JUANA DOMINGO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE WARDEN OF BILIBID PRISON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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Juana Domingo versus the Warden of Bilibid Prison
The Case
This is Juana Domingo versus the Warden of Bilibid Prison, a habeas corpus case decided by the Supreme Court in December 1902, under the early Code of Civil Procedure. Juana Domingo, held in custody under a conviction and sentence of the Municipal Court of Manila for the District of South Pasig, obtained a writ of habeas corpus from the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and was discharged. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court. The case matters far less for the liberty of the petitioner than for a single structural point: it fixes the rule that a habeas corpus proceeding is a special proceeding, not a civil action, and that no appeal lies from a decision granting the writ, because the law has simply not provided one.
Procedural History
Juana Domingo petitioned the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for a writ of habeas corpus. That court granted the writ, held a hearing, and discharged her from the custody of the respondent warden, who was holding her under a conviction and sentence of the Municipal Court of Manila for the District of South Pasig. From that decision of the Court of First Instance, the Government appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court declined to review the merits of the order, because it concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the appeal, and it dismissed the appeal.
Facts
Juana Domingo was in the custody of the warden of Bilibid Prison. She was held there under a conviction and sentence rendered by the Municipal Court of Manila for the District of South Pasig.
Seeking her release, she applied to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was granted, and upon a hearing she was discharged from the custody of the respondent warden.
The Government, dissatisfied with that discharge, brought the matter to the Supreme Court by appeal. The threshold question was not whether the discharge was correct, but whether the Supreme Court could entertain the appeal at all.
Issues
- Whether or not a proceeding in habeas corpus is a civil action or a special proceeding under the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether or not an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Court of First Instance granting a writ of habeas corpus and discharging the petitioner.
- Whether or not the Supreme Court may supply by its own act the remedy of appeal which the Legislature has not provided.
Applicable Provisions
The Court classified habeas corpus under the structure of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1901, which it described as follows:
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1901, is divided into two parts, Part I relating to civil actions and Part II to special proceedings.
This division is the foundation of the ruling, because the route to the Supreme Court differs for each part.
On the mode of review, the Court stated the governing distinction:
All civil actions are brought to this court by bill of exceptions, while special proceedings are brought here by the procedure denominated "appeals in special proceedings."
Habeas corpus falls on the special proceedings side, so the bill of exceptions route is unavailable.
The Court then examined Chapter 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which regulates appeals in special proceedings, and found that it enumerates the appealable cases one by one, including appeals from an allowance or disallowance of a claim, from the settlement of accounts of administrators, executors, trustees, or guardians, from the allowance or disallowance of wills, and from a decree of distribution. It also found in section 772 an appeal allowed in cases of adoption and custody of minors. The significance is what the enumeration omits: the special proceeding of habeas corpus.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that a proceeding in habeas corpus is a special proceeding, not a civil action. The Code of Civil Procedure divides its subject into civil actions in Part I and special proceedings in Part II, and habeas corpus belongs to the latter class, alongside guardians, trusts, wills, and the settlement of estates.
On the second issue, the Court held that no appeal lies from the decision of the Court of First Instance in a habeas corpus proceeding. The reasoning is one of legislative omission:
It will be seen by an examination of these sections the right to appeal is given in every character of special proceedings except the special proceeding of habeas corpus.
The Court explained why the omission is sensible rather than accidental:
For those wishing to avail themselves of the benefit of habeas corpus there would be no necessity of an appeal to the Supreme Court because they have the right to make application direct to the Supreme Court for the issuance of the writ.
On the third issue, the Court acknowledged that a judge of the Court of First Instance might discharge a defendant committed under the sentence of another court upon a mistaken view of the law as to jurisdiction, and that this might be quite serious. But it held that the remedy was for the Legislature, not the Court:
It is true that the act of a judge of the Court of First Instance in discharging a defendant committed under sentence of another court, under a mistaken view of the law as to jurisdiction, might be quite serious, but the legislative power has not seen proper to provide the Government with the remedy of appeal in such cases and we can not furnish one.
Having thus no jurisdiction over the appeal, the Court did not review the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
Doctrine
First, habeas corpus is a special proceeding, not a civil action. It is governed by Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it reaches the Supreme Court, if at all, only through the procedure for appeals in special proceedings, never by bill of exceptions.
Second, the right to appeal is statutory and is granted only where the law provides it. Chapter 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the special proceedings that may be appealed, and habeas corpus is not among them. The omission is decisive: where the statute grants the right of appeal in every special proceeding except habeas corpus, the courts cannot create the missing appeal.
Third, the absence of an appeal is not the absence of a remedy. A person seeking the benefit of the writ may apply directly to the Supreme Court for its issuance, which is why the Legislature could reasonably withhold an appeal.
Fourth, a court cannot supply a remedy the Legislature has withheld, however serious the consequence of a mistaken discharge may be. The judicial power is to apply the law as written, not to fill its gaps.
Disposition
The Supreme Court dismissed the Government's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, with costs de oficio, meaning costs were taxed against no party, and it did not review the order of the Court of First Instance discharging Juana Domingo.
Remember This
The line to memorize is that habeas corpus is a special proceeding, and no appeal lies from a decision granting the writ, because the Legislature has not provided one and the courts cannot furnish it. Examiners use this case to test the statutory nature of the right to appeal and the distinction between civil actions and special proceedings under the old Code of Civil Procedure.