THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RODOLFO SALGUERO Y LLANERAS, EMMANUEL MESINA Y DATUIN, ET AL., ACCUSED, RODOLFO SALGUERO Y LLANERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 92, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:

1.  Finding accused Rodolfo Salguero
y Llaneras GUILTY beyond all reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of Robbery with
Homicide as charged;

2.  Sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;

3.  Ordering him to pay moral damages in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND and 00/100 (P100,000.00) PESOS in favor of the
heirs of the victim Alma Sevilla, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;

4. To pay the amount
of ELEVEN THOUSAND and 00/100 (P11,000.00) PESOS by way of actual damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;

5.  To pay costs.” (Rollo,
p. 31)

The amended information filed against the accused-appellant and three other accused states:

“That on or about the 1st
day of September, 1986, in Quezon City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, all
armed with deadly weapons, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, with intent of gain, by means of violence and intimidation
on persons, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rob LEONARDO SEVILLA y FRANCO and his family in the following
manner, to wit:  on the date and place
aforementioned, accused pursuant to their conspiracy went to the residence of
said LEONARDO SEVILLA y FRANCO and once thereat, divested Leonardo Sevilla y Franco’s wallet containing cash money in the
amount of P1,000.00, Philippine Currency, and thereafter stabbed one ALMA
SEVILLA y TORRES on the chest, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal
wounds which was the direct and immediate cause of her death, to the damage and
prejudice of said Leonardo Sevilla y Franco in the
aforementioned amount and to the heirs of ALMA SEVILLA y TORRES as maybe
awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.” (Rollo, p. 22)

The accused Salguero pleaded not guilty
on arraignment.  The other accused
were not arraigned as they were still at large.

The prosecution
evidence upon which the trial court
based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is as follows:

“The People’s evidence reveals that at around 5:00 o’clock in
the morning of September 1, 1986, Leonardo Sevilla,
48 years old, married, storekeeper, residing at 11 Simprosa
Street, Bagbag, Novaliches,
Quezon City was in the process of backing out his jeep from the garage when he was startled
to find four strangers behind him armed with deadly weapons.  One of the
men stuck a gun at his side and barked:  ‘Patayin mo ang makina‘.  Having done as he was bade, Leonardo was
ordered to alight from the jeep.  As soon
as he got off, the man who held the gun at him, accused Rodolfo Salguero, took the ignition key and the wallet from
Leonardo’s back pocket containing P1,000.00 in cash intended for the day’s
marketing.  From the garage, Leonardo was
hustled to the front door and once inside the house, the accused ordered the
former, ‘dapa, dapa‘.  After the men had hurriedly gone through the
premises, Leonardo was told to stand up and ordered to lead the way
upstairs.  When they reached the pasillo next to Alma’s bedroom, Leonardo was
again ordered to lie flat on his belly. 
While in this position, he noticed the intruders going through the
family bedrooms.  Shortly thereafter, he
heard his daughter Alma scream from her bedroom, “Jesus Christ, Jesus
Christ, Alleluia!”.  This was
followed by the sound of the footsteps of the malefactors rushing down the
stairs.  Leonardo then ran towards the
terrace overlooking the driveway of the garage in time to see the accused and his cohorts on board the family jeep as it was leaving their
place.  He quickly gave chase but failed
to catch up with the jeep as it
sped towards the highway.

“At the time that the accused were going through the bedrooms
of the Sevilla family, Mrs. Corazon Sevilla was seated on the chamber pot when she was
approached by accused Salguero and at the point of
the gun ordered “Dapa, kung hindi
mamamatay kayong lahat“.  She was
led to the passageway where she joined her husband flat on the floor.  After the accused had gone, she lost no time
in going to her daughter Alma’s room because she was much concerned for the 20-year old girl who
was still single.  (The two younger children, Annalyn and Leo had managed to hide inside the terrace soon
as the commotion started.  The couple’s
son, Eduardo Sevilla, was likewise taken by the accused and ordered to lie down
on the floor next to his parents together with their maid.) To her great
sorrow, she found Alma bathed in her own blood. 
Alma was rushed to the hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival.  (Exh.
“C”.) Police investigators recovered a fan knife from the Sevilla residence which appears to be the death
weapon.  (Exh. “C”.)

“Accused Salguero was positively
identified by the Sevilla couple during the
confrontation at the police
station and in open Court as one of the armed men who forcibly entered their
house on the day in question who caused the death of their daughter Alma after
robbing Leonardo of P1,000.00 in cash.” (Rollo,
pp. 23-25)

The version of the defense on the other hand, is as follows:

“In denying the
charge against him, accused Salguero raises the
defense of alibi.  He declared on the
witness stand that he is an electrician,
residing at No. 41, Sauyo Road, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City, formerly
employed at ADR Enterprises, located at No. 411 Republic Supermarket, Sta.
Cruz, Manila.  He left Manila for Olongapo City on August 25, 1986 to buy scrap electrical
materials that could be repaired for resale. 
He stayed in the house of Mr. and Mrs. Bentanilla
in Olongapo City for around ten (10) days when he
returned to Manila on September 5, 1986. 
The police arrested him at his house between 12:00 midnight and 1:00
o’clock in the morning of September 23, 1986.  In the course of the investigation, he
claimed to have been subjected to physical torture by the police.” (Rollo, p. 25)

The appellant raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES WHICH WERE CONFLICTING,
UNCLEAR AND EVIDENTLY INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE OR
IGNORED UNASSAILED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING APPELLANT’S INNOCENCE OF ANY
PARTICIPATION WHATSOEVER IN THE OFFENSE HE WAS ACCUSED OF COMMITTING.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 7)

At the outset, it is noted that the Office of Solicitor General*,
in lieu of an appellee’s
brief, filed a manifestation recommending the acquittal of the appellant.  He states that the trial court overlooked
certain facts and circumstances pertaining to the identification of the
appellant by the prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime
which could alter the result of the case.

After a careful review of the records, this Court agrees with the
Solicitor General and finds merit in the arguments and submissions of the
appellant.

To support the judgment of conviction, the trial court relied
upon the identification of the appellant made by the prosecution
witnesses.  There is a question, however,
with regards to the “positive” identification of the appellant which
casts doubt on the judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant claims that the way he was presented alone, not in
a police line-up, for identification to the Sevilla
spouses, Leonardo and Corazon and their two sons, Eduardo and Leo is
inadmissible citing People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261, 272
[1988] that:

“The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the
accused was presented to witness xxx, is
as tainted as an uncounselled
confession and thus falls within
the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection.”

There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification
(People v. Espiritu, G. R. No. 80406, November 20, 1990). 
Thus, even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper identification as
long as such identification was
not suggested to the witnesses by the police.

In the instant case, there are circumstances which indicate that
the identification could have been suggested to the witnesses by the police.

First, although the affidavit
of Leonardo Sevilla dated September 23, 1986 (Exh. “A”, Records,
p. 179) shows that the
appellant was recognized by Leonardo from among the people in the investigation
room, in his testimony he stated
that one of the policemen asked
him if he knew that person (the appellant) (TSN, February 13, 1987, p. 17), directing Leonardo’s
attention to the appellant.

Second, the affidavit of Eduardo Sevilla
dated September 23, 1986 (Exh. “G”, Records, p. 186) shows that the appellant was presented alone to Eduardo but in his testimony he counteracted
this by stating that he picked out the
appellant from among several persons in civilian attire.  (TSN, March 6, 1987, p. 13) However, he later testified that:

“Q.  When
accused Salguero was presented to you, were there other people who
where presented to you aside
from Salguero to
identify?

WITNESS

He was with other
people.

ATTY. FORTUN

And those persons were
police officers, were they not?

A.    Police.

Q.   But
they were in civilian clothes?

A.    Yes,
Sir.

Q.   And
you immediately knew that they were police
officers, did you know that?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   And in fact you know they were police
officers because all of
them has (sic) a gun tuck out on there (sic)
belts?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   And
only Salguero who was the
only civilian there who was there without
a gun you presume he was a suspect?

A.    Yes,
sir.”

(TSN, March 6, 1987, pp.
17-18; Emphasis supplied)

The appellant then, could at once be picked out from among the police officers as it was obvious that the other people were police
officers in spite of their civilian attire.

