PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANOLO CARPIO Y SUBARAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The accused-appellant was a store owner but it appeared he was selling not only the usual sari-sari goods from bread to bubble gum. Among his stocks was marijuana, although this was of course not
displayed. The police got wind of his
clandestine business and laid a trap for him. Ensnared as planned, he was arrested and charged with violation of
Section 4, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

According to the prosecution, Manolo Carpio was reported by
several informers to be selling marijuana at Marcela Street in Maypajo. Acting on this information, the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Caloocan City Police Station organized a “buy-bust” team
on December 15, 1988, for the purpose of apprehending him.

The team was composed of Patrolmen Angel Lumabas, Manuel Valdoz,
Jose Marte, Edgardo Adawag, and Eliseo Gargaritano. Gargaritano was to pose as the buyer and for this role was
provided with two five-peso bills to be used in the sham purchase. The serial numbers of the bills were
recorded in the police blotter by Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra, as KH695187 and
KC842177.

Upon arrival at the target area, the team dispersed, with
Gargaritano proceeding to Carpio’s store in search of their quarry. The other agents posted themselves in
various places where they could covertly witness the sham transaction.

Gargaritano stood outside the store and asked Carpio for
marijuana, offering the marked bills in payment. Carpio took the money through the steel grill that separated them
and went inside his house. He returned
after a few minutes with a piece of folded pad paper which he handed to Gargaritano. The paper contained marijuana flowering
tops. Gargaritano complained that the
quantity was not worth P10.00 and
asked Carpio to come outside to see for himself. As Carpio opened the gate of the store, Gargaritano grabbed his
arm and the other policemen emerged from their respective vantage points and
pounced upon him. Gargaritano retrieved
the marked money from Carpio. The team
then took their captive to the police station for investigation and detention.^[1]

At the station, Gargaritano turned over the marked money and the
marijuana to Buenaobra. The latter
wrapped the marijuana in a sheet of bond paper and labeled it with his initials
(M.R.B.) and those of Carpio (M.C.S.), after which he had it hand-carried by
Adawag to the National Bureau of Investigation with a referral slip for its
examination. Buenaobra also attached
the marked bills to a sheet of bond paper, noting their serial numbers as
KH695187 and KC842177, the same numbers he had previously jotted down in his
logbook.^[2]

It was also Buenaobra who took the joint sworn statement of
Lumabas, Marte, and Valdoz^[3] and
the separate sworn statement of Gargaritano,^[4] both describing the buy-bust
operation. Gargaritano, Valdoz and
Buenaobra were later to affirm their statements in separate testimonies at the
trial.

Another prosecution witness was Felicisima Francisco, a forensic
chemist of the NBI, who subjected the specimen sent by Buenaobra to chemical,
microscopic and chromatographic examinations and found it positive for
marijuana. She embodied her findings in
a Certification^[5]
and a Dangerous Drugs Report,^[6] which
she later affirmed on the stand.

The marijuana was identified by Francisco^[7] as
well as by Gargaritano and Buenaobra, who also both identified the marked
money.^[8]

In his own defense, Carpio testified that in the morning of
December 15, 1988, he was tending his store when Gargaritano, who was
pretending to buy some cigarettes, suddenly grabbed him by the waist and pulled
him outside. He was thrown into a bicycle sidecar and there handcuffed. His wife and his mother protested and asked
why he was being arrested but Gargaritano simply asked them to go to the police
headquarters if they liked. He was then
taken in a Ford Fiera to the Caloocan City Police Station, where he was
confined in a cell until evening. During his investigation by the inquest fiscal later that night, he
denied ownership of the marijuana and the two five-peso bills.^[9]

Carpio was corroborated by his wife, Magdalena Carpio, his
mother, Muriel Carpio, and a neighbor, Tessie Veguilla. His mother admitted having called a
congressman and the vice-mayor of Caloocan City for help^[10]
but both, officials apparently declined to intervene.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City^[11]
rendered a decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused MANOLO CARPIO Y SUBARAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Pusher), and hereby
sentences said accused to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 and to pay the
costs.

The marijuana flowering tops, subject matter of this criminal case,
are forfeited in favor of the Government and the Deputy Sheriff of this Court
is hereby directed to turn over the aforesaid marijuana flowering tops to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for their disposition.

