PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DIONISIO LORENZO Y DE OCAMPO AND JEG GONZALES Y BULAHABO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

An information for robbery
with homicide was filed on April 3,
1989 against accused-appellants Dionisio
Lorenzo y de Ocampo and Jeg
Gonzales y Bulahabo in Criminal Case No. 32610 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 131, Kalookan
City, allegedly committed as
follows:

“That on or about the 31st day of March 1989 in Kalookan City, MM, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain, and by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, take, rob and carry away the following articles, to wit:

Cash more or less amounting to . . . ….	P100,000.00
One (1) ring Brilliant. . . . . . . . . ………..	P 30,000.00
One (1) college ring gold. . . . . …………	P 22,000.00
One (1) solid Gold wrist watch . . . . …..	P 50,000.00
One (1) Gold necklace. . . . . . . . . . . ….	P 10,000.00
	P212,000.00

all belonging to one EDISON PARAS Y ALVARAN,
with (sic) the total amount of P212,000.00, that on the occasion of said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away the aforementioned articles, the herein accused
in pursuance of their conspiracy did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with intent to kill, stab said EDISON PARAS Y ALVARAN, on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
physical injuries which injuries caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Kalookan
City, MM.

April 3, 1989.”^[1]

The Solicitor General submits the facts of the case for the
prosecution as follows:

“In the afternoon of 31
March 1989, the victim Edison Ong Paras a.k.a. Edison Paras, was
inside the Buenamina Quality Furniture Store on A.
Mabini Street, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, which he owned and managed
and which also served as his residence. 
He was watching his employees Romeo Rotone y Pabon and one lady worker known only as Aling
Ukit bringing inside the store the merchandise or
furniture on display because they were about to close shop for that day (TSN,
23 May 1989, pp. 6 & 14).  Aling Ukit left the store at
about 6:30 p.m. (Id., p. 15), while prosecution eyewitness Romeo Rotone stayed behind since he was invited by the victim to a disco to celebrate the latter’s
birthday the next day, April 1.  (Id,
p. 20)

“At about 7:30 o’clock
in the evening of the same date, the display area of the store was already
closed, witness Rotone heard the sound of the buzzer
and saw the victim Paras open the door leading to the
sala.  Edison Paras let in the appellant Gonzales and his co-accused
Lorenzo to the sala which is separated by a glass
divider (Id., pp. 6-7).  Then he
heard them watching a film on betamax.  (Id.)

“At about 9:00 o’clock p.m.,
while Rotone was in the store waiting for the victim
to call him, he heard a commotion (‘something fell’) coming from the adjacent
room where the visitors and the victim were. 
He ignored it as he was then in the store arranging and holding a flower
pot (Id., pp. 8 & 19).  However, when he heard another sound of an
object falling, Rotone hurriedly peeped through the
transparent glass separating the store and the sala
where the victim, appellant Gonzales and his co?accused Lorenzo
were watching betamax.  He saw appellant Gonzales and co-accused
Lorenzo stabbing the victim Paras several times.  Appellant Gonzales was using what appeared
to be a hunting knife, with a hook and jagged edge.  (Id., pp. 9-10).  After stabbing the victim, Lorenzo went
inside the other sala where the victim entertained
his close friends and relatives.  Rotone then hid himself for fear of being silenced by the
assailants.  (Id., p. 11).

“Paras, who was then mortally
wounded, was still able to reach the door (from whence appellant Gonzales and
Lorenzo entered) and managed to shout for help. 
As the neighbors came and broke down the door, the victim slumped.  Initially, the people did not go inside afraid that the robbers may still be in the
premises.  When the neighbors were preparing
to bring the victim to the hospital, witness Rotone
managed to slip away and he went to report the incident to the victim’s elder
sister Estrelita Paras who
lived nearby (Id., p. 11).

“The victim was dead on arrival at the hospital.  The cause of death was diagnosed by the NBI
Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Maximo Reyes, as: severe
hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds The victim sustained 26 stab
wounds, 24 of which were fatal, located
in the chest and abdomen.  (TSN, 30 May
1989, pp. 4-9).

“There was a sign of struggle as indicated by the incised
wounds in the scaphalanges and fingers resulting from
the instinctive reflex defense actions of the victim.  (Id., p. 7).

“Meanwhile, Estrellita Paras, the victim’s sister, arrived at the crime scene at
about 10:00 p.m. only to find that
the victim was no longer there.  She
stayed in the office and sala because the people
present prevented her from going to the residence area as the two men who
killed the victim might still be inside. 
After a few minutes, the policemen arrived and they entered the building
and some even climbed the roof.  A few
moments later, she was informed that appellants Gonzales and Lorenzo were
apprehended one after the other.  When Estrellita’s sister Luningning
arrived, both of them proceeded to the police station (TSN, 29 May 1989, pp.
28-29), but not before padlocking the door and requesting the neighbors to
watch over the place.  (TSN, 30 May 1989,
p. 32).  Later, at around 1:00 a.m. the next morning, after the
investigation at the police station, they went back to the store with the same policemen to
determine what may have been taken from the place.  Missing was the amount of P100,000.00,
representing the sales for that month, which was supposed to have been picked up and deposited by their brother
Val.  (TSN, 29 May 1989, p. 31).^[2]

As summarized by the trial court in its decision,^[3]
appellants present a different version. 
They claim that at around 5:00 o’clock
in the afternoon of March 31, 1989,
they and a certain Gary “Kabayo” were on their
way to the house of Edison Paras for a birthday
party, as well as to a disco
thereafter.  On the way, Gary told them
to go ahead as he had to go back to his
house for something he had left, promising to rejoin them at the
victim’s house.  Appellants arrived at
and were welcomed by the victim in his house, but shortly thereafter the
latter’s brother arrived and they were requested to leave awhile as the victim
had to attend to his brother.  They went
to and stayed in a nearby store for some time and, after the victim’s brother
and helpers left, they went back to the victim’s house and were ushered by him
into the sala where they watched betamax.  It does not
appear that assailants were aware that Rotone had
stayed behind in the house; in fact, they denied his presence therein.

After sometime, Gary
arrived but after sensing that he was under the influence of drugs (“sabog“), the victim tried to dissuade the former from going with them to the disco.  This was supposedly on the advice of
appellant Lorenzo since the victim was the celebrant.  Gary
agreed not to join them in the disco but he asked for some money which the
victim refused to give.  After some
verbal exchanges, Gary subjected
the victim to indignities and slapped him, whereupon the latter dashed to his
room and came back with a gun which he poked at Gary.  Gary
was able to parry the gun, which was thrown away, and then he drew out a knife
and repeatedly stabbed the victim.

Appellant Lorenzo claims that he was so confused such that he was
unable to assist the victim and, fearing for his life, he went to the second
floor where he forcibly opened the door and proceeded to the rooftop.  From there, he jumped down to the ground and
heard people shouting “magnanakaw, magnanakaw” (thief, thief)) and then the onlookers
mauled him until he became unconscious. 
When he regained consciousness at the city jail, he immediately informed
his mother, who was beside him, that it was not he but Gary who stabbed the
victim.  He admitted that he used to
visit the victim’s place once, twice or thrice a week.

Appellant Gonzales testified that he followed appellant Lorenzo
to the rooftop, but when he saw Gary
he lay flat on the roof.  Later,
policemen arrived, poked their gun at him and effected his arrest.  He denied that the policemen were able to get
P1,711.00 from his pocket since, at that time, he had only P111.00.  He further denied having stabbed the victim,
insisting that it was only Gary who committed the crime.  He also claimed that it was the first time
that he had gone to the victim’s house.

On July 19, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City promulgated its decision finding accused Dionisio
Lorenzo y de Ocampo and Jeg
Gonzales y Bulahabo guilty as charged, and sentenced them
“to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
sum of P30,000.00 and reimburse
the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00 representing reasonable
reimbursement for the wake and burial expenses they have incurred and to pay
the costs.”^[4]

The case is now before us on appeal, with each appellant
represented by his own counsel and filing a separate brief.  Appellant Lorenzo contends that the trial
court erred in (1) giving credence to the testimony of the supposed eyewitness
Romeo Rotone and holding that the same was logical,
straightforward and probable; (2) finding that the accused had confirmed Rotone’s presence when the stabbing occurred; (3) holding
that accused Lorenzo was one of the perpetrators of the stabbing incident; (4)
holding that accused Lorenzo conspired with the perpetrators in the commission
of the offense charged; and (5) convicting accused Lorenzo of the crime of
robbery with homicide.^[5]

Appellant Gonzales’ assignment of errors faults the lower court
for (1) giving weight to the testimonies of P/Cpl. Abner
Castro and Pat. Alexander Gatus, both of the Kalookan City
Police Department, regarding their investiga­tion of appellant Gonzales because
said investigation was done in violation of appellant’s constitutional right under Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights; (2) admitting in evidence the affidavits of P/Cpl. Abner
Castro and Pat. Alexander Gatus, Exhibits
“D” and “E,” for the reason that said affidavits blatantly
show a failure of compliance with the constitutional guarantee afforded
appellant Gonzales under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and (3) giving
weight and credence to the testimony of Romeo Rotone,
the alleged eyewitness, for, on closer examination, said testimony is full of
contradictions and simply beyond belief, thus creating a strong reasonable
doubt.^[6]

It is therefore, evident that the resolution of this case hinges
on the issue of credibility and the correctness of the factual findings of the
court a quo.

We are accordingly constrained to advert to and rely on the rule,
well established in this jurisdiction, that in the absence of any fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misconstrued as to impeach the findings of the
trial court, the appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court’s
findings on the credibility of witnesses, or set aside its judgment,
considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves during the trial.^[7]

The matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness
stand is best and most completely performed or, carried out by a trial judge
who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of
defendant’s behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial, and the
conclusions of trial courts command great weight and respect.^[8]
Moreover, the accepted rule is that in weighing contradictory declarations and
statements, greater weight must generally be given to the positive testimony of
the prosecution witnesses than to the denials of the defendant.^[9]

A painstaking review of the records of and the evidence submitted
in this case brings us to the conclusion that no cogent reason exists as would
justify a departure from the foregoing rules in determining the culpability of
appellants for the special complex crime with which they are charged.

It is not disputed that Edison Paras
was stabbed to death on the evening of March
31, 1989.  The nature and
character of the wounds sustained by the deceased are stated in the necropsy
report of Dr. Maximo Reyes who performed the autopsy
on April 1, 1989, thus:

x x x

“Contused abrasions, 2.5 x 4.0 cm. area of forehead from left
to right; 15.0 x 20.0 cm. area of the arm anterior aspect, right; 10.0 x 11.0
cm. scapular area, left.

Incised wounds, 1.0 cm. base of thumb, anterior aspect, right; 2.0
cm. ring finger, left, anterior aspect, 3.0 cm. index finger left anterior
aspect both distal phalanges.

stab wounds:

1.  All eliptical,
gaping, three (3) in number, and located over left side of chest, 2.0 cm., 2.1
and 2.5 cm. in size, level of 1st, 3rd and 5th intercostal
space all entering thoracic cavity and severing upper and lower lobe of left
lung.

2.  Two (2) in number located over the right side
of chest with clear cut edges and one extremity sharp, other is contused
similar to the 1st three mentioned above and also elliptical; gaping 2.5 and
3.0 cm. in size levle (sic) of 3rd and 4th intercostal
space, both entering the thoracic cavity and severing the middle lobe of right
lung.

3.  All elliptical and gaping with clean cut edges
and with one extremity sharp, other is contused, twenty-one (21) in number, all
located over the abdomen from left to right comprising an area of 30.0 x 25.0
cm. biggest diameter 3.5 cm. and smallest 2.0 cm. except for two (2) over the
left side of the abdomen, all entering the perito­neal cavity severing small
and large intestines, right and left lobe of liver, spleen and stomach.

x x x

Cause of Death: – Severe hemorrhage
secondary to multiple stab wounds.”^[10]

Appellants, however, insist in this appeal that one Gary “Kabayo” was the only person responsible for the
stabbing of Edison Paras.  The theory of appellants collides with the
categorical testimony of the prosecution witness, Romeo Rotone,
to the effect that he actually saw the victim being simultaneously stabbed by
both appellants in the receiving room or sala of the
house.  It is established that witness Rotone could not have been mistaken as to the identities of
appellants as, prior to March 31,1989, he had seen or met both appellants three
(3) times when they went to the shop.  On
the occasion of the stabbing incident, he clearly saw them through a
transparent glass in the
dividing wall of the adjacent room where he was at the time.^[11]
No derogatory motive has been adduced as would devalorize
Rotone’s testimony and militate against the
credibility and weight thereof.

Appellants assail the credit given by the court a quo
to the testimony of said prosecution witness for being supposedly illogical,
absurd and improbable.  Appellant Lorenzo
claims that it is most unlikely that Rotone was ever
present at the scene of the crime since the latter did not even take any action
to aid the victim.  This overlooks the
well-known fact that one cannot rely merely on how one believes a person should
behave since there is no standard as to how a person may react to a shocking
incident.  At any rate, Rotone explained that he hid himself for fear that he would
also be attacked by appellants.

On the other hand, while appellants maintain that one Gary “Kabayo” was the person solely responsible for the
crime, they have utterly failed to prove the same.  Aside from appellant’s allegations, no
evidence was ever presented to prove the existence of said Gary “Kabayo” nor was there any proof of the supposed
person’s presence at the scene of the crime.

Such pretension of appellants cannot prevail over the affirmative
assertions of witness Rotone which was bolstered by
the testimony of Dr. Maximo Reyes, the medico-legal
examiner.  Dr. Reyes explained without
contradiction that the incised wounds of the scaphalanges
and fingers of the victim were due to his reflex defensive actions and were
thereby indicative of a struggle among the protagonists.  He also stressed that considering the multiple
stab wounds inflicted on the victim, 26 stab wounds of which 24 were fatal, the
possibility is that there was more than one assailant.^[12]

The trial court did not err in holding that appellants conspired
with each other in the commission of the offense.  To prove conspiracy, the prosecution need not
establish that all the parties thereto agreed to every detail in the execution
of the crime or that they were actually together at all the stages of the
conspiracy.  It is enough that, from the
individual acts of each accused, it may reasonably be deduced that they had a
common plan to commit the felony.^[13]

Consequently, there is conspiracy if the evidence presented by
the prosecution clearly indicates that the acts and behavior of the accused reveal
their common purpose to assault and inflict harm upon the deceased and that
there was a concerted execution of that common purpose.^[14]

Here, the concerted efforts of appellants can be inferred from
the following testimony of witness Rotone:

“Q
–   At about 7:30 in the evening of the same date, March 31, 1989, were you still at the store?

 A –    Yes,
sir, I was.

Atty.
Mangahas ?

Q
–    At about 7:30 o’clock in the evening, was there anything unusual
that happened inside the store where you were?

A
–     At that precise time, sir, 7:30 p.m., on that date, March
31, 1989, I heard the buzzer rang (sic) and Mr. Edison Paras
also heard the ringing of the buzzer, sir, so he opened the door and I also saw
the two (witness referring by pointing to the place where the two accused are
seated and previously identified during the arraignment)

Q
–    Who were the two persons whom you
saw?

A
–     I only came to know their names,
sir, as Jeg and Dionisio.

Q
–    Where were these two persons when you
saw them?

A
–     When I saw them, sir, they were
already following or they followed Edison Paras in
going in, sir, and then after they entered, I heard as if they were watching a
play of the betamax, sir, because we have just closed
the shop at that time.

x x x

Q
–    Now you testified that you heard the
playing of a betamax, what happened after that?

A
–     When I heard they were still
watching betamax, sir, I ignored them, I did not peep
and when something fell, I still did not pay attention, sir.

Q
–    What
were you doing at that time?

A
–     At that precise time, sir, I was
holding a flowering (sic) pot and I was about to transfer the same so
that in case we open our door in the morning, it will not be an obstruction to
the door we are heading, sir.

Q
–    You heard something fell (sic) and yet
you did not pay attention to it, after that, was there anything (sic) happened
after that?

A –     Yes, sir.

Q –    What
happened?

A
–     I heard another object fell (sic),
sir, and I went to see it, sir, and when I peeped through the transparent
glass, I saw the two, Jeg and Dionisio,
helping one another in stabbing several times Edison Paras,
sir.”^[15]

The failure of the witness to specifically identify the appellant
who inflicted the lethal stab wounds on the victim is not critical or
essential, since the conspiracy between appellants was duly alleged and proven
at the trial.  Where there is conspiracy,
a showing as to who inflicted the fatal blow is not required.^[16]

With respect to the robbery charged as a component of the subject
composite crime, we reject appellant Gonzalez’ protestations that the money
retrieved from his person was merely “planted” by the policemen.  No plausible reason was even advanced as to
why and how said officers could have resorted to such incriminatory
fabrication.  The rapidity and sequence
of events — the alarm raised by the cries for help of the victim, the
immediate response of his neighbors, the timely arrival of the police and the
apprehension of appellants shortly thereafter — these render remote the
possibility that other persons engineered the robbery and foisted that felony
on appellants.  While only a portion of
the proceeds of such crime was recovered, that suffices to establish their
culpability for the robbery by reason or on the occasion of which the murder
was committed by appellants.  Save for
the robbery aspect, the records do not reveal or suggest any other possible
reason for their simultaneous criminal and fatal assault on the victim.

The case of People vs. Pacala, et al.,^[17]
is however, raised against our considering robbery as a component of the crime
charged.  The argument premised thereon
was also involved in People vs. Espera, et al.,^[18]
where, in view of the variance in the factual setting vis-a-vis
that in the case at bar, we
adopted this pragmatic response:

“To the same effect, as noted by Mr. Justice Padilla, is the
doctrine in People vs. Pacala, et al.,
where it was held that absent conclusive evidence that robbery has actually
taken place, there can be no conviction for the composite crime of robbery with homicide, but only for
homicide which was duly proved.  While
this holding has been criticized as
inaccurate, We are persuaded to
hold it as an applicable determinant for our present purposes.  It observes fidelity to the fundamental rule
that criminal law should yield any reasonable doubt in favor of the
accused.  At least in the factual milieu
of the present case, the acceptance of the foregoing doctrines would not
constitute an exacting onus on the criminal justice system and the law
enforcement agencies by seemingly demanding that there be an eyewitness to
prove the actual apoderamiento in crimes like robbery or theft.  For, further to what has already been said,
in the case at bar, there is a paucity of evidence showing that, other than the
accused, no other person had or
could have had access to the premises where the money and the watch were
allegedly kept, either before or after the killing of the victim and until the
loss was supposedly discovered.  The
possibil­ity that there could have been other intruders enhances the element of
doubt in favor of appellants on this score.”

As earlier explained, in the present case the circumstances are
such that only the malefactors, during the swift succession of events that
accompanied and followed the killing, could have had access to the money found
in the possession of appellant Gonzales. 
No outsiders were able to intrude into the premises and, shortly
thereafter, the police arrived and apprehended the appellants.  To require eyewitnesses to the robbery, as Pacala would imply, would be too
unreasonable and exacting in the face of ample circums­tantial evidence, not
speculations, a rational appreciation of which evidence establishes appellants’
culpability for robbery.  For, as early
as U.S. vs. Merin^[19]
this Court declared that “(i)n the absence of
any other known motive for the crime, it would be, in our judgment, to reject
the universal teaching of experience to refuse to draw the inference that the
same person who killed the occupants of the house also committed the robbery.”

The other objection, under Pacala,
that none of the things stolen were recovered does not apply in the instant
case.  Here, the amount of P1,711.00 was
recovered from appellant Gonzales right at the crime scene, his lame and easily
fabricated excuse being that it was “planted” on him.  True, no amount was retrieved from appellant
Lorenzo but it must be recalled that in trying to escape he jumped into the
avenging arms of the crowd gathered below and he was mauled by them.  It is not far-fetched that whatever he had
taken from the victim’s house was lost or removed from him during that episode.

The amounts and items alleged in the information were merely
based by the prosecutor on information supplied by the investigators and the
victim’s siblings and it would be absurd that, to establish the charge of
robbery, there must be proof that appellants actually knew of the existence
thereof or that all of said items be recovered from them.  Much less should evidence be required that
appellants went to the victim’s house with intent to rob aforethought.

That robbery was their purpose appears to be the only logical
deduction, but assuming that they also had the desire to take revenge for
grievances against the victim, still they are liable for robbery with homicide.^[20]
Evidently, it is their subsequent actuations at the scene of the crime that
prove what had been and is their primary motive or intent.  To require direct evidence on this point is
to lend credence to the lament that the law appears to give more rights and
protection to the accused than to the victim and his heirs.

We disagree with the proposition of appellant Gonzales that the
trial court erred in admitting and giving weight to the testimonies of P/Cpl. Abner Castro and Pat. Alexander Gatus
concerning the investigation they conducted on him because the same was
allegedly done in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

 Said appellant, in his
brief, alleges that:

“The accused-appellants in the case, particularly Jeg Gonzales, were brought to the Police Headquarters for
investigation (tsn, p. 31, 20 June 1989, Balcarse).  He was also brought to the rooftop near the
place of the incident by Pat. Alexander Gatus and
other policemen.  There he was made to
point to a knife (Exhibit ‘H’) lying on the roof.  (tsn, p. 9, 21 June 1989, Balcarse)
and he allegedly admitted before the policemen that it was the knife he used in
stabbing Edison Paras.  (tsn, p. 7, 22 May 1989, Aviles),
in his affidavit,  Exhibit ‘D’, Pat.
Alexander Gatus, referring to Jeg Gonzales, states:  ‘That
suspect when conducted spot interrogation verbally admitted having as (sic) one
of the suspects who stabbed and carted away the money.'”^[21]

It is true that the right of a person under interrogation to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates
an effective communication that results in the understanding of what is
conveyed.  Short of this is a denial of
the right, as it cannot truly be said that the accused has been informed of his
rights.  Where the “informing”
done by the police was nothing more than a
superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the
objectives of the fundamental law as to give
a semblance of compliance
with it, the constitutional mandate is not complied with.^[22]

What must not be
lost sight of, however, is that said constitutional provision prohibits as
evidence only confessions and admissions of the accused and only as against
himself.  Further, we agree with this
comment of the Solicitor General:

“Thus, granting arguendo that
the constitutional rights of appellant were indeed violated by P/Cpl Castro and
Pat. Gatus, it is respectfully submitted that only
appellant’s testimony taken in violation thereof should be inadmissible
evidence-but not the affidavits and testimonies of these two police officers,
notwithstanding appellant’s claim to the effect.  Verily, the testimonies of P/Cpl Castro and Pat.
Gatus, especially with respect to their having gone
to the scene of the crime, the recovery on the rooftop thereof of the knife
used in killing the victim (TSN, 22 May 1989, p. 7), and the recovery by Pat. Gatus of the amount of P1,711.00 in the person of the appellant (Id.,
p. 8), could not be expunged from
the records as they are not affected by the alleged inadmissibility of
appellant’s own extrajudicial confession.”^[23]

Moreover, from the preceding discussion of the facts of this case
and the evidence for the People, we are convinced that even if said appellant’s
extrajudicial confession would be disregarded, the evidence of the prosecution
is sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.^[24]

Finally, the inexplicable fact that appellants ran away from the
scene of the crime is a significant indication of their guilt.  Appellants used the door exit on the second
floor and proceeded to the rooftop from where they obviously thought of jumping
off to an adjacent building and, thence, to the street below.  Such behavior cannot but be positive and
convincing evidence of their consciousness of guilt.  Had they really been as blameless as they would now pose, there was
nothing that would have prevented them from proceeding to the front door and
opening the same to meet the victim’s neighbors who had congregated outside in
response to the victim’s cries for help, and then forthwith proclaim their
innocence by spontaneously denouncing the so-called Gary “Kabayo” as the culprit.

WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity for the death of the
victim is increased to P50,000.00 consonant with the present case law thereon.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), and Paras, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

Sarmiento, J., join J. Padilla in his
concurring and dissenting opinion.

---

^[1]
Original Record, 1.

^[2]
Rollo, 167-171.

^[3]
Original Record, 91-93.

^[4]
Per Judge Antonio J. Fineza; Original Record, 95.

^[5]
Brief for Accused-Appellant Dionisio Lorenzo, 5-6; Rollo, 45-46.

^[6]
Brief for Accused-Appellant Jeg Gonzales, 1-2; Rollo, 121­-122.

^[7]
People vs. Jovellano, 56 SCRA 156 (1974).

^[8]
People vs. Magallanes, et al., 23 SCRA 1274
(1968).

^[9]
People vs. Gonzales, et al., 76 Phil. 473 (1946).  See also People vs. Biago, 182 SCRA 411 (1990).

^[10]
Original Record, 50.

^[11]
TSN, May 23, 1989, 8-9.

^[12]
TSN, May 30, 1989, 7-9.

^[13]
People vs. Caitor, et al., 137 SCRA 761
(1985).

^[14]
People vs. Batas, et al., 176 SCRA 46 (1989).

^[15]
TSN, May 23, 1989, 52-53.

^[16]
People vs. Flores, et al., 185 SCRA 366 (1990).

^[17]
58 SCRA 370 (1974).

^[18]
175 SCRA 728 (1989).

^[19]
2 Phil. 88 (1903).

^[20]
People vs. Luna, 58 SCRA 198 (1974); People vs. Damaso, et al., 86 SCRA 370 (1978).

^[21]
Rollo, 129-130.

^[22]
People vs. Repe, et al., 175 SCRA 422 (1990),
citing People vs. Newman, et al., 163 SCRA 496 (1988).

^[23]
Rollo, 175-176.

^[24]
People vs. Polo, 147 SCRA 551 (1987).

---

Print

Clean
Clean

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }

/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}