Third, the affidavit of Leo Sevilla
dated September 23, 1986 (Exh. H, Records, p. 185)
shows that the appellant was singled out from a police line-up with Pat. Santos, Gurat
and Dacillo in civilian clothes but in Sevilla’s testimony, he stated that when he saw the
appellant, the appellant was alone. 
(TSN, March 27, 1987, p. 16)

There is a glaring inconsistency in the manner by which the appellant
was identified by the witnesses in the
police station.

The letter-referral to the
prosecutor’s office (Exh. K, Records, p. 305) states
that the appellant was singled out from a police line-up but it can be gleaned
from the witnesses’ testimonies that the police may have influenced the
identification by the Sevillas of the appellant as they either pointed out
the appellant, presented the appellant in an alleged line-up, or presented the
appellant alone.  This kind of
identification is pointedly suggestive as the Sevilla
family, having been earlier informed by the police that they have arrested
somebody (TSN, February 6, 1987, p. 16; TSN, February 13, 1987, p. 17) were
already on the look-out for that arrested person.

Although nothing in Corazon Sevilla’s
testimony implies that she was influenced by the police, rather she even stated
that she recognized the appellant and even went up to him to box him (TSN,
February 20, 1987, p. 19), such statement should be regarded with skepticism in
view of the above-mentioned circumstances and considering the previous
statements made by Corazon (Exhs. E and F; Records,
pp. 183-184).

In her September 1, 1986 affidavit (Exh.
E) Corazon described the appellant as “mga 35 taong gulang xxx, mga 5’6″, maitim, katam-taman ang katawan, unat ang
buhok“. 
Her September 23, 1986 affidavit (Exh. F) on
the other hand, contained:

“T.   Ano ang mga
palatandaan na siya nga ang
tumutok sa inyo?

S.    Mukha, begote, boses, laki ng
tiyan, at lahat na hong katauhan
niya.” (Exh. F,
Records, p. 184)

It was only after seeing the appellant that Corazon remembered
the “begote” and the “laki ng tiyan“,
both important distinguishing marks in describing a person.  Corazon maintains that she made it a point to
remember the accused’s face (TSN, February 20, 1987,
p. 21) but she forgot to mention the moustache in describing the appellant
(TSN, February 20, 1987, p. 28) in her September 1, 1986 affidavit, the very
day the incident happened.

Also, when Corazon was questioned on whether she suspected
anyone, she mentioned a certain Alan (Exh. E) as her
suspect but when confronted in open court, she denied having stated such a
thing.  The Court is aware that
affidavits, taken ex-parte are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate (People v. Segwaben,
G.R. No. 88401, February 19, 1991) but in this case, Corazon was asked three
times in open court whether said affidavit is accurate and complete and three
times she said yes.  (TSN, February 20,
1987, p. 22, 24, 26).  She even admitted
that she saw the particular portion which states the name of Alan during her
examination of the affidavit in open court but did not take exception to it as
she was not asked to explain it.  (TSN,
February 20, 1987, p. 26)

The factors presented above throw doubt upon the positive identification of the
appellant.  The Office of the Solicitor–General cites a misappreciation
of other facts, namely:

“(1)   the real suspect of the police was Otchok Salvador (not appellant), a notorious criminal
wanted by the police for robbery and other crimes (May 19, 1987 tsn, pp. 14-16 – Ramon Jarapa).

(2)    Otchok Salvador planned and executed the robbery at
the Sevilla residence (May 29, 1987 tsn, pp. 6-7 – Venancio de Asis).

(3)    the jeep of the Sevillas
was recovered within the vicinity of Otchok
Salvador’s residence (May 29, 1987 tsn, pp. 15-16, 19
– Ramon Jarapa).

(4)    Appellant (unlike Otchok
Salvador) carried no criminal record, was a Barangay Tanod for several years, was an ‘asset’ to the Quezon City Police in the resolution of organized crime in
his locality, and did not flee, hide (despite the closeness of his residence to
that of the Sevillas) or resist arrest when
apprehended like a common criminal by the police (May 29, 1987 tsn – Ramon Jarapa; August 18,
1987 tsn, pp. 5-7 – Rodolfo Salguero).”
(Rollo, p.
80)

The Office of the Solicitor-General also cites certain unanswered
questions which give rise to doubts:

“(1)  Why did it take three (3) weeks for the police
to go after appellant?

(2)    Why was it necessary to give him the
third-degree treatment and investigate him without the presence of a lawyer?

(3)    What exactly did the police tell the members
of the Sevilla family upon fetching them to identify
the suspect apprehended?  Did they tell
them that appellant already admitted participation in the ghastly crime?

(4)    Why is there no police report or follow-up
on Eugene or Dodong Lim, whom appellant named as his
cohorts?

Most probably, with respect to the third nagging question, the
police bragged that they had apprehended one subject who admitted
to the crime.

The effect of such information to a family crying out for justice
would be emotional and unpredictable, swift and instantaneous.  There would be no careful reflection.” (Rollo, pp. 77-78)

It is somewhat
surprising that the decision of the trial court did not carry any lengthy
discussion on the questioned identification of the appellant (Decision, p. 9)
despite its being raised in the accused’s memorandum (Memorandum, pp. 13-18, Records, pp. 345-350) Instead, it examined what it
termed as “significant flaws in the theory
of the defense.” (Decision, p. 4) These flaws, aside from the
“positive” identification of the appellant, are what the trial court
relied upon to sustain the conviction.

The trial court enumerated the inconsistencies between the
testimony of the appellant and that of his own witnesses.  These inconsistencies delve on minor details
like whether the appellant was receiving a fixed salary or not and on what the appellant purchased during his trip to Olongapo City.  (Decision, pp. 5-7) It also dismissed the
testimonies of Venancio Asis
and Corporal Ramon Jarapa who both claimed that the
main suspect of the crime was a certain Otchok
Salvador.  (TSN, May 29, 1987, p. 7 and
pp. 14-16) Asis stated that he decided to make a clean
breast of it because he pitied the accused who was detained for a crime he did
not commit (TSN, May 29, 1987, p. 9) but the trial court set aside his
testimony on grounds that he had no motive to show special concern for the appellant.  (Decision, p. 8)
As for Jarapa’s testimony, it was disregarded as
hearsay, based principally on his own personal opinions and conclusions from
the information given him.  (Decision, p.
8)

The trial court pointed out the weaknesses in the evidence of the
defense.  But we held in People v.
Hizon, 180 SCRA 364, 371 [1989] that:

“xxx Even if it be argued that the defense is weak, the fact is that the
prosecution is even weaker and
so must fail by its own impotence.”

The rule is firmly
entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of
the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.  (People v. Furugganan, G.R. Nos. 90191-96, January 28, 1991, People v.
de Dios, 187 SCRA 228, 247, [1990]).  It is the role of the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the
constitutional presumption of
innocence.  In this case, the
identification of the accused is of utmost importance.

With the abovementioned principle and without the
“positive” identification of the appellant, the evidence presented by
the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to the accused.

We held in People
v. Ng, 142 SCRA 615, 622 [1986] that:

“From the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that
reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the
accused.  The requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt.  It has been defined as meaning such proof ‘to
the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as
precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to
support.  It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even
though strong, that the fact charged
is more likely to be true than the contrary. 
It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral
certainty – a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the
conscience of those who are to act upon it.’ (Moreno, Philippine Law
Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3).”

In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was not
fulfilled.  Since such is the case, the
trial court likewise erred in its non-appreciation of the defense of alibi of
the appellant.  While alibi is admittedly
a weak defense, this Court, however, does not at once look upon it with
disfavor nor does it have a mental prejudice against the accused who uses it as
his defense.  For the defense of alibi
does not relieve the prosecution of the required burden of proof.  Nor is the rule that alibi must be
satisfactorily proven ever intended to change the burden of proof in criminal
cases.  In fact, alibi need not be
inquired into where the prosecution’s evidence is weak as in the case at
bar.  (People v. Mendoza, 174 SCRA 432,
452 [1989]).

Premises considered, we find the evidence for the prosecution
inadequate to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.  The appellant is
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt and ordered immediately RELEASED
unless he is detained on some other charges.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Bidin, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., no part.

*
The case was handled by Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega and
Associate Solicitor Marcelino U. Arellano.