The accused shall be credited in the service of his sentence with
the full time he has undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Carpio then came to this Court on appeal. He subsequently filed a petition for bail
pending appeal which we denied.

At the outset, let it be stated that questions of fact, including
the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are best resolved by the trial
court, and such resolution is received by the appellate court with much
respect, if not indeed as conclusive, in the absence of the established
exceptions calling for its reversal. As
this Court said in People v. De Guzman:^[12]

In the resolution of the
factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial
judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication
that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere
reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale
signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie
or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply. The record will not show if the
eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with
a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in
shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all
these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict.

With the above considerations in mind, we now proceed to examine
the arguments of the defense for the reversal of the judgment of conviction.

The defense questions the credibility of Gargaritano for certain
alleged inconsistencies, as when he said he gave Carpio a ten-peso bill when
the exhibits offered consisted of two five-peso bills; gave the serial numbers
of these bills as KH845177 and KC592187 when they were actually KH695187 and
KC842177; and testified that he wrote an “X” inside the letter
“O” in the word PISO on the said bills when the mark thereon was not
an “X” but a dot.

The record shows that all these inconsistencies were
satisfactorily explained by Gargaritano.

He said that when he spoke of the ten-peso bill, he was actually
referring to the amount of the purchase price, which consisted of 2 five-peso
bills.^[13]
He did mis-state the serial numbers earlier, but as he testified on re-direct
examination, this was because he gave these figures from memory only and
without consulting his records.^[14]
Significantly, the serial numbers of the bills submitted in evidence did
coincide with the numbers Buenaobra said he noted in the police blotter. Gargaritano also said that it was his
practice to use either a cross or a dot in marking bills for buy-bust
operations and that in this particular case he thought he had used a cross when
in fact he had dotted the bills. He
said that the number of operations in which he had participated was the cause
of this confusion.^[15]

As to his seeming self-contradiction when he first testified that
there was only one informer and later said there were eight, the record shows
that there was only one informer who was present at their briefing prior to the
buy-bust operation.^[16]
Before that, however, they had received information from no less than eight
persons that Carpio was engaged in drug-pushing in the vicinity of Marcela
street.^[17]

The defense also contends that the joint affidavit^[18]
of Lumabas, Valdoz and Marte should not have been admitted in evidence because
it was not signed by Marte. The Court
notes, however, that it was signed by Valdoz, who identified and affirmed it on
the stand. The document was therefore
admissible as part of his own testimony even if the other signatories were not
presented at the trial.

We do not agree that the non-submission of the police blotter
where the serial numbers of the marked bills were recorded was fatal to the
prosecution. If the defense felt that
the bills were not the best evidence of the money used for the operation, there
is no reason why it should not have objected to their admission on that
ground. Not having done so, it is
deemed to have waived this objection and cannot now raise it at this late
hour. At any rate, if the defense felt
that the logbook was vital to its cause, what it should have done was demand
its production at the trial through a subpoena duces tecum for use as
its own evidence.

We also find untenable the argument of the defense that the
prosecution should have presented Adawag to testify on his part in the buy-bust
operation. The defense cannot dictate
on the prosecution the choice of the latter’s witnesses. It is the prerogative of each party to
determine which evidence to submit and, if it so pleases, to dispense with
persons who will give merely corroborative testimony, as in the case of Adawag. After all, Gargaritano, Valdoz and Buenaobra had already
testified on the details of the arrest of the accused-appellant. If the defense felt that Adawag’s version of
the operation was vital, it should itself have called him to the stand as its
own witness to refute the statements of his team-mates.

The argument that the conviction should be reversed because of
the failure of the prosecution to present the informer should also be
rejected. People v. Rojo,^[19]
which the defense cites, is not in point for in that case the informant who was
not presented was alleged to have been also the poseur-buyer. As such, he was in the best position to
testify on the details of the purported sale of the marijuana by the
accused-appellant and so should have been presented by the prosecution. Moreover, the Court doubted in that case if
there was any entrapment at all. By
contrast, there is no doubt in the case at bar that the buy-bust operation was
actually conducted, and the principal witness to this operation was the
poseur-buyer himself in the person of Gargaritano. Gargaritano testified. The informer did not have to because he was not a participant in that
operation and would have been incompetent to narrate it.

