That same day the accused went to Manila.  (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)

Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National
Center for Mental Health testified
that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial
court dated August 17, 1987,
on August 25, 1987.  Based on the reports of their staff, they
concluded that Rosalino Dungo
was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the
alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro­vascular accident or
stroke.  (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988;
TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).

Rosalino Dungo
testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia
as welder.  However, he was not able to
finish his two-year contract when he got sick. 
He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali
Clinic.  However, he claimed that he was
not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua.  He only came
to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua
when he was already in jail.  (TSN, pp.
5-14, July 15, 1988)

Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution.  Dr. Vicente Balatbat
testified that the accused was his patient. 
He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke.  While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the
accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain
resulting in the left side weakness. 
Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino
Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their
clinic.  Dr. Leonardo Bascara
further testified that the accused is functioning at a low level of
intelligence.  (TSN, pp. 6-20, September
1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).

On January 20, 1989,
the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal for the crime of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment
sentencing the accused as follows:

“1.  To suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
accessories of the law;

“2.  To indemnify the
family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage, P20,000.00
as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 30, Rollo)

The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during
the perpetration of the criminal act. 
The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a
pattern to kill the victim.  He was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a
flight in order to evade arrest.  This to
the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane
when he committed the crime.

It is an exercise in
futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the
defendant-appellant.  The only pivotal
issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the commission
of the crime charged.

One who suffers from
insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for
his acts.  His unlawful act is the
product of a mental disease or a mental defect. 
In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal
responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of
cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete
absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.  (People v. Puno,
105 SCRA 151)

It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity.  There is no definite defined border between
sanity and insanity.  Under foreign
jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely:  delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and
the right and wrong test.  Insane
delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis
and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same person
if he is of compos mentis.  Under the
delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of
which no rational person would believe. 
A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or
mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free
agency being at the time destroyed. 
Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from
such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong.  (See 44 C.J.S. 2)

So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays
down a definite test or criterion for insanity. 
However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity
under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that
insanity is “a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect
of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of
the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion,
inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective
faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition.” Insanity as defined
above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties
which is manifested in language or conduct. 
An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequence of his act.

Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject,
such as evidence of the alleged deranged person’s general conduct and
appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his previous character and
habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains.

Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition
of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which
is the subject of inquiry.  However, it
is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable
period both before and after the time of the act in question.  Direct testimony is not required nor the
specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.  The vagaries of the mind can only be known by
outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person;
and through which we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of
people of sound mind.  (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)

In the case at bar, defense’s expert witnesses, who are doctors
of the National Center for Mental Health, concluded that the accused was
suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental disorder
secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke
before, during and after the commission of the crime charged.  (Exhibit L, p. 4).  Accordingly, the mental illness of the
accused was characterized by perceptual disturbances manifested through
impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment of memory and
disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. 
The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic.  The defect of the brain, therefore, is
permanent.

Dr. Echavez, defense’s expert witness,
admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and did not have a
period for normal thinking.  To quote

“Q.    Is there such a lucid intervals?

A.      In this case, considering the nature of
the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals unfortunately are not present,
sir.” (TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)

However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the
manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated with medication.  (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988).  Thus, although the defect of the brain is
permanent, the manifestation of insanity is curable.

Dr. Echavez further testified that the
accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987, thus:

“Q.  In
your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the
patient has been mentally ill?

A.    From
his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad.  If I may be allowed to scan my record, the
record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh
about seven (7) months before his contract expired and he was brought
home.  Sometime in January of 1987, the
first manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes.  He was noted to be in deep thought,
pre-occupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss
of appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir.” (TSN, pp. 21-22,
August 2, 1988)

The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the
doctors of the National Center
for Mental Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez’s
assessment that the accused has been insane since January of 1987 or three (3)
months before the commission of the crime charged.  The doctors arrived at this conclusion based
on the testimonies of the accused’s wife and
relatives, and after a series of medical and psychological examinations on the
accused when he was confined therein. 
However, We are still in quandary as to whether the accused was really
insane or not during the commission of the offense.

The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the
accused, though he may be insane, has no lucid intervals.  It is an undisputed fact that a month or few
weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged the accused confronted the
husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter.  He complained against the various
requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the victim.  We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty.
Rodolfo C. Sigua:

“Q.  In
the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino Dungo?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   Where?

A.    At
our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.

Q.   Could
you tell us what transpired in the
latter part of February 1987, when you met the accused at your residence?

A.    Accused
went to our residence.  When I asked him
what he wanted, accused told me that he wanted to know from my wife why she was
asking so many documents:  why she was
requiring him to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office
of the DAR.  Furthermore, he wanted to
know why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of
the landholding of his deceased father in his name.

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

Q.
  When the accused informed you in the
latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late Belen Macalino
Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the
right of his father, what did you tell him?

A.    I
asked the accused, “Have you talked or met my wife?  Why are you asking this question of me?”

Q.   What
was his answer?

A.    Accused told me that he never talked nor
met my wife but sent somebody to her office to make a request for the transfer
of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.

Q.   When
you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the
accused?

A.    The accused then said, “I now
ascertained that she is making things difficult for the transfer of the
landholding in the name of my father and my name.”

(TSN, pp. 5-7, April
22, 1987)

If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused
was supposed to be mentally ill during this confrontation.  However, it is not usual for an insane person
to confront a specified person who may have wronged him.  Be it noted that the accused was supposed to
be suffering from impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation
that the accused was aware of his acts. 
This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his
insanity admitted of lucid intervals.

The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor
Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could
have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it.  To quote:

“Q.  Could
you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused,
when asked by the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his
lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is waiting for his counsel to appear and
because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing
of the case and to reset the same to another date.  With those facts, do you consider him insane?

A.    I
cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.

Q.   In
other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?

A.    Yes,
sir.

COURT

Q.   How
about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?

A.    Having
examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory
examination, in short all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the
patient, like for example praying for postponement and fleeing from the scene
of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is really insane or
not.  If I may elaborate to explain the
situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the violent behavior, then
he appears normal he can reason out and at the next moment he burst out into
violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. 
This is one of the difficulties we have encountered in this case.  When we deliberated because when we prepared
this case we have really deliberation with all the members of the medical staff
so those are the things we considered. 
Like for example he shouted out ‘Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!’
at that particular moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the criminal
case.

COURT

Q.   With
that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the
victim in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he
shouted those words because he was aware when he did the act?

A.    The
fact that he
shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there.” (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2,
1983; underscoring supplied)

Insanity in law exists
when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence.  The statement of one of the expert witnesses
presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the
accused knew the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful that
accused was insane when he committed the act charged.  As stated by the trial court:

“The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he
perpetrated the act was sane.  The
evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was
carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden.  This is an evidence that the accused
consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim.  The suddenness of the attack classified the
killing as treacherous and therefore murder. 
After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he
stabbed the victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in Metro
Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest.  This to the mind of the Court is another
indicia that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing
the victim.” (Rollo, p. 63)

There is no ground to alter the trial court’s findings and
appreciation of the evidence presented. 
(People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). 
The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment and
demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were
telling the truth or not.

Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of
the accused.  However, in the defense of
insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in favor of
sanity.  The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense.  Thus:

“In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution
for crime, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of
sound mind.  (Art. 800, Civil Code; U.S.
v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305)
Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is
improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288).  x x x Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.  (U.S.
v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218)”
(People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)

The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of
sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance, and as such must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.  Insanity
must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the
ground of insanity.  Appellant has not
successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption that he
committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.

Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. 
(People v. Bonoan, supra)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., in the result.

* Penned by Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion