G.R. No. 88938. June 08, 1992
LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD ADDURU SANTILLAN, JUDGE, BRANCH 38, RTC, MANILA, DEPUTY SHERIFF REGIO RUEFA AND TEE CHIN HO, RESPONDENTS.
NARVASA, J.:
The appellate proceedings at bar originated from an action of
“replevin with damages” instituted in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila by La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. against a person named “Te Tien
Ho,” described in the complaint as a “junk dealer” or owner of a
“second hand store” with “office/bodega at 1005 Estrada St.,
Singalong, Manila.” The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-47768 and
assigned to Branch 38 of the Manila RTC, presided over by Hon. Natividad G.
Adduru-Santillan.
In its verified complaint,[1] La
Tondeña Distillers, Inc. (hereafter,
simply La Tondeña) set out the following facts, to wit:
1) that “it
manufacures and sells ** a gin popularly known as ‘Ginebra San Miguel,’ which is contained in 350 c.c. white flint
bottles with the marks of ownership ‘LA TONDEÑA, INC.’ and ‘GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL’
stamped or blown-in to the bottles which ** (it [La Tondeña]) specially ordered from the bottle
manufacturers for its exclusive use;”
2) that said white flint
bottles were registered with the Philippine Patent Office by La Tondeña’s
predecessor-in-interest in accordance with Republic Act No. 623,[2]
as amended,[3]
the registration having thereafter been renewed and being valid and subsisting;
3) that use of the
registered bottles by any one without written permission of the owner is
declared unlawful by Section 2 of R.A. 623, as amended, pertinently reading as follows:
“SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the
written consent of the manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has successfully
registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next
preceding section, to fill such bottles * * for the purpose of sale, or to
sell, dispose of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether
filled or not * * .”
4) that the sale of the gin
in the registered white flint bottles does not include the sale of the bottles
themselves; in fact, La Tondeña’s “sales invoices never specified that the
sale of the beverage includes the sale of the container;” and
5) that the defendant
“Te Tien Ho” has in his possession a quantity of the registered
bottles worth P20,000.00,
and on the basis of these facts, prayed
that:
“(a) Upon the filing
and approval of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, * * (the) Court issue an
order directing the Sheriff or other proper officer ** to take into his custody
all the 350 c.c. bottles of the plaintiff in the possession of the defendant *
* and to dispose of the same in accordance with the rules of court;
(b) After trial plaintiff be adjudged the lawful
owner and possessor of the said bottles and * * judgment (be rendered) in the
alternative against the defendant for the delivery thereof to plaintiff, or for
the payment * * of the value thereof in case delivery cannot be made;” and
(c) Defendant be made to pay actual, nominal and
temperate and exemplary damages in specific stated amounts (aggregating
P75,400.00), as well as attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
Judge Santillan issued the writ of delivery prayed for on
February 13, 1989 upon La Tondeña’s posting of a bond in the amount of
P40,000.00. In implementation of the
writ, Deputy Sheriff Regio Ruefa seized on February 22,1989 20,250 bottles with
the blown-in marks, ‘La Tondeña, Inc.’ and ‘Ginebra San Miguel’ from No.1105
Estrada St., Singalong.[4] On that
occasion Mr. Ruefa executed a handwritten “Receipt” of the following
tenor:[5]
‘RECEIVED FROM MR. TE TIEN HO 405 BOXES/50 ** (20,250) bottles,
pieces 350 c.c. bottles, marks BLOWN-IN ‘LA TONDEÑA INC. and GINEBRA San
Miguel’ subject of the Order of seizure in Civil Case No. 89-47768 entitled
‘LA TONDEÑA INC. vs. TE TIEN HO located at 1105 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila.
* * * * * Feb. 22, 1989.
FOR: THE SHERIFF OF MANILA
Note:
(405 boxes/50
OK EMPTY
20,250 bottles)
WITNESS BY :
(s) ALEXANDER ELLEVE[6]
Plaintiff
(s) TEE
CHIN HO [7] * * * * *
Defendant * * * * *.”
It is noteworthy that Tee
Chin Ho, denominated “defendant,” signed Sheriff Ruefa’s receipt as a
witness. He does not deny his
intervention in the receipt and in fact, as will shortly be narrated, insists
that it was from him that the bottles were seized. Furthermore, Sheriff Ruefa’s return dated March 3,1989 attests
that prior to seizing the bottles, he served summons, copy of the complaint and
its annexes, copy of the bond, and the writ of seizure personally on
“defendant Te Tien Ho,[8] who requested his wife Perla Diolesa to sign
his name on the original copy of the summons and the writ of seizure for and in
his own behalf, such service and implementation of the writ of seizure having
been effected “at 1105 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila and not at 1005
Estrada St., Singalong, Manila, as evidence(d) by the signature appearing on
the original summons and writ.”[9]
The five-day period
prescribed by law within which the sufficiency of the replevin bond might be
objected to or the return of the property seized required,[10] expired without any person objecting to the
bond or seeking the return of the bottles. Instead an individual identifying himself as “Tee Chin Ho”
filed on March 1, 1989 a pleading denominated “ANSWER (with preliminary
injunction and compulsory counterclaim),”[11] which opened with a plea that he be given
“leave to intervene as party who has legal interest in the matter in
litigation such that he would be adversely affected by a distribution or
disposition of the property in litigation,” and a declaration that he was
submitting the answer “as party-intervenor.” The answer asserted that
–
1) all purchases of La Tondena’s gin necessarily included the
bottles containing the gin; hence ownership of the bottles did not remain in La
Tondeña but was transferred to the purchasers;
2) it was from him, Tee Chin Ho, and not from Te Tien Ho, that
the bottles in question had been taken by Sheriff Ruefa, and the taking had
occurred at 1105 Estrada Street (his [Tee Chin Ho’s] place of business) and not
at 1005 Estrada Street, the address given in the complaint; and
3) La Tondeña had “masterminded and caused two instances
of seizure against intervenor, first through and by the Manila City
police, and second through the Court’s sheriff (copies of the receipts
of seizures * * (being attached to and made parts of the answer) as Annexes ‘5’
and ‘6’[12]).”[13]
Parenthetically, the text of the receipt, Annex 6, has already been set out
herein, supra.[14] The
other receipt, drawn up on October 6, 1988 — about four months earlier — and
referred to as Annex 5 — reads as follows:
“DATE OCT. 6, 1988
TIME
9:50 AM
FROM: TEE CHIN HO JUNK SHOP
ITEMS: QUANTITY:
432X50 (pcs. 21,600)
GSM ROUND 350 ml
GSM FRASCO 700 ml
GSM * * 350
ml
ANEJO FLAT 375 ml
ANEJO OVAL 750 ml
ISSUED BY: (s)
PAT. BENITO DE LEON
RECEIVED BY: (s)
F. LAZARO 10/6/88,”
and, on the basis of the foregoing
allegations, prayed “for the issuance forthwith of a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction * * and, after due proceedings, that said
writs be made permanent and that judgment be issued dismissing the complaint
and, with respect to intervenor’s compulsory counterclaim, that awards be made
for actual damages in the sum of P300,000.00, moral damages in the sum of
P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of P2,000,000.00, and P100,000.00
to cover attorney’s fees and litigation expenses * * .”
On March 3, 1989 the
Sheriff delivered the 20,250 empty bottles seized by him to La Tondeña.[15]
The Court set Tee Chin
Ho’s application for injunction for hearing on March 17, 1989 but by Order of
the same date, reset the hearing to April 3, 1989 to give La Tondeña time to
file a reply. It however issued on the
same day, April 3, 1989, a temporary restraining order “to preserve the
status quo and to prevent further damages, * * (enjoining) the plaintiff, or
other persons acting for and in its behalf, from seizing or otherwise
confiscating any bottles subject of the writ of seizure dated February 20, 1989
from the movant Tee Chin Ho of 1105 Estrada Street, Singalong, Manila, until
further orders. * *. “[16]
La Tondeña filed its Reply on March 1, 1989 and its opposition to
the application for injunction on April
3, 1989[17]
— which latter date, as aforestated,
was the date to which Tee Chin Ho’s application for injunction was reset. La Tondeña also filed, under date of April
5, 1989, a “Motion to Admit Attached Amended Complaint with Motion to Dismiss
Motion for Intervention and Petition for Preliminary Injunction,” which it set
for hearing on April 10, 1989 at 8:30 A.M.[18] In this motion La Tondeña alleged inter
alia that Tee Chin Ho’s answer-in-intervention had not yet been admitted (the
implication clearly being that it still could amend its complaint as a matter
of right[19]); that the amendment it wished to make in
its complaint consisted merely in correcting the “spelling in the name of
the defendant as well as his address,” considering that as shown by the
receipts annexed to the answer-in-intervention, “Tee Chin Ho with address
at 1105 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila and Te Tien Ho with address at 1005
Estrada St., Singalong, Manila, ** (are) one and the same person;” and
that Tee Chin Ho had “waived his right to question the incorrect spelling
of the name ** and ** address when he voluntarily signed the sheriff’s receipt
dated February 22, 1989 through his wife * * .”
On April 7, 1989, Judge
Adduru-Santillan promulgated an Order ruling “for intervenor Tee Chin
Ho” and directing issuance of “a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction * * as prayed for in
the answer in intervention, upon intervenor’s filing a bond in the amount of
Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00).” The Order was made to rest on the
following findings, to wit:
” * * that the seizure authorized by the Court’s writ of
replevin is only against the person whose name and address is pleaded in the
complaint namely TE TIEN HO at No. 1005 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila; the two
truckloads of empty bottles seized by the Manila Police (Exhibit ‘4’) and by
the Sheriff of Manila (Exhibit ‘5’) from intervenor Tee Chin Ho is improper and
unlawful; intervenor Tee Chin Ho possessor of the two truckloads of empty
bottles is presumed under the civil law as the owner thereof (Article 433 and
541, Civil Code); that even under Republic Act 623, as amended by Republic Act
5700, the fact that the law provides that the sale of the bottled products does
not ipso jure carry with it the sale of the bottle yet the same law negates any
right of action of plaintiff manufacturer and seller to recover the empty
bottles from ‘any person to whom the registered manufacturer . . . seller has
transferred . . . any of the containers (Section 5) and, moreover, the statute
expressly exempts from its coverage the use of bottles as containers for
‘sisi’, ‘bagoong,’ ‘patis,’ and similar native products’ (Section 6); and that
the due process clause protects intervenor in his right to earn his livelihood
through engagement in his junk shop business (Quisumbing and Fernando,
Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 80).”
Then Judge
Adduru-Santillan issued the “writ of mandatory and prohibitory
injunction” on April 11, 1989 –
1) “ordering plaintiff
La Tondeña Distillers, Inc., its agents, duly authorized representatives or
other persons acting for and in its behalf to return and restore unto
intervenor Tee Chin Ho at his address at 1105 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila,
all 41,850 empty bottles/containers with blown up mark ‘La Tondeña Inc.’ and
‘Ginebra San Miguel’ seized from intervenor mentioned in Annexes ‘4’ and ‘5’ of
the answer-in-intervention;” and
2) “enjoining
plaintiff from using, employing, inducing, corrupting or, otherwise causing
members of the Manila Police Force and/or other persons for the purpose of
seizing bottles/containers bearing the marks ‘La Tondeña Inc.’ or ‘Ginebra San
Miguel’ found in intervenor’s possession at his address at 1105 Estrada St.,
Singalong, Manila, until further orders * * .”
Earlier,
on April 10, 1989, at the hearing of La Tondeña’s motions (a) to dismiss
application for injunction and (b) to amend its complaint. Judge Adduru-Santillan informed the parties
that the motion to amend complaint was deemed “submitted for resolution
but that (s)he had already granted the petition for the issuance of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction, * * (and that) effective April 26, 1989,
she will not be holding trial due to her application for retirement.”[20] La Tondeña learned on the same day that by
Order dated April 7, 1989, the Judge had admitted Tee Chin Ho’s answer in
intervention.[21]
This Order La Tondeña
assailed in the Court of Appeals. On
April 19, 1989, it filed with that Court a petition “for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.”[22] In its petition, it alleged that Judge
Santillan had in effect adjudicated the case on the merits without trial; she
had ignored and failed to apply, or grossly misconstrued, the relevant
provisions of R.A. 623, as amended; she had disregarded circumstances on record
showing that Te Tien Ho and Tee Chin Ho are one and the same person; she had,
albeit utterly without authority, taken cognizance of and passed upon the
alleged seizure by the Manila Police of bottles from Tee Chin Ho on another,
earlier occasion; and she “should have disqualified herself from acting on
the petition or at least requested that it be transferred to her pairing
judge.” La Tondeña thus prayed for judgment “declaring null and void
and of no effect and force the order dated April 7, 1989 * * * including the
writ of prohibitory, mandatory injunction dated April 11, 1989 and directing
respondent sheriff Rufio[23] Ruefa to refrain from enforcing the said
writ, commanding the respondent judge to desist from conducting any further
proceedings in civil case no. 89-47768 * *.” It also prayed for a
temporary restraining order, which the Court of Appeals granted by Resolution
dated April 21, 1989 “in order not to render moot and academic the
issue/issues raised * *.”[24]
The Court of Appeals
promulgated its judgment on the case on May 18, 1989.[25] It dismissed La Tondeña’s petition. It declared that the petition did “not prima
facie reveal such sufficiency in substance as would merit its being given
due course;” that even “granting arguendo that the errors
pointed out by petitioner had indeed attended respondent Judge’s issuance of
the assailed Order, these errors cannot be corrected by means of certiorari,
* * * the appropriate remedy * * * being a timely appeal from the judgment on
the merits;” and that the “solidly grounded and well-reasoned
discussion of respondent Judge (in her challenged order) * * * cannot be
consistent with a finding ** that she indulged in a whimsical and capricious or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of judgment, characteristic of the grave abuse
of discretion calling for certiorari .”[26]
La Tondeña filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision[27] which was denied by Resolution dated June
29, 1989.[28] It then seasonably appealed to this Court on
certiorari; and here it ascribes several errors to the Court of Appeals,
i.e., in not finding that ?
1) ” * * the
Respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
in including in ** (her) order the return of 21,600 registered bottles
allegedly seized by the Manila Police on October 6, 1988, which were not the
subject of the case and not within the jurisdiction of the trial court;
2) the Respondent Judge
had violated fundamental rules on injunctions, viz.:
a) “that a mandatory
injunction shall not issue in favor of a party whose rights are not clear;”
b) “that no advantage
may be given (by an injunction to one (party) to the prejudice of the
other;”
c) “that ** (an
injunction’s) primary purpose is to preserve the status quo;”
3) ” ** the
Respondent Judge violated a rule on Replevin that the disposition of a property
seized under a replevin order upon the defendant shall be done only within 5
days from date of seizure;”
4) ” ** the
Respondent Judge utterly failed to apply the law in question, RA 623 as amended
by RA 5700;”
5) ” ** the act of
Respondent Judge in ** granting the preliminary injunction was tainted with
procedural infirmities;” and
6) Tee Chin Ho and Te
Tien Ho are one and the same person.
I
A defendant or other
party in a replevin proceeding against whom a writ of seizure has issued has
the following alternative remedies set forth in Section 5, Rule 60 of the Rules
of Court, viz.:
“SEC. 5. Return of property.–If the defendant objects
to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon, he cannot require the return of the property as in this section
provided; but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery
of the property to the plaintiff, require the return thereof, by filing with
the clerk or judge of the court a bond executed to the plaintiff, in double the
value of the property as stated in the plaintiff’s affidavit, for the delivery
of the property to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, for the payment
of such sum to him as may be recovered against the defendant, and by serving a
copy of such bond on the plaintiff or his attorney.”
The defendant may avail
of these alternative options only within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the officer. This is made
plain albeit impliedly by Section 6 of the same Rule, providing as follows:[29]
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by officer.–If within
five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer, the
defendant does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or
sureties thereon, or require the return of the property as provided in the last
preceding section; or if the defendant so objects, and the plaintiffs first or
new bond is approved; or if the defendant so requires, and his bond is objected
to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the
property shall be delivered to the plaintiff. If for any reason, the property is not delivered to the plaintiff, the
officer must return it to the defendant.”
Thus if a defendant in a
replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to
him, he should within five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in
double the value of said property,[30] and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof,
both requirements — as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period
mentioned — being mandatory.[31]
Alternatively, “the
defendant may object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s bond, or of the
surety or sureties thereon;” but if he does so, “he cannot require
the return of the property” by posting a counter-bond pursuant to Sections
5 and 6.
In other words, the law
does not allow the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ
of seizure (or delivery) — on the ground of insufficiency of the complaint or
of the grounds relied upon therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary
attachment or injunction,[32] and thereby put at issue the matter of the
title or right of possession over the specific chattel being replevied, the
policy apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined
only at the trial on the merits.
On the other hand, a stranger
to the action, i.e., a person not a party to the action, or as the law puts
it, “any other person than the defendant or his agent,” whose
property is seized pursuant to the writ of delivery, is accorded the remedy
known as a terceria, a third party claim, to wit:
“SEC. 7. Third-party claim.–If the property taken be
claimed by any other person than the defendant or his agent, and such person
makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the
officer while he has possession of the property, and a copy thereof upon the
plaintiff, the officer is not bound to keep the property or deliver it to the
plaintiff, unless the plaintiff or his agent, on demand of the officer,
indemnifies him against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the
value of the property, and in case of disagreement as to such value the same
shall be decided by the court issuing the order. The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping
of such property, to any other person than the defendant or his agent, unless
such a claim is so made and the action upon the bond brought within one hundred
and twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of said bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent
such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
action. However, when the plaintiff, or
the person in whose behalf the order of delivery was issued, is the Republic of
the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of bond shall
not be required, and in case the sheriff or the officer executing the order is
sued for damages as a result of such execution, he shall be represented by the
Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by
the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of the funds to be
appropriated for the purpose.”
The
remedy is identical to that granted to strangers in a proceeding on preliminary
attachment or execution of judgments.[33]
In lieu of, or in
addition to the filing of a terceria, the third party may, as Section 7
points out, vindicate “his claim to the property by any proper
action.” This effort at vindication may take the form of a separate action
for recovery of the property, or intervention in the replevin action itself.[34]
It was thus imperative
for the Trial Judge, before ultimately resolving the motion for leave to
irtervene as party defendant of the person identifying himself as “Tee
Chin Ho,” to determine the precise status of said “Tee Chin Ho:”
whether he was indeed a stranger to the action, as he claims, and could
therefore avail of the remedy of intervention as a party defendant, or he was
in truth a proper party defendant, who had been mistakenly and inadvertently
referred to as “Te Tien Ho,” and who therefore only had the
alternative remedies aforementioned of either (a) objecting to the replevin
bond or the surety or sureties thereof or (b) posting a counter-bond to compel
return of the property.
As of April 11, 1989,
when the Trial Judge issued the “writ of mandatory and prohibitory
injunction,” she was aware, or should have known, of certain facts in the
record bearing strongly on the identity of “Tee Chin Ho,” namely: –
1) that “Tee Chin
Ho” was actually served with summons at his junk shop at Estrada Street;
2) that the bottles
described in La Tondeña’s complaint and the writ of delivery were actually
found at his establishment, and were there seized;
3) that Tee Chin Ho’s
shop is the only junk shop on Estrada Street;
4) that “Tee Chin
Ho” did not then protest to the sheriff that he was not the defendant
named in the summons, “Te Tien Ho,” or that his address was different
from that indicated in the process; instead he asked his wife to sign his name
on the sheriffs receipt wherein lie was described as “defendant,” as
well as “on the original copy of the summons and the writ of seizure for
and in his own behalf;”[35]
5) that “Tee Chin
Ho” is not phonetically all that different from “Te Tien Ho;”
6) that “Tee Chin Ho” admitted that earlier, he had been found in
possession of empty bottles marked “La Tondeña, Inc.” and
“Ginebra San Miguel,” which had been seized by Manila police
officers; and
7) that La Tondeña had
filed a “motion to admit attached amended complaint with motion to dismiss
motion for intervention and petition for preliminary injunction” dated
April 5, 1989, in which it alleged infer alia, in relation to the
amendment of its complaint, that ?
a) the “name of defendant Tee Chin Ho and his address at 1105
Estrada St., Singalong, Manila ** (had been) inadvertently indicated as Te Tien
Ho with address at 1005 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila in the complaint;”
b) the amendment consisted
merely in the correction of “the spelling in the name of the defendant as
well as his address **;”
c) the error in La
Tondeña’s identification of the defendant was not a fatal one since the
principal object of the replevin suit was the recovery of identifiable bottles
in the wrongful possession of another; and
d) in any case, Tee Chin Ho
had waived his right to object to such an error.
There were thus circumstances of record, of which Her Honor was
charged with knowledge, that tended to show that La Tondeña’s proferred thesis
was not entirely far-fetched: that the
real target of its replevin suit was a junk dealer at Estrada Street,
Singalong, Manila, who was in unlawful possession of a large number of its
empty bottles, whose name and address had been mistakenly stated in the
original complaint but could nonetheless be ascertained. At the very least, therefore, it was a
matter of preferential priority for the Judge to determine whether “Tee
Chin Ho” is in fact “Te Tien Ho,” and thus enable her to know, to
turn, whether or not the remedy of intervention was proper in the premises,
instead of that provided in Section 5 of Rule 60, supra. In other words, unless there were a prior
determination by Her Honor of whether or not “Tee Chin Ho” was a proper
party defendant or a stranger to the action, she was in no position
to adjudge that his intervention as party defendant was correct. But this is what respondent Judge did. Without first making that prior
determination, she proceeded to pass upon the motion for intervention; she just
simply assumed and declared that Tee Chin Ho was not Te Tien Ho. She thus appears to have acted without
foundation, rashly, whimsically, oppressively.
II
Also overlooked by respondent Judge was that the amendment sought by La Tondeña was
one of those explicitly mentioned, and could, in the premises, be made as a matter
of right, in accordance with Sections 1 and 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, viz.:[36]
“SECTION 1. Amendments in general.–Pleadings may be
amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by
correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate
allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits
of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to
technicalities, and the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
SECTION 2. When amendments allowed as a matter of right.–A
party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within ten (10) days after it is
served.”
It is plain from the
record that at the time that La Tondeña moved to amend its complaint to correct
“a mistake in the name of a party” and “a mistaken or inadequate
allegation or description” of that party’s place of residence or business,
no effective “responsive pleading” (i.e., the answer) had been served
on it by the person impleaded in the action as defendant; for the admission of Tee
Chin Ho’s answer-in-intervention (with permissive counterclaim) was yet hanging
fire and no notice of the Court’s action thereon had been served on La
Tondeña. Clearly, then, the amendment
which La Tondeña wished to make was a matter of right in accordance with Section 2, Rule 10. Being directed at a “defect in the
designation of the parties,” it was in truth a correction that could be
summarily made at any stage of die action provided no prejudice is caused
thereby to the adverse party,” as Section 4 of the same Rule 10 further
provides.
It is simply amazing why
in light of all these factual and legal considerations, respondent Judge did
not quickly admit the amendment in question to correct the mistaken reference
to Tee Chin Ho as Te Tien Ho, but what is worse, first granted leave to Tee
Chin Ho’s intervention, and then indefinitely deferred the matter of the
amendment of the complaint by simply declaring it “submitted for
resolution” and commending it to the attention of the Judge who would
succeed her in her sala in view of her impending retirement. The Judge thus appears to have acted in
disregard of the plain provisions of the Rules, whimsically, oppressively.
III
It is amazing, too, why
Tee Chin Ho — who was already actually a defendant because he had been served with summons and
had implicitly acknowledged his status as such by signing or causing the
signing of his name to certain papers in which he was described as
defendant — should thereafter
still have moved to intervene in the action as defendant in intervention. The
more direct step indicated under the circumstances, since he had already been
brought into the action as defendant, although against his will, was merely to
draw the court’s attention, by some appropriate motion or pleading, to the lack
of any cause of action against him because he was not the person impleaded as
defendant in the complaint and, of course, seek relief from the writ of seizure
and the recovery of such damages as might have been caused to him by the
enforcement thereof. However, Tee Chin
Bo chose the more circuitous path: although already technically a defendant, he still filed a motion to intervene as defendant,
and also with the same basic objective:
to tell the Court he was not the person named in the complaint, and to recover
the property seized from him as well as damages.
By this maneuver, Tee
Chin Ho was able to evade the legal consequences of the expiration of the
five-day period prescribed by Section 5 (in relation to Section 6) of Rule 10, supra;
he succeeded in recovering the bottles in question even after the expiry of
said period, and what is more, as defendant in intervention, he was able
to put at issue the propriety of the ground relied upon for a writ of delivery
— which he would have been disqualified to do as defendant. It was seriously wrong for the Court to have
sanctioned such a maneuver.
IV
Again, the subject of La Tondeña’s replevin suit, as already
stated, are the 20,250 bottles seized from Tee Chin Ho on February
22,1989 on the strength of the writ of delivery of February 13, 1989.
But the Trial Court’s Order of April 7, 1989, directed La Tondeña
to “return and restore unto intervenor Tee Chin Ho * * all 41,850
empty bottles/containers with blown up mark ‘La Tondeña Inc.’ and ‘Ginebra San
Miguel’ seized from intervenor mentioned in Annexes ‘4’ and ‘5’ of the
answer-in-intervention” — more particularly, in the permissive
counterclaim set out in said answer-in-intervention. In other words, the Court ordered the return not only of the
20,250 bottles seized pursuant to its writ of delivery of February 13, 1989,
but also the quantity of bottles claimed by Tee Chin Ho to have been seized
from him by Manila Police officers at an earlier date.
Now, as regards these bottles earlier taken into custody by the
Manila Police, certain circumstances are germane, namely:
1) the claim therefor was made in a permissive
counterclaim, it not appearing that said claim “arises out of or is
necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party’s ** claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction;”[37] and
2) the only evidence on record is the receipt
issued by the officers involved in the seizure (Annex 5, answer-in-intervention);
the police officers were not impleaded as parties defendant on Tee Chin Ho’s
counterclaim nor required to appear and give evidence on said seizure; no proof
was ever adduced by Tee Chin Ho of the reason for the confiscation of the bottles,
or whether or not the bottles had been turned over to La Tondeña.
It does not appear that any docketing fees were paid by Tee Chin
Ho for his permissive counterclaim. At
no point has Tee Chin Ho ever stated that he had indeed paid any filing or
other fees thereon. The Trial Court,
therefore, should not have admitted the permissive counterclaim, much less
issued preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunctions founded on the
averments thereof.[38]
The Trial Court also required La Tondeña to return to Tee Chin Ho
the bottles seized from the latter by Manila police officers notwithstanding
the absence of any showing whatever that, the confiscation of those bottles had
been had at La Tondeña’s instance or, more importantly, that the bottles had
been turned over to La Tondeña, and without requiring the police officers
concerned to give evidence of the facts surrounding the seizure of those
bottles.
It being presumed that “official duty has been regularly
performed” and “the law has been obeyed,”[39]
the act of seizure of the police officers cannot initially be deemed unlawful
upon its face, in the absence of evidence of the circumstances under which they
effected the seizure. Indeed, since
regularity may be assumed in the act of the police officers in question, it may
not unreasonably be supposed that they acted in virtue of a search warrant or
some order of a competent Court — a court other than respondent Judge’s, which
would consequently have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the Court a quo,
to release the bottles. Prudence thus
dictated that the respondent Judge, at the very least, require evidence on this
matter: as to why seizure was made and
whether or not, the bottles had been surrendered to La Tondeña — so that it
could be ordered to return them to Tee Chin Ho. But this the respondent Judge did not do. Without knowing if jurisdiction over the
bottles seized by the Manila Police was in another court, without requiring the
officers concerned to appear and shed light on the issue, without knowing if
the bottles were indeed in possession of La Tondeña, she required La Tondeña to
restore possession thereof to Tee Chin Ho. In doing so, Her Honor acted quite imprudently, recklessly,
capriciously, oppressively.
V
Finally, it would appear that respondent Judge, in resolving an
application for a provisional remedy, in the process already disposed of the
case on the merits. The basic issue in
the action at bar is whether or not La Tondeña has a right of action to prevent
the use by Tee Chin Ho (or as he was mistakenly named in the complaint: Te Tien
Ho) of the bottles especially manufactured for it pursuant to its
specifications. This issue was resolved
by respondent Judge in her challenged Order of April 7, 1989 in the following
manner:
” ** even under Republic Act 623, as amended by Republic Act
5700, the fact that the law provides that the sale of the bottled products does
not ipso jure carry with it the sale of the bottle, yet the same law negates
any right of action of plaintiff manufacturer and seller to recover the empty
bottles from ‘any person to whom the registered manufacturer . . . seller has
transferred . . . any of the containers (Section 5) and, moreover, the statute
expressly exempts from its coverage the use of bottles as containers for
‘sisi’, ‘bagoong’,’patis,’ and similar native products’ (Section 6); and that
the due process clause protects intervenor in his right to earn his livelihood
through engagement in his junk shop business (Quisumbing and Fernando,
Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 80).
“It is of public knowledge that when a person purchases a
drink, whatever it may be, the buyer is required to deposit an amount for the
bottles and if the empty bottles, after consuming its contents, is not
returned, then the buyer is answerable for the empty bottle, thereby converting the transaction to one of
a sale to include the bottle thereof and the seller would not and shall not be
permitted to complain and recover the said bottles until and unless the
corresponding deposit is returned to the buyer in exchange of the bottle.”
Such a ruling having been handed down,
what else, it may be asked, would still have to be resolved at the trial, and
stated in its final judgment, as regards the merits of the action?
Said ruling, moreover, does not seem to be correct, being in
conflict with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 623, which reads:[40]
“SEC. 3. The use by
any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller, without
written permission of the latter of any such bottle, cask, barrel, keg, box,
steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators,
or other similar containers, or the
possession thereof without any written permission of the manufacturer, by any
junk dealer or dealer in casks, barrels, kegs, boxes, steel
cylinders, tanks, flask 3, accumulators,
or other similar containers, the same being duly marked or stamped and
registered as herein provided, shall
give rise to a prima facie presumption that such use or possession is unlawful.”
Since Tee Chin Ho never denied being a junk dealer — indeed, his
registered business name describes him as one such[41]
— or that he did not have La Tondeña’s written permission to possess the
bottles in question, a correct application of the law called for invoking the
presumption created by the confluence of these twin circumstances to deny said
respondent any right to the possession or use of the bottles, instead of
ordering their return to him, howsoever provisionally. And lacking any showing that La Tondeña
conveyed the bottles, sans contents, to Tee Chin Ho, or that the latter is a
bottler of “sisi,” “bagoong,” or similar products,
no argument can be made for extending to him the exemptive provisions of
Sections 5 and 6 of the same Act cited in the questioned Order of the Regional
Trial Court.
VI
All the foregoing considered; the Court is satisfied that the
grave errors ascribed to the Regional Trial Court were in fact committed; and
that it was quite wrong for the Court of Appeals to have failed to declare
those errors as constituting grave abuse of discretion, and to have upheld the
Order assailed in these proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
complained of is REVERSED. The Order of
April 7, 1989 of the RegionalTrial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 89-47768
and the Writ of Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction of April 11, 1989 issued
pursuant thereto are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The status quo obtaining prior to the issuance of said Order and
Writ is ORDERED RESTORED, and the proceedings in said case shall continue as if
they had never been issued. Costs
against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 33-38. The
complaint was verified by two Product Investigation Officers of plaintiff La
Tondeña.
[2]
“An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes,
Casks, Kegs, Barrels and other Similar Containers”
[3]
By R.A. 5700
[4]
Not No. 1005, as alleged in the
verified complaint
[5]
Rollo, pp. 70, 76: Annex 6 of Tee Chin Ho’s Answer-in-intervention in Civil Case No.
89-47768, being apparently a copy of Exhibit 5, submitted by said Tee Chin Ho
at the hearing on his application for injunction in said Civil Case No.
89-47768
[6]
Evidently one of the two (2) affiants who later verified La Tondena’s
complaint, signing as Alex Elleve, the other being Felipe Empeynado
[7]
N.B. Tee Chin Ho signed the sheriff’s receipt as witness and
“defendant” although the receipt recites that the bottles were seized
from “TE TIEN HO located at 1105 Estrada St., Singalong, Manila.”
[8]
It is La Tondeña’s position that Te Tien Ho and Tee Chin Ho are one and the
same person.
[9]
Rollo, p. 77
[10]
SEC. 6, Rule 60: “Disposition
of property by officer.–If within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the officer, the defendant does not object to the sufficiency of
the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the
property as provided in the last preceding section [by filing a counter-bond
“in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff’s
affidavit”], * * * the property shall be delivered to the plaintiff. * * *.”
[11]
Rollo, pp. 54-64, with Annexes 1 to 6, inclusive
[12]
“Annex 6″ is the receipt executed by Sheriff Ruefa: SEE footnotes 5 to 7, supra
[13]
Italics supplied
[14]
SEE footnote 5 and related text, supra
[15]
SEE footnote 8, supra
[16]
Rollo, p. 71
[17]
Id., p. 85
[18]
Id., pp. 72-75
[19]
SEC. 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides that “A party may amend his pleading once as a matter
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served * *.”
[20]
Par. 3 (n), petition in C.A., Rollo,
p. 98: an allegation never denied
[21]
Par. 3 (o), petition in C.A.
[22]
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 17384
[23]
Correctly quoted from p. 117, rollo,
but the correct name is “Regio”
[24]
Rollo, p. 105
[25]
Written for the Eighth Division by
Lombos-de la Fuente, J., Chairman, and concurred in by Herrera and
Santiago, JJ.
[26]
Rollo, pp. 134-140
[27]
Id., pp. 141-157
[28]
Id., p. 32
[29]
Underscoring supplied; see footnote 10,
supra
[30]
Like the plaintiff’s replevin
bond: Sec. 2 (last par.), Rule 60
[31]Chan v. Villanueva, etc., et al.,
April 30, 1952; Case and Nantz v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517; Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc. v. Albert, 60 Phil. 308, cited in Moran, Comments on the
Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 3, p. 129
[32]
SEE Sec. 13, Rule 57 and Sec. 6, Rule
58, Rules of Court, respectively
[33]
SEE Sec. 14, Rule 57 and Sec. 17, Rule
39, respectively
[34]
SEE Ong v. Tating, 149 SCRA 269
[35]
Sheriffs Return, March 3, 1989, Annex B, Petition: Rollo, p. 77 (see footnote 7, supra)
[36]
Emphasis supplied
[37]
Sec. 4, Rule 9, Rules of Court
[38]
SEE Manchester v. C.A., 149 SCRA
562; Taccay v. RTC, 180 SCRA 433
[39]
Sec. 2 (m) and (ff), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence, eff. July 1,1989
[40]
Italics supplied
[41]
Rollo, pp. 66-67: Annexes 2 and
3 of respondent’s Answer