ROGELIO INCIONG, ROMULO R. LICUANAN, CONSTANTE C. LEE, BIENVENIDO S. BAUTISTA, ROMEO R. RIANO, EDUARDO M. SUMAWAY, JOSE LOPEZ, ALBERTO AGA, EDUARDO S. MANGALIMAN, ERNESTO ROSALE…

The issue raised by the petition in this case is whether, in view
of the employer’s failure to file a supersedeas bond,
the petitioners-workers are entitled to execution pending appeal of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision ordering their reinstatement in the company.

The petitioners were regular and permanent employees of Procter
and Gamble Philippines, which is engaged
in the manufacture of soap, toothpaste, and other household products.

In 1982, Procter & Gamble-PMC formulated a Special Early
Retirement Program (SERP) and a Special Separation
Package (SSP), for its employees, as an economic recessionary measure to trim
its existing organization, maintain the company’s business viability, and
ensure its competitiveness through increased productivity (p. 63, Rollo).

On October 7, 1982, the Union President, Ricardo Q. Estonilo, wrote a letter to the company, requesting
management to dialogue with the Union concerning the company’s move to
implement the SSP and SERP programs.  In
the later part of 1982 through 1984, on the ground of redundancy, the company
terminated the services of many employees, including the ten original
complainants, giving them SSP and SERP benefits which they accepted.

However, problems arose because after dismissing the petitioners,
the company allegedly later hired new employees at lower rates of pay, in
violation of the petitioners’ right to security of tenure.  On September 22, 1986, four years after they
had received their special retirement benefits, petitioners filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and asked for reinstatement with backwages
and other benefits, as well as damages and attorney’s fees (NLRC Case No.
9-3763-86).

On October 27, 1986, one hundred forty (140) “retired” workers
joined as additional complainants.  On
July 11, 1988, these additional complainants filed a
Special Power of Attorney dated September 17, 1986, authorizing the ten (10)
above-named petitioners to represent them in the case.  The company questioned such authorization.

In its answer, respondent contended that complainants have no
cause of action against it considering that the redundancy program was justified
under the facts and the law; that the claim or demand set forth in the
complaint has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and that
the respondent exercised due diligence and care and acted with due regard for all circumstances.

On December 15, 1988, Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati
rendered judgment for the complainants and against the respondent company –

“1.          Declaring
respondent Procter & Gamble-PMC to have terminated the employment of
complainants without just and valid cause
and, consequently it is hereby directed to reinstate complainants to
their former positions, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
appertaining thereto, as well as
to pay them full backwages and other benefits
computed and adjusted at applicable rates of pay, from the dates they were retrenched up to the date of actual
reinstatement.  From the total backwages and accompanying benefits, however, shall be
deducted the separation benefits received by complainants proportionately;

“2.          Ordering respondents
to pay attorney’s fees in the sum
equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the total amount due the complainants; and

“3.          Dismissing
complainants’ claim for damages for insufficiency of evidence.” (pp. 43-44, Rollo.)

On January 6, 1989,
the company appealed to the NLRC.

On January 26, 1989, petitioners asked for immediate execution of
the decision pending appeal because the company had not filed an appeal
bond.  On January 30, 1989, the
petitioners also filed a motion for computation of the amounts due them under
the Labor Arbiter’s decision.  The motion
was opposed by the company.

On April 11, 1989, they filed a motion for execution, and on
April 17, 1989, a supplementary motion for execution.

On June 7, 1989, the NLRC denied the motion for execution.  Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
also denied.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

Book V, Rule XVI, Section 11, Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, provides:

“Sec. 11. 
Appeal fee and bond – The interested party appealing any decision, order
or award of the lower body or agency shall pay a filing fee of twenty-five
pesos (P25.00) with the body or agency of origin except deadlock in negotiation
cases wherein the minimum appeal fee shall be P50.00.

To stay the execution of the
decision, order or award, the appealing
party shall post an appeal bond to
be determined and approved by the Commissioner
or Labor Arbiter, Med-Arbiter, Regional Director,
or Director of the Bureau of origin,
as the case may be.” (Underscoring
supplied.)

The petitioners’ interpretation of the second paragraph of
Section 11 is that unless the appealing party posts an appeal bond, the
execution of the appealed decision shall follow as a matter of course.

The NLRC, on the other hand, contends that since it denied
petitioners’ motion for execution
pending appeal, the appellant need not file an appeal bond to stay execution of
the appealed decision for the simple reason that there is no order of execution
to be stayed.

“There appears to be a wrong notion on the applicability of the 2nd
paragraph, supra of [Section 111].  We cannot share the movant’s
posture that under the quoted 2nd paragraph herein appellants are required to
file an appeal bond to be determined by the Commission to perfect their appeal
and so for failure to comply, the decision of the Labor Arbiter of December 15,
1988 became final and executory.  The arguments of the movants
appear misplaced.  The cited paragraph
indubitably refers to stay of execution of an order, decision or award not
to perfection of an appeal.

“Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC speaks of the payment
of an appeal fee not an appeal bond.  Rule XI, execution, of the NLRC Revised Rules
directs the filing of a supersedeas bond to stay
execution in specified cases.  One
is not to be confounded with the other.” (pp. 20-21, Rollo.)

The NLRC’s interpretation of paragraph
2, – Section 11 of the Omnibus Rules is correct.  It accords with Art. 223 of the Labor Code
which provides:

“Art. 223.  Appeal –
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions,
awards, or orders.  Such appeal may be entertained only on any
of the following grounds:

“(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter;

“(b) If the decision, order award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;

“(c) If made purely on questions of law; and

“(d) If serious errors in the findings of
facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.”

A sensu contrario,
decisions, awards, or orders of the labor arbiter that have been appealed to
the Commission on time are not yet final and executory.

The decision of the Labor Arbiter in this case was rendered on
December 18, 1988, or three (3) months before Article 223 of the Labor Code was
amended by Republic Act 6715 (which became law on March 21, 1989), providing
that a decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering the reinstatement of a dismissed
or separated employee shall be immediately executory
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, and the posting of an appeal
bond by the employer shall not stay such execution.  Since this new law contains
no provision giving it retroactive effect (Art. 4, Civil Code), the amendment
may not be applied to this case.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
resolution of the NLRC denying the
petitioners’ motion for immediate execution of the appealed decision of the
Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 9-3763-86, the petition for certiorari is
dismissed, with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.