The invocation by the defense of Stonehill v. Diokno^[20]
deserves only a brief reminder of an elementary Principle of law. There is no need to obtain a search warrant
or a warrant of arrest where the culprit is caught red-handed like Carpio. Under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, a person may be arrested without warrant if he is actually committing an
offense, and a lawful search may also be made on his person, also without
warrant, as an incident of the lawful arrest.^[21] This
was what was done to the accused-appellant in the morning of December 5, 1988.

The defense complains that the trial court did not give credence
to the accused-appellant’s denial, as if such denial were enough to
raise the reasonable doubt that would forestall his conviction. It was not. The evidence adduced by the prosecution was strong enough to overcome
the constitutional presumption of his innocence and the burden thus fell on him
to offer more convincing evidence than a mere denial.

The corroboration of Carpio’s testimony by his wife, his mother
and his neighbor who, was also his mother’s lessee, was correctly received with
suspicion of bias by the trial court. On the other hand, the witnesses who testified against him had no known
or established motive to perjure themselves, let alone the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their official functions. Carpio himself admitted that he did not know any of the
prosecution witnesses and thus impliedly negated any evil purpose behind their
respective testimonies. The Court
itself sees no reason why the police officers herein involved should single out
an apparently innocent store-owner and charge him with a severe offense calling
for no less than imprisonment for life. No reason, that is, except his guilt.

As for the theory that Carpio would not have been so careless as
to sell marijuana to Gargaritano, whom he had never met before, we note with
not a little concern the growing casualness of drug pushers in the pursuit of
their illicit trade, as if it were a perfectly legitimate operation involving
no particular caution or qualm of conscience. The Court observed this heedless attitude in People v. Tandoy^[22]
thus:

Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to
that class of crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the
exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public
place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from
pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may even serve to camouflage the
same. Hence, the Court has sustained
the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billard hall
(People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store
(People vs. Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA
259), and in front of a house (People vs. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February
23, 1988).

The other arguments of the defense are so insubstantial as to
merit nothing more than short shrift. If anything, they only prove the desperation of the accused-appellant to
prove innocence where there is none and to resist the proof of guilt that has
been established against him beyond the whisper of a doubt.

The Solicitor General recommends affirmance of the decision in
toto, forgetting that the penalty prescribed by Section 4, Article II,
of Rep. Act No. 6425 is “life imprisonment to death,” not reclusion
perpetua. Life imprisonment is not
exactly synonymous with reclusion perpetua, which carries with it the
accessory penalties prescribed in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Life imprisonment does not.^[23]
As this Court has earlier advised, trial courts should be careful in using the
correct designation of the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code or by
special laws, to avoid misunderstanding as to their scope and consequences.^[24]
In the case before us, the penalty of “reclusion perpetua”
should be changed to “life imprisonment,” conformably to the
above-mentioned section.

WHEREFORE, as above modified, the decision of the trial
court is AFFIRMED and, accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against
the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., on leave.

^[1]
TSN, May 4, 1989, pp. 7, 19.

^[2]
Ibid., May 5, 1989, pp. 5-7.

^[3]
Exhibit “H.”

^[4]
Exhibit “F.”

^[5]
Exhibit “B.”

^[6]
Exhibit “E.”

^[7]
TSN, April 20, 1989, pp. 9-10.

^[8]
Ibid., May 4, 1989, p. 11; May 5, 1989, pp. 6-8; May 11, 1989, p.
3.

^[9]
Id., May 18, 1989, pp. 2-9.

^[10]
id., May 17, 1989, p. 35.

^[11]
Thru Judge Rene Victoriano.

^[12]
188 SCRA 407.

^[13]
TSN, May 4, 1989, p. 8.

^[14]
Ibid., May 11, 1989, pp. 8-9.

^[15]
Id., p. 7.

^[16]
id., May 4, 1989, p. 5.

^[17]
id., p. 13.

^[18]
Exhibit “H.”

^[19]
175 SCRA 119.

^[20]
20 SCRA 383.

^[21]
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., p. 150 citing Adams vs. Williams, 47
U.S. 143.

^[22]
192 SCRA 28.

^[23]
People vs. Del Pilar, 188 SCRA 37.

^[24]
People vs. Ansing, 196 SCRA 374; People vs. Dekingko, k189 SCRA
512; People vs. Manlansan, 189 SCRA 619.