THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JUAN MAQUI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of a
caraballa and her calf, and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of five
years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay his share
of the costs of the proceedings.

Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving
probative value to the testimony of one Dagsa, the principal witness for the
prosecution; in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial admissions alleged
to have been made by the accused, including an offer to compromise the case by
the payment of a sum of money; and in declining to accept as true the testimony
of the accused in his own behalf at the trial. We find nothing in the record,
however, which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge as
to the degree of credit which should be accorded the various witnesses called at
the trial.

Counsel rests his contention that the evidence as to the extrajudicial
statements made by the accused should have been excluded on the ground that, as
counsel insists, there is no formal proof in the record that they were made
voluntarily, and that they were therefore inadmissible as proof in so far as
they can be construed as admission or confessions of guilt. In answer to this
contention it is sufficient to say that there is no suggestion in the record in
the court below that these extrajudicial statements were not made voluntarily,
and we are satisfied that if the evidence as to the circumstances under which
these incriminating statements were made be accepted as true it clearly rebuts
the possibility that they were made involuntarily, or extorted by force,
threats, or promise of reward. The record clearly discloses that these
extrajudicial statements were made in the course of offers to compromise and
that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these offers to
compromise were made in the hope that if accepted he would escape
prosecution.

The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal
cases has frequently been discussed in the courts of the United States, and the
practice there does not appear to be wholly uniform. We think, however, that the
weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which admits evidence
of offers to compromise, but permits the accused to show that such offers were
not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the in convenience
of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the
accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt
and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue
therefrom.

Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence
against the accused, but if made merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not evidence. (U. S.
vs. Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C, 317.)

In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an
adjustment with the prosecutrix is inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did
not contain an admission of guilt. (Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala., 527.)

On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman,
evidence is admissible on behalf of the prosecution to show that the defendant
sent a third person to the father of the prosecutrix to ascertain if the case
could be compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 111., 471.)

In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated
that he would pay $50 if it could be settled, in reply to threats by the owner
of the goods stolen that he would be prosecuted for damages, and a solicitation
to settle. (Frain vs. State, 40 Ga., 530.)

In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that defendant paid
a sum of money in settlement of a civil action brought to recover the property
alleged to have been stolen. (State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)

An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or
promise, and the reply thereto, are admissible in evidence upon his trial for a
crime. (State vs. Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.)

An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be
proven by the state as an admission of guilt, or as disclosing possession of the
property which is the subject of the burglary and larceny charged in the
indictment (State vs. Rodrigues, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern,
802.)

It may be shown that the prisoner sent a message to the prosecutor, proposing
to take a whipping and to be let go. (State vs. DeBerry, 92 N. C.,
800.)

We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused,
but we are of opinion that in imposing the penalty the trial court should have
taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance the manifest lack of
“instruction and education” of the offender. It does not clearly appear whether
he is or is not an uncivilized Igorot, although there are indications in the
record which tend to show that he is. But in any event, it is very clear that if
he is not a member of an uncivilized tribe of Igorots, he is a densely ignorant
and untutored fellow, who lived in the Igorot country, and is not much, if any,
higher than are they in the scale of civilization. The beneficent provisions of
article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine
Legislature are peculiarly applicable to offenders who are shown to be members
of these uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the fact
that their lives are cast with such people far away from the centers of
civilization, appear to be so lacking in “instruction and education” that they
should not be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is demanded of those
citizens who have had the advantage of living their lives in contact with the
refining influences of civilization.

It is true that this court has quite uniformly held that convicts of the
crimes of theft and robbery are not entitled to the benefits of the provisions
of article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by Act No. 2142, this on
the theory that under the provisions of the article prior to its amendment the
ground upon which the courts were authorized in their discretion to mitigate the
penalties prescribed by the code was “the circumstance of the offender being a
native, mestizo, or Chinese.” As to crimes of this nature we declined to hold
that the mere fact that one is a native of the Philippine Islands, a mestizo or
a Chinese would justify a claim that upon conviction of crimes such as theft or
robbery he should be treated more leniently than the members of any other race
or people, no sound presumption arising from the mere racial affiliation of the
convict that he was less able to appreciate the criminal character of such
offenses or to resist the temptation to commit them than are they.

Under the provisions of the article as amended by Act No. 2142, the ground
upon which the courts are authorized to mitigate the1 prescribed penalties is
not the racial affiliation of the convict, but “the degree of instruction and
education of the offender;” and while mere ignorance or lack of education will
not always be sufficient to justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalties
for crimes such as theft and robbery, there can be no doubt that cases may and
will arise wherein under all the “circumstances attending” the commission of
these offenses the exercise of a sound discretion will justify a more lenient
treatment of an ignorant and semicivilized offender, than that which should be
accorded one who has had the advantage of such a degree of instruction and
education as would justify the court in believing that he was capable of fully
and properly understanding and appreciating the criminal character of the
offense committed by him.

We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 11 as amended by
Act No. 2142, the courts may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery,
take into consideration the lack of instruction and education of the offender
where it appears that under all the circumstances attending the commission of
the offense, he should not be held to the strict degree of responsibility
prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender.

The larceny was of large cattle and falls within articles 517, 518, and 520
of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2030. According to those sections, as
amended, the value of the animals stolen being 650 pesetas, a penalty
one degree higher than arresto mayor in its medium degree to
presidio correctional in its minimum degree should have been imposed;
in other words, presidio correctional in its medium degree to presidio
mayor in its minimum degree. Giving the convict the benefit of the provisions of
article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, this penalty should be imposed in its
minimum degree—that is to say, the penalty applicable in this case is that of
presidio correctional in its medium degree.

Modified by imposing the penalty prescribed for the offense of which the
defendant and appellant was convicted in the minimum degree—that is to say, by
imposing upon the accused the penalty of two years four months and one day of
presidio correctional, in lieu of that of five years’ imprisonment
imposed by the court below—the judgment convicting and sentencing him should be
and is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.